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In the existing academic literature on “genocide” there is an emphasis on 
moralistic arguments toward public acceptance of using the term genocide popularly in 
relation to specific events. This practice is unaccompanied by a recognition that the 
created genocide discourse is the product of a biased process, and that it is empowered to 
affect international law without being legally sanctioned to do so. Since the currently 
available scholarly information on “genocide” is grounded in self-assured presentations 
that the works of the genocide scholarship are social-scientific and reflective of the 
conscience of humanity, there is a lack of significant knowledge regarding the political 
use of the term genocide in the governing of global affairs. By employing a power-based 
theory, this study offers an interpretive analysis of available historical data to understand 
how “genocide” has been used as a tool for the advancement of international law. It 
shows that the term genocide has functioned as soft power through which hard power has 
been particularized toward legal power. Meaning, “genocide” has been used to bring 
governance closer to international law by appealing to group identity. Such a view of a 
dialectical progress identifies the power of “genocide” in the context of international law 
and invites new considerations of how the idea of international law may yet attain the 
















I Am the Lord Thy God. Why were the Ten Commandments not said at the beginning of 
the Torah? They give a parable. To what may this be compared? To the following: A 
king who entered a province said to the people: May I be your king? But the people said 
to him: Have you done anything good for us that you should rule over us? What did he do 
then? He built the city wall for them, he brought in the water supply for them, and he 
fought their battles. Then when he said to them: May I be your king? They said to him: 
Yes, yes. Likewise, God. He brought the Israelites out of Egypt, divided the sea for them, 
sent down the manna for them, brought up the well for them, brought the quails for them. 
He fought for them the battle with Amalek. Then He said to them: I am to be your king. 
And they said to Him: Yes, yes. 
 
—Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael 
 
Extravagant claims as to the role which the American Government has had in relation to 
the development of international law are to be avoided. 
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God revealed great power before giving the divine commandments to the 
Israelites, and the story of God’s relationship with the Israelites precedes the listing of the 
commandments. According to the ancient rabbinic interpretation in Mekhilta De-Rabbi 
Ishmael, the giving of the commandments was preceded by a demonstration of God’s 
power so that the people may know to accept God’s authority as a lawgiver. The 
knowledge by the law recipient that the lawgiver has great power is seen as significant in 
the process of accepting the law. Furthermore, it was suggested that a willing acceptance 
of rule is advanced by the quality of guardianship that is associated with the exhibition of 
great power. Meaning, authority becomes legitimate when the law recipient witnesses 
how that authority’s power sustains the existence of the society. In this story, the 
spectacular ways in which God displayed an ability to nourish the people were 
foundational in their transition into a united society under God’s law.  
 The story of international law is a different one. As reflected in the statement by 
Robert R. Wilson, a legal expert who was involved in the American endeavor to construct 
law among nation-states, the American preference was to discourage public opinion from 
imagining the United States government as the authority behind international law. The 





persuasiveness of it as a concept. This meant that instead of highlighting an authority that 
presents the law directly to the intended law recipients as in the biblical story, in the case 
of international law it has been preferred that power would only be used indirectly to 
cause the intended law recipients to believe that the law itself is needed for order in the 
international society. Thus, international law was not to be seen as given from above, but 
as constructed by the necessity to improve the conditions of international relations. 
Unlike the law-giving process in the biblical story, in international law there is no notion 
of a lawgiver’s transcendence in relation to the law recipients. Moreover, international 
law was not simply given as was the divine law in the narrative, but is still under 
construction. Since international law is situated differently, the authority over it has been 
kept out of clear sight and the production of it has not been instantaneous.    
 However, the juxtaposition of the divine law and international law shows that the 
two have a basic point of commonality, which is that the acceptance of law is preceded 
by the processing of information toward that effect. Put differently, the legal content is 
preceded by a story. In the case of the divine law, the acceptance of the law was based on 
knowledge that connects between God’s power and the commandments, be it through 
experience as the biblical narrative suggests or through instruction about the claimed 
experience in the form of a narration. Similarly, for international law to be accepted, first 
there had to be knowledge that would direct minds into considering the idea of the law as 
being in accord with accepted standards of behavior. While the knowledge on the divine 
law professes that the acceptance of the law is reasoned by the authority of the lawgiver, 
the knowledge on international law has sought to find acceptance that is reasoned by the 





the law would be accepted.   
 This study is designed to focus on power as a way of showing how the term 
genocide has been used to promote the acceptance of a criminal code in international law. 
It considers “genocide” as a tool for the inducement of a favorable reaction to the idea 
that international law ought to include rules of conduct regarding the internal affairs of 
nation-states as part of an effort to regulate the standards of governance around the world. 
“Genocide” is here examined as a phenomenon that has political utility because of its 
quality as a carrier of information regarding the governance of global affairs through 
international criminal law. Unlike that information, in which “genocide” is used to label 
certain events as particularly evil, this work concentrates on “genocide” as a tool for the 
construction of law. Hence, the following question presents the main inquiry of this work 
from a power-based approach: What has been the function of “genocide” within the 
progression of international law?       
 Guided by such a question, this dissertation has academic significance that is 
readily observable because the existing literature on “genocide” in academia is typically 
devoted to generating information about it as an occurrence rather than consider the 
purpose it serves as a term in international law. The contribution that this study may offer 
the current academic research on “genocide” is not from within genocide studies but from 
a perspective that is foreign to it. By distinguishing itself from the genocide scholarship, 
this work is able to study the existing literature as part of the phenomenon. The 
information that is created through the genocide scholarship is seen as part of the power 
to affect public opinion on international law through the term genocide. In line with a 





authority behind it, the genocide scholarship is characterized by a moralistic approach 
that spreads the sense among the public that genocide is rampant and that international 
criminal law is necessary. This work’s power-based approach presents a view of the 
genocide scholarship as moralism in the guise of science that is in the service of power. 
By applying Joseph Nye’s theory of power to the use of the term genocide, this study is 
able to identify the dominant “genocide” usage as a manifestation of soft power.    
 Therefore, the main argument of this dissertation is that “genocide” is a tool of 
soft power that has a nuanced role in the dialectical progress of international law. Nye’s 
distinction between hard power and soft power is here developed in order to articulate the 
function of “genocide” in international law. The term legal power is offered in this work 
as descriptive of the ability that law has to regulate behavior as legitimate authority, 
which means that the exercise of control is regularly recognized as acceptable by all who 
are involved.1 Legal power represents the synthesis of authority and legitimacy, and the 
understanding of it contextualizes the function of “genocide” as a moment in the 
dialectical movement of international law.2 In this context, “genocide” is seen as having 
been used to establish legitimacy for international law and is reflective of the antithetical 
                                                          
1 Over a century ago, the term legal power was emphasized in a work of legal scholarship as “the opposite 
of legal disability, and the correlative of legal liability.” See: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” Yale Law Journal 23, no. 1 (November 
1913): 44. “Legal power” was used by Hohfeld within an effort to enhance the precision of the language on 
the rights of individuals. See: Ibid., 30. Unlike the usage of the term in his work, this dissertation presents 
“legal power” as descriptive of a heightened form of power from the standpoint of governance.   
 
2 In a famous work, law was identified as the ultimate destination in “the progress of civilization” as it 
moves “from force to diplomacy” and then “from diplomacy to law.” See: Louis Henkin, How Nations 
Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 1. Henkin’s 
sense of a progression in international relations toward law is developed in this dissertation through a 
power-based focus, which explores group identity in a manner that does not take for granted the meaning of 
groups as nations. As this dissertation sets out to show, the current terminology on power enables a 
conceptualization that articulates the process differently, and inspires a consideration that this progression 






capacity of soft power in relation to hard power. Ultimately, for legal power to be 
attained, the negation of hard power by soft power must give way to the heightened state 
of authority, which is the legitimate authority that is known as law. Within this 
terminology, the place of “genocide” may be located in relation to the promotion of 
international law and the practice of it. This power-based theoretical premise guides the 
dissertation’s interpretive analysis of the relevant historical data. History is here 




Power is the essence of politics for it pertains to the ability to govern affairs. This 
work considers the definitions of power and the development of it as a concept in 
political science. It is instructive to introduce the exploration of power through its 
etymological premise. The word power is rooted in the Latin word posse, which in 
relation to the English noun potency suggests an emphasis on an ability to have an effect. 
In German, the word macht is used to describe power, which indicates a relation to the 
German verb machen and the English verb to make. In other words, discussions of power 
in German have a mental focus on making something happen whereas in English the 
focus is on the potential of it. While in German the meaning evokes actualized properties 
as the starting point of the conversation about power, in English the word can be much 
more abstract because of its orientation to point at the capability to influence. If put in 
simple terms, then it is seen that one concept of power involves a consideration of what 





former includes the possibility of indirect power; the latter is a communication about 
direct power. 
The etymological distinction reflects the clash between the American and German 
philosophies of power as derived from the American and German conflict of interests in 
the late nineteenth century. Their power struggle is held by this dissertation to be the 
main force of history that defined the particularization of power through international 
law. In the 1870s, both were primed for power growth following their nearly 
simultaneous campaigns of unifying critical territories under a central government. The 
difference in the philosophies of power was largely shaped by the arena of competition 
between them—Europe—and their relation to it. As the United States secured its 
dominion in America, its potential to have an effect on the governance of other regions 
increased. As Germany displayed its might in the defeat of France, it began to make 
Europe come under its governance. The United States enhanced its potential to affect 
Europe and the rest of the world; Germany was making Europe German. Had it remained 
unopposed by a united effort against it, Germany would have stayed on course to govern 
the affairs of Europe and expand its sphere of influence to the colonial outposts of other 
great powers.  
To prevent Germany’s domination of the continent, a balance of power had to be 
struck and sustained. While the containment of Germany necessitated the use of power to 
motivate Europeans to mind its growth and oppose it, the growth of German power 
required the making of Europe into one centrally governed entity without opposition. In 
Germany, the language about power directed minds toward a realization that Europeans 





the battlefield long before World War I (WWI) began. It was in Germany’s interest to 
promote the worship of human power under which old European identities could fade 
into a unified blend, but those who wanted to stop Germany were motivated to use their 
power to stress the existence of non-German group identities in Europe. Germany was 
inclined to unite Europe under its power, and the United States was inclined to divide 
Europe by empowering group identities before uniting them under international rather 
than German law. To this day, the American way of power is better characterized by the 
orchestration of international norms than by the assumption of authority, even when law 
requires the accountability that comes with clear and direct authority.     
Aside from the interest of keeping Europe free from the dominance of one 
government, the American way of power took shape by two political ingenuities that 
were unique to the development of the United States. One is libertarianism. The 
generations that established the basis of the American political system reflected a largely 
shared belief among the colonists: a disdain for an intrusive government of the kind that 
they experienced in the Old World. Thus, since its formative years, American political 
leadership had to master the skill of achieving order while respecting the sense of 
personal freedom among members of the public. This necessity rewarded the leadership’s 
ability to exert indirect influence on its people. To respect the wishes of the people while 
maintaining an orderly society, the American political leadership had to devise ways to 
mobilize the population without it seeming like direct acts of government. Such political 
practice meant that the idea of democracy—rule by the people—became an American 
political commodity, and the ability to affect what people think without the appearance of 





The other ingenious characteristic of American political power is 
constitutionalism. Its novelty lies in the idea of metalaw: rules about ruling. This does not 
only promote effective and less abusive governance by grounding a government in the 
people’s permanent expectations of rule quality, but it also introduces a distinction 
between different sensibilities: governing laws and laws of governance. While governing 
laws may follow different cultural traits in different cultural environments, laws of 
governance offer a generic formula that can have a favorable impact on politics 
worldwide. In other words, the rule of law’s promise of checks and balances has a civic 
applicability that goes beyond the culturally bound laws of the land, which are reliant on 
local societal guidelines. The rule of law gives governance a civic character that offers a 
broader common denominator than an ethnic one. The supreme status of rule of law in 
lawmaking has the capacity to develop internationalism—or anationalism—in the 
governing of affairs. Hence, even before German power prompted American activity 
toward international law, these two characteristics—libertarianism and 
constitutionalism—were already ingrained in the American political vision and equipped 
the brain trust of governance in the United States with an exceptional power path. One 
offers an explanation of the American adeptness at soft power; the other carries the 
essence of the American potential to inspire global governance. 
Germany’s philosophy of power at the time is articulated in Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
collection of writings from the 1880s, The Will to Power. He promoted the admiration of 
power as a replacement to the old values, which to him were simply “designed to 
maintain and increase human constructs of domination.”3 In Nietzsche’s view, morality is 
                                                          
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, ed. Walter 





the weapon of the oppressed against their oppressors: the “will to power” is despised 
because the contempt for it gives those who do not have power a sense of “higher rank.”4 
Accordingly, Nietzsche declared that if one were to internalize “that life itself is the will 
to power,” then “There is nothing to life that has value except the degree of power.”5 
Moreover, Nietzsche claimed that “Christianity is a herd religion” and “Christians are 
easier to rule than non-Christians.”6 He invited his readers to “combat” Christianity 
because “it wants to break the strong,”7 but in effect he was encouraging the dismissal of 
the distinct group identities that were intertwined with the long history of rivaling 
Christian traditions in Europe. Meaning, a power-based analysis of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of power suggests that by philosophizing the abandonment of Christian 
values, Nietzsche was promoting an ideology that advanced the prospects of German rule 
in Europe because it devaluated the religious group identities that distinguished 
Europeans such as the French and the Poles from the Germans.  
The impact of group identity on governance is at the heart of the philosophical 
split between the American way of power and the German way of power during that 
historical juncture. For this reason, the power struggle between the Americans and the 
Germans is seen as the historiographical premise upon which the modern-day character 
of political power in world governance is to be understood. German power sought to 
marginalize the religious-based group identity of Europeans, but American power was 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 36-37. 
  
5 Ibid., 37. 
 
6 Ibid., 127. 
 






employed to strengthen the relationship between group identities and self-rule within an 
international system of law. Hence, this study shows that while Nietzsche conveyed that 
“Bismarck realizes that Protestantism simply doesn’t exist any more,”8 American 
missionaries utilized Protestantism to direct the Christians of the Ottoman Empire toward 
national beliefs and political organizations that were based on the grain of a separate 
religious group identity. 
Nietzsche’s association of power with the identity of race rather than religion 
seems to have had much to do with the power consideration that the latter represented old 
divisions in Europe whereas the former represented a new unifying concept for most 
Europeans. In line with the rise of German power following its military triumphs, he 
stated that “the possibility has been established for the production of international racial 
unions whose task will be to rear a master race, the future ‘masters of the earth’,”9 which 
according to its vision of unprecedented political union would guide Europe toward the 
belief in a racial common denominator. The glorification of power is announced by 
Nietzsche in a straightforward manner: “Not ‘mankind’ but overman is the goal.”10 In 
Germany, power was boasted and the appeal of strength was used to persuade people into 
accepting the German-based government throughout Europe. In contrast, German power 
was to be countered by the power to raise national units in Europe and through their 
agency vocalize a moral opposition to German rule. 
In the intensified European environment post-WWI, the German way of power, 
                                                          
8 Ibid., 54. Nietzsche argued that Protestantism represented decadence. See: Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid., 504.  
 






upon its brand of direct authority and racial ideology, challenged the influence of the 
League of Nations, which sought by its very existence to contain German power and 
negate the German interest to govern Europe. The League of Nations was an organization 
that turned the division of Europe by non-German groups into a documented fact in 
Germany’s relations with other governments. In other words, the stifling of Germany’s 
political growth was international law. To rally Europeans to support the defiance of 
Europe’s division into nation-states, there was German incentive to make the argument 
about an all-European racial union more tangible and thereby more compelling. In the 
1930s, the German National Socialist party executed a scheme to attract Germans and 
other Europeans to its power by using law against the symbol of the “other” in the 
Europeans’ midst: the Jewish people. Germany began to use domestic law to counter the 
international law that was imposed on it through its defeat in WWI, and presented a 
racial-based picture of a unified Europe under German rule as an alternative to the post-
WWI status quo that was based on the legal sanctioning of identity groups into nation-
states. Thus, the German way of power forced itself on certain groups in Europe. In 
World War II (WWII), the Nazi German policy of group-based extermination resulted in 
the travesty that is commonly known as the Holocaust, in which Jews, along with others 
who were deemed unfitting for the progeny of a “master race” such as the Gypsies, the 
handicapped, and the homosexuals were removed from society and deliberately 
exterminated. Eventually, the German way of power ended with defeat in the two world 
wars, which—as their titles suggest—were about the direction of world governance. 
Ultimately, the American way of power prevailed.   





power intended to stop German power through international law. It was the ultimate 
defense of the identity groups that could be the basis for a publicized and consensus-
building moral opposition to imperial growth. One innovation of the term genocide was 
that it featured the national group in addition to other types of group identity that had 
already been considered as indicators of a minority group in the post-WWI language of 
international law. Specifically, the protection of the national group established a legal 
argument against Germany’s annexation of internationally recognized nation-states 
during WWII. The association of “genocide” with the Holocaust has suggested that the 
purpose of the term is to defend certain groups from the state, but the initial design of 
“genocide” was also, if not mainly, to protect nation-states from more powerful 
governments.  
As the international community later clarified in the post-WWII treaty that is 
known as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention), there was wide support for the idea that existing nation-states 
would be protected by international law. The national groups, which were subject for 
protection, are related to members of existing nation-states, and are not to be confused 
with political groups that challenge the sovereignty of an existing state from within it in 
the name of a separate national aspiration. However, since the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention, the gradual realization of the magnitude of the Holocaust swallowed up the 
memory of the national emphasis in the origination of “genocide” as a crime and the 
distinction therein between the protection of the nation-state and the facilitation of 
national-based rebellion. This study finds that the tremendous shock value of the 





memory of an event. By using the memory of the Holocaust in this way, the discourse on 
crime in international law was able to suggest a moral foundation for the law while 
disregarding the connection between the advent of “genocide” and the power 
considerations that led to it.  
 
International Law 
 Before there could be international law, there had to be that which is “national.” 
In the nineteenth century, the world did not have nearly two hundred recognized or even 
self-recognized nation-states. This change in the governance of world affairs had a 
confining effect on the designs of German power to centralize the governance of Europe, 
or on the aspiration of any government to achieve global dominance through direct rule. 
The German way of adjusting the identity of people to match the power that governs 
them was resisted by the American advent of power that adjusts governance according to 
existing identities. To achieve a Europe that was balanced in power between governing 
entities, power was invested in persuading groups that their collective identities had a 
political meaning. This entailed highlighting whatever it was about their identity as a 
group that made them unique, or more specifically not amenable to German or other 
governance that would be considered foreign to their identity, as well as motivating them 
to believe that the survival of their group identity was important and would be best 
advanced by organizing toward self-rule. From this perspective, nationalism is seen as the 
sentiment that a certain group identity is connected to an expectation that the group ought 
to be governing itself. For many around the world, this connection did not preexist 





 In a manner, the prevalence of nationalism functioned as an antidote to German 
power. The German drive to govern Europe was impeded by the long history of wars and 
division whose memory was informed by traditional identities. As Nietzsche’s text 
indicates, power and race were constructed to have a combined meaning that would 
attract people into accepting a central government in Europe, and lead people away from 
the old identities that separated Europeans. To prevent a Europe that was to be united by 
an ideology of race and governed by German power, it was advantageous to nourish 
cultural differences among Europeans, and crystallize them in the form of nation-states. 
For German rule to be denied, other people had to care about ruling themselves. 
Meaning, Germany’s power rival benefited from the creation of nation-states. From this 
view, if these group identities did not exist then they may have had to be invented. It is 
shown here that American power was involved in leading groups to reimagine their 
identity toward political organization.  
Nationalism presented an emphasis on group identities that meant a rejection of 
German rule. Germany was morally restricted by the other great powers’ promotion of a 
discourse that called for group identities to be respected politically. The sovereignty of 
nation-states was the ground rule in the law among nations. A symbiotic relationship then 
formed between certain group identities and international law: once a group identity 
became the basis for an active nation-state, then its participation in, and protection by, 
international law placed the group identity and international law in a situation of mutual 
perpetuation. Hence, international law’s existence depended on the existence of nation-
states, and vice versa. It created an environment of no dominant European government. 





was international law arranged to treat nation-states as individual units that were expected 
to keep what was recognized as theirs. International law meant that nation-states would 
be treated as rightful owners of territory, and the government that disregards the 
ownership would be considered a culprit in the international society.  
 Another prerequisite for international law was to establish the “inter” component 
of it, which means the ability to establish a dialogue between these nation-states. For 
international law to be set in motion, there had to be both division between units and 
cohesion among them. Identity groups had to be distinct enough to insist on existing 
politically as separate units, but as separate units they had also to exist on a level of inter-
unit unity to have a moral discussion as the basis for a law. While the “national” 
prerequisite of international law was advanced by the promotion of unique cultural traits 
such as those involving language and relationship to land, the “inter” part of international 
law was to be achieved by a more general cultural affinity that was shared by the units, 
and this feeling of kinship was made to seem natural by presenting Christianity as having 
a civilizational quality. The same religion that Nietzsche described as antiquated was 
elsewhere empowered into providing the moral fiber and societal glue for a body of rules 
among nations.   
 Since the “inter” in international law assumed that the language of interaction 
between nation-states was to be based on Christian heritage, governments that were 
unaffiliated with Christianity, such as those of the Ottoman and Qing empires that ruled 
over vast territories, could not take part in the conversation without undergoing complex 
processes of Christianization in the civilizational sense. Their initial exclusion from the 





Yellow Terror, and their eventual inclusion was preconditioned by their acculturation. 
They were not described as merely different and of a right to have their own civilizational 
input on governance, but initially depicted as if they were dangerous and disinclined to 
meet the standards of the Euro-Christian civilization. The adoption of Euro-Christian 
patterns of conduct in governance was not achieved through a natural transition for these 
non-Christian governments, but through conflict and violence. To be protected by 
international law, a government had to be a member in the Euro-Christian civilization’s 
society. 
 Here lies the contradiction within international law: the soft-power commitment 
to show it as a beacon of morality unto the nations has been based on a civilizational 
discrimination that does not allow for legal power to be reflected. There is a blindness 
regarding the phenomenon of international law that has been preventing its dispensation 
of justice from being blind. The denial of the power element in the progression of 
international law is rooted in both the historical conditions in which international law was 
conceived and the inherent agenda to legitimize it. Specifically, international law carved 
its moral space in light of Germany’s brandishing of power, and as an alternative to the 
German authoritative style. Generally, international law—as law—must persuade public 
opinion about its moral soundness. For both historical and jurisprudential reasons, the 
authority behind international law has been concealed from the time of its conception, 
and the power that has been used by this authority to advance international law is 
concealed by moral claims. Morality did not just cover up power; it was what this brand 
of power produced. This moral language described the German government as forceful 





on the history of international law and international relations omits from the discourse 
knowledge of the power that was used against these governments and consists of moral 
arguments against them. This in itself is a use of power—soft power—that caters to, and 
feeds on, bias that is in disharmony with legal power.   
 Thus, the final and still ongoing effort of international law has been to bring these 
national units into fully absorbing the idea of “law” among them. Persuading the vast 
majority of people is not the same as a legally sound execution. The current language on 
international criminal law might be able to convince most of the world’s public opinion 
of certain accusations and still be abusive of law. While judgments of law are expected to 
maintain a harmonious relationship with the public opinion of the international society in 
which they are issued, the rule of law demands that these judgments of law would not 
lead public opinion in service of the law’s source of political power. That is why a 
separation of powers is crucial for governance, and that is why in order for there to be a 
separation of powers in protection of international law’s legal power, the political power 
behind it has to be identified. However, this study’s inquiry does not assume that the 
continued moralistic narration of history and current events as an effective disguise of 
power is not preferred by the source of power over an arrival at a fully fledged 
international law. It might be discovered that the American way of power in international 
affairs is not to have international law reach legal power but to maintain international law 
as a platform for soft power.  
 The use of the term genocide epitomizes this power to affect international affairs 
through a convincing moralistic language. In the disseminated narration of the Armenian 





without ever being applied as an accusation against the Ottoman government in a court of 
law. This genocide accusation has manifested a greater interest in the bond between 
narrative and public opinion than that between procedure and law. The Turkophobic 
narration that was popularized during the American conflict with German power, and as 
part of the project of springing up Christian nation-states from within the Ottoman 
territory, has been maintained and even presented as evidence in the current genocide 
discourse. As a relic of past prejudice, the act of placing the ultimate label of criminality 
on the Turkish collective head is found to be believable by most in Western society 
nowadays just as it was readily accepted as true by the public of the Allied Powers during 
WWI. The vilification of the Turk as an Ottoman ruler effectively inspired support for 
international law against German interests because of the Turk’s otherness in Euro-
Christian eyes, and the remaining negativity in the image of the Turk enlivens the 
accusation of genocide that enables a culture of discussing a matter of international law 
without having to enter a courtroom. In addition, China—another “other” in Euro-
Christian terms—has been popularly portrayed as the sponsor of genocide in Sudan 
through nonlegal sources of information.  
As such, the “genocide” usage is here found to be located between the legal and 
the popular. “Genocide” has been utilized for the popularization of the legal. It has 
promoted a discourse of international law but has also facilitated the usurpation of legal 
procedure. If the persuasion of public opinion about history and current world affairs—
rather than the regulation of orderly governance worldwide—is the goal of American 
power, then a court decision about genocide can be a mere formality when the public is 





television shows, that an event was or is genocide. Once the public consumes this 
information and adopts the label of “genocide” as part of its own use of language, it then 
becomes unlikely and unexpected that a court judge would go against this expression of 
public opinion. The effect of the popular discourse on “genocide” has been to invite a 
debate on international criminal law that is entrenched in group identity, and within 
which the concept of reaching a civic identity among nation-states through law remains 
undeveloped.  
Through tracking the development of international criminal law, it is observed 
that there is a subtle difference between why law is necessary for a society and how the 
society becomes convinced that law is necessary. Although law starts with an authority 
that has an interest in regulating the conduct of a society, it does not mean that the benefit 
of law is limited to whatever reason the authority had for wanting it established. Law has 
a proven ability to mold a society and free members of a given environment from the 
paralyzing shackles of fearing each other. The interest for the authority might be in 
fulfilling the law’s power to define a society and its units, but, once defined, these units 
are enabled by law to function cooperatively for the enhancement of what the societal 
existence may offer the lives of its members. Greater safety from threat is a basic quality 
of what law may provide units of a society.  
In international law, the units are comprised of nation-states but also of the people 
who populate these states, and if the same power holder that introduced international law 
is better positioned than the government of a nation-state to affect the collective opinion 
of that nation-state’s own population, then public opinion becomes a source of tension in 





through law at the expense of other governments cannot have legal power. It remains 
effective soft power as long as public opinion is convinced that certain information 
reflects the public’s own moral position rather than the power to narrate its beliefs. While 
the public might follow the dictates of soft power on international criminal law, 
governments might balk at the popular usage of legal labels such as “genocide” to 
solidify soft-power projects against them in accordance with the interests of a 
government with which they are supposed to share an equality before the law. This kind 
of disparity could be greater than those concerning biases regarding class, gender, race, or 
religion, in domestic law. It would prove to be more debilitating than the domestic 
aspects of inequality when the disbelief of governments in the system of international law 
is higher than that of the average citizen of a state, especially with the lack of regulated 
enforcement.  
Therefore, as a tool of soft power, “genocide” has a way of pushing humanity 
forward toward international law yet pulling international law away from legal viability. 
The popular narrations of “genocide” successfully build up an acceptance of international 
criminal law in public opinion, but governments might be wary that the power behind 
international law is the same power that is behind the information that claims to be the 
moral voice of these governments’ own people. It would then be within reason for 
governments to become convinced that their security as such is not reliably protected by 
this system of law. The state of international law is that the public at large has become 
increasingly receptive to the moral discourse whereas governments in general have 
become exceedingly skeptical that international law generates enough accountability for 





The treatment of the Holocaust’s memory and meaning by the genocide discourse 
was a foundational part of the attempt to show international law as aligned with morality 
rather than power. By harnessing the moral consensus on the Nazi German policies in 
WWII for the development of knowledge about “genocide” as a crime, the genocide 
scholars have been able to carry themselves as conveyors of humanity’s conscience 
without being seen as cultural agents of power. In this study, the power-based approach 
to international law brings into view a new perspective of the genocide discourse. Here, 
the genocide scholarship is not assumed to be an outgrowth of morality but rather it is 
interpreted as a construct of power consideration and power particularization. 
 
Meeting “Genocide” 
I had my first substantial encounter with the genocide discourse through its 
treatment of the Holocaust. Although my research had not been conducted within the 
field of Holocaust studies, my upbringing in Israel involved a heavy consciousness of the 
event, and, later, my academic focus on Jewish thought included an engagement with the 
theological meaning of the Holocaust. My initial reaction to the existing efforts to liken 
the Ottoman Armenian experience to the Holocaust in genocidal terms was an impression 
that they were based on weak arguments and could easily be criticized. There was a 
dearth of critiques in this context, and it gave me reason to believe that I could fill a 
vacuum in the academic space. Hence, my first contribution to the academic literature on 
“genocide” was a critical endeavor. Being trained in philosophical discourse to give voice 
to a missing perspective through conceptualization, I was inclined to illuminate the 





the creation of the term genovive.11  
“Genovive” instructs that when a nation sets out to protect its existence as a 
sovereign, its intent is not to destroy in the genocidal sense. The emphasis of “genovive” 
is on the intent to survive as a group rather than to destroy one. When there is a total war 
against a nation-state, and a group from within its own territory acts toward the state’s 
destruction, either independently or under the sponsorship of foreign power, then 
whatever the leaders of that state decide to do in support of the state in the face of a direct 
threat to its existence can be said to be ill-advised, harsh, and perhaps criminal in some 
way that corresponds with existing international law, but it cannot be seen as genocidal in 
its legal meaning. Survival in this instance is a construction that is based on an 
assumption of national existence, but it nonetheless presents a lucid conceptual break 
from the realm of “genocide” in intergroup violence.  
It may be argued that the claim of “genovive” allows state leaders to avoid the 
guilt of “genocide” by feigning the perception of a threat against the state, but the 
determination of whether a threat was substantive or not is part of what international 
court procedures are expected to produce. “Genovive” offers a guide for the perplexed on 
how to distinguish one intent from another. The notion that in WWI the Turks were 
defending the Ottoman government as their nation-state requires a nuanced analysis, but 
at any rate the commitment of the Turkish leadership to defend that state from attacks on 
its borders and from inside it is significantly different from the expansionist aim of the 
Nazi Germany. The Ottoman state was under threat of conquest; the Nazis conquered. 
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Many Armenians were perceived as a wartime threat due to their leadership’s 
commitment to a political agenda in cooperation with the war efforts of the Entente on 
Ottoman land against the Ottoman government; the Jews were persecuted in Nazi-
occupied areas. While the Armenian leadership cooperated with those who sought to 
destroy the Ottoman state, the Jewish victims were designated for destruction as part of 
the Nazi ambition to expand the German state through the concept of European racial 
unity.   
However, when the term genocide itself became the centerpiece of my research as 
a scholar of the Turkish Studies Project at the University of Utah, the persistence of the 
feeble comparisons between the Holocaust and the Ottoman Armenian experience started 
to appear as an oddity: if the arguments are so plainly lacking in strength, then why are 
they so prevalent in the scholarly literature? My focus shifted from criticizing the 
discourse to examining why it is designed in this way. I found that the meaning of power 
in the study of politics enabled me to understand my sense that the genocide discourse 
was based on forced information. In retrospect, it occurs to me that my article on 
“genovive” was never going to simply set straight some inaccuracies, but rather it was 
bound to be taken as more material for the thickening of an existing discourse. The 
discourse is what “genocide” does: it attracts minds to absorb the language of 
international law. What gets lost in a debate over the comparability of the Holocaust and 
the Ottoman Armenian experience is that these events were never established as legal 
cases of “genocide” and their popular characterization as “genocide” is not legally 
warranted, but that is immaterial if it turns out that the debate itself is how “genocide” 





was drawn into the world of international law through the question of how the term 
genocide is used.   
Comparing group-based suffering through the narrow framework of “genocide” 
can be misleading for analysts of mass violence, and hurtful for those who are 
emotionally invested in the memory of the events. International law might be promoted 
by the popularization of the term genocide, but it would advance in substantive terms if 
historical events are studied openly and closely in search of exact details without 
prejudice or prior commitment to the genocide label. The demand to genocidize the 
Ottoman Armenian experience has discouraged scholarly knowledge of what happened. 
Similarly, the treatment of the Holocaust as a prototypical genocide has turned scholars 
away from looking into the role of Zionist leaders such as Chaim Weizmann and Ze’ev 
(Vladimir) Jabotinsky, who were empowered to speak against the German government on 
behalf of Jews as a nation.12 What could they have done differently to avoid aggravating 
the situation of German Jews, and other Jews who later came under the control of the 
Nazi government? How does international law protect civilians from being targeted by a 
government in relation to actions taken by leaders of civilians as members of an identity 
group and by those who empower such leaders? What could the German government had 
done amicably and effectively under international law when witnessing the emergence of 
organized identity groups in Europe and sensing that these groups are being mobilized by 
great powers toward limiting the government’s power? In the case of the Ottoman state 
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during WWI, the government was not pursuing an aggressive policy to negate 
encirclement but engaged in a war over its destruction as a state.13 The circumstances in 
which the Ottoman state was destroyed can provide significant information for the 
understanding of crime in international law, and much progress can be made in the 
discourse about relations between governments and their civilians if both the Armenian 
and the Turkish governments become advocates in leading this historical case toward 
greater articulation.      
From my familiarity with both Armenian and Turkish perspectives, which are 
arguably the two most involved national perspectives in the genocide discourse, I have 
become convinced that both international law and the general well-being of Armenians 
and Turks are detrimentally affected by this controversial usage of the term genocide. I 
have been able to complement my research with international travel in relation to the 
issue, and on occasions such as participating in a conference or giving a lecture I 
managed to collect a wealth of knowledge from conversations with those who are 
involved in the debate. My impression is that both sides of this disagreement, along with 
international law, are in a bind because of it. There is the Armenian predicament of 
clutching to “genocide” as an anti-Turkic symbol of collective identity or otherwise risk 
the loss of national fervor. Also, there is the Turkish predicament of being given a 
miserable choice between having to deny a popular “genocide” claim and agreeing to 
genocidize the history of their ancestors against their knowledge of what happened. This 
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work produces knowledge that may convince both Armenians and Turks that it is 
sensible to formulate a way to recognize the profound suffering of the Ottoman 
Armenians without genocidizing the memory of it. Relieving the historical engagement 
from the preconditional stress on the genocide label would create an environment in 
which a culture of detailed study may flourish. Finding a precise way to express what 
happened could be a significant source of advancement for the conversation about crimes 
in international law.   
For the progression of international law, its criminal code cannot acquire legal 
power as long as it is mired in such controversy. The genocide discourse about the 
Armenian victimhood has popularized the idea of international criminal law, but at the 
same time it has called into question the legal accountability of international law. An 
effort to resolve the Armenian-Turkish conflict on how to characterize the Ottoman 
Armenian experience can be a process that inspires the retooling of international criminal 
law toward greater workability. When it comes into view that the Ottoman Armenian past 
was affected by the quest for international law, then it will become symbolic and perhaps 
even inevitable that the future of international law will be affected by the precise 
understanding of the Ottoman Armenian experience. Until then, the label of “genocide” 
in the Armenian case is the symbol of the tension between the popular and legal 
meanings of the term genocide.   
“Genocide” has a popular meaning that is different from its legal meaning, but 
both the popular narrations and the legal definition are functions of power. Its legal 
definition centers on the wording in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, which states 





whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such,” but, as 
considered in this dissertation’s analysis of the term’s usage, its legal applicability is 
conditioned by the wording in other articles of the Genocide Convention. Its popular 
usage is shown here as having been a characteristic of the Cold War period that has 
received an added dimension of influence in the public discourse since scholarly attempts 
to redefine the term genocide have been promoted by the genocide scholarship. Hence, 
“genocide” has a meaning that is documented in an international treaty, and another 
meaning that is molded by the power to dominate information around the world. The 
employment of “genocide” by power presents a choice between soft power and legal 
power, but this choice does not have to be made. There can be popular usages of the soft-
power variety, and a rare application of the term through a procedure of legal power.  
However, the confusion of the popular usage with the legal definition creates 
difficulties for the legal procedure. When one government has an advantage over others 
in the ability to influence public opinion around the world about how and when 
“genocide” is used, it means that the court decisions are likely to reflect that 
government’s preferences on matters that are related to genocide accusations. Even if the 
judges are not conscientious of it, their adjudications administer an indirect inequality 
before the law between nation-states. As long as the popular usage usurps the legal 
design of the term genocide, the legitimacy of international law would be limited to 
persuasion without reaching regulation. To regulate international law, governments must 
be able to trust its system, but when the system is shaped by the bypassing or 
hoodwinking of legal procedure through the ability to affect public opinion then the 





In this dissertation, “genocide” is understood according to its function of power. 
When it is used in the popular sense, it has the power to promote awareness of 
international law, but an adherence to its legal meaning is required for the power to 
actually process international law. As this work shows, the progress of international law 
through modern history is interlaced with the ability to affect public opinion. It is claimed 
here that international law’s arrival at legal power goes through soft power, but also that 
the effectiveness of soft power is not to be confused with legal power. Success in leading 
public opinion to use the term genocide in certain ways does not mean that a rule of law 
is being respected; rather, it means that the law might be manipulated. Soft power thrives 
on the assumption that public opinion is free from control, but legal power demands 
verification that bias does not pass as justice. This is the essence of the contradiction 
between them that makes the progress of international law dialectical: the tension 
between attracting to the law and enacting it. 
 As it considers the relationship between the popular and legal usages of 
“genocide,” this work not only associates “legal” with “power” but also sees the meaning 
of “popular” from a power-based perspective. “Popular” might mean a representation of 
the vast majority of the people, but here it is regarded as a concept that is also subjected 
to the influence of power. By calling attention to soft power in this context of how the 
term genocide is used, it is suggested that the genocide discourse is not simply a pure 
reflection of preexisting common beliefs but rather it is the product of an ability to lead 
the general public to adopt beliefs as if they were common. For instance, one distinction 
is that the reference to “genocide” regarding the Ottoman Armenians is a popular usage 





wording of the Genocide Convention; another distinction is between “popular” in the 
sense that the belief is an authentic communication from people to power and “popular” 
in the sense that the belief is the consequence of the power to convince people of it. Put 
differently, it is not assumed that “popular” claims necessarily surface without the guided 
activity of the power to co-opt opinion effectively. The general public did not hold any 
particular belief about the Armenian experience and the genocide label prior to the 
decades in which influential information has constructed it as a common belief and 
presented the Turkish government as the power that goes against it. Soft power is defined 
by the ability to make an item of knowledge achieve a popular status while making it 
appear like a bottom-up process rather than a top-down one. The references to the 
“popular” genocide discourse throughout this work carry with them an awareness of this 
soft-power achievement, and they most certainly do not mean that the currently popular 
discourse is seen as indicative of a genuine moral consensus about what happened to the 
Ottoman Armenians in 1915. This is why the Ottoman Armenian case is a strong 
example of the tension between soft power and legal power in international law: the 
popular view of what is just, which in this case is a construct of soft power, robs a 
member state of equality before the law, and promotes disorder. 
Since this study presents legal power as the destination of international law, the 
legal definition of genocide, which is stated in the Genocide Convention, is here treated 
as the pivot in the meaning of the term genocide. The distance between soft power and 
legal power becomes measurable through the manifestation of separation between the 
popular usages of “genocide” and its legal definition. By pointing at the gaps between the 





a statement about the current quality of international law. It sees the dominance of the 
popular usages over the legal meaning as a sign that international law suffers from a 
shortage in accountability, and, possibly, that the long road to legal power—rather than 
an arrival at it—is all that is foreseeable at this time.   
 
Methodology 
There is no methodological choice for a dissertation whose theory is power-based, 
and whose subject matter—“genocide”—is an item of knowledge about international law 
that has been dominated by disinformation and misinformation. This study does not 
simply engage in an effort to fill a void in the existing research but to define and redefine 
the existing research. Its challenge is to inquire into the history of the term genocide, and 
present a more convincing story than the one that has been told. Both inquiry and 
presentation are guided by the introduction of power as a prism through which existing 
information may be gazed. Accordingly, the method of the work is best characterized as 
interpretive.  
 In his illuminating work on the foundations of public-administration research, Jay 
D. White highlights inquiry and presentation as the two fundamental standards of the 
interpretive method.14 The inquiry involves the study of “beliefs, meanings, feelings, and 
attitudes of actors in social situations” as phenomena,15 and the presentation “is like good 
storytelling.”16 In accordance with the postpositivist philosophy of science, the 
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interpretive method is considered to be one of three modes that are related to qualitative 
research design in the social sciences.17 White posits that the dominance of the 
explanatory research among the social sciences in comparison to the interpretive and 
critical researches is partly due to “the lack of understanding of the philosophical 
foundations of these modes of research.”18 To White, a causal explanation of behavior 
cannot be formulated without an interpretation of “its nature and the conditions under 
which it might take place.”19 The inventiveness that White considers to be conducive to 
the research of public administration also carries the potential of conceptualizing new 
options for the governing value of international law.  
 Still, it is not expected that those who lead the presentation of the study of politics 
as a social science would support an overall recognition that the interpretive mode of 
research is as equally representative of research in political science as the explanatory 
one. The nature of politics as a subject of study is such that its legitimacy as a social 
science requires persistent attempts at persuasion by its practitioners, and might even 
invite a zealous attitude in defense of its status as a social science. In its explanatory 
mode of qualitative analysis, political science is the art of employing social sciences 
toward the production of information about or toward governance. Since the credibility of 
social sciences allows for the information that political science generates about 
governance to be presented as a product of science rather than power, political scientists 
are expected to maintain such an image for the sake of effectiveness. Without describing 
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their findings as causal, the objectivity of political scientists would become less apparent. 
Yet, interpretivism is constructed by human nuance and does not project an image of 
white coats and laboratories. Therefore, it is common for political scientists who are 
identified as positivists to equate the interpretive method “to history, or even fiction,”20 
while neglecting to recognize that “Knowledge is theoretically or discursively laden” and 
that there is an inherently subjective quality to the academic discourse or tradition within 
which they operate.21 
The literature on methods of research in political science has tended to conflate 
the interpretive approach in the study of International Relations (IR) with 
constructivism.22 However, the works that have been produced in IR as constructivist 
projects have largely ignored the tremendous disparity between the influence of 
American-controlled scholarship and scholarship that is not promoted by American 
power. This insensitivity is detectable in Nicholas Onuf’s foundational work, in which he 
makes the basic claim that “this world” is “of our making,” and that “scholarship is social 
construction.”23 By using the pronoun our so prominently, without indicating that he 
means to refer only to his fellow Americans, Onuf glosses over the inequality among 
nation-states in the ability to produce scholarship that constructs knowledge in the 
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international society. This is emblematic of how American power manages to conceal its 
dominance in the production of globally consumed information in texts that are presented 
as progressive. Onuf declares that “The reconstruction of International Relations requires 
that the discipline be stripped of its current pretensions,”24 but he promotes a new 
pretension about the nature of the relations between nation-states.  
Guided by a focus on how the American control of information has affected 
international law through the use of the term genocide, this dissertation does not embrace 
the constructivist label. In IR, works of constructivism typically divert attention away 
from knowledge that the superiority of American power is a decisive factor in how 
information, be it scholarly or not, has shaped society’s view of the world. IR itself is an 
American product that has had this effect. Constructivist works in IR are commonly 
unaccompanied by the recognition of their function as American soft power. The main 
constructivist argument in IR that the global society is socially constructed has directed 
attention away from the consideration of how international information is affected by 
American power. This study stands opposed to such a discourse. Thus, the interpretivist 
method that is used here in a study of international politics is not associated with the 
mission of constructivism in IR. 
In addition to employing the less popular mode of research among political 
scientists, this study confronts beliefs that are foundational to the research of existing 
fields of study. As a work of international politics, this dissertation is in disagreement 
with the belief that IR theory is a social scientific venture that may be considered as 
removed from American interests. Similarly, as a study of the term genocide, this 
                                                          






dissertation is in tension with the belief that the comparative work of genocide scholars 
would be seen as meeting the criteria of social sciences if not for its empowerment by 
American-controlled information. As part of the attempt to put “genocide” in the 
historical context of international law, this work questions the common historiographical 
practice, which comes from within international law as a field of study, of concealing the 
American roots of international law. The conflict with these existing discourses relates to 
the sense of an American preference to avoid being seen as an authority in matters of 
world affairs. This avoidance reflects an ongoing commitment to indirect influence, and 
this study of “genocide” shows how the progression of legal procedure at a certain point 
of legitimacy requires an authority to establish an accountability regarding the 
information. The clash with existing scholarly information not only requires that this 
work would be interpretive, but might give rise to a misinterpretation by observers that 
this is a methodologically inadequate work of IR, genocide studies, or international law. 
This work is not of these academic fields, but rather it offers an interpretation of their 
roles as sets of information. Due to the focus on the use of the term genocide, the work of 
the genocide scholarship is the feature of the literary review in this dissertation. 
Even though this interpretive study has an interdisciplinary quality, it is first and 
foremost a study of politics. It is conducted in continuation of advanced studies in 
political science, and is informed by the language of political scientists. As a work of 
political science, it studies the use of “genocide” in a manner that contributes to the 
discourse on the relationship between power and governance. Furthermore, it generates 
information that has the capacity to influence international relations and create new 





disciplines of study such as jurisprudence, psychology, and sociology but remains 
dedicated to understanding its subject matter as a political element. This work’s inquiry is 
historiographical, and its presentation is conceptual. Since “genocide” is a post-WWII 
phenomenon, its history crosses paths with the rise of postcolonialism, but the historical 
context of international law precedes WWI and sheds light on the path of colonialism 
during that time.  
In this work, a conceptualization of political power elucidates an approach to 
history, which in turn may inspire further historical research for a greater understanding 
of the work’s claim about international politics. The research of historical material 
involved archival work in surveying the James Bryce collection in Oxford, and the two 
Raphael Lemkin collections in New York. These collections were not archived in a 
transparent process, and it cannot be assumed that considerations of reputations and 
policies were not a factor in the decisions about what would be included in these 
collections. It is recognized that the available historical data that were researched for 
interpretation in this work are not exhaustive. Nonetheless, this dissertation draws on a 
sufficient amount of existing data to have the capacity to open up avenues for the 
development of more historical research through its conceptual innovation. The 
commitment to cohesiveness in the interpretation of this history inspires a philosophical 
configuration that is representative of the relationship between power and governance as 
reflected in the function of “genocide” within the development of international law. This 
dissertation sketches a new outline for researching “genocide” as information and for 
understanding international law.  





research through the ProQuest database of the New York Times (NYT). The NYT is treated 
throughout the dissertation as representative of the popular discourse on “genocide.” This 
reliance on the information in the NYT is based on the prominence with which the 
newspaper features items of international affairs, and the influence it has on the popular 
discourse as a narrator of them. The choice of this newspaper as a substantial source for 
analysis constitutes a selective act due to research constraints, but, as seen in this work, 
the volume alone of the narration in the NYT of matters pertaining to the usage of 
“genocide” is unrivaled by any other newspaper. From its beginning as the New York 
Daily Times in 1851, the newspaper distinguished itself among the existing daily news 
publications in New York by making an effort to establish a language about the existence 
of foreign national identities. This language on the pages of the NYT was being 
constructed ahead of Germany’s unification. During its first year of operation, the 
newspaper expressed a particular interest in promoting the public standing of Lajos 
Kossuth as the leader of a Hungarian movement for political independence.25 In line with 
the theoretical basis of this dissertation, the NYT is seen as a significant conveyor of soft 
power. It is the quintessential source of information that connects power with the popular 
usage of language.  
                                                          
25 According to the results of a ProQuest search, “Kossuth” was mentioned in 913 different items during the 
newspaper’s first year (September 18, 1851 – September 18, 1852). The newspaper reported on Kossuth in 
its first issue. See: “The News from Europe,” New York Daily Times, September 18, 1851. A later report 
focused on “Kossuth’s movements” in a manner that presented his leadership as a matter of importance to 
the public, and this news item was also the first context in which the newspaper used “human rights” as a 
phrase. See: “The Movements of Kossuth,” New York Daily Times, October 29, 1851. In the principal 
speech at a banquet that was held in honor of Kossuth in New York on December 15, 1851, Henry J. 
Raymond, who was the New York Daily Times’ editor spoke of “the right of the people of Hungary to 
exercise over their own dominions exclusive and sovereign legislation.” See: Augustus Maverick, Henry J. 
Raymond and the New York Press for Thirty Years: Progress of American Journalism from 1840 to 1870 
(Hartford, CT: A. S. Hale and Company, 1870), 115. This points at how NYT’s history is marked by an 






 The study of “genocide” as information requires an interpretive mode of research 
in order for it to enter the discourse of political science. Soft power is information that is 
effective when it cannot be directly linked to its governing objective, and as such it is 
designed to be immeasurable and unverifiable. Hence, to account for the possibility that 
power uses information for governance the research does not seek to prove causality but 
to narrate the context of the relationship. Not only is proof of soft power hard to produce, 
but an expectation of proof would suggest a failure to grasp the purpose of soft power. 
The inquiry that concerns itself with soft-power projects is sustained by a focus on the 
connection between sources of information, use of language, and their effects. It carries 
an assumption that there are power holders who can and do affect human affairs 
deliberately. The endeavor to draw a coherent historical analysis of the relationship 
between the interests of power holders and the use of “genocide” is an interpretive 




While the academic language on power in politics provides the theoretical basis of 
this dissertation, the conceptual framework is designed in the fashion of the Hegelian 
dialectical movement. This dissertation does not present a study of Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel’s work. Neither is it necessary for this dissertation to show that its 
subject matter is a perfect example of the Hegelian dialectical logic. Rather, an 
interpretation of his work is utilized here for the purpose of understanding the subject 





power-based theoretical approach. To understand the philosophical structure of this 
dissertation, it is not necessary to offer a close analysis of the Hegelian dialectical 
movement, but only to articulate its service in the context of the dissertation. 
 Hegel’s philosophical instruction was found to be a fitting instrument for the 
presentation of this dissertation following the process of inquiry. By using the Hegelian 
logic as the underlying structure of the dissertation, this work becomes aligned with a 
system of thought that is highly recognizable and has been tested time and again for its 
effectiveness as a conveyor of interpretation. The theoretical basis was largely informed 
by Nye’s distinction between hard power and soft power, and from this perspective the 
relevant historical data about the origination and development of “genocide” within the 
project of international law point at a theoretical language that mirrors the Hegelian 
dialectical movement. In the context of international law as a product of power, hard 
power and soft power appear to have a dialectical relationship in which the latter negates 
the quality of the former toward an eventual synthesis. That heightened stage of power is 
here defined as legal power. The progression of power from material advantage to a 
particularized level that enables effective governance is the story of law, and it is 
observable in the case of international law. The function of “genocide” is seen as having 
the capacity to illustrate how the movement from hard power to legal power is achieved 
through soft power.  
 According to the Hegelian dialectical reasoning, the progression of knowledge is 





absorption of the premises.”26 For example, faith arrives at knowledge through doubt.27 
In other words, confidence that something is true only becomes verified information once 
it is negated by the realization that the confidence is lacking in some way. This example 
elucidates that there are three points and two transitional acts in a single frame of the 
dialectical movement. It may be described as a general pattern in the following manner: 
the negation of A by B, leads to the absorption of B by C, and means that C is an 
advanced form of A. The experience of B particularizes A into becoming C.  
 Essence is considered a “simple identity with itself” prior to becoming identified 
through negation.28 A becomes known as such only once it is seen in relation to B. 
Similarly, power began to be seen as hard power in Nye’s work because of how soft 
power is distinguished from it. To distinguish is to detect identity. The negation through 
B is a distinction that facilitates A’s self-relation.29 A does not just become distinguished 
from another “but of itself from itself.”30 This negation is also described as an antithesis, 
and it signals a “particularized reflection.”31 The particularized quality of hard power in 
relation to soft power means that there is a movement toward a nuanced understanding of 
the essence and the compartmentalization of it according to specific aspects of identity. In 
                                                          
26 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Logic of Hegel: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the 




28 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Doctrine of Reflection: Being a Paraphrase and a Commentary 
Interpolated into the Text of the Second Volume of Hegel’s Larger Logic Treating of ‘Essence’, trans. and 
ed. William T. Harris (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1881), 30.  
 










short, it is thought that “Distinction is always contradiction, at least implicitly.”32 
 Negation has “the look of a destructive agent,”33 but it allows the essence to be 
better defined by realizing that A does not have the identity of B. This realization is what 
distinguishes C from A. Put differently, C is A with the added quality of knowing B and 
knowing itself through B. C signifies an identity that is unlike A or B because it 
represents the combination of their separate qualities. Thus, C negates B’s negation of A 
by coming into being as a synthesis of the two. Within the essence of power, hard 
power’s directness and soft power’s indirectness are synthesized into the combined value 
of authority and legitimacy in legal power.  
 Absorption has to follow negation in order for the dialectical progress to be 
manifested, and in the context of international law it is the study of “genocide” that 
enables an evaluation of the dialectical status in the movement from hard power through 
soft power toward legal power. As the subtitle of the dissertation indicates, this work is 
conceptually structured to present international law as a story of a dialectical progress 
from hard power through soft power toward legal power. The narration of the historical 
data gives expression to this structure. From the vantage point of the inquiry, this 
dissertation presents the hard power that prompted the advent of the term genocide in the 
context of international law; the soft power that has directed the use of “genocide” in 
international law; and the legal power that is conditioned by the ability of international 
law to process the absorption of soft power as the negation of hard power. By narrating 
the function of “genocide” within this conceptual framework, it becomes possible to 
                                                          
32 Ibid., 63. 
 






observe how soft power is a particularization of power, but also how the negation of soft 
power is indispensable for international law.  
 This absorption of soft power by hard power as legal power is a complex matter. 
The antithetical relationship between hard power and soft power is in quality rather than 
in purpose, but the quality of legal power is to evolve into a purpose that is different or 
perhaps heightened from the perspective of governance. Eventually, the leading question 
in this dissertation becomes the following: What is the distinction between information 
toward international law and information of international law? In other words, this study 
of “genocide” points at the significance of setting apart efforts to popularize notions of 
international law from the actual work of legal procedure. The usage of the term genocide 
is such that it lacks a distinction between soft power that complements and sustains law 
and soft power that dominates and disrupts law.  
 
Outline 
This introduction, which is listed as the first chapter of the dissertation, is 
followed by five chapters and the concluding chapter. In keeping with the conceptual 
framework, the chapters of this dissertation are arranged to narrate the function of 
“genocide” within a dialectical progression of power. Following a review of the existing 
literature on “genocide,” and an exploration of power as a theoretical basis, the historical 
inquiry is presented in the form of three periods. The first period (1870s-1944) lays out 
the hard-power considerations that preceded the advent of the term genocide and 
provided the ground for it through efforts of soft power. In the study of the second period 





2010s), which leads to the present time, is characterized by the tension between soft 
power and legal power. Hence, the conclusion of this work is generally devoted to 
weighing the conditions that may adjust the function of the term genocide toward an 
attainment of legal power in international law. The literary review and the theoretical 
orientation involve a dialogue with the current scholarly literature and are mainly written 
in the present tense, whereas the three chapters on the history of “genocide” in relation to 
power treat existing literature as historical items and are mostly regarded in the past 
tense. 
 Chapter 2 identifies the work of the genocide scholarship as the academic 
literature that is at the core of the inquiry into the relevant scholarly discourse, and offers 
a critical analysis of it. The interpretation of these existing studies on “genocide” as a 
discursive whole was essential in shaping this dissertation’s development from inquiry to 
presentation. This chapter addresses the major themes in the genocide scholarship. It 
describes the state of the scholarly field as found in this dissertation’s process of inquiry. 
Specifically, the review of the material pays close attention to the genocide scholarship’s 
depiction of itself; its foundational reliance on making the Holocaust comparable to other 
events; its labeling of Armenian victimhood as “genocide” and the Turkish position about 
it as “denial”; its usurpation of the information about “genocide”; its moralization of 
politics in accordance with American interests; its effrontery of the Genocide 
Convention; and its claims about Raphael Lemkin’s function in the creation of the term 
genocide. By addressing these aspects of the genocide scholarship and their meaning, the 
dissertation work locates its potential for contribution in relation to the currently 





moralistic format the genocide scholarship does not express a recognition of its own 
power or the power of “genocide” as a tool for the popularization of international law. 
 Chapter 3 examines the theoretical language on power in the study of politics, and 
develops a nuanced understanding of it in the context of law. This chapter is dedicated to 
explicating how a power-based theoretical approach matches the conceptual framework 
that is inspired by the Hegelian dialectical logic. It clarifies what is meant by the key 
terms that are used in the dissertation to narrate the function of “genocide” in 
international law. Moreover, it gives a theoretical orientation that is enmeshed with 
political philosophy, and, thereby, cements the location of this dissertation as a study of 
politics. In this chapter, the theoretical ground is prepared for understanding how the 
analysis of the available historical data points at the internationally significant 
developments in hard-power relations, the utility of “genocide” as soft power, and the 
yearning of international law for legal power. 
 Chapter 4 relates the initiation of international law to events in the 1870s, and 
ascribes the advent of “genocide” to a long American-led process to globalize its political 
vision and to halt the growth of Germany’s spheres of influence. It establishes knowledge 
of the American authority behind the modern construction of international law. By 
bringing into view the American role in the design of international law, this chapter sets 
the dissertation apart from the literary works of the genocide scholarship that refrain from 
recognizing the American origination of international law, and produces information that 
enables the placement of “genocide” in the context of power. The chapter considers how 
the traditional strategy of maintaining material advantages by the facilitation of a 





and what it signaled for the future of Europe and global affairs. It shows how Germany’s 
conflict with the status quo in Europe was met by an American effort to promote 
international arbitration and rules of conduct among nations. Also, it offers a view of the 
historical connection in international politics between power, identity, and governance, 
which puts into context the later role of “genocide” in international law. The effort to 
block German expansion, even prior to the advent of the term genocide, is related to the 
formation of identity groups toward political independence in territories that otherwise 
would have been left open for German influence. Through this chapter, one can see how 
the propping of identity groups as political entities—a prerequisite to their protection as 
such—was both essential in the development of international law and disruptive of 
German growth.  
 Chapter 5 surveys the function of “genocide” as a legal term that existed for over 
four decades without legal application, and illustrates how the term was developed by a 
popular discourse prior to receiving any input by competent legal procedure. It pins the 
origination of “genocide” in the considerations of post-WWII international order, and 
especially the project of Germany’s reeducation. In this chapter, Lemkin’s agency is 
considered in depth, and the common beliefs regarding him are questioned by exposing 
the unreliability of the information about him and by pointing at a context that is much 
greater than his biographical background. The emphasis on Lemkin in the genocide 
discourse is seen as reflective of the denial that there has been a dominant American 
influence on the use of “genocide” in particular, and the direction of international law in 
general. Throughout this chapter, it is shown that the use of “genocide” was acted out on 





of international-law awareness among the nation-states. Chief among such uses of 
“genocide” was the carefully developed scholarly discourse about the Armenian suffering 
during WWI, and the chapter connects between the genocidized Armenian issue and the 
post-Vietnam War agenda to associate “genocide” with civil wars. In this chapter, it is 
considered how the soft-power effect of the genocide discourse on public opinion 
preceded and preconditioned the term’s coming into legal force in the United States. 
 Chapter 6 focuses on the penetration of soft power into the legal procedure of 
international law through “genocide,” and demonstrates that the international 
adjudications of “genocide” are lacking in legal power as long as they are greatly affected 
by biased information. As shown in this chapter, the American ratification of the 
Genocide Convention marked the opening of an era in international criminal law that 
witnessed the incorporation of “genocide” into judgments of competent tribunals with the 
support of the United Nations. However, instead of negating the use of “genocide” as a 
form of soft power, the ratification amplified the impact that the term’s usage has on 
events and their narration. The ability to shape international criminal law by the use of 
“genocide” gave impetus to a new language that intensifies innerstate political conflict. In 
this chapter it is shown how soft power continues to dominate the information about, and 
by, international criminal law. The examples of Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia, Rwanda, 
Sudan, and the case of Perinçek v. Switzerland, indicate that the tension between soft 
power and legal power is defining the unstable condition of international law. This lack 
of fixity is connected to the tug-of-war between the narrow interests that are served 
through the abuse of international law and the broader interests that would be served by 





international law. It is also considered how the use of “genocide” was a factor in the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the Rome Statute of the 
International Court (Rome Statute) in the midst of these developments, and how the 
introduction of “crimes against humanity” to the international criminal code affects the 
future of international law.         
 The conclusion, which is listed as the seventh chapter of this dissertation, 
summarizes the function that genocide has had as an instrument of power, and suggests 
how—in accordance with the work’s interpretive analysis—international law may 
advance toward legal power. Since international law is still in the process of acquiring 
legal power, it is proposed that it would focus on the attainment of unified standards of 
governance among governments, and refrain from letting the disequilibrium in soft power 
determine what is just between governments. In order for international judgments to 
perform this feat, there will have to be a concerted effort to enhance the ability of 
international law to process and deliver information. The soft-power emphasis regarding 
international law can no longer be to persuade the public of other governments’ 
criminality but rather to persuade governments that the information is thoroughly 
international and professional. To this end, the conclusion also contains ideas on how to 
reform the mechanism of international judgments. The openness of the information by 
international law is to be preceded by an American willingness to reexamine the history 
of activities toward bringing governments closer to international law. A significant 
breakthrough in the stabilization of the criminal code and the negotiation of human rights 
can be made by recognizing how efforts to particularize power through international law 





of governance. The legitimacy of international law depends on how power builds up the 
law’s authority without interfering with its interpretation.   
 This dissertation’s concluding chapter seeks to express what it means to see the 
use of “genocide” as soft power. Its discussion of meaning regards the effect of 
“genocide” usage and the ability to use the term. The first aspect considers the 
genocidizing language as a politicization of history, a popularization of law, and an 
ethnocization of governance. In this manner, it is a timely addition to the public debate 
about tension between ethnonationalism and civic nationalism. While the former enlivens 
the interest in governance, it is the latter that allows governance to reach unified 
standards globally. To genocidize events that are not cases of genocide is not an act of 
protecting the weak but rather it is an act of choosing a language of popular intergroup 
division. The second aspect is about the control over the information in which the 
language about “genocide” is used. Much more can be done to lead the use of “genocide” 
to its initial goal to protect nation-states along with their civilians, and reduce the space in 
international criminal law for the promotion of narrow great-power interests. 
International law has been popularized by ethnic strife and a didactic discourse, but its 
legal power requires a civic common denominator and an authentically independent 












A LITERARY REVIEW OF THE GENOCIDE SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Genocide scholarship is a manifestation of American policy, whose initiation was 
expressed in 1979 in the official Report to the President: President’s Commission on the 
Holocaust (President’s Commission).1 While the popular usage of “genocide” preexisted 
the establishment of the genocide scholarship, the creation and operation of a scholarly 
discourse on “genocide” added a dimension of influence through which the legal meaning 
of the term may be affected. It is shown in this chapter how the genocide scholarship has 
produced information that—with the assigned credibility of expertise—is able to steer the 
popular usage toward having an effect on the legal application of the term genocide. 
There are three academic journals that have provided three main avenues of information 
for the genocide scholarship, all of which have originated in the United States as the 
utilization of the term genocide developed following the President’s Commission. They 
are: Holocaust and Genocide Studies (HGS), since 1986; Journal of Genocide Research 
(JGR), since 1999; and Genocide Studies and Prevention (GSP), since 2006, which was 
known as Genocide Studies International (GSI) between 2014 and 2016 but is now back 
                                                          
1 Elie Wiesel (chairman), Report to the President: President’s Commission on the Holocaust (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1979). While one is able to glean points of policy from this 
document, it does not mean that core policy ideas about the use of the term genocide did not precede the 
assembly of the President’s Commission and the issuing of the document nor that the document offers an 






to being called GSP.2 
 This chapter proceeds by way of focus on the literature that has been produced by 
these three journals. For the sake of the data being reflective of controlled themes, the 
chapter concentrates on the trends that are detected in the works that have been published 
in these journals since their respective first issue to the time of this study as well as the 
editorial directions that guided them.3 The chapter consists of sections, each of which 
represents an element that is found to be recurrent within the literature.4 These elements 
represent characteristics that are seen as descriptive of the genocide scholarship as a 
whole.5 The aim of this chapter is to show a bird’s-eye view of the content that has been 
produced by the genocide scholarship toward an ability to illuminate its patterns, starting 
with the scholarship’s narrative on its own history and purpose. By omitting a genuine 
account of its own power, the genocide scholarship’s view of itself sets the tone for its 
core assumptions, which are addressed in the sections throughout this chapter. These 
                                                          
2 HGS is published by Oxford University Press; JGR is published by Taylor & Francis Group; GSP used to 
be published by University of Toronto Press, even as GSI, but has been sustained by University of South 
Florida Libraries since reverting to the original journal title.   
 
3 An analysis of the influential monographs that have either centered on “genocide” as a main feature or are 
seen as offering a poignant contribution to the understanding of how the term genocide has been used, as 
well as relevant articles in journals that are not of the genocide scholarship, will be incorporated into 
Chapters 5 and 6, as part of the effort to put “genocide” in its historical context. Since there are many 
published works on “genocide” or regarding genocide, it would have given the task of this chapter an 
unnecessary sense of selectivity in choosing which works are more representative than others of the 
genocide scholarship. By carving out the data’s territory in line with the three academic journals, the pool 
of data is given the semblance of a more precise shape. Also, since these journals are held to be academic, 
this literary review may treat the literature with the expectation that it would meet scholarly standards.   
 
4 The cross-section circularity of references to certain elements is not avoided. For instance, the ideas of 
comparative theory or genocide prevention are mentioned in more than one section.  
 
5 “Genocide scholarship” is used here as a term of reference to describe the produced works in these 
journals. The idea is not to make generalizations that a single statement in one work is necessarily 
representative of other works within the genocide scholarship, but rather to treat any statement that has 






assumptions are the following: the Holocaust is a comparable case of genocide; the 
Ottoman Armenians suffered a genocide and Turkish governments have been in denial of 
it; the widely consumed information about “genocide” is to be produced by a source that 
was not empowered by the member states of the United Nations; determinations about 
what is right and wrong in the policies of nation-states are to be issued by an American-
based scholarship; the legal meaning of “genocide” as specified in the Genocide 
Convention is not the only definition of the term, and other definitions might be preferred 
over it in the discourse; and the term genocide was coined by Raphael Lemkin in an 
effort to give voice to the consciousness of humanity. The sections are followed by a 
conclusion that sets the agenda for the next chapters toward the explication of the term 
genocide in ways that the genocide scholarship itself has not administered.  
 
The Genocide Scholarship’s Narration of Its History and Purpose 
It is instructive to grasp how the genocide scholarship views itself before 
attempting to understand what the scholarship produces about “genocide”; what it does 
not see or show; and why. The essence of the scholarship’s expressed sense of self is 
captured in the following emblematic sentence by Robert Melson, who is considered to 
be among the prominent early definers of genocide scholarship: “Raphael Lemkin 
initiated the field of genocide studies in large part as a response to the Armenian 
Genocide of the First World War and the Holocaust of the Second World War.”6 This one 
                                                          
6 Robert Melson, “Critique of Current Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 
(Winter 2011): 279. Similarly, Lemkin is described as “our field’s founder” in another article of the same 
issue. See: Adam Jones, “Diffusing Genocide Studies, Defusing Genocides,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 6, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 275. In the next issue of the same journal, GSP, there is an article in 
which Lemkin is titled “the founding scholar of genocide studies.” See: Henry C. Theriault, “Against the 
Grain: Critical Reflections on the State and Future of Genocide Scholarship,” Genocide Studies and 





sentence invites readers to suppose that the origin of the term genocide is to be associated 
with one individual, namely Lemkin; that genocide as a field of study was started by 
Lemkin; that Lemkin’s personal reaction to the Ottoman Armenian experience, before the 
Holocaust ever occurred, inspired genocide studies; that the Holocaust and the Armenian 
experience are to be considered on an equal footing; that the Armenian experience is to 
be regarded as “the Armenian Genocide”; and, generally, that the advent of the term 
genocide was a moral project rather than a political one. 
 The visible movement toward “genocide” as a field of study did not start until 
after the recommendations of the President’s Commission gave voice to ongoing changes 
in how the term genocide was being used and will be used. Yet, the genocide 
scholarship’s version of its own history ignores its empowerment by the United States 
government,7 and presents a narrative in which scholars, led by Lemkin and followed by 
                                                          
genocide studies.” See: Israel W. Charny, “Requiem for the Prevention of Genocide in Our Time: Working 
toward an Improbable Possibility but Not Giving Up,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 
2012): 110. 
 
7 The single reference to the President’s Commission in the entire body of literature that has been produced 
by the genocide scholarship thus far is short and decontextualized. It oddly fails to recognize the connection 
between the President’s Commission and the start of genocide studies. See: Samuel Totten, “Paying Lip 
Service to R2P and Genocide Prevention: The Muted Response of the US Atrocities Prevention Board and 
the USHMM’s Committee on Conscience to the Crisis in the Nuba Mountains,” Genocide Studies 






others who are seen as “pioneers” of the field,8 are said to have “helped forge the field”9 
that is “an autonomous intellectual field,”10 as if a field that began with the “seminal 
works” of these pioneers independent of governmental power and interests,11 or as if 
“rediscovered” along with Lemkin’s notes by way of some natural maturation of 
historical perspective rather than by governmental prodding.12 The emphasis on the role 
played by the honored scholars who solidified the new usage of “genocide” on academic 
platforms is categorized superficially and actually hinders the advancement of knowledge 
on the field of study’s development.13 A connection is not drawn between the scholars 
                                                          
8 Steven L. Jacobs, “The Papers of Raphael Lemkin: A First Look,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 
(March 1999): 111; Thomas Cushman, “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 529; Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, 
“Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 
(December 2005): 501; Jürgen Zimmerer, “Genocide Studies for the Twenty-First Century: A Departing 
Editor’s Perspective,” Journal of Genocide Research 13, no. 3 (September 2011): 205; Samuel Totten, 
“The State and Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Overview and Analysis of Some Key 
Issues,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 212; Dominik J. Schaller, “From Lemkin 
to Clooney: The Development and State of Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 
(Winter 2011): 246; Hannibal Travis, “On the Original Understanding of the Crime of Genocide,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 30-31; Ernesto Verdeja, “On Situating the Study 
of Genocide within Political Violence,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 81; 
Charny, “Requiem,” 110. The use of the word pioneer has the effect of leading readers to perceive scholars 
as explorers who have themselves opened up new ways of studying genocide. It strongly associates the 
scholars with notions of initiative, as if they are strictly self-empowered.  
 
9 Alexander Laban Hinton, “Critical Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 
2012): 7. 
 
10 Cushman, “Is,” 523. 
 
11 Evegny Finkel and Scott Straus, “Macro, Meso, and Micro Research on Genocide: Gains, Shortcomings, 
and Future Areas of Inquiry,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 56. 
 
12 Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, “From the Guest Editors: Raphael Lemkin: The ‘Founder of 
the United Nation’s Genocide Convention’ as a Historian of Mass Violence,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 7, no. 4 (December 2005): 449; Thomas Kühne, “Colonialism and the Holocaust: Continuities, 
Causations, and Complexities,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (September 2013): 344; Schaller, 
“Lemkin,” 246; Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Studying Mass Violence: Pitfalls, Problems, and Promises,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 68-69. 
 
13 For instance, a work categorizes both Vahakn Dadrian and Richard Hovannisian in one group as if there 
is no distinction between their roles in the development of what is labeled “the Armenian Genocide” as a 
subject of study. See: Totten, “State,” 213. However, a close examination, which is reserved here for 





and the United States government, but rather between the early scholars and their 
perceived identity as either Jewish or Armenian,14 in a manner which insinuates that the 
genocide scholarship took shape according to these scholars’ commitment to their 
separate group rather than in keeping with a political agenda. On numerous occasions, 
conjugated forms of the verbs to emerge and to evolve are used to present the 
development of the field of study as a whole, thereby suggesting that the field’s 
maturation was is a result of self-growth, as if it has been growing independently or 
naturally.15  
 The references to the time when genocide studies began are inconsistent and 
                                                          
Hovannisian avoided using the term genocide in his written publications until the late 1970s even in works 
of history that cover the year 1915, Dadrian had already characterized the Armenian experience as 
genocide in the 1960s. A careful distinction between the works of Dadrian and Hovannisian in the context 
of genocide usage sheds light on the differences between the utilization of sociology and history as two 
separate academic fields.  
 
14 A. Dirk Moses, “Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 6, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 294. In addition, Moses calls his readers’ attention to the field’s 
“founders’ biographies” rather than the American system of education, and to “the intellectual and cultural 
context of the 1970s” rather than the political context of American power.  
 
15 For descriptions of an emerging field of study and discourse, see: Steven L. Jacobs, review of Holocaust 
and Genocide Bibliographic Database, edited by Marc I. Sherman and Israel W. Charny, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 9, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 267; Steven L. Jacobs, review of The Widening Circle of Genocide, 
edited by Israel W. Charny, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 9, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 389; Cushman, “Is,” 
528; Mark Levene, “A Dissenting Voice: Or How Current Assumptions of Deterring and Preventing 
Genocide May Be Looking at the Problem through the Wrong End of the Telescope, Part I,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 6, no. 2 (June 2004): 155; Daniel Feierstein, “Leaving the Parental Home: An 
Overview of the Current State of Genocide Studies,” trans. Douglas Andrew Town, Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 6, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 257, 266; Hinton, “Critical,” 4, 6-7; Herbert Hirsch, “Preventing 
Genocide and Protecting Human Rights: A Failure of Policy,” Genocide Studies International 8, no. 1 
(Spring 2014): 1; Laase Heerten and A. Dirk Moses, “The Nigeria-Biafra War: Postcolonial Conflict and 
the Question of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 2-3 (July 2014): 181; Elisa Novic, 
“Physical-Biological or Socio-Cultural ‘Destruction’ in Genocide? Unravelling the Legal Underpinnings of 
Conflicting Interpretations,” Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 1 (March 2015): 63; Thomas James 
Rogers and Stephen Bain, “Genocide and Frontier Violence in Australia,” Journal of Genocide Research 
18, no. 1 (March 2016): 91. For descriptions of an evolving field of study and discourse, see: Totten, 
“State,” 224; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 248; Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Genocide is a Process, Not an Event,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 21; Theriault, “Grain,” 124; Cushman, “Is,” 523; 
Novic, “Physical-Biological,” 63. In one article it is stated that some of the “early genocide scholars” 






without detailed relation to the context of power relations and historical developments. 
Some accounts relate the beginning of genocide studies to the aftermath of WWII 
directly,16 while others relate it to the late 1970s and early 1980s,17 and one scholar 
makes both claims in one article.18 There are no attempts to point at the relevant set of 
circumstances in the realm of politics and “genocide” that surrounded the advent of the 
three journals.19 Even though the history of genocide studies has involved calls for action 
outside the realm of academia, there is great obscurity regarding the intertwinement 
                                                          
16 Cushman “Is,” 523, 528; Melson, “Critique,” 279. These references to WWII do not merely identify the 
origin of “genocide” with the war, but go as far as suggesting that genocide studies started following the 
war. It is unclear whether this is the result of the authors’ inability to discern between the origin of the term 
and the origin of the field of study or the authors’ expectation that readers would be unable to make the 
discernment.   
 
17 Totten, “State,” 212; Hinton, “Critical,” 6; Finkel and Straus, “Macro,” 56; Heerten and Moses, “Nigeria-
Biafra,” 181. In one work there is reference to the “rise of interest in the Holocaust” during this time, 
without mentioning the United States government or the President’s Commission. See: Richard Leibowitz, 
review of The History and Sociology of Genocide, by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 6, no. 4 (1991): 428. Moreover, there appears to be a measure of revisionism: Israel 
Charny claims that he began his engagement with the “studies of genocide in 1963,” and cites an article by 
him from 1968 to support that claim. However, the article that he mentions contains no reference to 
“genocide.” See: Charny, “Requiem,” 121 (note 32); Israel W. Charny, “Teaching the Violence of the 
Holocaust: A Challenge to Educating Potential Oppressors and Victims for Nonviolence,” Jewish 
Education 38 (1968): 15-24. It is inaccurate and misleading to present a work that focuses on the Jewish 
experience regarding the Holocaust without any recognition of the term genocide as a work of genocide 
studies. A survey of Charny’s works shows that there is no detectable focus on “genocide” in them before 
the President’s Commission was organized in the late 1970s.  
 
18 Feierstein, “Leaving,” 257, 266.  
 
19 For example, an article in JGR informs its readers about the hundreds of millions of dollars that have 
been committed in 1999 to establish a court in which those who were members of the Khmer Rouge 
government in 1975-1979 may be tried in Cambodia, but there is no consideration of the possibility that the 
founding of the journal in 1999 is related to this development. See: George Chigas, “The Politics of 
Defining Justice after the Cambodian Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 2, no. 2 (June 2000): 254. 
In the same vein, the editors of GSP do not announce that the journal’s origin in 2006 is designed to create 
another platform for American efforts to persuade the public to support the government’s claims that 
genocide is being committed in Darfur, but rather is explicit about the journal’s association with the Zoryan 
Institute, which is dedicated to Armenian studies. See: Israel W. Charny and Roger W. Smith, “Why GSP?” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 1 (July 2006): i. It is also noteworthy that the United States 
government-affiliated “Genocide Prevention Task Force was officially launched in November 2007” with 
GSP ready to function as a source of narration that carries the idea of prevention as its banner. For example, 






between the scholars’ ideas for intervention in the affairs of other governments and 
American interests to do so.20 Not only does the genocide scholarship refrain from 
computing American power into the origin of the term genocide, it does not recognize the 
developments in the use of “genocide” internationally since the 1990s as being related to 
the ratification of the Genocide Convention in the United States in the late 1980s.21 The 
genocide scholarship controls the information on its own history and purpose under the 
rubric of self-critique,22 or through self-congratulation,23 and uses this control to steer the 
content that it produces about its own origins away from its American sources. 
 The hard-power root of the genocide scholarship has become exceedingly 
                                                          
20 The field of genocide studies is said to have originated as a “preventative project of modernity and as a 
form of human rights practice.” See: Cushman, “Is,” 540. In one article there is vague reference to the 
“Genocide Early Warning System (GEWS),” which is said to have been “devised” in the “1970s” by Israel 
Charny and Chanan Rapaport, without there being any mention of GEWS’ relation to the Committee of 
Conscience that was suggested as a matter of policy in the report by the President’s Commission for the 
same purpose of publicizing early reports on alleged genocides. See: Michael J. Bazyler, “In the Footsteps 
of Raphael Lemkin,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 52; Wiesel, Report, 13-14. 
Israel Charny’s own account of GEWS does not place it in the context of the President’s Commission and 
its policy suggestion to establish a Committee on Conscience. See: Charny, “Requiem,” 111. 
 
21 Jeffrey S. Morton and Neil Vijay Singh, “The International Legal Regime on Genocide,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (March 2003): 63; William A. Schabas, “The ‘Odious Scourge’: Evolving 
Interpretations of the Crime of Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 97; 
Saul Ben, “From the Guest Editor: Building on the Law on Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 9, 
no. 2 (June 2007): 173. These texts mention the first administration of competent tribunals for the charge of 
genocide without addressing the possible relationship between the American ratification and the 
unprecedented organization of courts within the following decade. 
 
22 Totten, “State,” 211-230; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 245-256; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 257-269; Melson, 
“Critique,” 279-286; Moses, “Revisiting,” 287-300; Hinton, “Critical,” 4-15; Theriault, “Grain,” 123-144. 
  
23 One scholar states that “The growth of our field is impressive,” and what he finds impressive is the 
expansive use of the term genocide: “Scholarship spans the alphabet, from the Armenian and Bangladesh 
genocides to those perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia and in Zimbabwe.” See: Colin Tatz, “Genocide 
Studies: An Australian Perspective,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 231. 
Another scholar claims that “The triumph of the term ‘genocide’ is reflected in the development of a 
productive and vibrant scholarly community,” making genocide studies “a pure success story.” See: 
Schaller, “Lemkin,” 247-248. Schaller attributes the popular usage of “genocide”—“Over 5.2 million 
books scanned by Google” at the time of his writing—to the work of scholars rather than the structure that 
invites, enables, and sustains the production of this literature. See: Ibid., 246. The genocide scholarship 






concealed throughout the accumulating years of genocide studies largely because the 
field’s development has been aligned with its internationalization, which not only makes 
the field’s identity seem less American but also enhances its effectiveness in discourse 
control. The promotion of two separate organizations of genocide scholars, the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and the International Network of 
Genocide Scholars (INoGS),24 has facilitated content that would not by itself orient 
readers to know that the organizations have a unified history and purpose. The latter 
organization is said to have been founded in Berlin in January 2005,25 but JGR, which 
serves as its literary platform, is actually an American project.26 The history of their 
mutual empowerment is defied by a proclivity to emphasize their differences,27 and the 
                                                          
24 The names of both organizations advertise an international quality. IAGS used to be without the 
international marker in its name, originally known as the Association of Genocide Scholars (AGS) when it 
was established in 1994. See: International Association of Genocide Scholars, “About Us: History,” 
http://www.genocidescholars.org/about-us/history (accessed, 1/23/2017). INoGS was conceived to function 
as a European network, and it was introduced as the European Network of Genocide Scholars before 
adopting its current name. See: Charny, “Requiem,” 120. 
 
25 International Network of Genocide Scholars, “About Us,” http://inogs.com/about-us/ (accessed, 
1/23/2017).  
 
26 According to the American original editor of JGR, an agreement was already signed between the journal 
and the new organization in September 2004. See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: JGR Finds a 
Home!” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 4 (December 2004): 485. INoGS’ website does not specify 
the deliberations and decisions that were made prior to January 2005 or September 2004—possibly in 
locations other than Berlin—toward the establishment of a second organization of genocide scholars. At 
any rate, in the post-WWII international scene, the mention of Berlin as an origination point of an 
organization might show it as international in the public eye but does not actually preclude an Anglo-
American design. Interestingly, Taylor & Francis Group remained the publisher of the journal. See: Ibid. 
The journal’s predecessor, The Genocide Forum, first appeared in September 1994 and was operated by the 
same person, Huttenbach. See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: Apologia Rationalis,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (March 1999): 7. Previously, Huttenbach contributed to the first American 
journal on genocide, HGS, which carried out the United States government’s plan, as indicated by the 
President’s Commission, to stabilize a discourse on “genocide” through relatability to the Holocaust. See: 
Henry R. Huttenbach, “Locating the Holocaust on the Genocide Spectrum: Towards a Methodology of 
Definition and Categorization,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3, no. 3 (1988): 289-303. In his article, 
Huttenbach states: “Once the Holocaust is classified as a case of genocide, one can begin the process of 
ranking it alongside others which qualified according to the definition.” See: Ibid., 300. 
 
27 Jürgen Zimmerer, INoGS’ first president, professes that the organization stands out for its “global and 
decolonial approach.” See: Jürgen Zimmerer, “Genocide,” 206. Dominik Schaller, who became 





effect of their pronounced disagreements is an enlarged scope of the genocide 
scholarship’s total spread of information regarding the term genocide.28 
 Another major trend that makes it difficult for readers to trace the history of 
genocide studies going by the literature in HGS, GSP/GSI, and JGR regards the treatment 
of the Holocaust. In an evasion of its own history as a government-sanctioned field of 
study that was nursed by the public consensus about Holocaust memory,29 the genocide 
scholarship is conditioned to see Holocaust studies as a shadow that is cast on its 
continued growth rather than acknowledge that Holocaust studies had been the fertile 
ground on which it originally grew.30 The modification of Holocaust studies under the 
authority of the United States government was the genocide scholarship’s historical 
                                                          
claims—while writing for GSP, the opposite organization’s journal, in 2011—that the two organizations 
“compete with each other.” See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 247. Israel Charny, a cofounder and former president 
of IAGS, claims that he and other genocide scholars were insulted by the appearance of certain 
controversial articles by members of INoGS, such as those on “Zionism and Israel,” and maintains that the 
two organizations take a different approach to the profession. See: Charny, “Requiem,” 120. More recently, 
GSP published an article that calls more attention to Charny’s feud with JGR about its treatment of the 
Holocaust and the State of Israel. See: Amos Goldberg et al., “Israel Charny’s Attack on the Journal of 
Genocide Research and its Authors: A Response,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 2 (2016): 3-22. 
However, both sides of this debate are agents of information whose empowerment is American-based. 
Jewish history and the State of Israel might seem to be defended by Charny, but in actuality the effect is 
that they are used as a springboard for the genocide discourse. The enhancement of the genocide discourse 
is a goal that is shared and promoted by Charny and the genocide scholars who are associated with JGR. 
There used to be less written material to conceal this common aim. For instance, before the posture became 
accentuated the conference of AGS (IAGS’ original name) was announced on JGR, which is now linked 
with INoGS. See: “Conference Announcement,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 1 (March 2001): 171. 
In addition, a work presented at an IAGS conference was published by JGR. See: Levene, “Dissenting,” 
163 (note 1). Perhaps, the commonality in editorial purpose that is shared by all three journals is best 
reflected by the fact that Vahakn Dadrian has had at least one article under his name published in each of 
the genocide journals.  
 
28 A source of information can produce more volume, reach wider audiences, and control what counts as 
variety, by multiplying its instruments of representation and generating points of contention between them.   
 
29 According to the President’s Commission, genocide prevention is seen as a component of the 
Holocaust’s living memorial. See: Wiesel, Report, 9.  
 
30 Hinton, “Critical,” 4. Without getting into details, Hinton only offers a limited remark about genocide 






breath of life. However, for it to exist effectively as a scholarly endeavor, the genocide 
scholarship has distanced itself from its most basic point of origin, and has taken on a 
self-proclaimed social-scientific identity that is based on comparative theory and boasts 
an interdisciplinarity to boost academic credibility.31  
 Chief and first among the topics of comparison was the Armenian experience.32 
Significantly, the genocide scholarship’s account of its own history on the Armenian 
issue looks away from preexisting developments that prepared minds for a genocide 
                                                          
31 For examples of references to the field’s social-scientific self-image, see: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Essay: 
Comments on Robert Melson’s Revolution and Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 8, no. 3 
(Winter 1994): 411; Taner Akçam, “Guenter Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 119; Maureen S. Hiebert, “Theorizing 
Destruction: Reflections on the State of Comparative Genocide Theory,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 
3, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 335; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 246, 251; Scott Straus, “Contested Meanings and 
Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 3 
(November 2001): 370;  Jacques Semelin, “Toward a Vocabulary of Massacre and Genocide,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 5, no. 2 (June 2003): 209;  Henry R. Huttenbach, “Editor’s Note: A Caveat. Towards a 
Theory of Genocide? Not Yet,” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (March 2004): 5. For examples of 
references to the field’s interdisciplinarity, see: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Towards a Theory of Genocide 
Incorporating the Instance of Holocaust: Comments, Criticisms and Suggestions,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 5, no. 2 (1990): 129; Cushman, “Is,” 523; Levene, “Dissenting,” 155; Uğur Ümit Üngör, “Team 
America: Genocide Prevention?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 32; “A Plea 
from International Scholars of Genocide and Human Rights Studies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 
no. 3 (Winter 2011): 301; Hinton, “Critical,” 6; Rosenberg, “Genocide,” 21. The idea that the 
interdisciplinarity of the field originates in Lemkin’s own teaching of genocide is conveyed in two articles. 
See: Tanya Elder, “What You See Before Your Eyes: Documenting Raphael Lemkin’s Life by Exploring 
His Archival Papers, 1900-1959,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (December 2005): 490; Donna-
Lee Frieze, “New Approaches to Raphael Lemkin,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (September 
2013): 249. The overall view of genocide studies as interdisciplinary from its inception leads away from 
examining how sociological studies in particular presented a platform for unprecedented usage of the term 
genocide before it became the norm among other disciplines and before the establishment of genocide 
studies. 
 
32 In the introduction to HGS as a new journal, the only case that is labeled as genocide and said to be the 
subject of future articles and contributions is the Armenian one. See: Yehuda Bauer, “Editor’s 
Introduction,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1, no. 1 (1986): 1. Bauer also mentions “problems 
concerning the Native Indian populations of the Americas,” but without relating the term genocide, and 
while the two words “Armenian” and “genocide” are coupled together into a phrase dozens of times in the 
articles that have been published by this journal over the years, a phrase such as “Native American 
genocide” does not appear at all nor was the case of the Native Americans addressed even remotely as 
many times as the Armenian. Furthermore, the “first comparative genocide studies conference,” which was 
held in Tel Aviv in 1982, featured a focus on Armenian victimhood—freely labeled as genocide—






discourse that features the Armenians as victims. The genocide scholarship does not 
recognize the administrative processes that established Armenian studies in the 1950s and 
the publicized references to genocide regarding the status of Armenians as victims in 
WWI since the 1960s as an interest and policy of the American government to increase 
its influence in a Soviet region; rather, the genocide scholarship instilled a notion that the 
world was somehow waking up from a “collective amnesia” about the Armenian 
suffering,33 thus conflating the use of “genocide” with Armenian memory. This 
conflation promotes the view of Turkey as a denier state, but there is no Turkish 
opposition to the historical study of the events or an understanding of the Armenian 
suffering inherent in the Turkish disagreement with the popular usage of the legal term 
genocide. The unscholarly supposition that “genocide” and memory are inseparable in the 
Armenian past has gone unchallenged in effect because the main voice of objection to the 
use of genocide in this context in general has been associated with the Turkish 
                                                          
33 Samuel Totten, review of Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide, by Donald E. Miller 
and Lorna Touryan Miller, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 9, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 255. The phrase 
“collective amnesia” is used by another genocide scholar, but in reference only to Turkish society as 
opposed to the whole world. See: Roger W. Smith, “How Does One Address the 100th Anniversary of the 
Armenian Genocide and Modern Denial?” Genocide Studies International 10, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 104. 
The phrase “collective amnesia” is related to the function of “forgotten genocide” as a phrase, which is also 
used by Totten. See: Totten, review of Survivors, 254. The idea of forgetting or not remembering in this 
context was first made popular in the 1960s. See: Marjorie Housepian, “The Unremembered Genocide,” 
Commentary, September 1966, 55-61. As a rhetorical tactic, “forgotten genocide” is a phrase that carries in 
it a presupposition that what happened to the Armenians was genocide, and it embodies the conflation of 
Armenian memory and the use of genocide by falsely suggesting that leaving out the term genocide from 
this aspect of Armenian history is akin to forgetting this history. More recently, Dominik Schaller is 
associated with references to the phrase, first by stating that it “had been one of the forgotten genocides for 
a long time,” then in a call for papers in the journal that he co-edited the Armenian case is said to be “still 
labelled as a ‘forgotten genocide,’” and later he promotes the claim that it is no longer a “forgotten 
genocide.” See: Dominik J. Schaller, “From the Editor(s): Genocide Research, Preventionism and Politics 
of Memory—A Personal Note,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 3 (September 2006): 246; 
“Announcement: Call for Papers,” Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 2 (June 2007): 347; Dominik J. 
Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, “Late Ottoman Genocides: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and 
Young Turkish Population and Extermination Policies—Introduction,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, 
no. 1 (March 2008): 10; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 253. Either way, the effect is to connect the term genocide 






government,34 thereby depicting the genocide scholarship as a valiant entity that is caught 
up in a history of adversity coming from a political power. This idea of a fight against 
powerful denialism is a substantive factor in the projected history of genocide studies,35 
and has relieved the genocide scholarship from having to express a denial that it is an 
extension of a policy by the United States government.36   
 In consideration of the genocide scholarship’s presentation of its own history and 
purpose, the following research questions, which are not asked by the genocide 
scholarship itself, are pertinent for better understanding genocide studies: Why does the 
                                                          
34 Vigen Guroian, “Post-Holocaust Political Morality: The Litmus of Bitburg and the Armenian Genocide 
Resolution,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3, no. 3 (1988): 318; Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen, and 
Robert Jay Lifton, “Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide 9, 
no. 1 (Spring 1995): 4; Hank Theriault, “Universal Social Theory and the Denial of Genocide: Norman 
Itzkowitz Revisited,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 2 (June 2001): 242; Henry R. Huttenbach, 
review of Armenien und der Völkermord: Die Istambuler Prozesse und die türkische Nationalbewegung, by 
Taner Akçam, Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 2 (June 2003): 325; Stephen Feinstein, review of 
Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, by Henry Morgenthau, Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (June 
2005): 294; Paul Boghossian, “The Concept of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 1-2 
(March-June 2010): 69, 71; Vahagn Avedian, “The Armenian Genocide of 1915 from a Neutral Small 
State’s Perspective: Sweden,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 323. 
 
35 What is seen as genocide studies’ formative conference in Tel Aviv in 1982 is largely characterized by 
claims that the Turkish government was trying to impose its opposition to the use of “genocide” regarding 
the Armenian suffering in WWI. The publicized conflict between the Turkish government and the 
organizers of the event has been marked as an important moment in the history of genocide studies. It is 
presented as exemplary of “attempts by the Turkish government to disrupt academic conferences and 
public discussions of genocide.” See: Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 4; Vartkes S. 
Dolabjian, “The Armenian Genocide as Portrayed in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica [sic],” Journal of 
Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (March 2003): 103; Roger W. Smith, “Genocide Denial and Prevention,” 
Genocide Studies International 8, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 107. The genocide journals contain no works that 
examine the connection between the American government—or specifically the Americans who took part 
in the President’s Commission in 1979—and the organization of the conference in Tel Aviv.  
 
36 A scholar such as Daniel Feierstein whose work in the genocide scholarship presents him as a credible 
critique of American foreign policy then functions as a believable narrator when he produces information 
about the history of genocide studies as if the field was established independently of American power. 
Compare: Daniel Feierstein, “Getting Things into Perspective,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 2 
(Summer 2009): 155; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 257. The abundance of references that describe the genocide 
scholarship as if in a disadvantaged position against the Turkish government helps the believability of the 
historical account that omits the empowerment of genocide studies by the United States government. By 
pointing away from the dominance over discourse that the genocide scholarship has, its link with the great 






genocide scholarship hesitate to offer a clear distinction between the history of the term 
genocide and the history of genocide studies? Why is Lemkin said to be the founder of 
genocide studies even though “genocide” was not a field of study for many years after he 
died? Why is the discourse on the history of genocide studies based on accounts about the 
personal motivations and accomplishments of individual scholars rather than the political 
function of the information that is produced by genocide studies and the infrastructure 
that accommodates it? Who had the political power to promote genocide studies as an 
academic field? In what context did the idea of genocide studies first become the subject 
of planning by those who have the power to establish academic fields of study? How can 
the genocide scholarship negotiate between recognizing that it is empowered by the 
United States government and maintaining credibility as a scholarly endeavor? What 
made sociological studies the chosen platform for the advancement of works that 
aggressively labeled the Armenian victimhood as genocide in the late 1960s prior to the 
gradual incorporation of the label in works of history and the establishment of genocide 
studies in the late 1970s and early 1980s? What considerations of international law 
preceded the decision to establish the President’s Commission? What tactics of soft 
power were used through the first international conference of genocide studies in Tel 
Aviv in 1982 to advance the popular usage of genocide?  
 
The Holocaust Made Comparable 
Since historical context points at the Holocaust as the event that carries the 
quintessence of “genocide,” the comparison of other events to the Holocaust is the 





information about “genocide” in accordance with the interests of those who empowered it 
to do so. At the time of the President’s Commission, there had been no cases of genocide 
charged before a competent tribunal, and the simple recitation of the Genocide 
Convention on what qualifies as genocide would not have created opportunities for a 
discourse that would influence knowledge of “genocide.” Therefore, in order for the 
genocide scholarship to dictate a language on genocide, its first words were of relation to 
the one prototypical case.37    
The term genocide had not been commonly used in connection with the Holocaust 
until the late 1970s, and the report by the President’s Commission displays a purposed 
usage of the term to describe the Holocaust, in preparation of the genocide scholarship’s 
need to establish itself by first establishing the Holocaust as a frame of reference to the 
meaning of “genocide.” In the report of the President’s Commission, the term genocide is 
incorporated four times into a brief discussion of the Holocaust prior to unfolding a 
narrative about the Armenian experience that includes the term as well.38 This means that 
the modus operandi of the genocide scholarship was foreshadowed and furnished in an 
official document of the United States government. The President’s Commission 
harnessed the gravitas of those who were perceived as the guardians of Holocaust 
                                                          
37 It is here noted that not a single Nazi German under the leadership of Adolf Hitler was ever convicted of 
genocide by a competent tribunal. The Genocide Convention was adopted in December 1948, over two 
years after the primary set of the Nuremberg Trials had ended. This is recognized by the genocide 
scholarship. See: Daniel Marc Segesser and Myriam Gessler, “Raphael Lemkin and the International 
Debate on the Punishment of War Crimes (1919-1948),” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (December 
2005): 463; David Stannard, “De´ja Vu All Over Again,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (March 
2008): 131; William A. Schabas, “‘Definitional Traps’ and Misleading Titles,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 4, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 178; Hilary Earl, “Prosecuting Genocide before the Genocide 
Convention: Raphael Lemkin and the Nuremberg Trials, 1945-1949,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, 
no. 3 (September 2013): 319.  
 






memory toward the effect of lending credibility to those whose profession it would be—
by the nature of the task to produce a compelling discourse about the prevalence of 
genocide—to claim that the Holocaust is not unique. In other words, the United States 
government commissioned a previously nonexistent genocide scholarship to produce 
knowledge that the Holocaust is monumental but also that—when characterized as a 
genocide—it is not one of a kind.  
Such a maneuver passed effectively via the agency of highly regarded Jewish 
scholars and recognizable representatives of the American Jewish community, who as 
members of the President’s Commission and its advisory board facilitated the utilization 
of Holocaust memory for the spawning of a wide-yet-centralized and a wild-yet-
controlled discourse on “genocide.” It is said that there were “strong disagreements 
among American Jews about institutionalizing Holocaust memory” because of fears 
that—as it becomes “part of the official legacy of the American experience”—the 
popularization of Holocaust memory could have an adverse effect on the Jews’ 
relationship with other ethnic groups or with their own collective past and identity, and 
that the memory might be trivialized or politicized.39 While these are expressions of 
sensible concerns that were publicized at the time, the narration of them as an inter-
Jewish dilemma seems to be itself aligned with the genocide discourse for it too turns the 
public away from considering how the institutionalization of Holocaust memory may 
have been the execution of a soft-power strategy, which provided a foundational 
orientation for the usage of the term genocide. Thus, the mainstream account of this 
                                                          
39 Edward T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum (New 






institutionalization unfolds a story about the back and forth of a White House 
administration’s electoral interests and interest-group lobbying,40 and gives no heed to 
how the ability to control the memory of the Holocaust may have been crucial for the 
promotion of international law. The narration shows the institutionalization of the 
Holocaust as a Jewish-processed outcome, but the utilization of Holocaust memory for 
the management of the term genocide suggests the existence of a greater plan for the 
advancement of international law.41  
In line with the direction that was set by the President’s Commission, the 
genocide scholarship demeans the memory of the Holocaust as an event. Hitler’s alleged 
comment about the Armenians was used by the President’s Commission, and then in the 
memorialization by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), in a 
manner that imposed a connection between the Ottoman Armenian experience and the 
Holocaust in the historical narrative.42 This sudden lack of source criticism in the 
                                                          
40 For instance, Linenthal writes that United States President Jimmy Carter’s decision to assemble a 
commission for the recommendation of “an appropriate national Holocaust memorial” had “everything to 
do with the domestic political priority of appeasing Jewish interests.” See: Ibid., 17. Furthermore, he points 
at “troubles” that Carter had with the Jewish community just prior to the advent of the President’s 
Commission. See: Ibid., 18.  
 
41 For example, in April 1978—just a few months before the President’s Commission was established—a 
miniseries about the Holocaust was televised by the American national network, NBC, but Linenthal’s 
mention of this broadcast focuses on the critical reaction to the quality of it as a narration of memory 
without expanding on how its timing in relation to the President’s Commission could be an indicator of a 
strategy regarding the usage of Holocaust memory. Linenthal relays that the The Holocaust had “an 
estimated audience of approximately 120 million,” but does not express how this act of creating a massive 
wave of public awareness about the Holocaust might be connected to the President’s Commission as part of 
designed information toward a political goal. See: Ibid., 12. In Linenthal’s text there is a quote of a film 
historian who in a discussion of the miniseries referred to the Holocaust as “the Nazi genocide,” but 
Linenthal does not consider that the popularization of this phrase—Nazi genocide—may have been a 
primary objective in an informational campaign that sought to establish a discourse about genocide through 
the memory of the Holocaust. See: Ibid.  
 
42 The so-called Hitler quote, which questions on the eve of WWII if anybody still spoke of what happened 
to the Armenians, functions as a magnifier of Armenian victimhood and a decontextualized suggestion that 
what Hitler intended to accomplish in WWII was somehow encouraged by the failure of the international 





treatment of the Holocaust’s memory is made more conspicuously odd when paired with 
the genocide scholarship’s claim that the effort to compare the Holocaust to other events 
is warranted by a “scientific method.”43 In the first editorial of the first genocide journal, 
HGS, Yehuda Bauer, a scholar of the Holocaust who acted as the journal’s editor, poses 
as foundational the question “whether ‘Holocaust’ and ‘genocide’ are interchangeable 
terms.”44 Thereby, the seeds were planted for a genocide discourse that bases itself on a 
                                                          
has been emphasized, its authenticity is doubted, especially when considering that the report of the 
President’s Commission used a later version of the “alleged” quote. See: Wiesel, Report, 5. Despite being 
an unproven comment, the quote’s supposed words in English are on display at the USHMM. This is a 
break of the promise made by the director of the USHMM during its planning and early days of operation, 
who in a co-authored book states that “The slightest doubt about the accuracy of the caption of a 
photograph, or about the provenance of an artifact led to its disqualification,” because “The quest for 
truthfulness and proven authenticity helped give the exhibition a very high degree of credibility.” See: 
Jeshajahu Weinberg and Rina Elieli, The Holocaust Museum in Washington (New York: Rizzoli 
International Publications in collaboration with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1995), 
153. Despite this assurance, the credibility of the USHMM was used to lend believability to a controversial 
comment that has never been confirmed as historically true. Furthermore, the book expresses a clear 
opposition to turning the USHMM into “a museum of genocide” for fear that it would unmark the “very 
delicate demarcation line” that “separates the appropriate use” of the Holocaust’s “metaphoric universality” 
from “its abuse.” See: Ibid., 19. Franklin Littell was the first to refer to Hitler in a genocide journal as part 
of the attempt to make the Holocaust comparable to the Armenian experience. Even though the quote 
suffered from an unproven status, Littell nonetheless expresses in an academic journal without qualification 
that “Hitler was well aware of the Armenian massacres,” and does not hesitate to speculate that “Hitler’s 
Holocaust was launched in awareness of the failure of ‘world opinion’ in respect to the Armenians.” See: 
Franklin H. Littell, “Holocaust and Genocide: The Essential Dialectic,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2, 
no. 1 (1987): 98. Before contributing to the first genocide journal, HGS, Littell was on the advisory board 
of the President’s Commission and on the organizing committee of the first international conference on 
genocide. See: Wiesel, Report, 38; Israel W. Charny and Shamai Davidson, eds., The Book of the 
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide: The Conference Program and Crisis (Tel Aviv: 
Institute of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, 1983), 7. Littell’s involvement in 
both government policy and academic production provides one straight line that connects between the 
report of the President’s Commission and the genocide scholarship that later executed its recommendations. 
In a review of a book on Hitler and the Armenians, a scholar tries to support the believability of the quote 
by pointing out that the American journalist who produced the quote, Louis P. Lochner, “had excellent 
contacts with German officials during the war,” but he does not address Lochner’s affiliation with the 
Associated Press whose general mission is an effort to connect between American-sourced information and 
global knowledge. See: David Myers, review of Hitler and the Armenian Genocide, by Kevork Bardakijan, 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2, no. 1 (1987): 176. The genocide scholarship does not shy away from 
conjecture to promote the Armenian experience as a case of genocide, such as stating confidently that 
Hitler “knew quite a lot about the Armenian Genocide.” See: Smith, “How,” 102. For a discussion of 
Hitler’s alleged quote in the context of international law, see: Chapter 5, section titled “The Scholarly 
Discourse.” 
 
43 Littell, “Holocaust,” 99. 
 





genericized view of the Holocaust.45 Following its repeated insistence on presenting the 
Holocaust as a genocide among genocides,46 there was momentum for degrading the 
                                                          
scholars, such as Omer Bartov and Yehuda Bauer, have developed a different point of view and have 
demonstrated that they are open to comparative analysis with other cases of genocide.” See: Jacques 
Semelin, “Around the ‘G’ Word: From Raphael Lemkin’s Definition to Current Memorial and Academic 
Controversies,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 26. Not only is the comparability 
of the Holocaust viewed favorably form this perspective, it also gives the impression of the comparative 
approach being the result of research decisions made by certain key individual scholars of the Holocaust 
rather than recognize the connection between the President’s Commission and the editorial direction that is 
expressed by Bauer in HGS’ first issue.  
 
45 To make the generic view of the Holocaust as a genocide appear as if academically legitimate rather than 
politically decreed, scholars such as Vigen Guroian are given platform to state that “In recent years 
prominent writers on the Holocaust have established a comparability of the Armenian Genocide with the 
Holocaust.” See: Guroian, “Post-Holocaust,” 305. Later, Bauer himself comments that “The Armenian 
Genocide at the hands of the Young Turkish regime in World War I has been receiving more and more 
attention in recent years,” and uses the passive “has been receiving” as if not by design, and as if he did not 
have a part in the discourse’s design. See: Yehuda Bauer, review of The History of the Armenian Genocide, 
by Vahakn N. Dadrian, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 10, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 331. This has the effect 
of presenting the comparability as a bottom-up scholarly endeavor while ignoring the United States 
government’s involvement in commissioning this comparative literature. Bauer himself played a role in 
turning the genocide label of the Armenian victimhood into a popular one. For instance, in Linenthal’s 
account of the debate on using the USHMM to give expression to the genocide discourse about the 
Armenians, the text of a letter from Bauer to Ben Meed is featured and it has the effect of leading readers to 
assume that the Armenian suffering ought to be characterized as genocide. Moreover, it presents Bauer as 
morally guided and the Turks as forceful. After putting forth Bauer’s mention in the letter to Meed of 
Turkish pressure on Jews in Jerusalem, London, Istanbul, and Washington, Linenthal adds that “Bauer 
cautioned him [Meed] that the ‘denial of other people’s genocides would expose us to a tremendous wave 
of criticism, and would be morally absolutely contemptible.” Linenthal, Preserving, 234-235. In this 
fashion, Bauer’s cultural agency is used to affect public opinion on the popular labeling of the Armenian 
victimhood as genocide without even having to engage in a discussion of historical detail. The writing and 
publishing of a letter in this way can be an effective form of persuasion because readers are more likely to 
be persuaded by a statement when it seems like the source of information was not written to influence them 
directly. Thus, this letter is exemplary of indirect influence that is the theoretical marker of soft power. 
Through this letter, Linenthal’s readers were more likely to be persuaded of the narrative because the 
author of the information, Bauer, was presented as highly credible on different levels: as an independent 
expert, a moral actor, and as one who did not even try to influence the opinion of the book’s readers. The 
publication of Bauer’s letter enabled a discourse about the Holocaust and a credible scholar who has no 
expertise in the study of Ottoman history to have an effect on public opinion regarding the use of 
“genocide” in the Ottoman Armenian context, and this amounts to the very politicization of Holocaust 
memory that was reportedly a vocalized matter of concern for members of the American Jewish 
community. Linenthal’s book contains references that strengthen assumptions toward the popular usage of 
“genocide” regarding the Armenian victimhood, be it through the direct use of the genocide label in this 
context or by presenting the Turks as active blockers of memory. For example, see: Ibid., 229-232. As 
shown in this chapter, it is a trait of the genocide scholarship to treat the Turkish refutation of the genocide 
label as a Turkish campaign to interfere with collective memory, as if the popular usage of “genocide” is a 
necessary element in the memory of the Ottoman Armenian experience.  
 
46 Even when it might appear as though Bauer is arguing for the uniqueness of the Holocaust by stating that 
unlike the Nazi Germans “The Turks never planned the murder of Armenians outside of Turkey,” it has the 
effect of using the Holocaust memory as a pivot for a discourse that calls attention to what Turks did to 





stature of the Holocaust’s memory and its value to society.47     
Moreover, in accordance with the task that it was commissioned to perform, the 
genocide scholarship demotes Holocaust studies. The President’s Commission signaled 
what soon manifested itself as the direct politicization of Holocaust studies.48 However, 
in a manner that denies knowledge of the guided process in which “genocide” as a topic 
of study was initially carried by the achievements of the scholarly work on the Holocaust, 
                                                          
mention a myriad of other events of civilian mass deaths that are not mentioned when the Holocaust is 
compared to the Armenian experience exclusively. See: Yehuda Bauer, “Essay: On the Place of the 
Holocaust in History (In Honour of Franklin H. Littell),” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2, no. 2 (1987): 
215. This leads to a chain reaction in which scholars who wish to publish are drawn into participating in 
this debate about the Holocaust’s comparability to the Armenian experience, and, whether they agree with 
the comparison or not, their published work has the effect of thickening the volume of information about it 
and the top-down forcing of a discourse about the Holocaust as a comparable genocide. To this effect, 
Bauer maintains that the Holocaust is different while emphasizing that it is a genocide among genocides, 
and not the only genocide. Thus, Bauer is empowered without specification of a clear authority to claim 
about the Armenian experience that “Clearly, this is more than genocide.” See: Ibid., 217. Over the years, 
the genocide scholarship would mix the Holocaust together in a sentence with the new legally recognized 
cases of genocide as well the Armenian experience that has no legal standing as genocide. This has the 
effect of presenting information on a level that washes away distinction between “genocide” cases. For 
instances of such lists, see: Stacey Gibson, “The Role of Structure and Institutions in the Genocide of the 
Rwandan Tutsi and the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 4 
(December 2003): 503; Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 98; Donald Bloxham, “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, 
Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 22, no. 2 (Fall 
2008): 208; Üngör, “Team,” 32; Üngör, “Studying,” 69. In both cases, Üngör presents the list as the 
subjects of “much useful research.” More recently, even Darfur has been added to such lists of “genocides” 
alongside the Holocaust. See: Hirsch, “Preventing,” 2. The genocide scholarship has even engaged in a 
provocative—and otherwise randomly selected—comparison between the Holocaust and the Nakba. See: 
Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg, “Deliberating the Holocaust and the Nakba: Disruptive Empathy and 
Binationalism in Israel/Palestine,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 1 (January 2014): 77-99.  
 
47 One genocide scholar states that “…things like the Holocaust … are happening all the time.” See: David 
Moshman, “Conceptual Constraints on Thinking about Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, 3 
(2001): 448. In addition, another genocide scholar emphasizes that the Holocaust is not seen as “the 
landmark moment in the genealogy of genocide studies.” See: Hinton, “Critical,” 7. The academic license 
to subject the Holocaust to comparison paved the way for a claim that the Armenian experience in WWI 
“comes closer to the concept of holocaust than the Jewish one” because “Tens of thousands of Armenians 
were burned alive” whereas “in the Jewish case the gas chambers almost always preceded the ovens.” See: 
Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Convergent Aspects of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A 
Reinterpretation of the Concept of Holocaust,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3, no. 2 (1988): 165. 
 
48 The political use of an academic journal that carries the name of the Holocaust, HGS, manifested itself in 
the journal’s first issue. An interview with Elie Wiesel is used as a platform to criticize “The cynical 
attitude of the world with Cambodia” and to suggest that Pol Pot should not have representation in the 
United Nations. See: Harry J. Cargas, “An Interview with Elie Wiesel,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1, 





the genocide scholarship nowadays describes Holocaust studies as backward in 
comparison to genocide studies.49 Henry R. Huttenbach, who in the 1990s turned his 
focus from the Holocaust to genocide studies, campaigned as the editor of JGR for 
comparing the Holocaust as genocide to other events and berated the academic worth of 
Holocaust scholars who do not,50 even though his own monograph in 1981 on the 
Holocaust experience does not describe it as genocide even once, let alone demonstrate 
an inclination to compare its historical significance with other events.51 The genocide 
scholarship has instilled an overall sentiment that the focused study of the Holocaust is 
used to maintain the prominence of Jewish history in world history, and as if a 
euphemism for Jewish exceptionalism that is imposed on others.52  
                                                          
49 The genocide scholarship claims that “Scholarship on the Holocaust too often treats the subject as if it 
occurred in a vacuum, as an event to be reckoned with and analyzed on its own.” See: Christopher J. 
Fettweis, “War as Catalyst: Moving World War II to the Center of Holocaust Scholarship,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 5, no. 2 (June 2003): 225. The study of genocide is said to be social scientific while the 
study of the Holocaust is “more often linked to the humanities.” See: Hinton, “Critical,” 7. This has the 
effect of creating further separation between the two while looking down at Holocaust studies as a field that 
does not conform to methods of science as genocide studies. Heerten and Moses quote the sociologist and 
genocide scholar, Helen Fein, whose opinion it is that in the first international conference on the Holocaust 
in 1975 “the dominant position was that the Holocaust was unique, noncomparable and to some, non-
explicable as a historical event—viewed as mystifying or transcendent event.” See: Heerten and Moses, 
“Nigeria-Biafra,” 181. Meaning, by describing her view as “sober,” the later generation of genocide 
scholarship show one of the first genocide scholars as sensibly criticizing Holocaust studies. However, this 
attempt to brand Holocaust studies as unscientific is not based on the works that have been produced by 
Holocaust studies, but rather on the words of a sociologist-turned-genocide scholar whose work was in 
keeping with the agenda to pave the way for genocide studies as set out by the President’s Commission. 
Thus, when years later a genocide scholar argues against the “‘disunion’ between Holocaust and genocide 
studies,” it has the effect of further obliterating the trace of the political and organizational unity that 
originally set genocide studies on track. See: Tatz, “Genocide,” 232. 
   
50 For example, the opposition to subjecting the Holocaust to comparison is described by Huttenbach as 
“inherent logical fallacy” and “willed ignorance.” See: Huttenbach, “Editor: Apologia,” 9; Henry R. 
Huttenbach, “From the Editor: A Reply to Fackenheim (2). What is Holocaust Uniqueness? Can Other 
Genocides Be Unique?” Journal of Genocide Research 2, no. 1 (March 2000): 7.  
 
51 The lack of reference to “genocide” in Huttenbach’s book suggests that one of the most vocal proponents 
in academia of subjecting the Holocaust to comparisons as genocide himself had engaged in an exemplary 
historical study of the Holocaust before the genocide scholarship took shape. See: Henry R. Huttenbach, 
The Destruction of the Jewish Community of Worms, 1933-1945: A Study of the Holocaust Experience in 
Germany (New York: Memorial Committee of Jewish Victims of Nazism from Worms, 1981). 
  





Finally, in connection with its commitment to enable the use of the term genocide 
in its literature, the genocide scholarship denounces claims that the Holocaust is unique. 
The uniqueness of the Holocaust had not been a feature of the work by Holocaust 
scholars, but it was highlighted in the report of the President’s Commission in 
anticipation of a new discourse that seeks to consider the Holocaust in relation to other 
events.53 Meaning, the genocide scholarship has run an agenda to delegitimize claims of 
the Holocaust’s uniqueness as if made by Holocaust studies, even though the insistence 
on the Holocaust’s uniqueness was not explicit in the actual study of the Holocaust but 
rather it was made implicit by the great attention that was given to its scholarship.54 
Significantly, this debate is not a feature of Holocaust scholarship; it is sustained by the 
editorial direction within the genocide scholarship, which persistently reports a “still 
                                                          
the experience of the Australian Aborigines constituted genocide, preferring instead to consider that only 
the Holocaust can be so described.” See: Paul R. Bartrop, “The Holocaust, the Aborigines, and the 
Bureaucracy of Destruction: An Australian Dimension of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 
1 (March 2001): 83. The tone had been set by many editorials that carried claims to the same effect. As part 
of his incorporation of “genocide” into common language, Huttenbach leads readers to become suspicious 
of a Jewish agenda as he claims that “though other genocides have taken place, none of the survivors and 
scholars, other than those engaged in Holocaust research, have found it necessary to make a claim of 
uniqueness in a comparative, hierarchic sense.” See: Huttenbach, “Editor: A Reply,” 8.   
 
53 The uniqueness of the Holocaust was listed by the President’s Commission as one of two guiding 
principles, along with “the moral obligation to remember.” See: Wiesel, Report, 3.  
 
54 Therefore, it is questionable practice for the genocide scholarship to direct criticism against Jewish 
survivors and scholars who focus on the Holocaust rather than against those who determined that Holocaust 
studies would have a unique place in the education system, such as those who have power in the United 
States government. However, this other direction is not really an optional course of action, being that it is 
by commission of the United States government that the genocide scholarship itself was created, and the 
criticism against Holocaust studies had become ingrained in the field’s development of discourse. 
Accordingly, the genocide scholarship directs attention to implied or professed Jews who believe that the 
Holocaust is unique, and keeps silent on government policies that had elevated Holocaust studies before 
promoting genocide studies. For instance, in his quest to “improve the interpretive landscape of genocide,” 
Huttenbach decries that claims regarding the Holocaust’s uniqueness by “(ab)users” are a resurfacing 
“syndrome,” and claims that the use of uniqueness as a term in academia had long been discredited. See: 
Harry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: Uniqueness (Redux): Trivialization by Any Name,” Journal of 






ongoing debate about the uniqueness and incomparability of the Holocaust,”55 and by 
scholars who disagree with how the genocide scholarship has used the Holocaust’s 
meaning. The Jewish scholars who are drawn into the fray by the genocide scholarship 
are—by the nature of how the debate is structured—made to seem like poor professionals 
if not ethnocentric naysayers.56 The question of uniqueness is depicted by the genocide 
                                                          
55 Schaller, “Editor(s),” 246. 
 
56 Early on, the genocide scholarship presented the “Jewish theologian Emil Fackenheim” as one “who 
denies the plausibility of any comparison.” See: Dadrian, “Convergent,” 159. In a contribution to HGS a 
year later, Steven T. Katz argues that three cases of victimhood from before the twentieth century and three 
cases of victimhood during WWII are distinguishable from the Holocaust and are not genocidal, and his 
selection of cases was such that his essay during a formative time for the genocide scholarship’s discourse 
did not subject to examination the Armenian case of WWI, which he describes as one of the Holocaust’s 
“many apposite cases.” See: Steven T. Katz, “Essay: Quantity and Interpretation—Issues in the 
Comparative Historical Analysis of the Holocaust,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4, no. 2 (1989): 148. 
This means that while Katz’s work defends the distinguishability of the Holocaust, he took part in 
advancing the culture of comparative discourse regarding the Holocaust, and, significantly, invited the 
genocide scholarship to conduct further comparisons. Nonetheless, Katz is described as “The most extreme 
proponent of limiting the term genocide” for thinking that “the Nazi extermination of European Jews is the 
only case of genocide in world history.” See: J. Otto Pohl, “Stalin’s Genocide against the ‘Repressed 
Peoples’,” Journal of Genocide Research 2, no. 2 (June 2000): 271. For similar references to Katz, see: 
Feierstein, “Leaving,” 258; Semelin, “‘G’,” 26. Huttenbach casts doubt about Katz’s scholarship for his 
role in creating “a hierarchy of massacres over which the Holocaust reigns supreme, incomparable, unique, 
with its own definition that applies only to itself.” See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: Towards a 
Conceptual Definition of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 2 (June 2002): 168. In 
continuation of this line of argument, Katz’s “methodological basis” is said to have “internal 
contradictions” and “an inconsistent conceptual system.” See: Daniel Blatman, “Holocaust Scholarship: 
Towards a Post-Uniqueness Era,” Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 1 (March 2015): 25. Similarly, 
Guenter Lewy is accused of having a “transparent historical agenda—to define away any genocide that is 
not the Holocaust” and of setting out “to impose a more limited idea of genocide to fit a more truncated 
approach to history.” See: Tony Barta, “With Intent to Deny: Colonial Intentions and Genocide Denial,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (March 2008): 111. In his reply, Lewy states that he considers the 
cases of Cambodia and Rwanda to have been genocides. See: Günter Lewy, “Reply to Tony Barta, Norbert 
Finzsch and David Stannard,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 307. Lewy is even 
associated with failing to adapt to a changing academic environment, as he is called “one of the last of a 
disappearing breed: the extreme ‘uniqueness’ advocate determined to assert—in the face of contrary and 
increasingly overwhelming fact and logic—that, of all the mass killings that have ever occurred in the 
history of the world, only Holocaust, or more precisely the Shoah, rose to the level of true ‘genocide.’” See: 
Stannard, “De’ja,” 127. Stannard also suggests that Lewy’s work “cannot be taken seriously” if he does not 
read up on the works by genocide scholars. See: Ibid., 129. A unique “Corrigendum” in JGR’s history notes 
that Lewy misstated Ben Kiernan’s position, and its uniqueness is reflective of an unusual effort to 
diminish Lewy’s credibility as a scholar. Ironically, the “Corrigendum” misspells Kiernan’s name twice, 
and one of the two errors is falsely related to a Lewy quote. See: “Corrigendum,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 339. The following issue of JGR did not feature a corrigendum about the 
errors in the “Corrigendum.” Katz and Lewy are paired together by the genocide scholarship to stress that 
these scholars argue “that only Jews were victims of genocide and all Jews were victims of a total genocide 
in the Holocaust or Hebrew Shoah.” See: Travis, “Original,” 32. Thus, the scholars of the Holocaust—





scholarship also as an inter-Jewish debate,57 but altogether this discursive setting in 
which Jews are shown to be arguing for their special status among victims has the 
markings of fodder for anti-Semitism.      
The following questions about the role of Holocaust memory and study in the 
genocide discourse are left unasked by the genocide scholarship, despite their 
significance toward the understanding of how “genocide” is being used in academia: 
What was the status of the term genocide in public opinion before the President’s 
Commission promoted a template for erecting a genocide discourse on the basis of 
genericizing the Holocaust and subjecting it to comparisons, especially with the 
Armenian experience? What work had been done to prepare the Armenian victimhood in 
WWI for comparison with the Holocaust prior to the President’s Commission? How did 
leading Jewish scholars and leaders of the Jewish community agree to take part in making 
the Holocaust subject to systematic comparison in academic literature? What does the 
willingness to promote genocide studies suggest about the relationship between the 
                                                          
keepers of an old and unscholarly Jewish favoritism in academia. In contrast, the genocide scholarship—by 
virtue of its opposition to their practice—is made to seem like a liberating force. The genocide scholarship 
describes “Holocaust uniqueness” as a “scientifically irrelevant thesis.” See: Dominik J. Schaller, “From 
the Editors: Judges and Politicians as Historians?” Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 1 (March 2007): 1. 
However, it is questionable that all scholars who disapprove of the works in which certain events are 
selectively compared to the Holocaust as genocide are necessarily professing a “thesis” of the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness by doing so. The argument that the subjection of the Holocaust to selective comparisons is a 
flawed project does not rely on adopting any claims that the uniqueness of the Holocaust is scientific.      
 
57 In a unique publication of a “letter to the editor” in JGR, Israel Charny is given a platform to speak as a 
Jew who rebukes Jews for their “exclusive and exclusionary” view of what counts as genocide and say that 
“there is no other genocide than the genocide to (us) Jews.” See: Israel W. Charny, “Letter to the Editor,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 2 (June 2002): 303. However, Jews do not commonly formulate 
sentences about the Holocaust by using the term genocide. Charny, with the credibility of being a Jew, is 
relating to Jews a sentiment within a debate that was imposed by the needs of the genocide scholarship. It is 
the genocide scholarship, not the Holocaust scholarship, that advertises this debate in its specific 
manifestation between Charny and Katz, as in Feierstein, “Leaving,” 258. To add to the sense of a Jewish 
debate about uniqueness, Raphael Lemkin, whose Jewishness is pronounced by the genocide scholarship 
(see: section titled Raphael Lemkin’s Centrality in the Origination of the Term), is said to have opposed 






United States government and Holocaust studies? What American interests were served 
by instituting genocide studies?  
 
The Armenian Focus 
Through the imposed subjection of the Holocaust to comparison, the genocide 
scholarship has focused on the dissemination of a narrative regarding the Armenians as 
victims of genocide in WWI. In the three genocide journals there is almost no reference 
to the organization Facing History and Ourselves, despite its service as a preliminary 
platform for the formulation of the Holocaust’s comparison to the Armenian experience 
in information that passes as education. The single and brief discussion of this 
organization’s work does not conceal its association with, and promotion by, the United 
States government, but the overall direction of the text is to praise rather than critically 
evaluate the organization’s work.58 Accordingly, from the early days of the genocide 
scholarship in academic journals, the comparison of the Holocaust to the Armenian 
experience has been conducted self-assuredly,59 which is uncharacteristic of scientific 
research and indicative of undisclosed empowerment. In addition, to make the 
                                                          
58 Reference is made to “the Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation” as having been “designed 
in 1976 with US Department of Education funds” and that “Since 1981, the US Department of Education 
has cited Facing History and Ourselves as an exemplary model teacher training program,” and readers are 
informed that the organization “has been working diligently” to produce a “widely acclaimed” educational 
material. See: Samuel Totten, review of Facing History and Ourselves: Elements of Time, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 5, no. 4 (1990): 463. Totten does not ask why the organization, under the direct approval 
and support of the United States government, decided to unprecedentedly produce and incorporate a 
narrative about the Armenians as victims of genocide into an educational program on the Holocaust. The 
function of Facing History and Ourselves within the development of the use of “genocide” is put into 
context here in Chapter 5, section titled “The Scholarly Discourse.”  
 
59 For instance, the casual reference to them as “the two episodes of genocide.” See: Dadrian, 
“Convergent,” 160. Later, other works simply refer to them without distinction as “these two cases of 







randomness of the discourse less apparent, the language on the Armenian experience has 
borrowed key words and phrasing from the historical narrative that had been the work of 
Holocaust studies.60   
 The most blatant form of mimicry is the genocide scholarship’s use of “denial,”61 
which is an accusation that imposes strongly negative connotations on whomever it is 
made due to its traditional use in relation to those who question the findings of Holocaust 
research. Significantly, there is a difference between “Holocaust denial” and the denial 
                                                          
60 For example, in the second issue of HGS, an article features the role of Turkish physicians, and a claim is 
made that they “displayed inordinate cruelty,” though this condemnation is based on the recollection of an 
Armenian who overheard a Turkish physician express his hatred of Armenians in 1919. See: Vahakn N. 
Dadrian, “The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1, no. 2 (1986): 181. Similarly, the idea that in the Holocaust Jews were 
persecuted for who they were as a group and not for any action or position as a group is copied in the 
statement that the “Armenians were annihilated—because they were Armenians.” See: Huttenbach, 
“Locating,” 290. Also, use of the word survivor has been copied to the effect of leading readers to consider 
Armenian survivors as having an elevated status of victimhood by drawing a rhetorical resemblance to 
Holocaust survivors. See: Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, “The Armenian and Rwandan 
Genocides: Some Preliminary Reflections on Two Oral History Projects with Survivors,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (March 2004): 135-140; Robert Melson, review of Armenia Golgotha, by 
Grigoris Balakian, Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 123; Katherine Goldsmith, 
“The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and Its Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based Approach,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 3 
(Winter 2010): 238; Üngör, “Studying,” 70; Roger W. Smith, “Introduction: The Ottoman Genocides of 
Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks,” Genocide Studies International 9, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 8; Taner 
Akçam, “A Short History of the Torossian Debate,” Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 3 (September 
2015): 357. 
 
61 Each of the three genocide journals has published dozens of references to “denial” directed at the Turkish 
government, and recently the accusation of denial was featured in Smith, “How,” 100-104. Smith alerts that 
“there also seems to be a major effort to infiltrate both publishers and graduate programs to promote denial 
of the Armenian Genocide.” See: Ibid., 103. This accusation singles out Turkish Americans for the practice 
of funding research even though it is common knowledge that academic research requires and receives 
funding from those who are interested in seeing particular research be carried out. Also, this statement 
lacks recognition that the publication of Smith’s own work and the control of the genocide discourse 
altogether are the creation of power that is evidently greater than that of the Turkish government. 
Elsewhere, Smith, Markusen, and Lifton regard scholarly work that is approved by the Turkish government 
to be “the subversion of scholarship” and the substitution of “a narrative of power for the search for truth.” 
See: Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 2. This is another text that associates Smith with utter 
disregard for his own source of empowerment as a discourse-shaping scholar while depicting Turkey as the 
only active political power for its efforts to challenge the discourse. Similarly, a scholar’s claim of a 
subversive “attempt to rewrite the past” by Turkish power is unaccompanied by acknowledgment of the 
power that has written and rewritten the past prior to the Turkish reaction, and that power’s interests. See 






that the Armenian victimhood is to be characterized as genocide: “Holocaust” is used as a 
name for the event, and to deny the Holocaust is to claim that the event did not happen, 
such as saying that no gas chambers were used by the Nazi Germans against their 
victims; “genocide” is not a name but a term of legal meaning, and despite the genocide 
scholarship’s use of the word with an uppercase letter G as part of how the Armenian 
experience is recalled, to say that the Armenian expulsions and massacres in WWI did 
not amount to genocide is not like saying that the event itself did not happen.62 The 
genocide scholarship might not recognize this difference, but the dissimilarity in quality 
between the two uses of “denial” is such that the rebuke of Holocaust denial is an effort 
to shun ideological refusals to acknowledge historical findings, whereas the manipulation 
of the denial label by the genocide scholarship is an attempt to piggyback on Holocaust 
terminology to the effect of excluding those who disagree with the assignment of the 
genocide label.63 The hurling of “denialism” against the Turkish government and scholars 
                                                          
62 This distinction was made by the European Court of Human Rights, which found that the contestation of 
the genocide label in the Ottoman Armenian context is not the same as the denial of “historical facts” in the 
context of the Holocaust. See: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Perinçek v. Switzerland, 
Judgment, December 17, 2013, par. 117. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":["001-139724"]} 
(accessed, 3/12/2017). For a discussion of this case here, see: Chapter 6, section titled “Genocide Labels vs. 
Human Rights.” 
 
63 The ability to present disagreement as denial is reflective of the power that the genocide scholarship has 
to control the discourse. For example, the genocide scholarship marginalizes Guenter Lewy’s work by 
insinuating that he is “lured to power” at the expense of integrity, and branding him as a “researcher 
attempting to deny the Armenian genocide,” while ascribing to itself the search “for the truth.” See: Joseph 
A. Kéchichian, “The Armenian Genocide and an Updated Denial Initiative: A Review Essay,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention 2, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 173. Similarly, the Turkish Studies Project at the 
University of Utah under the supervision of M. Hakan Yavuz is accused of being “a denialist beachhead” 
that undermines “the historicity of the Armenian Genocide.” See: Marc A. Mamigonian, “Academic Denial 
of the Armenian Genocide in American Scholarship: Denialism as Manufactured Controversy,” Genocide 
Studies International 9, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 68-69. Yavuz is accused of “efforts to deny that Armenians 
suffered genocide,” whereas the Turkish Coalition of America, whose funding established the project, is 
accused of being “an organization that aggressively attacks the truth of the Armenian Genocide.” See: 
Richard G. Hovannisian, “Denial of the Armenian Genocide 100 Years Later: The New Practitioners and 
Their Trade,” Genocide Studies International 9, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 233. These accusations show the 
tendency of the genocide scholarship in the Armenian discourse to conflate the intellectually forced use of 





who are associated with Turkish funding is consistent with expectations that the public 
holds Turkophobic notions believable.64 
 In the Armenian context, genocide scholars do not seem to have the ability to 
articulate what precisely is being denied.65 Is someone’s conviction for having committed 
the crime of genocide being denied? There are references that present this as the basis for 
the genocide-denial accusation,66 but not a single member of the Ottoman government 
has ever been charged with the crime of genocide by a competent tribunal. Is the use of 
“genocide” as part of an event’s name being denied? There are peculiar suggestions that 
“the Armenian Genocide” is being denied,67 as if the phrase itself is a matter of historical 
                                                          
necessarily means the denial of history, suffering, or truth.  
 
64 This is accentuated in a suspicion-riddled formulation of “the legacy of genocide,” in a platform for 
echoing Peter Balakian’s impression of Turks. See: Rouben Paul Adalian, review of Black Dog of Fate, A 
Memoir, by Peter Balakian, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 185-186.   
 
65 For instance, one scholar writes in the late 1980s about “the Turkish denial of 70 years,” dating back to 
the late 1910s, long before the advent of the term genocide. See: Guroian, “Post-Holocaust,” 310. This 
indicates that there is a confusion by the genocide scholarship between accusations regarding the “denial” 
of genocide allegations and accusations regarding the “denial” of historical events. The two are treated like 
they are the same, but they are not.   
 
66 For example, Vahakn Dadrian writes about “a crime still denied by official Turkish statesmen,” and that 
view is later reiterated and affirmed by another scholar in a separate article, saying that “as Vahakn Dadrian 
has pointed out, an unpunished crime encourages its repetition.” See: Dadrian, “Role,” 169; Kurt 
Jonassohn, “Prevention without Prediction,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 6. 
Later, Dadrian again simply refers to “the crime” as if to suggest genocide. See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The 
Signal Facts Surrounding the Armenian Genocide and the Turkish Denial Syndrome,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 5, no. 2 (June 2003): 269. 
 
67 For instance, it is said that “Turks, past and present, deny the historical reality of the Armenian 
genocide.” See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Determinants of the Armenian Genocide,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 1, no. 1 (March 1999): 66. Previously, it was more common for genocide scholars to use the 
phrase “Armenian genocide” without an uppercase letter G, but the usage of it is more prevalent now and 
has the effect of making the phrase appear to be more like a name. It is the genocide scholarship that turns 
into language the idea of denial, as in the phrasings “Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide” or “Denial 
of the Armenian Genocide,” or “the Turkish government’s denial of the Armenian Genocide.” See: Smith, 
Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” title, 3; Theriault, “Universal,” 241; Israel W. Charny, “A 
Classification of Denials of the Holocaust and Other Genocides,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 
(March 2003): 11, 15; Robert Melson, “Responses to the Armenian Genocide: America, the Yishuv, 
Israel,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 103-104, 109-110. Donna-Lee Frieze, 
“Cycles of Genocide, Stories of Denial: Atom Egoyan’s Ararat,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, no. 2 





truth, but the choice of a name is not an inherent part of what happened, and the 
disagreement over this choice of a name—for it is a name that is used to falsely imply 
legal culpability of a particular kind—is a matter of Turkish protest, not denial. Is the 
memory of history being denied? There is an unexplained belief that deeming the use of 
the term genocide in the Armenian context to be inappropriate for its political motivation 
and lack of legal backing is the same as being dismissive of recalling the past,68 but even 
the genocide scholarship recognizes—though in a minimal manner—that Turkey has 
expressed an interest in the establishment of an international committee of historians for 
                                                          
Realist Ethics,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 203; Theriault, “Grain,” 134; 
Peter Balakian, “Raphael Lemkin, Cultural Destruction, and the Armenian Genocide,” Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 27, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 73-74; Robert Melson, “Recent Developments in the Study of 
the Armenian Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 27, no. 2 (Fall 2013): 314; Smith, “Genocide 
Denial,” 107-108; Mamigonian, “Academic,” 61, 63, 77; Hovannisian, “Denial,” title; Smith, “How,” 101, 
103. The title of one article states “The Truth of the Armenian Genocide.” See: Rubina Peroomian, “The 
Truth of the Armenian Genocide in Edgar Hilsenrath’s Fiction,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 2 
(June 2003), title. Also, a statement such as “the truth of the Armenian Genocide” is found in Taner 
Akçam, “Short,” 353. However, it is unclear what exactly is meant by the truth of a phrase such as 
“Armenian Genocide,” which is separate from the historical event itself. This lack of discernment later 
manifested itself in a nation-state’s law: “Despite Turkish protests, the French National Assembly enacted a 
law prohibiting the denial of the Armenian Genocide in October 2006.” See: Schaller, “Editors: Judges,” 1-
2.    
 
68 An example of how the use of the term genocide is imposed on the memory of what happened is found in 
a statement such as “the Armenian Genocide was relegated to the memory hole.” Melson, “Responses,” 
103. Another work adds the idea of “the nation’s martyrdom” to the merger of memory and “genocide.” 
See: Simon Payaslian, “The Destruction of the Armenian Church during the Genocide,” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 1, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 164. One editorial recognizes “The involvement of genocide 
researchers in memory politics” as possibly being “problematic,” but deflects the problematic aspect of it to 
competition among “victim-groups and their lobbies” rather than the role of the genocide scholarship. See: 
Schaller, “Editor(s),” 246. Even a “Call for Papers” is used to cement the language that fuses together 
memory and “genocide”: “And although the Turkish state still denies the Armenian Genocide, the event 
has entered the realm of global collective memory.” See: “Announcement,” 347. The text of the genocide 
scholarship casually suggests that there is a “memory and memorialization of the genocide.” See: Burcu 
Münyas, “Genocide in the Minds of Cambodian Youth: Transmitting (Hi)stories of Genocide to Second 
and Third Generations in Cambodia,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 3 (September 2008): 414. In a 
more recent article, the text makes use of an exclamation mark to mobilize readers in its passionate appeal 
against “the goal” of Turkish governments “to prevent the recognition of the Armenian Genocide”: “It is 
time to say ‘Enough! You do not have monopoly over the historical memory of the people of the region!’” 
See: Seyla Benhabib, “Of Jews, Turks and Armenians: Entangled Memories—A Personal Recollection,” 






the task of closely examining the catastrophe and the circumstances that led to it.69 These 
three claims of denialism are bundled together by the genocide scholarship, but they 
present different arguments, and neither of them involves outright rejections of history by 
those who are accused of denial.  
 The claim that there is a systematic denial of “the Armenian Genocide” marks the 
area of the debate around the assumption that the title is a matter of fact, thereby leading 
attention away from questions regarding the purpose and process behind this dubious use 
of a legal term. Reference to the Armenian experience as genocide is made dozens of 
times in each of the genocide journals, but it is an anachronistic and unconventional use 
of the term genocide. It is anachronistic not only in the sense that it makes an allegation 
of genocide regarding an event that took place before the term genocide was invented or 
made into a crime but also in the way that the genocide scholarship dresses its 
descriptions of history with the word genocide to give a false impression that the term 
was used at the time that is being described.70 The use of the term genocide is literally 
                                                          
69 The text mentions the agreement between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Turkey in 2009, the 
result of the “football diplomacy” that was engaged in 2008. The agreement involved setting up “an 
impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives,” but the idea was not implemented. 
See: Khatchik DerGhougassian, “Genocide and Identity (Geo)Politics: Bridging State Reasoning and 
Diaspora Activism,” Genocide Studies International 8, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 193-194. 
   
70 For instance, Vahakn Dadrian refers to a text by a member of the anti-Ottoman organization NILI, which 
comprised of several Jews who cooperated with the British during WWI, as an account that records “the 
Armenian genocide,” thereby manipulating the simple truth that the operative, Absalom Feinberg, did not 
use the term genocide in his account well ahead of the term’s invention. See: Dadrian, “Convergent,” 156. 
Other such misuses of the term genocide are related to the legal procedures following WWI: “After World 
War I, Turkey tried and condemned the leading figures that had been responsible for the Armenian 
genocide.” See: Jonassohn, “Prevention,” 10-11. Also: “…the British had him arrested through the Turkish 
Court Martial authorities then investigating the Armenian Genocide.” See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Secret 
Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 175. Similarly, Israel Charny’s language 
superimposes “genocide” on newspaper reports from 1915: “New York Times reports of the Armenian 
Genocide in the period from 1915 … detail the day-to-day progress of the genocide.” See: Charny, 
“Classification,” 11. Two articles present an example of the anachronistic use of genocide to create a 
falsehood by tampering with the presentation of a court decision. In one: “…the proceedings of the Turkish 





unconventional because, contrary to Article 6 of the Genocide Convention, which states 
that the charge of genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal,”71 the genocide 
scholarship has popularized “the Armenian Genocide” as a phrase without there being a 
record of a competent tribunal finding that the Armenians were victims of genocide.72 
Thus, the genocide scholarship has turned the charge of genocide from a legally defined 
and internationally agreed upon procedure to a matter that is decided by whoever has the 
power to spread information effectively and control common language.73  
                                                          
implemented its scheme of genocide.” See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Turkish Military Tribunal’s 
Prosecution of the Authors of the Armenian Genocide: Four Major Court-Martial Series,” Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 53. In the other: “The latter include the verdict of the Turkish 
Military Court which convicted some of the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide…” See: Richard J. 
Goldstone, review of Encyclopedia of Genocide, edited by Israel W. Charny, Journal of Genocide 
Research 4, no. 2 (June 2002): 261. In an editorial, the readers are asked to “Imagine a scholarly 
conference on the Armenian genocide convened in April 1943 and making no mention of the Warsaw 
Ghetto Uprising!” even though it is an absolute anachronism to suggest that the now popular phrase 
“Armenian genocide” existed at that time. See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: Remembering (the 
Shoah) and Forgetting (the Itsembambor),” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 1 (March 2005): 3. Long 
after such texts have had their effect on readers in establishing the popular usage of “genocide” in relation 
to the Armenians, one work of the genocide scholarship clarifies that “When the Armenian massacres took 
place, the term ‘genocide’ did not yet exist.” See: Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 94.   
 
71 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 6. The unconventional quality of the use is not widely considered because the discourse that 
refers to the Armenian experience as genocide is dominant. Language manipulations make the use of the 
term appear as if it is conventional. For example, it is said that the Armenian case is “a well-documented 
genocide,” even though it has never been documented as genocide by a competent tribunal, and what is 
referred to as “genocide” by the genocide scholarship is merely the genocide scholars’ own interpretation 
of certain documents. See: Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 12. Also, debates that are 
manufactured by the genocide scholarship lead to assumptions that the use of the term genocide is 
unquestioned. For instance, the minidebate in the genocide scholarship about whether or not the Armenian 
experience is “the first genocide of the twentieth century” is an example of a question whose formulation 
alone suggests that the use of “genocide” is to be taken as an accepted practice: “The claim that the 
Armenian Genocide was the first of the twentieth century is open to debate.” See: Jonathan Markovitz, 
“Ararat and Collective Memories of the Armenian Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 20, no. 2 
(Fall 2006): 250 (note 2). Thus, the question in people’s minds is not why there is a genocide discourse 
about this event, but rather the genocide label is treated as an established fact in the question about the 
event’s place among genocides. 
 
72 In a list that is ambitiously titled “The genocide studies canon,” the Armenian experience is the only 
one—out of over twenty cases mentioned—whose name includes “Genocide.” Also, the case that is labeled 
as “Armenian Genocide” is categorized together with “Rwanda” and the “Holocaust” as “The Triad.” See: 
Hinton, “Critical,” 13 (Figure 1).  
 
73 This is reflected in how the popular American search sites online, Bing.com and Google.com, direct their 





By its insistence on using the term genocide, the genocide scholarship affects the 
historiographical focus in two main ways. First, it determines what aspects of Armenian 
and WWI history are emphasized. The study of the relevant history has been defined in 
terms of a perpetrator-victim dichotomy that portrays the Ottoman government as the 
main actor and villain.74 The use of genocide perpetration as the discourse’s main 
assumption directs the research toward an examination of the Ottoman governing 
choices, especially during WWI. Genocide scholars are rewarded for speculating about 
                                                          
top option to complete the search, and “cucumber” as the second suggestion from top. The typing of 
“Jewish” does not yield a suggestion of “genocide” to complete the search, but “calendar” on top in 
Bing.com, and “holidays 2016” on top in Google.com. By typing “genocide in” in Bing.com, “darfur” (as 
in, Darfur) is the top option that is suggested, and in Google.com, “darfur” is second from top after 
“rwanda” (as in, Rwanda), even though no competent tribunal has ever found any member of the Sudanese 
government guilty of genocide. These searches were made on 8/22/2016. 
 
74 For example, see: Bauer, “Editor’s Introduction,” 2; Dadrian, “Role,” 169, 182; Smith, Markusen, and 
Lifton, “Professional,” 12-13; Vahakn N. Dadrian, “The Agency of ‘Triggering Mechanisms’ as a Factor in 
the Organization of the Genocide against the Armenians of Kayseri District,” Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 1, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 107, 122; Daniel Marc Segesser, “Dissolve or Punish? The 
International Debate amongst Jurists and Publicists on the Consequences of the Armenian Genocide for the 
Ottoman Empire, 1915-23,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (March 2008): 97, 101, 106; Bloxham, 
“Organized,” 225; Theriault, “Albright-Cohen,” 203; Armen T. Marsoobian, “Acknowledging 
Intergenerational Moral Responsibility in the Aftermath of Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, 
no. 2 (Summer 2009): 219; Moses, “Revisiting,” 294; Anton Weiss-Wendt and Uğur Ümit Üngör, 
“Collaboration in Genocide: The Ottoman Empire 1915-1915, the German-Occupied Baltic 1914-1944, and 
Rwanda 1994,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 25, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 425; Wolfgang Gust, “The 
Question of an Armenian Revolution and the Radicalization of the Committee of Union and Progress 
toward the Armenian Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 2-3 (Summer-Winter 2012): 261; 
Robert Melson, “Contending Interpretations Concerning the Armenian Genocide: Continuity and 
Conspiracy, Discontinuity and Cumulative Radicalization,” Genocide Studies International 9, no. 1 (Spring 
2015): 13. In some of the references listed above, the notion of a “perpetrator state” might be interpreted as 
directed against the Turkish government as if a continuation of the Ottoman government. A comment that 
“a manicheistic divide between purely evil perpetrators and purely good victims is not at all helpful in 
explaining process of mass violence,” is a hyperbolic presentation of the dichotomy that might have the 
effect of convincing readers of a critical approach, but appears hollow when one considers the dichotomous 
essence of the body of work that has been produced by the genocide scholarship in general, and this scholar 
in particular. See: Üngör, “Studying,” 70. The perpetrator-victim dichotomy also means that the genocide 
scholarship is able to regard the Armenians as a victim group that is separate from the powerful Entente, 
and thus, for example, put forth an argument that “facts” are against the claim “that the Armenians actually 
posed an existential threat to the Ottoman Empire.” See: Mamigonian, “Academic,” 81 (note 101). An 
existential threat might seem unlikely if coming from a victim group, but when the Ottoman Armenians are 
seen as an extension of a powerful onslaught on the Ottoman government then it is seen that “an existential 






the intention of the Ottoman government.75 The intensification of relations between the 
Ottoman government and the Armenian minority are explained by pointing at a Turkish 
ideological drive against the Armenians that is based on either ethnical, national, racial or 
religious motives, as if to fit the description in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention.76 
                                                          
75 For instance, the statement that “In any debate over whether or not the events on [sic] 1915 should be 
considered genocide, the question requiring an answer is whether there was an intent to exterminate.” See: 
Akçam, “Guenter,” 119. Also notable is the certainty with which it is stated that “The decision to destroy 
the Armenians was driven by the intent and ideology of the decision makers and by their adapting their 
plans to changing circumstance.” See: Melson, “Contending,” 10. Even those who disagree with the 
veracity of such a statement are expected to address it as part of the discourse. For more references to 
notions about Ottoman intent, motives, and premeditation, see: Dadrian, “Determinants,” 68-69; Catherine 
Barnes, “The Functional Utility of Genocide: Towards a Framework for Understanding the Connection 
between Genocide and Regime Consolidation, Expansion and Maintenance,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 7, no. 3 (September 2005): 309; Hilmar Kaiser, “Regional Resistance to Central Government 
Policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo, and Armenian Deportees in the Spring and 
Summer of 1915,” Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 3-4 (September-December 2010): 175. 
 
76 For examples of how the focus on “genocide” directs research to characterize the thinking of the 
Ottoman government, see: Dadrian, “Role,” 184; Marko Milivojević, review of The Armenian File, by 
Kamuran Gürün, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 1, no. 2 (1986): 305-306; Robert Melson, 
“Revolutionary Genocide: On the Causes of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Holocaust,” 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4, no. 2 (1989): 172; Bauer, review of History, 333; Helen Fein, 
“Genocide and Gender: The Uses of Women and Group Destiny,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 
(March 1999): 50; Rouben Paul Adalian, “Comparative Policy and Differential Practice in the Treatment of 
Minorities in Wartime: The United States Archival Evidence on the Armenians and Greeks in the Ottoman 
Empire,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 1 (March 2001): 31; Melson, “Responses,” 103; Bloxham, 
“Organized,” 225; Melson, “Recent,” 314, 319; Matthias Bjørnlund, “‘When the Cannons Talk, the 
Diplomats Must Be Silent’: A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople during the Armenian Genocide,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 200; Dikran M. Kaligian, “A Prelude to 
Genocide: CUP Population Policies and Provincial Insecurity, 1908-14,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, 
no. 1 (March 2008): 91; Melson, “Contending,” 10, 17. Specifically, the said ideology in the articles listed 
above is portrayed as imperial and dangerous through words such as pan- or Pan- “Turanian,” “Turanic,” 
“Turkic,” “Turkish,” to suggest attempts to impose “Turkification,” even though the Ottoman government 
fought in WWI on and within its own borders for its survival as a sovereign. It is claimed about the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that “the regime’s Pan-Turkic expansionist and unification 
schemes … contributed to the Armenian Genocide.” See: Payaslian, “Destruction,” 155. The genocide 
scholarship also emphasizes a “Muslim fanaticism” and the engagement in a “holy war” also known as 
“jihad.” See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Patterns of Twentieth Century Genocides: The Armenian, Jewish, and 
Rwandan Cases,” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 4 (December 2004): 489; Dadrian, “Agency,” 122; 
Hannibal Travis, “‘Native Christians Massacred’: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during World 
War I,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 327. The label of “genocide” invites 
analysis of the Ottoman government’s thinking process in a manner that is uneven in relation to how the 
thinking process of other governments is considered, and regarding a time when the Ottoman government 
was in a total war with other nations and groups. The genocide scholarship also connects between this CUP 
“ideology” and the national quality of modern Turkey. See: Marsoobian, “Acknowledging,” 218. The use 
of a language in academia that places ethnoreligious division between groups at the root of an alleged 






All of these lead the discourse on a narrow path that shows an interest that is limited to 
regional symptoms and outcomes.   
Second, the genocide scholarship affects the historiography by determining what 
aspects of Armenian and WWI history go unmentioned. International interests are 
presented in terms of pressures rather than interferences in the governance of the 
Ottoman state,77 and thus are far removed from considerations of substantial foreign 
responsibility that cannot be explained within the framework of a genocide label.78 
Moreover, the great powers that are typically associated with bolstering Armenian 
defiance of the Ottoman government are the members of the Entente but not the United 
States.79 Accordingly, the timeframe of the genocide discourse primarily discusses 1915 
                                                          
77 For example, see: Payaslian, “Destruction,” 151; Bjørnlund, “‘When’,” 200. If these international 
pressures are related to a group of powers, then the pressures are said to be “European,” in a manner that 
leaves the United States out of the discussion. See: Melson, “Contending,” 11.   
 
78 The legal definition of genocide considers the intent of the assailant to be relevant and does not consider 
the intent of a great power that may have deliberately set up a conflict between the eventual perpetrators 
and victims of massacres, leading both sides on a path of violence. In such a case, the intent of the great 
power supersedes the intent of the massacre’s perpetrator in significance and, therefore, the intent of the 
massacre’s perpetrator could not have been genocidal but toward survival. However, by insisting on 
“genocide” as the starting point of research, the intent of great powers is structurally left out of 
consideration.   
 
79 References to Russia as the Armenians’ sponsor are frequent in the genocide scholarship’s discourse on 
the Armenian experience, mainly because of Imperial Russia’s proximity, history of wars with the Ottoman 
Empire, Armenian population, and the threat it posed as a potential conqueror. For instance, see: Dadrian, 
“Secret,” 189; Bauer, review of History, 333; Mark Levene, “Creating a Modern ‘Zone of Genocide’: The 
Impact of Nation- and State-Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878-1923,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 
12, no. 3 (Winter 1998): 399. 402, 405, 408; Robert Melson, review of German Responsibility in the 
Armenian Genocide, by Vahakn N. Dadrian, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12, no. 3 (Winter 1998): 485; 
Semelin, “Vocabulary,” 194; Barnes, “Functional,” 314; Payaslian, “Destruction,” 151-152; Akçam, 
“Guenter,” 119; Frieze, “Cycles,” 243; Deborah Mayersen, “On the Timing of Genocide,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention 5, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 26; Avedian, “Armenian,” 336; Dikran Kaligian, “Anatomy 
of Denial: Manipulating Sources and Manufacturing a Rebellion,” Genocide Studies International 8, no. 2 
(Fall 2014): 209, 220; Melson, “Contending,” 11; Hans-Lukas Kieser, Mehmet Polatel, and Thomas 
Schmutz, “Reform or Cataclysm? The Agreement of 8 February 1914 Regarding the Ottoman Eastern 
Provinces,” Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 3 (September 2015): 290-291. However, Russia’s 
position as an apparent political actor does not mean that other great powers did not have substantial 
interests and means of influence that involved Ottoman territory. Second to Russia in great-power 
involvement is Britain, and the two are considered by the genocide scholarship as the two main powers to 
influence the Armenians: “Up to the First World War, Ottoman Armenians looked fruitlessly to Russia or 





and its aftermath,80 secondarily the events of 1894-1896,81 1908,82 or 1912-1913,83 and 
minimally the 1870s84, leaving out the crucial decades of influence by American 
                                                          
American Genocide Denial: Near Eastern Geopolitics and the Interwar Armenian Question,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 8, no. 1 (March 2006): 45. While Britain’s role is underexamined, the American role is 
nonexistent in the genocide scholarship. In reference to “the role of the great powers,” one text serves as an 
example of the tendency to list “Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary," but not the 
United States. See: Robert Melson, “Responses,” 103-104, 106.  
 
80 There are dozens of references to 1915 in each of the three genocide journals, and the effect of this is to 
define Armenian-Turkish relations in the decline of the Ottoman Empire according to the wartime 
atrocities, and with a bias toward labeling the Armenian victimhood as genocide.  
 
81 There are several references to 1894-1896 in each of the three genocide journals. This period calls 
attention to riots and massacres in which a great many Armenians died. Interestingly, while this period 
itself is a symptom of underemphasized developments in the deteriorating relations between Armenians and 
the Ottoman government, the genocide scholarship positions the period as a precursor of 1915. For 
example, it is said that the events in the period of 1894-1896 “led the Turks to adopt a mind-set conducive 
to their later genocidal persecutions.” See: Paul Bartrop, “The Relationship between War and Genocide in 
the Twentieth Century: A Consideration,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 4 (December 2002): 523. 
Similarly, Dadrian argues that the events in 1894-1896 “dramatically exposed the vulnerability of the 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.” See: Dadrian, “Patterns,” 498. There is a significant difference 
between estimations of the number of Armenians killed in these events. According to one scholar there 
were “about 200,000 victims,” whereas according to another scholar the number is “80-100,000 
Armenians.” Compare: Dadrian, “Patterns,” 489; Bloxham, “Roots,” 29. The massacres are called the 
“Hamidian massacres.” For instance, see: Schaller and Zimmerer, “Late,” 9; Kieser, Polatel, and Schmutz, 
“Reform,” 287. However, the association with the sultan’s name distracts from a learned focus on the 
agency of Armenians and Kurds in the unrest in addition to the external influence.  
 
82 The genocide scholarship makes several references to the year when the Young Turks reached governing 
power in the Ottoman Empire as CUP, but there is no close examination of the specific foreign 
influences—cultural and political—that inspired the formulation of the movement in Thessaloniki, 
especially while the movement was known as the Ottoman Freedom Society. 
 
83 Much like the period of 1894-1896, the genocide scholarship treats the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 
largely as a cause but not an effect. The events in the Balkans are used to explain Turkish animosity toward 
Christian minorities. For example, it is stated that “The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 finally discredited the 
idea of a liberal and multinational Ottoman state in the eyes of the majority of the CUP movement, not the 
least because it provoked the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from the Balkans to 
Anatolia.” See: Segesser, “Dissolve,” 98. If attention is given by the genocide scholarship to the great 
powers’ interests in the Balkan Wars, the reference is to the “European powers” and their opportunity “to 
drive the Turks out of Europe.” See: Melson, “Contending,” 11. However, the competition between the two 
powers of the greatest and most rapid growth at the time, the United States and Germany, is not examined 
in the context of the Balkan Wars and the Armenian victimhood, despite its tremendous explanatory 
potential.  
 
84 These include references to the Constitution of 1876; the Bulgarian Horrors, or Bulgarian Agitation, of 
1876; the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78; and the San-Stefano and Berlin treaties of 1878. The genocide 
scholarship does not seem interested in examining the decades of influence by American missionaries on 
Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, especially the Armenians and Bulgarians, in connection with 
the violence that later followed in eastern Anatolia and the Balkans. Reflective of this disinterest is the 
marking of the 1870s, rather than an earlier decade, as the beginning of the critical period of European 





Protestants, who began to change the Armenian group identity and organization long 
before the rise of Armenian claims for political independence and the ensuing tensions 
with the Ottoman government.85  
In turn, the historiography that is created by the genocide label in the Armenian 
case has an effect on politics. While the genocide discourse has had readily observable 
implications for Turkey’s international relations by way of the genocide accusations and 
the accusations of denial,86 its impact on Armenian nationalism is not recognized. 
Nonetheless, the genocide scholarship has made politically mobilizing claims about 
Armenian history,87 and it also advances the belief that the persistent demands to have 
                                                          
beginning of the relevant period for examination: “Creating a Modern ‘Zone of Genocide’: The Impact of 
Nation- and State- Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878-1923.” See: Levene, “Creating,” title.  
 
85 In the genocide scholarship, the missionaries in the Ottoman Empire receive a minimal description 
without distinction between American and other missionaries in terms of activities and impact. For 
instance, see: Robert G. Weisbord, “The King, the Cardinal and the Pope: Leopold II’s Genocide in the 
Congo and the Vatican,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (March 2003): 36; Bjørnlund, “‘When’,” 
200; Travis, “‘Native’,” 327. Also, the missionaries are typically presented as neutral reporters or advocates 
of Armenian relief. For example, see: Dadrian, “Role,” 192 (note 1); Milivojević, review of Armenian, 305-
306; Bloxham, “Roots,” 30; Melson, “Responses,” 104; Shaun O’Dwyer, “John Dewey’s ‘Turkish 
Tragedy’,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 25, no. 3 (Winter 2011): 377. O’Dwyer also relates that the 
American missionaries “played an instrumental role in the circulation” of “anti-Turkish and pro-Armenian 
propaganda.” Ibid., 387. However, even this detail does not convey substantive knowledge of the role 
played by the American missionaries in the decades that preceded WWI, 1912-1913, 1894-1896, and the 
1870s.  
 
86 The suggestion is made that by not “acknowledging” massacres of Christians in the history of the 
Ottoman state and the Turkish republic, Turkey does not share the “moral values” of the European Union. 
See: Alfred de Zayas, “The Istanbul Pogrom of 6-7 September 1955 in the Light of International Law,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 146. The use of the verbs to acknowledge or to 
recognize is effective in leading the public to perceive Turkey’s position as being inadequate, but it is 
practically vague. It is unclear what exactly the genocide discourse demands to have acknowledged or 
recognized. For another example of a text that connects between the question of Turkey’s admission by the 
European Union and “the need to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide,” see: Marsoobian, 
“Acknowledging,” 218-219. Furthermore, not only is the Turkish protest—commonly said to be denial—of 
the genocide label used as justification for barring Turkey from entering the European Union as a member, 
the genocide scholarship expresses a desire to use Turkey’s bid to join the European Union as leverage 
toward compelling it to accept the genocide label. See: Stephen Feinstein, review of The Banality of 
Denial, by Yair Auron, Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 2 (June 2004): 274. 
 
87 The genocide scholarship published an old letter that was sent to the United States president at the time, 
Woodrow Wilson, in which it is stated that “It would be an irremediable mistake if the Armenian districts 





Turkey agree to the label of “genocide” are inherently Armenian.88 Correspondingly, the 
United States’ role in the triggering of the Armenian-Turkish conflict in the 1960s is 
outside the confines of the genocide discourse, and the American role in disrupting 
Ottoman governance through the Armenians has no place in the genocide-based 
historiography.   
Toward the attainment of political effects, the study of Armenian history in the 
context of WWI becomes genocidized: the preexisting commitment of the genocide 
scholarship as such to label the Armenian suffering in WWI as genocide has necessitated 
the construction and popularization of a narrative that is based on a biased selection of 
sources and the uncritical use of them in a pseudolegal language. Only certain accounts 
                                                          
country entirely liberated from Turkish rule, with an outlet of its own sea.” See: Armin T. Wegner, “An 
Open Letter to the President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, on the Mass Deportation 
of the Armenians into the Mesopotamian Desert,” trans. Silvia Samuelli, Journal of Genocide Research 2, 
no. 1 (March 2000): 131. By publishing such a text, the genocide scholarship calls attention to territorial 
claims regarding land that is under Turkish sovereignty and thereby suggests that this is an integral part of 
the genocide accusation. Also, the genocide scholarship creates information that popularizes the thought 
that “The Armenians were destroyed in their historic homeland—their ancestral territories—in ancient 
Armenia.” See: Dadrian, “Patterns,” 488. This provokes a national sentiment that challenges Turkey’s 
sovereignty over parts of its territory, and, therefore, invites political action. Accordingly, the genocide 
scholarship’s narration of Armenian history points at an ancient existence as a political entity. See: 
Dadrian, “Convergent,” 152. 
 
88 The genocide scholarship presents the lobbying of the Armenian diaspora as the force behind the push 
for “political and scientific recognition of the murder of the Armenians,” thus pointing at interest-group 
efforts by Armenians rather than greater American interests as the source of activity: “Many genocide 
researchers have had sympathy for this legitimate concern and joined the campaign led by Armenian lobby 
organizations as, for example, the well known Zoryan Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts.” See: 
Schaller, “Editor(s),” 247. Similarly, it is posited that “Very often, activist or nationalist leaders put moral 
pressure on historians to recognize their individual cases as genocide.” See: Semelin, “‘G’,” 25. This has 
the effect of leading readers to believe that the Armenian focus of the genocide scholarship is the pursuit of 
the Armenian interest group rather than an American strategy. The “Turkish-Armenian conflict” is put forth 
as an example of the “danger that looms over genocide research” from “Lobbyists, identity politics, 
activism and advocacy groups” who “often operate with legal and moral agendas.” See: Üngör, “Studying,” 
72. This is a denial of the inherently political quality of the genocide scholarship’s use of the term genocide 
regarding the Armenian experience. The genocide scholarship is not at risk of being affected by identity 
politics; it has been affecting identity politics by its very existence. For example, the genocide scholarship 
acts as if calls for reparations are part of a movement that originates in victim groups themselves, but it is 
the genocide scholarship that led the way in describing cases of victimhood as genocide and suggesting that 
such calls are in the name of justice. For instance, see: Charny, “Requiem,” 141. This leads to conflict 






of what took place are put forth,89 and those used documents are presented without 
analysis of the authors’ interests.90 Political actors are described as dependable 
                                                          
89 The popularization of the issue on a worldwide scale through American means of information has meant 
that the genocide scholarship has constructed its Armenian narrative by drawing from sources that are 
conducive to showing the Ottoman government as cruel; that are mostly in English; and that originally 
functioned as wartime narrations for the public in English speaking countries. Since the genocide discourse 
was created in the United States, a great wealth of sources has not been used by the genocide scholarship to 
arrive at an understanding of what happened, and especially lacking are references to Armenian and 
Ottoman sources.   
 
90 The genocide scholarship refers to Arnold Toynbee’s wartime literature on the fate of the Ottoman 
Armenians during WWI as a source on what happened, despite it being known that he generated 
information about the Ottoman Empire as an employee of the British Foreign Office while the British 
government was at war with the Ottoman government. See: Dadrian, “Secret,” 183, 185; Totten, review of 
Survivors, 255-256; O’Dwyer, “John,” 376, 379, 382. While the references do not mention Toynbee’s 
association with the British government, O’Dwyer, oddly enough, first uses Toynbee’s material as a source 
to establish his argument and only later in the article he admits that “until 1917 Toynbee worked for the 
British government propaganda office Wellington House.” See: Ibid., 388. One scholar relates that 
Toynbee “was a member of the British Armenia Committee’s propaganda subcommittee,” but does not 
describe him as a Foreign Office worker. See: Segesser, “Dissolve,” 100. Another scholar refers to the Blue 
Book, which was commissioned by the British government and compiled by Toynbee under the supervision 
of James Bryce during WWI as “A key source of evidentiary support for the existence of the Armenian and 
Assyrian genocides.” See: Travis, “‘Native’,” 331. Also, the literature under the name of the United States 
ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the start of WWI, Henry Morgenthau, is used as a credible 
source, without any effort to critically examine the interests behind the Morgenthau literature. See: 
Dadrian, “Convergent,” 164; Eliz Sanasarian, “Gender Distinction in the Genocidal Process: A Preliminary 
Study of the Armenian Case,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4, no. 4 (1989): 450; Dadrian, “Secret,” 
181, 185, 187; Dadrian, “Essay,” 414; Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 2; Melson, review of 
German, 486; Dadrian, “Determinants,” 69; Dolabjian, “Armenian,” 111; Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Children as 
Victims of Genocide: The Armenian Case,” Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 3 (September 2003): 423; 
Dadrian, “Patterns,” 489; Feinstein, review of Ambassador, 291-294; Melson, “Responses,” 109; Dadrian, 
“Agency,” 122; Bjørnlund, “‘When’,” 200; Schaller and Zimmerer, “Late,” 10; O’Dwyer, “John,” 376, 
382. After using it as a source, O’Dwyer comments that—like the Toynbee material—the Morgenthau 
literature is not “above suspicion.” See: Ibid., 388. Not only does the genocide scholarship build on the 
American historiographical premise that the United States was neutral until April 1917 and uninvolved in 
Ottoman affairs prior to WWI and during the war, it also takes part in sustaining it. The belief that an 
impartial United States government had followed a strict policy of noninterference abroad until it joined the 
Entente’s war efforts is intertwined with the lack of research on the political effects of the American 
missionaries’ work among Ottoman Armenians. Moreover, even the German nationality of a missionary or 
diplomat does not mean that the account on Armenian victimhood in WWI Is a reliable source of 
information, but the genocide scholarship presents them as sources of information without criticism. See: 
Dadrian, “Secret,” 192; Rooney, “Forgotten,” 117; Dolabjian, “Armenian,” 111; Bjørnlund, “‘When’,” 200; 






observers.91 The presentation of fatality numbers is fuzzy.92 Words such as “evidence,”93 
                                                          
91 In addition to the assumption that Morgenthau was free from bias, it is significant to note the apolitical 
language with which the genocide scholarship describes Bryce—who was active in organizing the 
Armenian national leadership and publicizing the Armenian claim for political independence on Ottoman 
land from 1876 to the aftermath of WWI—as the most prominent helper of the Armenians, or a “keen 
observer of Armenian affairs.” See: Segesser, “Dissolve,” 99; Mayersen, “Timing,” 28. Bryce’s role in 
politicizing the Ottoman Armenian existence and compromising the safety of their communities is not 
examined by the genocide scholarship, and instead he is portrayed as “something of a ‘champion of the 
Ottoman Armenians’” without qualification. See: Travis, “Native,” 331. The understatement of Bryce’s 
function in the Armenian context and the minimal references to him—as a commentator or sympathizer—
reflect the genocide scholarship’s disinclination to find that political actors such as Bryce colluded toward 
the creation of an Armenian-Turkish conflict; such a finding would suggest that the Armenian suffering 
was a case of imperialist divide-and-rule rather than genocide. For an extended discussion here of Bryce’s 
involvement, see: Chapter 4, section titled “The Armenian Question.”  
 
92 One account states that “the Ittihadist administration massacred around 1,600,000,” whereas another 
gives the number “1,000,000 Armenian citizens.” Compare: Littell, “Holocaust,” 97; Jacobs, review of 
Widening, 391. The number that has gained the most agreement among the genocide scholars is around 
1,500,000 fatalities. See: Theriault, “Universal,” 241; Katharine Derderian, “Common Fate, Different 
Experience: Gender-Specific Aspects of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917,” Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 2; Stuart D. Stein, “Conceptions and Terms: Templates for the Analysis of 
Holocausts and Genocides,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 195; Melson, 
“Contending,” 12. However, no account of the numbers includes a distinction between the number of 
Armenians who were killed in massacres and the number of Armenians who perished in the poor 
conditions after being removed from their homes. The genocide scholarship has a tendency to equate the 
expulsion of the Ottoman Armenians with their massacre. For instance, one account makes it possible to 
infer, falsely, that more people died in executions than from starvation or sickness during the expulsions: 
“In that year the ‘Young Turks’ régime ordered, organized and then systematically carried out the 
extermination of 1.2 million Armenians by mass shootings and forced death marches.” See: Milivojević, 
review of Armenian, 305. 
 
93 For references to “evidence” of “genocide” by the genocide scholarship without legal backing, see: Ibid., 
306; Myers, review of Hitler, 176; Dadrian, “Secret,” 196; Roger W. Smith, review of Genocide as a 
Problem of National and International Law, by Vahakn N. Dadrian, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 7, no. 
2 (Fall 1993): 275; Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 3, 16; Dadrian, “Determinants,” 68; 
Martin Rooney, “A Forgotten Humanist: Armin T. Wegner,” Journal of Genocide Research 2, no. 1 
(March 2000): 117; Theriault, “Universal,” 242; Dadrian, “Signal,” 272, 278; Taner Akçam, “The Ottoman 
Documents and the Genocidal Policies of the Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) toward 
the Armenians in 1915,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no.  2 (Summer 2006): 144; Matthias 
Bjørnlund, “The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (March 2008): 51; Kaiser, “Regional,” 209; Robert Melson, review of The 
Young Turks’ Crime against Humanity, by Taner Akçam, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 28, no. 3 
(Winter 2014): 510. These uses of the word evidence are made in relation to material that had not been 
recognized by any competent tribunal as evidence of genocide, yet the genocide scholarship’s language 
gives it the false appearance of proof. A flagrant example of this misuse is found in a text that conflates 
evidence regarding the Rwandan case with “evidence” about the Armenian experience, even though the 
former had undergone the legal procedures of a competent tribunal for the charge of genocide and the latter 
did not. See: Gibson, “Role,” 518. In a twisted manifestation of the genocide scholarship’s misuse of 
“evidence,” one text states that the Turkish Historical Society has produced “no new evidence to refute 
‘claims’ of genocide.” See: Taner Akçam, “Anatomy of a Crime: The Turkish Historical Society’s 
Manipulation of Archival Documents,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 255. The 
genocide scholarship’s language promotes the absurd notion that one is burdened with having to produce 





“eyewitness” or “witness,”94 and “testimony”95 are used to sprinkle legal rhetoric as if to 
correspond with the legal capacity of the term genocide, but this is done in lieu of an 
authentic legal backing, and without the scrutiny that is provided by a competent legal 
procedure to secure that sources are reliable, presentable, and representable, proof of 
what is being claimed.    
In view of the genocide scholarship’s focus on the Armenian experience as its 
flagship case of genocide, the following questions are seen as relevant to understanding 
the use of “genocide” yet are unpronounced in the genocide journals: What 
considerations led to the first mention of the Armenian experience in WWI as an example 
of genocide? What was the context in which the usage of “Armenian Genocide” as a 
phrase began to be featured prominently and systematically? What historically significant 
developments may explain the Armenian predicament in WWI but are not addressed by 
the genocide scholarship? How is the United States government served by genocidizing 
Armenian history? How do the popular references to the Armenian experience as 
genocide affect the legal meaning of the term genocide in international law? Since there 
had been no charge of genocide made in a competent tribunal against any member of the 
Ottoman government, by what power has the genocide label against Turks regarding the 
                                                          
94 For references to “eyewitness” or “witness” of “genocide” by the genocide scholarship without legal 
backing, see: Dadrian, “Convergent,” 156; Sanasarian, “Gender,” 449; Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, 
“Professional,” 3; Rooney, “Forgotten,” 117-118; Derderian, “Common,” 2; Melson, “Responses,” 104; 
Bjørnlund, “‘When’,” 198; Schaller and Zimmerer, “Late,” 7; Dickran Kouymjian, review of Armenian 
Golgotha, by Grigoris Balakian, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 24, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 324; O’Dwyer, 
“John,” 376; Smith, “Introduction,” 8; Tessa Hofmann, “The Genocide against the Ottoman Armenians: 
German Diplomatic Correspondence and Eyewitness Testimonies,” Genocide Studies International 9, no. 1 
(Spring 2015), title.  
 
95 For references to “testimony” of “genocide” by the genocide scholarship without legal backing, see: 
Dadrian, “Secret,” 182, 196; Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 3; Totten, review of Survivors, 






Armenian victimhood become a matter of common language? 
 
Controlled Information 
Having shown that in its Armenian focus the genocide scholarship exercises a 
subjective and imprecise use of language and sources to present the Ottoman leaders as 
perpetrators, the modern-day Turkish leaders as deniers, and the Armenian people as 
victims, of genocide, it becomes imperative to consider the function of the greater 
genocide discourse as one that has to generally sustain itself as an academic project 
despite its unscientific following of a political consciousness. The nature of the material 
that is being generated by the genocide scholarship—the genocidizing of history 
necessarily attaches to the past a legal label that has political implications—begs for the 
direction of scholarly attention to its process. The genocide scholarship is scientifically 
undisciplined and politically disciplined.96 While its selection of cases and their treatment 
as genocide is not governed by an objective system, there is nevertheless a method of 
information creation and delivery that is in accordance with political purpose. It is an 
observable matter to study what goes into producing, presenting, and promoting this 
information. The genocide scholarship is arranged through framing, attracting, and 
persuading.97  
 By framing, the genocide scholarship marks its content. The preliminary and 
foundational act of framing was accomplished by Bauer’s introduction of HGS’ 
                                                          
96 The genocide scholarship’s pronounced interdisciplinarity, or multidisciplinarity, may also be seen as 
being of no particular discipline, which means that it has the flexibility to produce knowledge in service of 
political agenda. 
 
97 Nye’s analysis of soft power includes a reference to framing, attracting, and persuading. It is cited here in 






“framework” for genocide studies as surrounding questions about “the universality or 
uniqueness of the Holocaust.”98 Thus, a platform was provided for framing the Armenian 
experience within a genocide discourse, and for establishing its frame of reference as an 
assumed genocide.99 The framing by the genocide scholarship not only includes 
influencing what period of time is being examined, but also what periods are left outside 
its suggested timeframes.100 Aside from time-period framing, some of the genocide 
                                                          
98 Bauer, “Editor’s,” 1. 
 
99 For example, in HGS’ second issue it is instructed that “the proper frame of reference for the Armenian 
genocide” is “nationalism.” See: Dadrian, “Role,” 184.  
 
100 As is shown in the section on the genocide scholarship’s Armenian focus, the 1915 timeframe has 
invited a concentration of academic interest on Ottoman perpetration, Armenian Victimhood, Russian 
military strategies, and the ostracizing of the position held by Turkish governments on the use of 
“genocide” as a label for what happened during that time. By operating within the 1915 timeframe, the 
genocide scholarship has looked away from the decades in which American involvement has led the 
Ottoman Armenian group to shift from a peaceful ethnoreligious minority to a nationalistically organized 
entity whose political ambition was in conflict with the sovereignty of the Ottoman state. Generally, the 
genocide scholarship seems to have given its discourse on “genocide” a twentieth-century timeframe, and 
this choice of a timeframe—though itself not self-explanatory—has the effect of highlighting the Armenian 
experience. See: Milivojević, review of Armenian, 305; Levene, “Creating,” 395; Bartrop, “Relationship,” 
525; Semelin, “Vocabulary,” 193; Dadrian, “Children,” 421; Gibson, “Role,” 503; Linda M. Woolf and 
Michael R. Hulsizer, “Psychosocial Roots of Genocide: Risk, Prevention, and Intervention,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 7, no. 1 (March 2005): 102; Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: New Directions,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 169; Barnes, “Functional,” 312; Jacques Semelin, 
“Announcement: Encyclopedia on Genocides and Massacres,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 3 
(September 2005): 436; Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 98; Bjørnlund, “‘When’,” 214; Melson, “Responses,” 103; 
Markovitz, “Ararat,” 250 (note 2); Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, “Settlers, Imperialism, 
Genocide: Seeing the Global without Ignoring the Local—Introduction,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, 
no. 2 (June 2008): 197; Feierstein, “Getting,” 155; Mayersen, “Timing,” 23; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 253-254; 
Travis, “Original,” 43; Üngör, “Studying,” 68; Charny, “Requiem,” 110; Smith, “Introduction,” 1. This 
timeframe is stretched back to focus on massacres of Armenians as precursors of the events in 1915. For 
instance, see: Bedross Der Matossian, “From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 152-173. In addition to the Armenian focus, the 
information that the genocide scholarship has produced on the Cambodian experience has consistently 
designated 1975-1979/1980 as its timeframe in the three genocide journals. This has meant that the 
preceding period of time, in which the country was bombed by the United States Air Force, is not included 
as a significant factor in the analysis that is offered by the genocide scholarship. For example, see: Roger 
W. Smith, review of The Stones Cry Out, by Molyda Szymusiak, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3, no. 2 
(1988): 225-226; Sorpong Peou, review of The Pol Pot Regime by Ben Kiernan; Brother Number One, by 
David Chandler; Western Responses to Human Rights Abuses in Cambodia, 1975-80, by Jamie Frederick 
Metzl, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 11, no. 3 (Winter 1997): 413; Fein, “Genocide,” 53; Jörg Menzel, 
“Justice Delayed or Too Late for Justice? The Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the Cambodian ‘Genocide’ 
1975-79,” Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 2 (June 2007): 215; Totten, “State,” 212; James Tyner and 
Stian Rice, “Cambodia’s Political Economy of Violence: Space, Time, and Genocide under the Khmer 





scholarship’s framing tactics may be characterized as preemptive framing,101 departure-
point framing,102 narrow-view framing,103 empty-lingo framing,104 and information-walls 
                                                          
101 This tactic is employed when a particular phrasing is seen as having the potential to lead the public into 
considering a new set of information that is possibly unwanted by the genocide scholarship. To prevent the 
phrase from provoking inquiry that is not controlled, the genocide scholarship might frame the conversation 
so as to fill it with checked content. For instance, see: Hilene Flanzbaum, “The Americanization of the 
Holocaust,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 1 (March 1999): 91-104. The concept of the Holocaust’s 
Americanization might provoke research on how the United States government has taken over the meaning 
of the Holocaust in service of American interests, but, instead, the concept is used by Flanzbaum to 
consider some cultural responses to the Holocaust by Americans. Thus, the genocide scholarship can claim 
that it has covered the issue of the Holocaust’s Americanization, without having to generate information 
about what American interests lie behind the educational purposes that have been assigned to Holocaust 
memory. As a frame, the Americanization of the Holocaust was filled with content about A, B, C, instead of 
X, Y, Z. 
 
102 The genocide scholarship has assumed points of departure in its discourse. This means that by centering 
the discussion on whether or not the truth of X means that Y is true, the discourse creates assumptions about 
X as an unquestioned point of departure. For example, when a genocide scholar writes that “the American 
failure to take a League of Nations mandate for Armenia … should not be seen as an American ‘betrayal’ 
of the values that led to the donation of vast quantities of charitable aide to the Armenians from 1915,” 
readers might focus on whether it is true or not that the lack of political support for Armenians post-WWI 
suggests that the US had forsaken the core beliefs that guided its early efforts on behalf of Armenians, and 
thus the readers are not inclined to question the assumed truth that “charitable aide to the Armenians from 
1915” covers the relevant history of the American involvement in the lives of Ottoman Armenians. See: 
Bloxham, “Roots,” 28. This false assumption is crucial, for not only does Bloxham’s text keep the readers 
uninformed about significant occurrences that took place between Americans and Armenians in Anatolia 
over the course of decades prior to 1915, his text also leads them away from even considering the existence 
of these occurrences. Another form of this tactic is created when one scholar agrees with another scholar’s 
conclusion that “it is unnecessary to use a single word to frame the debate about the persecution of the 
Armenian people by the Ottoman Turks in 1915.” In relation to other works by genocide scholars, it might 
seem that this text is exceptionally lenient about the use of “genocide” regarding 1915, but as the departure 
point of stating that the debate about 1915 does not need to center on the term genocide, there is a solidified 
framing assumption that the discourse is naturally about 1915 and Ottoman perpetration. See: William A. 
Schabas, “Commentary on Paul Boghossian, ‘The Concept of Genocide’,” Journal of Genocide Research 
12, no. 1-2 (March-June 2010): 91. Therefore, even when questioning the use of “genocide” and appearing 
to entertain neutrality, the historiographical focus of the genocide scholarship stays on 1915.    
 
103 A narrow view of history allows the genocide scholarship to present half-truths that lead readers away 
from discovering a greater historical reasoning. For example, it is claimed that in 1913 “the USA reverted 
to non-interventionism, non-favouritism in the promotion of business concerns, and the protection of 
missionary interests,” thus leading readers to see noninterventionism as helpful for missionary interests. 
See: Bloxham, “Roots,” 30. This framing keeps readers two mental steps away from considering that the 
missionaries’ activities were a manifestation of an American involvement in the affairs of another country.  
 
104 A tactic that is integral to the genocide scholarship’s practice of assigning the genocide label to cases 
without legal backing involves the use of a language that helps to frame the discourse around “genocide.” 
This does not just mean the borrowing of legal terms, but also the use of self-assured phrasing that the 
subject matter is genocidal. For instance, the claim regarding Darfur that certain information “confirms” 
that the “Arab Janjaweed militias have a clear intent to destroy the Fur, Massaalit and Zaghawa ethnic 
groups in whole or in part, in accordance with Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” frames the discussion around “genocide” by using words from the 





framing.105 Put together in a constructed discourse, such tactics are set to manage what is 
considered public knowledge on the meaning of the term genocide.106  
 By attracting, the genocide scholarship draws the public to come across its 
content. This aspect of control also involves making the information prominent and 
dominant. Therefore, the genocide scholarship endeavors to maintain a mechanically 
centralized and academically authoritative sourcing, whereas it is the influence of public 
figures and popular media that helps to make the genocide scholarship’s language 
common. The research of the genocide scholarship becomes fixed by way of promoting 
database tools through which knowledge is gathered and offered systematically such as a 
                                                          
does not fit into it: ethnic groups were not persecuted as such, but as part of a political conflict. Thus, the 
readers are led to consider Darfur in genocidal terms despite the scholar’s complacent use of lingo that 
might not match the particulars. 
 
105 This tactic uses publicized disagreement between two sides to enclose the information within a certain 
frame of focus, without it seeming like a guided effort, and thus also create an idea of a middle ground 
between the two walls of opinion. Put another way, if the information presents a debate between X and Z, 
then the public is led to think in terms of the space between X and Z, and believe that Y might present a 
consensus. Accordingly, the public is not expected to question the focus of the discourse on X-Z or consider 
the existence of views A-W as relevant. For example, an argument creates one wall of information by 
stating that “the 4th Army cannot be taken as being representative for other Ottoman armies” and that the 
“notion of an empire-wide genocide of Ottoman Armenians perpetrated by a unified CUP is untenable.” 
See: Kaiser, “Regional,” 209. Then, the supposed counterargument presents the other wall of information 
by saying that Kaiser’s argument “conceals severe atrocities committed by the Ottoman perpetrators” and 
that “It will still take a long time before we are fully clear on all the details of the Armenian Genocide after 
so much effort has been spent on manipulating it to make it disappear.” See: Gust, “Question,” 261, 263. In 
this manner, the debate is the frame of information that draws the public, and the agreed element within this 
information as a whole, which is then internalized by the consumers of the information, is the reference to 
“genocide” as if a matter of fact. Under this influence, the public is removed from being able to imagine a 
completely different discourse on the meaning of “genocide,” or consider the unscientific quality of 
choosing the Armenian experience as the subject-matter of a debate about “genocide.”  
 
106 Being treated as public knowledge, references to “the Armenian Genocide” in the genocide scholarship 
are ingrained in the language without any added explanatory notes to show on what the phrasing is based, 
as if the labeling of the Armenian experience as genocide is on the same level of public knowledge as 






“Bibliographic Software,”107 “a who’s who and what’s what” guide,108 an “Encyclopedia 
of Genocide,”109 “The Dictionary” of genocide,110 “The Oxford Handbook of Genocide 
Studies,”111 and recommended websites that serve as search engines.112 Also, book 
reviews have served as opportunities for the genocide scholarship to direct readers to 
particular sources of information by use of praise.113 As a result, an air of ascendancy is 
given to the information, which is then passed on as specialized knowledge in tandem 
                                                          
107 The review that describes this bibliographic software has the quality of an ad: it specifies the software’s 
features and varied costs, promises that “Installation instructions are clear and simple,” and assures readers 
that “the ease of access of this comprehensive database will, indeed, prove to be a boon to scholars and 
those seriously interested in this emerging field of important work.” See: Jacobs, review of Holocaust, 267. 
The review also states that the bibliographic software was “Funded primarily by the United States Institute 
of Peace.” See: Ibid., 266. The United States Institute of Peace is a federal institute whose board of 
directors is said to “consist of fifteen voting members,” twelve of whom are appointed by the President of 
the United States, and—unless otherwise designated “with the advice and consent of the Senate”—the other 
three are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the president of the National Defense 
University. See: “United States Institute of Peace Act,” 5, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/usip_act.pdf (accessed, 1/23/2017).     
 
108 A literary product is presented as “the essential starting-point for serious investigation,” and described 
as “a veritable ‘gold mine’ of who’s who and what’s what in the newly-emerging field of genocide 
studies.” See: Jacobs, review of Widening, 389-390. 
 
109 A genocide encyclopedia was the subject of two reviews in one issue of JGR, in which it was 
recommended as an “invaluable resource for anyone interested in the origins and details of the genocides, 
the war crimes and human rights violations committed in recent history,” and as “the culmination of the 30-
year development of genocide studies.” See: Goldstone, “Encyclopedia,” 265; Henry Theriault, review of 
Encyclopedia of Genocide, edited by Israel W. Charny, Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 2 (June 2002): 
266. Attention was also called to another genocide encyclopedia, which was presented as a European 
project. See: Semelin, “Announcement,” 436.  
 
110 A genocide dictionary is mentioned as one of the “various research tools” that “have been developed by 




112 Before it became common practice to search for information online through websites such as Bing.com 
and Google.com, the genocide scholarship attempted to attract the public to its preferred information online 
by directing its readers to bibliographical lists on selected websites. For instance, see: Peter A. Sproat, 
“Researching, Writing and Teaching Genocide: Sources on the Internet,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, 
no. 3 (November 2001): 453, 455.   
 
113 As an example of this, Roger W. Smith describes Vahakn Dadrian’s book as a path-breaking study, and 
just over a year later Dadrian describes Robert Melson’s book as a path-breaking study. See: Smith, review 






with the support of known personalities.114 It then becomes unlikely to consider other 
information about “genocide,” or even to think of other information as a possibility, 
because in order to do so the public would have to question and possibly abandon general 
habits of knowledge consumption.   
 By persuading, the genocide scholarship causes the public to accept its content as 
knowledge. The genocide scholarship uses a persuasion-driven language in describing 
history115 or the works of other genocide scholars.116 In addition, the genocide 
                                                          
114 In one article, a genocide scholar makes several references to George Clooney’s influence regarding 
Darfur: its popular treatment as a case of genocide and the calls for intervention. At the end of the article, it 
is argued that the genocide scholarship needs “more Lemkin and less Clooney,” as if to suggest that the 
field of study would appear more erudite by discussing the former’s rather than the latter’s thoughts on 
genocide. See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 247-248, 254. In this way, the genocide scholarship both enjoys the 
publicity its discourse receives through a celebrity such as Clooney while protecting its image as a 
scholarly project. 
 
115 The genocide scholarship uses the word fact in a manner that confuses historical findings or memory 
with the genocide scholarship’s own labeling of genocide. An instance of this is the use of “the fact of the 
genocide” as a phrase when discussing the Armenian experience. See: Guroian, “Post-Holocaust,” 311. In 
another example, “The fact that the 1915-16 Genocide of the Ottoman Armenian was committed,” the use 
of “fact” in relation to the genocide label is part of an assumption that precedes a claim. See: Bloxham, 
“Organized,” 225. Similarly, “the fact that the genocide of the Armenians,” is used to confuse the label 
with memory. See: Balakian, “Raphael,” 61. Through such rhetorical manipulation, the public is led into 
believing that a misused legal label is the actual historical event. Furthermore, the genocide scholarship 
uses “fact” to describe debatable and unsubstantiated claims: “The fact remains that the Armenian 
community was completely unprepared for the calamity which befell it because it did not consider itself a 
threat to either Turkish national security or to Turkish national aspirations.” See: Dadrian, “Secret,” 194. 
The entire paragraph in which Dadrian used “fact” contains no references to sources. Along these lines, 
“denial of facts (it didn’t happen),” is used without articulating what the facts are and without 
distinguishing between supposed facts and whatever “it” means. See: Smith, “How,” 102. Another 
rhetorical manipulation involves the use of verbs such as to acknowledge and to recognize in relation to the 
phrase “the Armenian Genocide,” as if the misuse of the genocide label as part of a name is something to 
be accepted as part of the historical event. The verb to acknowledge is used to claim that many Turks have 
a “continuing inability to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide.” See: Benhabib, “Jews,” 369. The verb to 
recognize is used to the same effect: “The aim of the militant Armenian organizations was to bring Turkey 
to recognize the Armenian Genocide.” See: Hülya Adak, “Gendering Denial Narratives of the Decade of 
Terror (1975-85): The Case of Saˆmiha Ayverdi/Neşide Kerem Demir and Hatun Sebliciyan/Sabiha 
Gökçen,” Journal of Genocide Research 17, no. 3 (September 2015): 329. For references here to the 
genocide scholarship’s borrowing of words from Holocaust studies or legal procedure, see: note 60 in this 
chapter. 
 
116 For instance, when saying that “Bloxham demonstrates convincingly that the leadership’s sensitivities to 
outside intervention in Turkish internal affairs grew more extreme during World War I and the genocide.” 
See: Norman M. Naimark, review of The Great Game of Genocide, by Donald Bloxham; The Armenian 
Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, by Guenter Lewy, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 





scholarship has attempted to gain the public’s trust in its selective representations of 
genocide by appealing to what the public already believes to be associated with social 
improvement, such as the awareness of violence against women.117 The genocide 
                                                          
themselves to believe in the truth of the claim.  
 
117 There have been articles in the genocide scholarship whose theme is to blend genocide studies and 
women’s studies. These include references to gender-specific suffering supposedly from genocide, with the 
underlying assumption that the Armenian experience is seen as genocide, such as “female victims of 
genocide,” “the issue of gender enters the Armenian genocide,” and “The Genocidal process was gender-
based.” See: Sanasarian, “Gender,” 449, 459. Also to be considered are comments such as “sexual violence 
and gender-specific persecution of victims were central aspects of the Armenian Genocide of 1915-17;” “a 
definite link between genocidal and gender ideologies;” “Gender-specific practices marked every stage of 
the Armenian Genocide;” and “Violence directed at female deportees.” See: Derderian, “Common,” 1, 3, 6. 
It is proposed that “if gender violence is a core component of genocide—the Armenian, Rwandan, and 
Bosnian cases are particularly well documented in this respect—then prevention of genocide requires 
engaging the foundations of gender violence.” See: Theriault, “Albright-Cohen,” 207. However, the 
prevention of gender violence does not run through the labeling of “genocide.” As shown above, the 
labeling of “genocide” without the legal backing could mean that the research of circumstances 
surrounding mass violence is limited by an unwarranted focus on local responsibility alone. The Genocide 
Convention does not address rape. There is nothing distinctly genocidal about rape. Generally, rape occurs 
when the use of force is encouraged by power. When in the context of mass violence, rape happens in 
situations of intergroup tension that are not necessarily genocidal such as colonization, enslavement, 
occupation, and the destruction of the state as in the Armenian experience in WWI. Unlike genocide, rape 
is not an act that needed to be conceptualized; rape was not without a name, but a clearly defined act that 
could not be effectively prevented as long as the victims were without representation. Its ongoing 
articulation as a crime did not require the advent of “genocide.” The rise of women’s rights in society has 
brought a wave of new thoughts on gender-based mistreatment, and the use of this current social sensitivity 
regarding the abuse of women for the promotion of selective genocide labeling is exploitative and perhaps 
even predatory. The genocide scholarship exploits the credibility of female victimhood to advance its own 
claims just as it exploited the credibility of Jewish victimhood to come into existence. By giving itself the 
appearance of being aligned with women’s studies, the genocide scholarship also assumes a postmodernist 
identity, and thus presents itself as a pioneering field of study that cannot be readily associated with the 
established principles of governing agencies. The genocide scholarship also tries to use the trendiness of 
women’s studies to promote the genocide discourse on Cambodia. The effort to incorporate the semblance 
of women’s studies into the genocide discourse was so persistent that one genocide scholar published the 
same information twice: “Yet in Cambodia women were deeply involved in the whole process of 
destruction: maintaining the killing pace of work, close surveillance over individuals and families, the 
setting of traps to test people’s loyalty, interrogation, the use of violence to whip people into line, the 
administration of brutal punishments for minor infractions, and direct killing with pickaxes” is similar to 
“Cambodian women were deeply involved in the whole process of destruction that ensued: the killing pace 
of work, close surveillance over individuals and families, the setting of traps to test people’s loyalty, the 
use of violence to whip people into line, the administration of brutal punishments for minor infractions, and 
direct killing with pickaxes.” Compare: Smith, review of Stones, 226; Roger W. Smith, “Women and 
Genocide: Notes on an Unwritten History,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 8, no. 3 (Winter 1994): 326. 
In other words, a previously written argument, which was published by the same journal, is repeated word 
for word with the exception of some adjustments. Ironically, the title of the second article refers to an 
unwritten history. This instance indicates that the process of knowledge production by a prominent 
genocide scholar shows a commitment to the message rather than a full embrace of writing as a creative 






scholarship has also sought to persuade readers to adopt its genocide labeling by 
associating the hindrance of social progress with an adversarial position to the genocide 
discourse.118  
 Being controlled, the information is channeled toward two main avenues of 
political agenda: the protection of American historiography as the dominant narrative 
worldwide, and the projection of American foreign interests as moral pleas. First, the 
genocide scholarship is geared toward treating past events in a manner that affects how 
members of the American and international public view the role of the United States 
government in modern history. Sensitive American historiographical interests are handled 
through omission or qualification: the systematic enslavement of African peoples and the 
ordered bombardment of Asian populated areas are virtually left out of the discourse;119 
                                                          
118 The genocide scholarship’s presentation of the Turkish government as a denier lends credibility to the 
genocide discourse because of a long history of publicized prejudice against Turks in Anglo-American 
circles, which is linked to the politics of the Eastern Question and the culture of orientalism. Turks were 
considered to be incapable of effective rule: “The history of Mohammedan empires shows that no 
development of the arts of government or society, no advance in thought or industry, is to be looked for 
under them.” James Bryce, “The Future of Asiatic Turkey,” The Fortnightly Review 23 [29] (January-June 
1878): 928. Turks were also considered to be an obstruction of civilizational progress: “He [the Turk] is not 
simply unprogressive, but stupidly dull, either ignorant of the strides which the rest of the world is making, 
or sullenly indifferent to them.” See: George H. Hepworth, Through Armenia on Horseback (New York: E. 
P. Dutton & Company, 1898), 351. The genocide scholarship taps into the remaining influence that such 
information has on the public, and converts the common partiality against Turks into scholarly credibility 
by having the Turkish government be positioned as its adversary. Based on the tradition of Turkophobia, 
there seems to be an expectation that Westerners would ascribe intellectual integrity to the genocide 
scholarship by virtue of it being in conflict with Turkey. To gain favor within Turkey, and influence 
Turkey’s internal affairs, the genocide scholarship has found utility in the memory of the journalist Hrant 
Dink, who as a Turkish citizen of Armenian descent criticized his government’s handling of the Armenian 
issue. The genocide scholarship suggests to Turks that if they wish to be perceived as progressive by the 
international community, then the support of people like Dink is the way forward. His assassination is 
recruited by the genocide scholarship to portray an intolerant Turkey, as if a symbol of an effort to silence a 
voice who spoke the truth against denial. This notion of truth is then associated with the work of the 
genocide scholarship. For instances of this, see: Schaller, “From the Editors: Judges,” 2; Marsoobian, 
“Acknowledging,” 218-219; Adak, “Gendering,” 336, 340-341. 
    
119 The references to these events are few and brief. In a rare reference, the “African American slavery” is 
said to be irrelevant for considerations of genocide. See: Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the 
Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 403. The genocide 
scholarship does not call the nuclear attack on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki “genocide,” but it is 





the annihilation of the precolonial societies in America is mentioned as genocide, but in a 
restricted manner that places detectable limits on its ability to have a significantly 
detrimental effect on the United States government.120 By studying the genocide 
scholarship’s treatment of the victims who are often described as American Indians or 
Native Americans, it is possible to observe how complex production rather than simple 
reduction allows the genocide discourse to control sensitive information on history in line 
with American interests.  
The case of the precolonial population in the United States shows how the 
scholarly discourse on persecutions of identity groups is information that is controlled by 
power. There are detectable signs that the genocide scholarship is not empowered to 
                                                          
Charny, whose liberal definition of genocide was accentuated in his debate with Steven T. Katz (see: note 
29 in this chapter), states that “the nuclear destruction of Nagasaki” was “certainly” a genocidal murder and 
that “perhaps also Hiroshima,” but relates these acts to “‘good’ guys” in “just wars.” See: Charny, 
“Requiem,” 115. Charny does not disclose what scientific method—if any—led him to reach a conclusion 
that there is some notable distinction between Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the context of “genocide,” but 
this use of “genocidal” has no bearing on the discourse because of its detached quality. Charny’s odd and 
casual reference might make it seem like the genocide scholarship does not ignore Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, but this single remark has no part in the discourse and is not incorporated into the greater scheme 
of genocide studies. For example, an issue of JGR was dedicated to the topic of environmental genocide 
without offering any scholarly research on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The editorial introduction to the issue 
does not mention Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet space was found in the context of “genocide” and the 
environment to mention the Ottoman government as perpetrator of multiple “genocides” during WWI. See: 
Jürgen Zimmerer, “From the Editors: Environmental Genocide? Climate Change, Mass Violence and the 
Question of Ideology,” Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 3 (September 2007): 350. There is one 
reference to “atrocities” that were committed by the military in Vietnam. See: Theriault, “Grain,” 128-129. 
However, references to Vietnam in the genocide scholarship are mostly made in the context of the Khmer 
Rouge rule of Cambodia, which is discussed here in the next section. Even a reference to Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
work on genocide does not mention that his intellectual efforts were made in the context of Vietnam. See: 
Barnes, “Functional,” 313. The American military campaign in Vietnam is described as an “intervention.” 
See: Eyal Mayroz, “Ever Again? The United States, Genocide Suppression, and the Crisis in Darfur,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 3 (September 2008): 378. The publicized debates about “genocide” 
in the contexts of the African American community in the 1950s and the American war in Vietnam in the 
1960s and 1970s are discussed in Chapter 5.   
  
120 The instances in which the history of Native Americans is addressed in the context of genocide studies 
provides the genocide scholarship with credibility capital. Arriving at the desired discourse regarding this 
topic is a delicate matter for the genocide scholarship: its need for credibility means that it cannot ignore 






establish a discourse regarding American history as it is regarding Ottoman history.121 
Furthermore, the discourse does not offer an exploration of the power considerations that 
may explain why the group identity of Poles was defended as national in the name of 
morality and international law during WWII whereas a group identity such as that of the 
Cherokee people did not receive a similar defense.122 Five characteristics of the genocide 
scholarship’s treatment of the United States government’s treatment of its precolonial 
population—which may be defined as involving the victimhood of identity groups—
provide an example of how the discourse controls information: an expanded 
                                                          
121 The introduction to the first journal by the genocide scholarship, HGS, reveals how the genocide 
discourse was going to proceed on this issue: it would be addressed by the genocide scholarship, but 
carefully blended into the discourse, and it would receive a vastly different treatment from cases that have a 
strong accusatory nature such as the Armenian aspect of the discourse. When defining the topics that will 
be raised by the journal, one is described as “the Armenian genocide,” while the other is described as 
“problems concerning the Native Indian populations of the Americas.” The hesitation to use the term 
genocide regarding the latter is stressed by the drive to present the use of the term as a matter of fact 
regarding the former. See: Bauer, “Editor’s,” 1. Since then, “Armenian” was mentioned hundreds of times 
in HGS, whereas “American Indian” or “Native American” appear only a few times on the pages of this 
journal. Much of the language that the genocide scholarship applies in reference to the Armenian 
experience has not been used in relation to the experience of those who were called Indians by their 
assailants: Native Americans are not addressed as descendants of survivors by the genocide scholarship, 
and no attention is called to Native American interest-groups regarding lobbying for genocide recognition. 
There is no effort to popularize a phrase such as “the Armenian Genocide” in the context of specific tribes 
or in general, and there is separation between the name of the victims and the term genocide, such as 
“genocide of Native Americans.” For example, see: Theriault, “Albright-Cohen,” 204; Theriault, “Grain,” 
128. While in the Armenian context the genocide scholarship labels invitations for historical debate as 
denial, when it comes to the United States government’s treatment of its precolonial population the 
genocide scholarship produces questions about what happened. For instance, the genocide scholarship 
invites a debate over whether or not a certain event, known as the Sand Creek Massacre, involving the 
United States government, was a battle. See: Brenden Rensink, “The Sand Creek Phenomenon: The 
Complexity and Difficulty of Undertaking a Comparative Study of Genocide vis-à-vis the Northern 
American West,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 14. This is in sharp contrast to 
the treatment of the Armenian experience, regarding which the genocide scholarship does not seek to 
distinguish between massacres and battles. Moreover, the historical discourse is described geographically 
as “the history of the North American West,” rather than within United States history. See: Ibid., 17. 
However, the genocide scholarship does not describe the Armenian experience as part of the history of 
Eastern Anatolia, but rather insists on it being a part of “Ottoman history,” which is a description that 
focuses on the government. For example, see: Akçam, review of Armenian, 118-119. 
 
122 The power-consideration was that Poland’s existence as a nation-state served as a political buffer that 
contributed to stopping German growth and promoting a balance of power in Europe, while the Cherokee’s 
existence as a nation-state would have interfered with the growth of American governance and there was no 






timeframe,123 an Americanization of the victims’ title,124 a generalization of the 
                                                          
123 Reference is made to 1492 as the beginning of the victimhood, thereby presenting the perpetrators as a 
whole host of colonizers since the days of Christopher Columbus. See: Robert Melson, review of Little 
Matter of Genocide, by Ward Churchill, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 14, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 270. 
Correspondingly, the perpetrators are described as Europeans. See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 250. Melson refers 
to Europeans as the assailants five times in one paragraph. See: Melson, review of Little, 270. One scholar 
explains the atrocities as the result of a “Euro-American contact.” See: Rensink, “Sand,” 11. By expanding 
the timeframe, the scholarship becomes less focused on the actions of the United States government. The 
expansion of the timeframe in this discourse is a stark contrast to the narrowing of it in the discourse about 
the Armenian experience. The narrowed timeframe that the genocide scholarship maintains in its narration 
of the Armenian experience is discussed here with references provided in this chapter’s notes 81-86.   
 
124 Usage of the title “Native Americans” to describe an identity group might be fitting for the descendants 
of the precolonial societies after becoming citizens of the United States. It does not appear to be as fitting 
as a title for the victims who did not themselves name the land America, and, correspondingly, did not 
consider themselves to be natives of “America,” which is a name that was given to the land by colonizers 
and popularized by those who persecuted the precolonial societies. The reference to the victims as Native 
Americans who were persecuted by European colonizers gives an impression of a European offense against 
Americans, and that, in a manner, this is a narration about the victimization of America. For instance, the 
events are presented as “the overall genocide of Native America” or “the near-extinction of America’s 
Native Peoples.” See: Barbara Alice Mann, “Fractal Massacres in the Old Northwest: The Example of the 
Miamis,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 2 (June 2013): 179; Jens-Uwe Guettel, “The US Frontier 
as Rationale for the Nazi East? Settler Colonialism and Genocide in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe and the 
American West,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 4 (December 2013): 401. Even though “America” 







offense,125 a usage of alternative terminology,126 and an inconspicuous discussion.127         
                                                          
125 There is an attempt to lump together the victimhood of the Native Americans’ ancestors with other cases 
of native populations being massacred, such as the Australian case. This is a development of Leo Kuper’s 
typology, which included “genocide against indigenous peoples” as a category. See: Walter K. Ezell, 
review of The Prevention of Genocide, by Leo Kuper, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2, no. 1 (1987): 
172. In effect, reiterated references to Australian genocidal guilt turns the American experience into a more 
general colonial phenomenon rather than be seen as a specific policy of the United States government. For 
examples of this, see: Charny and Smith, “Why,” i; Schaller and Zimmerer, “Settlers,” 197; Damien Short, 
“Australia: A Continuing Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 1-2 (March-June 2010): 53; 
Daniel Feierstein and Henry Theriault, “Editor’s Introduction,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 5, no. 2 
(Summer 2010): 133; Andrew Woolford and Jeff Benvenuto, “Canada and Colonial Genocide,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 17, no. 4 (December 2015): 377. In this context, “British imperialism and colonialism” 
is highlighted as the perpetrator “in the physical and cultural destruction of native peoples in North 
America, Australia, and New Zealand,” thereby looking away from the United States government’s 
responsibility toward the natives within the territories it controlled. See: Robert Melson, “Critique,” 282. 
Sometimes, the references to genocide in this context are made without mentioning a perpetrator. For 
instance, see: Stannard, “De´ja,” 129; Jeffrey Ostler, “‘Just and Lawful War’ as Genocidal War in the 
(United States) Northwest Ordinance and Northwest Territory, 1787-1832,” Journal of Genocide Research 
18, no. 1 (March 2016): 15. 
 
126 Terms other than “genocide” have been used to flood the information about this victimhood. This has 
the effect of equipping the discourse with a language that does not rely on references to “genocide,” and, 
therefore, the term is kept from reaching a high level of popular usage in this context. Instead of a 
committed labeling of genocide, the genocide scholarship has bundled the term genocide in this context 
with other generic terms, such as “settler colonialism,” or “settler imperialism,” which opened up the 
discourse for a dichotomy of “settlers and natives” that is unaccompanied by suggestions of government 
responsibility. For instances of this shift toward a broader postcolonial rhetoric, see: Wolfe, “Settler,” 387, 
403; Stannard, “De´ja,” 131; Schaller and Zimmerer, Settlers,” 195-197; Norbert Finzsch, “‘[…] Extirpate 
or Remove That Vermine’: Genocide, Biological Warfare, and Settler Imperialism in the Eighteenth and 
Early Century,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 219; William Gallois, “Genocide in 
Nineteenth-Century Algeria,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 1 (March 2013): 69; Guettel, “US,” 
title; Woolford and Benvenuto, “Canada,” 377, 382; Rogers and Bain, “Genocide,” 83, 92. Unlike the 
position on the Armenian experience, the genocide scholarship’s treatment of colonized societies involves a 
call “to assess these nation’s [sic] histories more clearly” rather than dwell on the applicability of the term 
genocide. See: Katherine Ellinghaus, “Biological Absorption and Genocide: A Comparison of Indigenous 
Assimilation Policies in the United States and Australia,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 1 (Spring 
2009): 72. 
 
127 The discussion is often embedded inside paragraphs without any way for the readers anticipate it. For 
instance, Theriault’s quick reference to “genocide of Native Americans” is within a paragraph on “cycles of 
violence” in an article about genocide scholarship in general. See: Theriault, “Grain,” 128. In another 
article by him, “the extermination of the Native Americans” is described at the start of a paragraph as a 
“government policy” and within “the definition of genocide,” but the reference is deeply embedded within 
a discussion on the Albright-Cohen Report. See: Theriault, “Albright-Cohen,” 204. Hitting two birds with 
one stone, the genocide scholarship created an indirect way to deal with the memory of the “American 
Indian” victimhood by presenting the issue as a background in a discussion that centers on Guenter Lewy 
as an advocate of a “uniqueness thesis” who denies that cases other than the Holocaust are genocide, and it 
also gains an indirect way to deal with the memory of how the North American precolonial population was 
treated by the United States government. Lewy claims that there is no basis for charging the United States 
government of genocide because there is no evidence of intent to massacre “the Indian people as such.” 
See: Guenter Lewy, “Can There Be Genocide without the Intent to Commit Genocide?” Journal of 
Genocide Research 9, no. 4 (December 2007): 670. In the following issue of the same journal, three 





 Second, the genocide scholarship is designed to create a discourse about global 
events that is predetermined to have an atrocity focus, and thereby direct the public 
conversation according to the perception that the international community is expected to 
stop human suffering by way of intervention. Much of the genocide scholarship’s work is 
unabashedly supportive of political activism, which it expresses as being for the sake of 
prevention.128 The emphasis on prevention reflects the genocide scholarship’s 
foundationally warped view of genocide as a cause for action rather than a legal 
                                                          
Duck, If It Walks Like a Duck, If It Quacks Like a Duck,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 1 (March 
2008): 119-126; Stannard, “De´ja,” 127-133. Thus, instead of offering specific studies that label the 
destruction of North American communities as genocide, the genocide scholarship created an opportunity 
to reject the work of a scholar who is portrayed as committed to arguing against the use of genocide in this 
instance and generally. 
 
128 One of the genocide journals features the word prevention in its original name. In the journal’s first 
editorial as GSP, it is stated that those behind its publication “share a deep commitment to the study and 
prevention of the genocide of all peoples.” See: Charny and Smith, “Why,” i. In a later editorial of GSP, 
the co-editor at the time gives voice to the idea that the mission to “help end” genocide is a core element of 
the genocide scholarship. See: Herb Hirsch, “Editor’s Introduction: MARO: Mass Atrocity Response 
Operations; A Military Planning Handbook: Selling the Mission and/or Protecting Human Rights?” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 5. The argument is made that “Genocide studies 
should be defined today explicitly and prominently as a field of study as well as research and action for 
intervention and prevention,” and that “Prevention should be at the center.” See: Charny, “Requiem,” 116. 
This sentiment is also shared by the supposedly rivaling journal, JGR, in which a “belief in prevention” is 
professed as being a “fundamental ideology within genocide studies.” See: Cushman, “Is,” 524. The 
founder of JGR, asks in one editorial “Why study the crime of genocide at all if not partially for the sake of 
prevention?” See: Huttenbach, “Editor: Remembering,” 3. He later revisits the question, asking “If bona 
fide prevention is practically unattainable, why continue the study of genocide except as an academic 
pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake?” See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editors: Genocide 
Prevention: Sound Policy or Pursuit of a Mirage?” Journal of Genocide Research 10, no. 4 (December 
2008): 473. The activism of the genocide scholarship assumes an unexplained sense of authority, as 
manifested in AGS’ Armenian Genocide Resolution, which was “unanimously passed” at a conference in 
1997, and is worded as if to suggest that it is standard practice for scholars—they present themselves as 
“prominent” scholars—to pass a resolution, which “reaffirms that the mass murder of over a million 
Armenians in Turkey in 1915 is a case of genocide” and that it “conforms to the statutes of the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide.” See: Association of Genocide 
Scholars, “The Armenian Resolution Unanimously Passed by the Association of Genocide Scholars of 
North America,” http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent-
page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGSArmenian%20Genocide%20Resolution%20_0.pdf (accessed, 1/23/2017). 
Later, the president of INoGS tries to create some separation from the activities of the association that is 
now known as IAGS, and says about INoGS that “It has largely refrained from passing political resolutions 
and from getting dragged into history wars so typical of genocide activism.” See: Zimmerer, “Genocide,” 
205. However, as shown here, JGR—INoGS’ official journal—has had a major role in promoting the idea 
of genocide prevention, which promotes the political activism that is advocated by IAGS. Indirectly, 






characterization to criminalize a certain action.129 Accordingly, a moral underpinning can 
                                                          
129 Instead of seeking to prevent mass deaths through the legal application of “genocide,” the genocide 
scholarship acts as if “genocide” itself is being prevented. The word prevention is often used in medical 
context regarding efforts to stop ailments that cause bodily suffering and possibly death. The insistence on 
preventing genocide seems to suggest a similar act of stopping something that causes death, yet genocide is 
not a cause of death, be it directly (such as a weapon used for killing) or indirectly (such as a reason for 
violence). This distortion of the term genocide is noticeable in how the word scourge, which is a cause of 
death, is used as a nickname for genocide. See: Charny and Smith, “Why,” i; Schabas, “‘Odious’,” title; 
Hiebert, “Theorizing,” 335; “Plea,” 301; Smith, “Introduction,” 8. As stated in Article 8 of the Genocide 
Convention, this contributes to the genocide scholarship’s assumption that campaigning for genocide 
prevention can precede any designation by “the competent organs of the United Nations” on what counts as 
genocide and how to appropriately suppress it. It is said that the “UN Genocide Convention … specifically 
called on the prevention of genocide.” See: Huttenbach, “Editors: Genocide,” 471. However, the 
commitment to “undertake to prevent and to punish,” as stated in Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, 
does not mean that the prevention involves public campaigns that ignore the authority of the United 
Nations in determining what is genocide or the intervention of forces before an event is seen as genocide 
through the United Nations’ proper channels. The genocide scholarship’s discussion of “an early warning 
system” undermines the work of competent tribunals as it presents an expectation that human beings can 
and ought to be prevented from committing a crime before they are found to be guilty of it. Even without 
believing in the ability to predict genocide, it is argued that “Unfortunately the law is only marginally 
relevant in matters of prevention.” See: Jonassohn, “Prevention,” 10. It seems as though the genocide 
scholarship is bothered by the inability to charge individuals with a crime before it is committed: “Another 
problem with judicial processes is that an individual can be charged only after a crime has been 
committed.” See: Ibid., 11. It is suggested by the genocide scholarship that there should be a focus on “the 
early recognition of the stages of the incipient genocides as soon as they occur.” See: Ibid., 12. The 
genocide scholarship presents it as “a simple but profound fact that the time to prevent genocide is before it 
is perpetrated.” See: Totten, “Paying,” 24. This argument is similar to that which was dramatized as a 
subject of concern through the film Minority Report (2002): a system that arrests individuals before a crime 
is committed and without due process. The genocide scholarship celebrates that the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) called “it ‘absurd’ in the context of prevention to wait until genocide has been committed and 
determined to fit the legal definition” and instructed that “’a State’s obligation to prevent, and the 
corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, 
the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.’” See: Martin Mennecke, “Genocide 
Prevention and International Law,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 172. 
However, Mennecke does not relate that the judgment also found that it is “only if genocide was actually 
committed” that “a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to prevent genocide,” and that 
“if neither genocide nor any of the other acts listed in Article III of the Convention are ultimately carried 
out, then a State that omitted to act when it could have done so cannot be held responsible a posteriori, 
since the event did not happen which, under the rule set out above, must occur for there to be a violation of 
the obligation to prevent.” See: International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, 221-222, paragraph 431, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (accessed, 1/23/2017). Meaning, it is not “genocide” per se that the ICJ 
expects governments to prevent, but rather violence regarding which there is a reasonable expectation that 
it might be held as genocide later by a competent tribunal. The genocide scholarship does not have the legal 
authority to determine what is genocide and does not have legal validation when it calls for “genocide 
prevention” before a competent tribunal has found the violence in question to be genocide. This conceptual 
problem of “genocide prevention” does not seem to be foreign to the United States government. David 
Scheffer, who has served the government in several capacities, tried to introduce a transition to use 
“atrocity crimes” or “precursors of genocide” as phrases for prevention action because of the legal 
requirements that accompany the term genocide. See: David Scheffer, “Genocide and Atrocity Crimes,” 
Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (Winter 2006): 229, 237. To Scheffer, “The status quo of 





be used to prompt calls for aggressive action regarding matters of international conflict 
and other countries’ internal affairs, without there being consideration of how the 
genocide scholarship might be organizationally set up to serve the invested interests of a 
powerful party such as the United States government.130 Simultaneously, by framing the 
public debate around the question of the United States’ role as a possible savior, the 
controlled departure point of the discourse leaves out consideration of the United States 
                                                          
Unifying Terms: ‘Atrocity Crimes’ and ‘Atrocity Law’,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, no. 1 (Spring 
2007): 91. More recently, the White House announced “the creation of a whole-of-government Atrocities 
Prevention Board (APB), and directing the National Security Advisor to lead a comprehensive review to 
assess the U.S. government’s anti-atrocity capabilities, and recommend reforms that would fill identified 
gaps in these capabilities.” See: White House, “Fact Sheet: A Comprehensive Strategy and New Tools to 
Prevent and Respond to Atrocities,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/23/fact-sheet-
comprehensive-strategy-and-new-tools-prevent-and-respond-atro (accessed, 1/23/2017). However, instead 
of recognizing that its notion of “genocide prevention” is problematic, the genocide scholarship insists that 
there is “a record of failure” when it comes to “genocide preventing.” See: Ezell, review of Prevention, 
172. Zimmerer exclaims that “Genocide prevention—as we know it—has failed!” See: Jürgen Zimmerer, 
“From the Editors: Genocide and Global Social Justice: Towards Sustainable Prevention,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 183.  
 
130 An example of this is found in the genocide scholarship’s role in the American-based campaign to treat 
events in Darfur as genocide, even though the United Nation’s Report of the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur in 2005 had “concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of 
genocide.” See: International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission on 
Darfur, http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (accessed, 1/23/2017). For instances in 
which Darfur is labeled genocide despite the position by one of the United Nations’ competent organs, see: 
Elisa von Joeden-Forgey, “Gender and the Future of Genocide Studies and Prevention,” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 89; Totten, “Paying,” 34, 50. This was also made compatible with 
the genocide scholarship’s bias against the Turkish government by accusing it of “denying the Darfur 
Genocide.” See: Hannibal Travis, “The United Nations and Genocide Prevention: The Problem of Racial 
and Religious Bias,” Genocide Studies International 8, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 128. In one article in particular it 
is shown how the United States government was instrumental in identifying the events in Darfur as 
genocide, and it is recognized that “never before had one nation officially accused another of genocide as 
the events unfolded.” See: Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, “The US Government Darfur Genocide 
Investigation,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (June 2005): 279. However, Totten and Markusen do 
not contextualize the matter by offering significant details on American interests in the region and the 
United States government’s relations with the Sudanese government. Instead, they admonish “the US 
government and the international community”—as if in the name of morality—for “the failure to take 
significant action to halt the genocide,” and thereby they thicken the popular labeling of the events in 
Darfur as genocide while creating a semblance of separation from American interests. See: Ibid. When the 
information is controlled in this way, the public is led to perceive action as something that is expected and 
inaction as waywardness. For instance, the discourse enables a phrasing such as “The reluctance of global 
powers to characterize Darfur as a genocide,” instead of inviting the public to focus on the American 
insistence to use the term genocide to muster support for action against a government. See: Matthew 
Lippman, “Darfur: The Politics of Genocide Denial Syndrome,” Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 2 






government’s possible role as instigator.131    
 In light of the major ways in which the genocide scholarship controls information, 
the following critical questions are raised about the use of the term genocide: How does 
the current framing of the discourse around “genocide” prevent governments and the 
public from being effectively educated toward limiting the chances of conflict between a 
government and a certain section of its population? What compromise can be found 
between the use of “genocide” to attract attention to ongoing suffering and the upholding 
of the term’s legal standards? To what extent is the genocide discourse defined by 
American efforts to persuade the public of beliefs that serve the interests of the United 
States government in international affairs? How do American interests affect the 
genocide scholarship’s treatment of different atrocities in history? How does political 
science address the claim that “genocide prevention” is the genocide scholarship’s 
genuine concern and primary purpose?    
 
 
                                                          
131 When the information is controlled in such a way as to make the discourse revolve around the question 
of intervention, even a strong argument against calls for it might serve American interests. The criticism 
that “the prospect of luring Western intervention” against the Sudanese government has the capacity to 
encourage rebels toward “perpetuating fighting in Darfur and the resultant suffering of its civilians” 
illustrates this. See: Alan J. Kuperman, “Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again?” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 4, no. 3 (Winter 2009): 281. Kuperman discerns between “genocide” and cases in which 
atrocities are the result of political conflict, but he contributes to the discourse even without agreeing with 
the genocide label. By claiming that intervention is not an effective way for “Western” entities—Kuperman 
prefers to point at Western action rather than mention the United States specifically as an actor—to “protect 
civilians” in Darfur or in similar situations, an assumption is made that those prospective interveners had no 
significant part in the creation of the conflict that brought harm upon these civilians. Kuperman leads his 
readers to think in terms of how the rebels are being affected as existing actors, without considering 
whether the United States took part in conditioning the rebels toward their initial role in the violence. This, 
much like those who insist on misusing the term genocide in their reading of atrocities, leads the public to 
focus on the motivation of the local actors at the expense of considering the preexisting interests of remote 






Moralizing an American Agenda 
The genocide scholarship produces a discourse that is fundamentally moralistic 
and ignorant of its own power. Typical moralizing involves an effort to upkeep or 
improve the public’s performance of validated principles, and it is commonly found to be 
the practice of social organizations outside the realm of scientific pursuits. What the 
genocide scholarship does in its professed efforts to moralize is more intricate. It does not 
use its platform as an academic field of study to reiterate standard teachings about 
behavior such as “Thou shall not kill,” nor would that constitute the production of 
knowledge that is expected of scholarly activity. By labeling as genocide its own 
selection of cases, the genocide scholarship only highlights killings in certain situations 
that it seeks to show as genocide, and thereby rebukes their perpetrators in particular. 
While it claims to have social-scientific methods in doing so, its findings are moral 
instructions that affect public opinion on matters that pertain to conflict of interests 
between governments in international politics. At the basis of the genocide scholarship is 
a moralistic language that is made common in academia and has a persuasive effect 
because it assumes a universal—rather than a political—authority.132 
                                                          
132 From his morally authoritative position as the chairman of USHMM, Elie Wiesel contextualizes the 
genocide scholarship in HGS’ first issue by saying that it appeals to “the moralist in you.” See: Cargas, 
“Interview,” 7. The introduction to GSP’s first issue rationalizes the journal’s mission by claiming that it 
has “both pragmatic and moral reasons.” See: Charny and Smith, “Why,” i. Sophisticatedly, the genocide 
scholarship amplifies the perception of it as having moral authority by describing itself as having “social 
prestige and moral capital.” See: Schaller, “Editor(s),” 246. The moral discourse gives the genocide 
scholarship a semblance of separation from the United States government while endowing it with the 
authority to rally the public into believing that the United States would be morally attentive by becoming 
more involved in governing the affairs of other countries. This echoes the argument that was made popular 
by Samantha Power. For instance, see: Hirsch, “Preventing,” 18. In the process, the public is directed away 
from even considering what role the United States government may have had in instigating the conflicts 
that it is called upon by the genocide scholarship to resolve. Questions surrounding the role of third parties 
in cases of genocide are limited to the third party being complicit or a bystander. For instance, portrayals of 
Germany as complicit or the United States as a bystander in WWI. See: Melson, review of German, 484-
487; Melson, “Responses,” 105. The role of the third party as an instigator of the conflict is not part of the 





 This image of a moral entity is illustrated in the genocide scholarship’s portrayal 
of the campaign to label the Sudanese government as guilty of committing genocide. In 
its narration of the events, the genocide scholarship cannot deny that the United States 
government had made crucial and unprecedented declarations about genocide in Darfur, 
but it nonetheless attributes the driving force behind the government’s position to moral 
pressure from nongovernmental elements, including itself.133 The genocide scholarship’s 
                                                          
which there is an intent to destroy a group, but a divide-and-rule policy by a third party whose intent is to 
maintain power through the conflict of others. While complicity is listed as a punishable act in Article 3 of 
the Genocide Convention, third-party instigation of conflict is not addressed within the Genocide 
Convention and has not received significant consideration in connection to genocide claims.  
 
133 The accusation by the United States secretary of state at the time, Colin Powell, that Sudan committed 
genocide, is said to be based on “Evidence collected by the US State Department’s Atrocities 
Documentation Team (ADT).” See: Totten and Markusen, “US,” 279. However, the editorial in a later 
issue of the same journal in which their article was published puts the matter differently in a critical tone: 
“When the former US Secretary of State Colin Powell finally made up his mind to call the atrocities in the 
Sudanese province of Darfur ‘genocide’ in September 2004, this statement was celebrated among many 
colleagues as a great triumph.” See: Schaller, “From the Editor(s),” 245. Rather than recognize, in 
consistency with Totten and Markusen’s account, that the official declaration followed a process in which 
genocide researchers were commissioned to collect data—the commission used the word evidence—by the 
United States government, Schaller’s narration of the events presents the genocide scholarship and the 
government as two separate entities. See: Ibid. In contrast to his “finally made up his mind” phrasing, the 
same Schaller later states that Powell “did not hesitate to call the atrocities in Darfur/Sudan genocide in 
September 2004.” See: Dominik J. Schaller, “From the Editors: Kenya—Another Genocide?” Journal of 
Genocide Research 10, no. 3 (September 2008): 342. This exposes the tricky task of the genocide 
scholarship: one the one hand, it cannot be seen as being an extension of the United States government in 
the production of a genocide accusation, but on the other hand, it is committed to support the government’s 
position. Thus, it is said that “The invocation of the term genocide by Secretary of State Powell 
undoubtedly was the product of a methodical and reasoned analysis” and in addition that “The criticism of 
Sudan also reflects public opinion in the United States.” See: Lippman, “Darfur,” 199-200. Thus, it is made 
to seem as if public opinion is not informed by governmental planning and execution via the genocide 
scholarship, Darfur-specific groups, celebrities, and the press, but rather it is a separate source of influence. 
“Polls” are cited as indication that “the electorate believes that genocide is being carried out in Darfur” in a 
manner that shows public opinion as if the public’s opinion on the matter was not an intended effect of 
controlled information and as if formed independently of government interests. See: Ibid. According to the 
genocide scholarship, “The Save Darfur campaign has been described as the largest international social 
movement since anti-apartheid,” the activities of which are related to “the leadership of film stars Mia 
Farrow and George Clooney.” See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 247-248. There is an assumption that “film starts” 
are independent actors in this morality production, or that the government is detached from the capacity to 
influence public opinion through them. Instead of examining how it was an American interest to use the 
label of “genocide” regarding Darfur, the genocide scholarship is arranged so that a genocide scholar of a 
German identity, who was then a leading member of a second organization of genocide scholars that is 
made to appear as European and more international than the other one (which is also named as being 
international), can appear credible as he internationalizes and moralizes the phenomenon, and pushes it 






criticism of the United States government for failing to “fulfill its ongoing oral 
commitment to the ‘Never Again’ promise,”134 for “not using more of its resources to 
stop the killing in the region,”135 and for following “narrowly defined” interests,136 
presents two identifiable benefits for the United States government. First, it lends 
credibility to the genocide scholarship as an independent force of morality and expertise, 
thereby enhancing the genocide scholarship’s ability to affect public opinion according to 
American interests without suspicion. Second, it invites the United States government to 
use more of its resources upon the next situation in which the use of the term genocide is 
accepted by the public, thereby allowing the government to coercively affect the affairs 
of other governments according to its interests with moral support.  
Accordingly, not only does the genocide scholarship avoid detailing the United 
States government’s decisive role in its operation, it also presents itself as a bottom-up 
phenomenon that is proudly enmeshed in independent analysis and activism. It wants to 
be seen as unapologetically following a moral compass,137 as if positioned as an outlier in 
                                                          
134 Mayroz, “Ever,” 360.  
 
135 Ibid., 364.  
 
136 Ibid., 378. Mayroz does not expand on what those interests might be in terms of the United States’ 
rivalry with China over influence in the region. China is presented as a blocker of international intervention 
in the context of Darfur. See: Ibid., 373-375. However, the American perception of the Chinese relationship 
with the Sudanese government is not brought forth as part of an analysis to explain the American genocide 
campaign against the Sudanese government. Similarly, in another article, Chinese interests in the region are 
pointed out, but not the American interests as they relate to the Chinese investments in Sudan and how a 
military intervention that might have followed a successful application of the term genocide would have 
disrupted China’s working relations with the Sudanese government. The effect that this would have had is 
not considered by the genocide scholarship as possibly being an American strategy that could explain the 
attempt to rally the international community into believing that the Sudanese government is guilty of 
genocide. The genocide scholarship briefly informs that “the international pressure on Sudan and its close 
economic partner and diplomatic ally China is quite high,” but the foiling of these relations between China 
and Sudan is not considered as a possible reason for the intensified conflict and the genocide accusation. 
See: Schaller, “Editors: Kenya,” 342.      
 
137 In one example of this, it is argued that those who question the quality of the scholarship because of its 





relation to the government and the mainstream sources of information.138 By doing so, 
the genocide scholarship further encourages individual researchers who fancy this image 
to think of themselves as morally stout and involved for staying within the genocide 
discourse.139 The incorporation of activism into academic work is even said to be the 
right choice careerwise.140 The image of the genocide scholar as the independent moral 
intellectual is most poignantly displayed when the genocide scholarship uses its platform 
to publicize disagreement with the United States government’s policy regarding 
genocide.141   
                                                          
Even those who do not agree with his assertion are led to internalize that the genocide scholarship is 
devoted to independent activism and that it is unrelated to the United States government.    
 
138 It is asked whether or not the “collective will” of “the several millions in colleges and university” can 
function as “an authentic international anti-genocide voice” and “a Fifth Estate” to affect “the powerful.” 
See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: An Editor’s Swan-Song,” Journal of Genocide Research 11, 
no. 4 (December 2009): 418. The question solidifies an assumption that the grass-roots image on university 
campuses and this idea of “collective will” is not itself by the design of the powerful.   
 
139 In an articulation of how genocide scholars see themselves, it is said that “For most students and 
scholars the study of genocide is more than just an academic or intellectual occupation” and that “They see 
their roles as scholar-activists.” See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 247. Similarly, “genocide prevention” is 
described as a “scholarly pursuit.” See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the Editor: In Search of Genocide 
Prevention: Utopia, Mirage or Rational Policy?” Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 2 (June 2007): 167. 
 
140 It is stated that the use of “genocide” in manuscripts helps their publication and sales, and that 
“‘Genocide’ and ‘prevention’ are indispensable key terms that enhance the status of any research proposal.” 
See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 248. In addition, the genocide scholarship advertises that “Genocide Prevention 
has become a distinct sub-industry on campuses, in think tanks, and in government,” which seems to 
suggest that the idea of genocide prevention has a life of its own. See: Henry R. Huttenbach, “From the 
Editor: Can Genocide Be Prevented? No! Yes? Perhaps,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 3 
(September 2005): 307. 
  
141 The two main opportunities for staging such disagreement in GSP were the publications of Preventing 
Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers (2008), which is also known as the Albright-Cohen Report, 
and Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook (2010), which is also known as 
MARO. Even though it is common for scholars to weigh in as part of the policy-making process itself, in 
these two occasions it was decided that the genocide scholarship would publish a set of critical reviews 
after the process and thus present a public debate between genocide scholars and policy makers, with the 
underlying and unquestioned assumption being that the genocide scholarship is not itself an extension of an 
American policy. For instance, it is stated about the Albright-Cohen Report that “For many who have spent 
most of their academic careers studying genocide … [it] will be seen as a huge disappointment” and that it 
“provides ample evidence of two clashing cultures” between academics and policy makers. See: Herb 
Hirsch, “The Genocide Prevention Task Force: Recycling People and Policy,” Genocide Studies and 





Attaining the public’s belief that the genocide scholarship follows morality rather 
than discursive dictations is vital for its ability to effectively unfold the genocide 
narrative about the Ottoman Armenians without it seeming like an American political 
endeavor.142 From this vantage point, the genocide scholarship argues that “Modern 
Armenian history serves as a nearly ideal case to test the role of moral values … and in 
particular the moral commitments of both the United States and Israel.”143 In this framing 
                                                          
credibility for the field of study by stating that to non-American eyes the report might be seen as using the 
“moral condemnation of genocide” as “a pretext for intervention.” See: Feierstein, “Getting,” 159. Even a 
strong argument about how the Albright-Cohen Report confuses “genocide” with “crimes against 
humanity” and is unable to make “important legal distinctions” seems odd because it is unclear why the 
straightforward criticism would be put in the journal rather than be a matter for prereport consultations 
unless it was desired to establish the report and its critique as two distinct projects: one that is made to seem 
political, and the other that is made to seem scholarly by virtue of accusing the political of exercising “a 
form of deception.” See: Schabas, “‘Definitional’,” 179, 182. Some of the other criticisms are that the 
United States government has no moral say as long as it does not become party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court; that the report is based on a faulty premise; and that it fails to address its own 
American identity. See: Jacques Sémelin, “An International but Especially American Event,” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention 4, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 165; Alan J. Kuperman, “Wishful Thinking Will Not Stop 
Genocide: Suggestions for a More Realistic Strategy,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 2 (Summer 
2009): 191; Theriault, “Albright-Cohen,” 206. The MARO handbook is criticized for not grasping “the 
complexity of the many processes that occur during genocide”; for using “hard-to-decode acronyms”; for 
lacking in theoretical expertise; and for reflecting Washington’s reluctance “to intervene to stop genocide.” 
See: Üngör, “Team,” 37; Daniel Feierstein, “The Good, the Bad, and the Invisible: A Critical Look at the 
MARO Report,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 41; Alex Alvarez, “Reflections 
on the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 1 (Spring 
2011): 71; Roger W. Smith, “Utopian Goals, Unasked Questions: Reflections on a Proposed Military 
Planning Handbook Response to Mass Atrocities against Civilians,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, 
no. 1 (Spring 2011): 80. Be it “a step” in the right direction or in the wrong direction, the use of such 
language about the government taking first or tentative steps in certain directions depicts the genocide 
scholarship as a source for the assessment of policy rather than call attention to it being itself an execution 
of policy. For examples of this, see: Sémelin, “International,” 166; Mennecke, “Genocide,” 172; Schabas, 
“’Definitional’,” 182; Scott Straus, “Step,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4, no. 2 (Summer 2009): title. 
Similarly, the MARO handbook was described by the genocide scholarship as having taken “Missteps” as 
well as being a “good first step.” See: Henry C. Theriault, “The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities or the 
Same Old Militarism?” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 9; Maureen S. Hiebert, 
“MARO as the Partial Operationalization of R2P,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 
57. Thus, the discourse is framed between official United States government publications and the genocide 
scholarship, with the latter appearing as if it is an independent project that is critical of the former.   
 
142 In the context of labeling the Armenian experience as genocide and accusing Turkey of denial, it is 
concluded about “Those of us who wish to be true to our scholarly calling” that “our moral advocacy 
should require us to open ourselves to suffering as a way of taking a stand against cruelty and killing, 
whatever its source.” See: Smith, Markusen, and Lifton, “Professional,” 17.   
 
143 Melson, “Responses,” 105. According to Melson’s framing, “the president of the United States and State 





of the discourse, Turkey is shown as an active political power that is bullying others to 
accept a “moral wrong,”144 whereas the United States is described as an inactive political 
power that is called into action by a moral voice.145 By presenting Turkey as the political 
actor and the United States as a hesitant counteractor that is urged to act in the name of 
morality, the genocide scholarship creates a perception that fully reverses the two 
governments’ roles.146 A half-truth is told by the genocide scholarship about Turkey’s 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): it shows the NATO 
alliance as Turkish leverage in keeping the United States government from passing a 
resolution to declare that the Armenians were victims of genocide,147 but not as an 
                                                          
referring to the events of 1915-23, for fear of offending Turkish sensibilities.” See: Ibid., 109-110. This is 
an example of how a half-truth functions as disinformation. Because it may be true, or at least highly 
believable, that Turkish sensibilities are offended by the genocide label, readers become satisfied with the 
veracity of such an explanation and in the process are left unaware that a greater context is being kept from 
consideration. In other words, pertinent information is disregarded through this type of framing, which then 
facilitates the development of a sidetrack into a discourse. The focus on the Turkish reaction to the 
genocide claims strengthens the notion that the United States among other countries is being silenced, and 
induced “into aiding and abetting denial out of expediency.” For example, see: Smith, “Genocide Denial,” 
107. As a result of such a focus, the public is far removed from considering the United States’ active role in 
creating the genocide discourse. 
 
144 Melson, review of Young, 512. The genocide scholarship generates a conviction that today’s Turks are 
“morally responsible” for being “the descendants of the perpetrators.” See: Marsoobian, “Acknowledging,” 
211. For the genocide scholarship, it is “a moral responsibility that academic work continues to shed light 
on the Armenian Genocide and promote awareness of it through publications and university courses.” See: 
“Plea,” 302. The genocide scholarship even instructs Armenians that it is their “moral responsibility” as a 
“community worldwide” to support the academic pursuit of the Armenian experience as part of the 
genocide discourse. See: Ibid.   
 
145 For instance, it is claimed that the “active campaign of denial” by the Turkish government “needed, on 
moral grounds, to be countered” for genocide scholars to conduct their “Armenian genocide project.” See: 
Miller and Miller, “Armenian,” 139. 
 
146 This reversal becomes observable upon the examination of how the term genocide was developed into a 
discourse. It was under American control that the term took on its meaning in Armenian historiography, 
obliging a Turkish response to the impactful implications for Ottoman historiography and Armenian-
Turkish relations. This chain of events is considered here in Chapter 5.   
 
147 For examples of such references to NATO, see: Guroian, “Post-Holocaust,” 310; Dadrian, “Signal,” 
269; Bloxham, “Roots,” 44. The United States Congress’ consideration of a resolution in October 2000 is 
given as an instance in which Turkey used its political power to respond “with a barrage of threats.” See: 
Dolabjian, “Armenian,” 103. Other instances include the opposition to the production of a film on the 





explanation why Turkey has thus far avoided making direct accusations against the 
United States for orchestrating this genocide discourse. The genocide scholarship’s 
Armenian bias provokes Turkish reactions for apparent reasons, but it is primarily 
reflective of American interests regarding historiography and international relations.148     
The Cambodian focus of the genocide scholarship has some tactical similarities 
with its Armenian focus, but the moralizing in this case stands out for two main effects: it 
has shifted historiographical attention away from physical destruction that had been 
caused directly by the United States government in Cambodia,149 and it has eventually led 
to legal charges of genocide against former members of the Khmer Rouge government 
that ruled Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 in the aftermath of the American 
bombardment.150 Beginning with cursory and repetitive texts in book reviews, the 
genocide scholarship was able to promote a genocide narrative regarding Cambodia 
without having to enter lengthy or conclusive academic discussions about the 
applicability of the term genocide in this instance.151 The genocide scholarship has 
                                                          
encyclopedia.” See: Ibid., 103.  
 
148 American interests are explored here in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 as part of the power-based view of 
international law.  
 
149 The American involvement in the physical destruction of the Ottoman state was indirect. This is 
discussed here in Chapter 4. The bombing of Cambodia was part of the American military campaign in 
Indochina, known as the Vietnam War. For a discussion of this here, see: Chapter 5, section titled “Civil 
Wars.” It is noted that the Cambodian focus has also been used as space for stating as fact that the United 
States was defeated in Vietnam. For example, see: Chigas, “Politics,” 246-247. 
 
150 For official information on the legal proceedings of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC), see: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en 
(accessed, 1/23/2017). The genocide scholarship’s Armenian focus has not led to legal charges of genocide 
through an organ that is sanctioned by the United Nations, though there have been legal implications as a 
result of state legislations that followed the discourse of the genocide scholarship. This is discussed here in 
Chapter 6.   
 
151 By adhering to this format through the review of monographs, the genocide scholarship, in its early 
stages, when the first journal was still in the process of introducing the genocide scholarship’s discourse, 





produced minimal comparative work involving Cambodia,152 but the indoctrination of the 
public into believing that the Khmer Rouge government committed genocide has mainly 
been carried out by many lists and pairings in which Cambodia appears in the context of 
genocide alongside other cases that are either legally established as genocide or that the 
genocide scholarship treats as genocide.153 When the Cambodian case is not simply 
                                                          
Cambodia-centered book reviews that were published in HGS during its initial years of operation was 
disproportionate in relation to all other cases of mass deaths in modern history with the exception of the 
Holocaust and the Armenian experience. For examples of these reviews, see: Smith, review of Stones, 225-
228; Samuel Totten, review of To Destroy You Is No Loss, by Joan D. Criddle and Teeda Butt Man; Haing 
Ngor, by Haing Ngor with Roger Warner, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3, no. 4 (1988): 495-498; 
Samuel Totten, review of Cambodia 1975-1979, edited by Karl D. Jackson, Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies 6, no. 3 (1991): 324-328; Peou, review of Pol, 413-425; Kelvin Rowley, review of Children of 
Cambodia’s Killing Fields, edited by Dith Pran, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 12, no. 2 (Fall 1998): 
357-359. 
 
152 A comparative work on “Women and Genocide” shows how the use of the term genocide in the 
Cambodian context was taken for granted. Not only does such an article not explain why the term genocide 
is used in connection with the Cambodian experience, it presents a text in which the use of the term 
genocide regarding Cambodia is a major assumption that is announced in the work’s title and is framed by 
way of a selective comparison between Nazi Germany and Cambodia. See: Smith, “Women,” 316. The 
unconvincing emphasis on females as a theme of genocide studies is discussed here in this chapter’s note 
117. A later work presents “Cambodia” as genocidal by highlighting the element of revolution as the basis 
for its comparison with “Rwanda.” See: Edward Kissi, “Rwanda, Ethiopia and Cambodia: Links, Faultlines 
and Complexities in a Comparative Study of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (March 
2004): 130.  
 
153 The following present references to lists or pairings in which the genocide labeling of the Cambodian 
experience is justified by framing alone, leading readers to falsely assume that the Cambodian experience is 
already proven to have been genocide simply because the genocide scholarship makes it seem like common 
language: Guroian, “Post-Holocaust,” 309, 311; Melson, review of Little, 271; Stuart Stein, “Geno- and 
Other cides: A Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 1 
(March 2002): 46; Bartrop, “Relationship,” 525; Henry Huttenbach, review of “A Problem from Hell”: 
America and the Age of Genocide, by Samantha Power, Journal of Genocide Research 5, no. 1 (March 
2003): 166; Woolf and Hulsizer, “Psychosocial,” 105; Jürgen Zimmerer, “From the Editors: Genocidal 
Terrorism? A Plea for Conceptual Clarity,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 387; 
Lippman, “Darfur,” 193; Akçam, “Guenter,” 120; Lewy, “Reply,” 307; Hiebert, “Theorizing,” 311, 318, 
320, 326; Mayroz, “Ever,” 376; Üngör, “Team,” 32; Totten, “State,” 213; Melson, “Critique,” 283; “Plea,” 
301; Hinton, “Critical,” 6, 13; Travis, “Original,” 31; Üngör, “Studying,” 69; Verdeja, “Situating,” 82, 85; 
Charny, “Requiem,” 115; Hirsch, “Preventing,” 2; Travis, “United,” 125, 133-134; Heerten and Moses, 
“Nigeria-Biafra,” 182; Rebecca Jinks, “Thinking Comparatively about Genocide Memorialization,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 4 (December 2014): 424. If reiteration might be an indication that a 
message is important, then one genocide scholar’s repetition of almost the same wording in two separate 
articles might point at the importance of listing “Cambodia” as a genocide among genocides. First, it is 
stated in the context of the Albright-Cohen Report that a certain point of view is “clearly discernible in 
Samantha Power’s book ‘A Problem from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide, which focuses on 
genocide in Cambodia, Rwanda, and the Balkans,” and then in another article, as part of an overview of 
genocide studies, it is stated again that a certain point of view is “clearly discernible in Samantha Power’s A 





reduced to labeling,154 the scattered references in the genocide scholarship oscillate from 
an awkward effort to genocidize Cambodian history by suggesting that the Khmer 
Rouge’s operations are associated with ethnoreligious or racist motives to an equally 
awkward insistence that the genocide label applies regardless of realizations that the 
Khmer Rouge policies were political and never targeted either an ethnical, national, 
racial, or religious, group, as such, for destruction.155 The genocide framing also includes 
                                                          
and the Balkans.” Compare: Feierstein, “Getting,” 155; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 263. The difference between 
the texts is found in the word book and the quotation marks within the book title. Interestingly, the latter 
article is said to have been translated whereas the former article received no credit for translation. In fact, it 
is even suggested in the former article that, as the author, Feierstein himself translated a source into 
English. See: Feierstein, “Getting,” 160 (note 5). If the repetition is not odd enough, it is even odder that 
the translated work essentially copies from the work that supposedly was not translated.    
 
154 The phrasing “the Cambodian Genocide, or “the Cambodian genocide,” appears in the following: 
Jonassohn, “Prevention,” 10; Melson, review of Little, 271; Chigas, “Politics,” title; Woolf and Hulsizer, 
“Psychosocial,” 104-105, 125; Donald W. Beachler, “Arguing about Cambodia: Genocide and Political 
Interest,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 230; Totten, “State,” 213; Feierstein, 
“Leaving,” 261; “Plea,” 301; Hinton, “Critical,” 6; Travis, “Original,” 34, 41; Hirsch, “Preventing,” 7.  The 
phrasing “genocide in Cambodia” appears in the following: Smith, “Women,” 325; Kiss, “Rwanda,” 130; 
Menzel, “Justice,” 221; Feierstein, “Getting,” 155, 263.   
 
155 In a review of Ben Kiernan’s work, it is stated that “It was race, not class, that most preoccupied the 
regime’s thinking” and that “Racialism existed at all levels in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.” See: 
Peou, review of Pol, 413. Years later, it is said about Kiernan that he “had to come to terms with the fact 
that the Cambodian genocide was carried out essentially for political reasons, while the UNCG expressly 
excludes crimes against political groups.” See: Feierstein, “Leaving,” 261. If so, then Feierstein’s position 
that a “genocide was carried out” despite this observation about the circumstances in Cambodia and the 
Genocide Convention seems to require an explanation. It might also seem perplexing that such a drastic 
reversal of analysis by a Yale University professor who is the founding director of the Genocide Studies 
Program there—that what he thought and taught to be racial was actually political—has not been addressed 
at much greater length by the genocide scholarship at least in one of its three academic journals. Oddly, 
Kiernan changed his position and yet the genocide scholarship is disinterested in an investigation of the 
extent to which Kiernan’s work prior to his change of perspective was used as part of the historiographical 
basis for the establishment of the ECCC. The change in Kiernan’s position coincides with the change in the 
genocide scholarship’s ability to apply the term genocide to political persecution. This is not the first time 
that Kiernan drastically changes his characterization of events in Cambodia. Compare: Ben Kiernan, 
“Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia,” Australian Outlook 30, no. 3 (December 1976): 371-386; 
Ben Kiernan, “Vietnam and the Governments and People of Kampuchea,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian 
Scholars 11, no. 4 (October-December 1979): 19-25. It is noted that Kiernan’s change of mind—from an 
optimistic analysis of the Khmer Rouge government to a condemning one—followed the Vietnamese 
invasion into Cambodia and the termination of the Khmer Rouge rule. Also problematic is the way in 
which the genocide scholarship adjusts the meaning of “genocide” to meet the Cambodian history. One 
scholar writes that the Cambodian experience is “sometimes described as auto genocide.” See: Stein, 
“Geno- and Other cides,” 46. This reflects how the retreat from the argument about a racist method in 
Cambodia has not been matched by a retreat from using the term genocide in this instance, even if it 





a tallying of fatalities that is murky, and potentially misleading regarding the assignment 
of responsibility.156  
                                                          
in the Genocide Convention. The whimsical decision by a subcommission of the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission in 1978 to describe the events in Cambodia as “nothing less than autogenocide” is 
stressed by the genocide scholarship and invites associations with the term genocide as legally defined in 
the Genocide Convention despite the case’s disharmony with the wording of the Genocide Convention. 
See: Totten, review of Destroy, 495. An understatement such as “the majority of the victims of the Khmer 
Rouge were not killed on the basis of their ethnicity” is accompanied by a conjectural and conditional 
sentence: “Had the U.N. definition of genocide included economic classes, or the killing of people who did 
not fit a particular government’s version of the good society, Cambodia’s experience would likely be 
accepted as genocide.” See: Beachler, “Arguing,” 215. It is as though a recognition by the genocide 
scholarship that the Cambodian experience is “outside the fore of the legal definition of genocide” does not 
mean that the Khmer Rouge did not commit genocide but rather it points at “the inadequacy of the 
Convention definition.” See: Pamela Ballinger, “Who Defines and Remembers Genocide after the Cold 
War? Contested Memories of Partisan Massacre in Venezia Giulia in 1943-1945,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 2, no. 1 (March 2000): 11. The Genocide Convention is blamed for allowing “the ghastly 
devastation in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge to pass as non-genocidal.” See: Stannard, “De´ja,” 131. 
However, despite the restrained discussion of the term’s legal inapplicability in relation to the Cambodian 
experience, the genocide scholarship still describes group identifiers for the victims there as if they fall 
within the legal definition: “In Cambodia, the victims of genocide were defined on the bases of their ethnic 
and religious identity within Khmer Rouge determination of who was pure enough to be part of the utopian 
glorious past.” See: Kissi, “Rwanda,” 130. In addition, it is still claimed that “Ben Kiernan and others have 
shown that the Buddhist, Vietnamese, and Muslim populations of Cambodia were not simply assimilated; 
they were massacred and tortured.” See: Travis, “Original,” 41-42.  
 
156 In 1988, HGS publicized in a book review that “Between 1975 and 1979 it is estimated that up to three 
million Cambodians … perished at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.” See: Totten, review of Destroy, 495. In 
a later publication of the same journal, it is said that “Ben Kiernan has concluded that between 1,671,000 
and 1,871,000 people died as a result of its policies.” See: Beachler, “Arguing,” 214. This difference means 
that at least one of the two estimations that were published in an academic journal is false, and the margin 
of error might be as wide as over a million people. Remarkably, a similar difference in the estimation 
appears in the official site of the ECCC. One page states that “Perhaps up to three million people perished 
during this period of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days.” See: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, “About ECCC,” https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc (accessed, 1/23/2017). Another page 
states that “At least 1.7 million people are believed to have died from starvation, torture, execution and 
forced labour during this period of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days.” See: Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, “Introduction to the ECCC,” https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc/introduction 
(accessed, 1/23/2017). At any rate, the numbers that have been produced by the genocide scholarship do 
not question how many of the fatalities can be considered as an inevitable, probable, or possible, 
consequence of the American aerial attack on Cambodia. Through the genocide discourse, the framing is 
such that American responsibility for the fatalities remains largely unexamined whereas local responsibility 
is at the center of the discussion. American involvement is recognized but marginalized. For example, a 
quote from Ben Kiernan’s work is put forth in a book review to acknowledge that the political situation in 
Cambodia was related to the American bombing, but still the thematic focus is on the Khmer Rouge and its 
leader Pol Pot. See: Peou, review of Pol, 421. Instead of considering the nuance of Cambodian governance 
after the bombing, simplistic language is used to build a discourse on Pol Pot’s intent: “The plan of Pol Pot 
(the leader of the Khmer Rouge) and his associates was to literally wipe out any semblance of past life in 
Cambodia (now Kampuchea), and replace it with a totally reorganized agrarian- and totalitarian-based 






Ever since political conditions in Cambodia have facilitated a process toward the 
establishment of a tribunal to try former members of the Khmer Rouge for genocide, the 
genocide scholarship’s distorted claims on history have been emboldened by a legal 
stamp of approval.157 That process itself then became the subject of articles rather than 
the use of the term,158 and a source of perverse phrasing in which the events that were 
                                                          
157 The ECCC functions as a laminator of the genocide scholarship’s presentation of 1975-1979 in 
Cambodia as a genocidized history, although the historical account of the events does not warrant the use 
of the term genocide. Despite the weakness of the reasoning behind the label of the Cambodian experience 
as genocide, the genocide scholarship is now equipped with the ability to say that those who argue “that the 
Cambodian Genocide did not occur because Cambodians are not a protected national group, and religious 
minorities were singled out for assimilation rather than murder” are also arguing that the “Cambodian war 
crimes tribunal”—along with the UN General Assembly and the US Congress—is “‘idiosyncratic’ or 
‘political’ in declaring a Cambodian genocide.” See: Travis, “Original,” 34. Even if Travis had not 
misstated the argument against the use of “genocide” regarding Cambodia (suggesting the argument is that 
an event did not occur or that the Cambodians are not a protected group), the argument is still discredited 
by appearing to be in opposition to decisions by the tribunal in addition to going against the will of the 
United Nations and the United States. The symbiotic relationship between the genocide scholarship and the 
ECCC is illustrated in the suggestion that “Considering all the books and research already available on the 
Khmer Rouge, one might argue that it is not necessary to conduct a trial to find the truth about the events 
between 1975 and 1979.” See: Menzel, “Justice,” 225. Thus, the ECCC gains information from the 
genocide scholarship, and the genocide scholarship benefits by the validation that the ECCC gives it as a 
finder of “the truth.”   
 
158 In this manner, the genocide scholarship has managed to come full circle in the avoidance of the 
incompatibility between the Cambodian experience and the wording of the Genocide Convention. First, the 
book reviews provided a format in which the genocide scholarship unfolded a brief narrative without 
questioning the use of the term genocide, then awkwardness ensued when the genocide scholarship 
attempted to relate the Cambodian experience to the Genocide Convention, but more recently the genocide 
scholarship has become able to use the term freely, without question, because the setting up of the ECCC 
created a new focus, and the use of “genocide” in this context now appears to be cemented as justice. Two 
articles contain titles that associate the Cambodian experience with “justice” and “genocide.” One article 
about the negotiations toward a tribunal does not burden itself with mindfulness of the definition in the 
Genocide Convention. See: Chigas, “Politics,” 245-265. In another such article on the establishment of the 
tribunal, a section is dedicated to the question “Was it ‘genocide’?” See: Menzel, “Justice,” 221. Menzel’s 
somewhat convoluted analysis seems to conclude that the political nature of the persecutions by the Khmer 
Rouge government do not qualify as genocide according to the Genocide Convention, yet he moves on 
from the matter by stating that “For the practical outcome of the trial the question of ‘genocide’ is not as 
important as one might think.” See: Ibid., 223. Menzel then defers to public opinion, as if the genocide 
scholarship had not already influenced public opinion: “As the crimes of the Khmer Rouge are perceived to 
be extremely atrocious, public opinion may suggest that only genocide is the appropriate term with which 
to label them.” See: Ibid. A year later, as if the inability to reconcile the Cambodian experience with the 
specifics of the Genocide Convention has no bearing, the genocide scholarship introduced the notion of 
Cambodian “genocide survivors.” See: Münyas, “Genocide,” 431. Münyas does not question the very use 
of “genocide” or qualify his own usage of it by stating that the genocide scholarship’s attempts to justify in 
an academic setting the use of the term as it is legally defined have failed. Therefore, the genocide 
scholarship’s discourse on Cambodia has reached a legal status in Cambodia while circumventing the view 






slated to be judged already had a genocide label.159 The practice of having American 
scholars—some of whom have clear links to the United States government—write the 
history of a country that suffered from an American attack is concealed by the current 
international attire of the genocide scholarship.160 Through the Cambodian tribunal, the 
American narrative of the genocide scholarship is receiving a Cambodian appearance.161 
                                                          
159 For example, prior to the establishment of the ECCC, it was said that “efforts to form a tribunal in 
Cambodia to try the perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide have been largely unsuccessful.” See: Woolf 
and Hulsizer, “Psychosocial,” 125.  
 
160 Roger W. Smith, Samuel Totten, and Helen Fein are not known as experts on Cambodia, but, as early 
leaders of the genocide scholarship, they had a major role in labeling the Cambodian experience as a 
locally committed genocide. See: Smith, review of Stones, 225-228; Totten, review of Destroy, 495-498; 
Totten, review of Cambodia, 324-428; Smith, “Women,” 315-334; Fein, “Genocide,” 43-63. Gregory 
Stanton’s work toward genocidizing Cambodian history has not been published in the three genocide 
journals, and it is discussed here in Chapter 6, section titled “The Abuse of International Law.” These are 
the scholars who paved the way for the association of the Khmer Rouge government with “genocide” by 
introducing it as knowledge. In his version of genocide-studies history, Totten lists Craig Etcheson, David 
Hawk, and Ben Kiernan as the scholars who focused on “the Cambodian Genocide” in the early days of 
genocide studies. See: Totten, “State,” 213. However, the history of Cambodian studies and the history of 
genocide studies are not as neatly consolidated as Totten’s categorization suggests. Hawk briefly addresses 
the Genocide Convention in connection with the policies of Democratic Kampuchea in an article, but the 
former executive director of Amnesty International, U.S.A., did not research the matter as a Ph.D., and his 
writing may be characterized as advocacy rather than scholarship. See: David Hawk, “International Human 
Rights Law and Democratic Kampuchea,” International Journal of Politics 16, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 13-14. 
The chapter on the Cambodian experience between 1975 and 1978 in Etcheson’s book on Democratic 
Kampuchea does not mention “genocide” even once. See: Craig Etcheson, The Rise and Demise of 
Democratic Kampuchea (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 143-183. Neither does Ben Kiernan 
mention “genocide” in his work on Cambodian history prior to the existence of the first genocide journal. 
See: Ben Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens, and Cormorants: Kampuchea’s Eastern Zone under Pol 
Pot,” in Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, ed. David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), 136-228; Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot 
Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975 (London: Verso, 1985), 412-423. The 
use of “genocide” as if common knowledge was added to this brand of historiography by the genocide 
scholarship, and only then the use of “genocide” and the historiography was blended together more 
extensively. Once Kiernan turned into a genocide scholar as well as being an expert on Cambodia, his rise 
into prominence in genocide studies mirrored the internationalization of this American project. It is relevant 
to note that while Kiernan was not born in the United States, the Cambodian Genocide Program that he 
founded at Yale University in 1994 was funded by the United States Department of State. See: Genocide 
Studies Program at Yale University, “Introduction to Cambodian Genocide Program,” 
http://gsp.yale.edu/introduction-cambodian-genocide-program (accessed, 1/23/2017).     
 
161 The trials in Cambodia generate information on the genocide discourse that is perceived as Cambodia’s 
own depiction of its history. This allows for the genocide scholarship to create a semblance of distance 
from American interests and scholarship, and point at a Cambodian process for Cambodia’s own good: “It 
seems that many Cambodians hope that the trial will bring some form of reconciliation for Cambodian 
society.” See: Menzel, “Justice,” 224. It has become possible for the genocide scholarship to act as if the 
genocide discourse about the Khmer Rouge government does not have a clear American origination. This 





Cambodia’s own government legitimizes—in cooperation with the United Nations—the 
ongoing legal proceedings in which genocide charges are being made to the effect of 
coalescing American historiographical preferences and international law, and it is not a 
moot point to insist on examining how the label of “genocide” traveled from American 
information to an internationally recognized and sponsored tribunal in Cambodia.162 
Under the guise of “moral development,”163 the term genocide has been effectively 
utilized against governments that the United States would like to show as authoritarian, 
and the genocide scholarship has enabled this practice by drowning the letter of the law 
in a sea of information. The Genocide Convention contains the promise of leading to a 
                                                          
associates the Khmer Rouge and—more generally—Cambodia with genocide.” See: Ibid., 221. 
 
162 The international quality of the Cambodian tribunal is characterized by partisanship, but that is 
underexplored by the genocide scholarship. While there is mention of an “international donor community” 
in relation to the Cambodian tribunal, and of Japan’s exceptionally large pledge in comparison to others in 
this donor community, there is no discussion of the parts of which this community is comprised. See: 
Chigas, “Politics,” 254. The genocide scholarship avoids the suggestion that only certain countries along 
with the United States, according to regional considerations and in keeping with a history of following 
American lead regarding international affairs, have funded the tribunal, and essentially bought the 
exhibition of court proceedings in Cambodia. Generally, the genocide scholarship has not expressed an 
interest in examining the connection between the ratification of the Genocide Convention by the United 
States in 1988 and the introduction in the 1990s of tribunals that announced breaches of the Genocide 
Convention. For instances in which the lack of legal activity between the opening of the Genocide 
Convention for signature in 1948 and the appearance of tribunals in the 1990s is noted without mentioning 
as relevant the change of the term’s legal standing in the United States, see: Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 97; Ben, 
“Guest Editor,” 173; Huttenbach, “Editors: Genocide,” 471; Schabas, “‘Definitional’,” 179; Douglas 
Singleterry, “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ and Genocidal Intent: A Failure of Judicial Interpretation?” Genocide 
Studies and Prevention 5, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 39.      
 
163 The genocide scholarship’s emphasis on humanitarian concerns have colored the American involvement 
in the affairs of other governments such as the Cambodian and Sudanese governments through the use of 
the term genocide with a sense of “moral responsibility” and a commitment to be the “champion of human 
rights in the world.” See: Mayroz, “Ever,” 374. The process toward the ECCC is said to have brought back 
the United States “to the center of the world stage as the champion of human rights and the rule of law in 
Cambodia.” See: Chigas, “Politics,” 250. The Genocide Convention is described as “an aid to moral 
development” rather than as a project of global governance. See: Roger W. Smith, review of Lemkin on 
Genocide, edited by Steven L. Jacobs, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 28, no. 1 (2014): 138. The 
moralizing of the Genocide Convention facilitates the vilification of other governments and even the use of 
force against them according to changing American interests, and does not offer a basis for a steady 
network that would reliably support existing structures of government and social contracts. The events in 
Cambodia and the relevant literature about them in the context of “genocide” are also discussed in Chapter 






unified quality of government, but the genocide scholarship follows an American agenda 
that pushes for a unified form of government. 
Since the genocide scholarship does not recognize that its usage of the term 
genocide offers a moralistic pretext for American interests, the following questions are 
asked here: What lessons on the separation of politics and academia may be drawn from 
observing the genocide scholarship’s moralistic approach to matters involving 
international conflict? What allows the moralizations of the genocide scholarship to pass 
as scholarly work? What does the success of the genocide scholarship in the realm of 
world public opinion, particularly regarding the Armenians, Cambodians, and Sudanese, 
teach about American influence? What system of checks and balances is there to 
discourage an academic project such as the genocide scholarship from producing self-
assured presentations of what is true? What methods can international courts use when 
approaching information about world history, and, specifically, how may it be ascertained 
that the courts do not adopt historical narratives according to the interests of the most 
powerful party in the international community? How is the legal standing of the term 
genocide worldwide affected by court decisions that are based on the genocide 
scholarship’s framing? What is the relationship between the ratification of the Genocide 
Convention by the United States and the creation of tribunals since the 1990s in which 
the crime of genocide is charged? What are the implications for international law when—
under the supervision of the United Nations—a tribunal that is financed only by some 
members of the international community processes information that matches the interests 
of those who funded its proceedings? How does the United Nations organization protect 





Tension with the Legal Definition 
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention states what “genocide means,” and holds 
the key to the legal definition of the term. It instructs that acts of genocide are 
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious groups, as such.”164 From these words, mainly two matters have become the 
focus of attention by the genocide scholarship in its treatment of the definition: how to 
determine intent to destroy as such any of the group types that are listed in the definition, 
and which victim groups fall within the identity categories that are listed in the definition. 
Significantly, while these two points present interpretational challenges, the genocide 
scholarship has not only usurped the work of future competent tribunals that were called 
upon by the Genocide Convention to explain how might the definition apply on a case by 
case basis, but it has also utilized the absence of a legally generated discourse prior to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 to create a discourse 
that questions the quality of the definition because of its application uncertainties. Even 
though it was natural for clarity to be lacking until the establishment of a competent 
tribunal to consider an indictment of genocide in accordance with the Genocide 
Convention, the genocide scholarship took it upon itself not only to precede the 
prospective deliberations of competent tribunals on how to make the definition 
operational, but also to undermine the Genocide Convention as the written authority on 
the definition of genocide. Thus, even though member states agreed to the meaning of 
                                                          
164 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 2. As shown in this section, two matters have become the main focus of attention by the 
genocide scholarship in its treatment of the definition: how to determine intent and which groups fall within 






“genocide” as worded in the Genocide Convention and as set to be interpreted by 
competent legal organs, the genocide scholarship was able to inject subjectivity into the 
predominant use of the word by filling in the void that existed before the term’s first legal 
application.    
 There are indications that the rise of the genocide scholarship has meant a break 
from the authority of the Genocide Convention. The language of the genocide 
scholarship, in which events are characterized as cases of genocide without legal backing, 
would not have been so readily acceptable to the public unless the definition of the 
Genocide Convention was to be seen as disputable. Words such as “cobbled together,”165 
“contested,”166 “deficient,”167 “flaws,”168 “inadequacy” or “inadequate,”169 “limited,”170 
“shortcomings,”171 and “strange”172 are found in the language that is used by the genocide 
scholarship to describe the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide. The 
derogatory references to the Genocide Convention’s definition have had the effect of 
minimizing the legal document’s influence on the discourse and creating space for the 
genocide scholarship to generate information about “genocide” outside the confines of 
the wording in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. The notion that the Genocide 
                                                          
165 Stannard, “De´ja,” 131-132. 
 
166 Straus, “Contested,” 349; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 250; Rosenberg, “Genocide,” 16.  
 
167 Tatz, “Genocide,” 234. 
 
168 Boghossian, “Concept,” 69. 
 
169 Ballinger, “Who,” 11; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 258. 
  
170 Jonassohn, “Prevention,” 2.  
 
171 Mennecke, “Genocide,” 167; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 257. 
 






Convention fails to completely address what “genocide” means was vital for the 
justification of a normative discourse on what “genocide” should mean.  
 Fundamentally, by distancing itself from the definition in the Genocide 
Convention, the genocide scholarship allowed itself to handle the term genocide more 
like an abstract, and therefore, as a conceptual framework rather than as a legal 
framework.173 As a result, redefinitions,174 types,175 categories,176 classifications,177 and 
                                                          
173 For examples of works that discuss “genocide” as a matter for conceptual explanation, see: Leibowitz, 
review of History, 429; Thomas Blass, review of The Roots of Evil, by Ervin Staub, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 7, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 277; Dadrian, “Essay,” 410; Moshman, “Conceptual,” 431-432; 
Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 167; Semelin, “Announcement,” 437; Boghossian, 
“Concept,” 70. This shift from one legal definition of genocide to multiple conceptual definitions of 
genocide is presented by the genocide scholarship as a necessary occurrence because an agreement on the 
definition could not be reached: “Disagreements over definitions led scholars to develop a rich variety of 
concepts based on alternative definitions of genocide.” See: Feierstein, “Leaving,” 258. In other words, the 
disruption of the Genocide Convention definition’s universality was a prerequisite for the introduction of 
the term’s conceptualization as a scholarly task. However, the idea of disagreement over the definition 
assumes a departure from the wording of a legal document that provided the basis for the signatures of 
governments in agreement over what the term means. The Genocide Convention expresses no anticipation 
of the American-created genocide scholarship or there being a need for genocide scholars to agree on the 
definition of genocide.  
 
174 For instances in which genocide scholars suggest their own definition of genocide or prefer to use 
another scholar’s definition of it over the Genocide Convention, see: Huttenbach, “Locating,” 297; Frank 
Chalk, “Definitions of Genocide and Their Implications for Prediction and Prevention,” Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 4, no. 2 (1989): 151; Dadrian, “Determinants,” 65; Woolf and Hulsizer, “Psychosocial,” 
101; Üngör, “Team,” 32; Üngör, “Studying,” 68; Ostler, “Just,” 2-3. In 2001, it was said that “broad 
conceptual disagreement” has led to “at least 21 different definitions” of genocide. See: Straus, 
“Contested,” 368. This observation is reiterated in a later publication. See: Rosenberg, “Genocide,” 16.     
 
175 Ezell, review of Prevention, 172; Huttenbach, “Locating,” 292; Straus, “Contested,” 369; Gallois, 
“Genocide,” 70. 
 
176 Huttenbach, “Locating,” 291; Jacobs, review of Holocaust, 266; Huttenbach, “Editor: Uniqueness,” 185; 
Hiebert, “Theorizing,” 310; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 254; Charny, “Requiem,” 116. Also, it has been suggested 
that genocide itself is a “subcategory of conflict behaviour” or a subfield within “atrocity crimes.” See: 
Stein, “Conceptions,” 196; Scheffer, “Genocide,” 238-239. 
 
177 Charny, “Letter,” 304; Despite the international agreement on the definition in the Genocide 
Convention, Henry Huttenbach claims that “The absence of a strict definition” is a reason for “experiments 
to classify genocidal incidents and sub-divide them into coherent types.” See: Huttenbach, “Locating,” 292. 
He then proceeds to describe the significance of having the Holocaust “classified as a case of genocide.” 







alternative terms178 flooded the meaning of “genocide.” This has been accompanied by an 
inaccurate drawing of a dichotomy between legal practitioners and academic researchers 
regarding how the term’s function is perceived, as if the latter generally or inherently 
oppose the former’s position.179 Also, the genocide scholarship has a label, 
“definitionalism,” through which the straightforward adherence to the legal definition is 
made to seem like a sidetracking engrossment or even “a basis for flagrant denials.”180 
                                                          
178 For a list of such alternative terms, see: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 251-252. The major competing terms are 
considered here in their historical context in Chapters 5 and 6.   
 
179 For example, Henry Huttenbach claims that “the historian striving to be as inclusive as possible in order 
to embrace all forms of genocide while the lawyer insists on being as exclusive as terminology permits in 
order to fix the precise identity of a crime.” See: Huttenbach, “Locating,” 293. Not only is his description 
of “the historian” a generality that is not based on scientific measure, it even fails to explain how before his 
involvement in the genocide scholarship “the historian” that he was did not mention the term genocide in 
his historical work on the Holocaust, as discussed here in this chapter’s note 23. For similar references to 
differences between lawyers and scholars such as historians and social scientists in the treatment of the 
term genocide, see: Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 171; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 251, 254. This 
dichotomy also involves a statement about “The political scientists,” who, according to the genocide 
scholarship, are on the opposite side of “establishing clear legal definitions” and prefer to “view definitions 
and conceptual debates as useful tools for establishing some parameter for the universe of admissible cases 
and for elucidating links between structures and agency.” See: Rosenberg, “Genocide,” 21. In an 
endorsement of Israel Charny’s Encyclopedia of Genocide by a legal practitioner in JGR while it was 
edited by Huttenbach, Richard Goldstone attempts to lend credibility to the genocide scholarship’s 
presentation of this dichotomy by suggesting that “as a lawyer and as a former prosecutor of war crimes in 
the United Nations Criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, I feel uneasy about this kind of 
scholarly dilution of the definition of genocide” yet the supposed sense of uneasiness does not stop him 
from using the phrase “the Armenian Genocide” regarding an event that an adherence to the Genocide 
Convention does not warrant as genocide. See: Goldstone, review of Encyclopedia, 261. This indicates that 
as much as he tried to appear as opposed to the genocide scholarship’s mentality by professional 
commitment, his text advanced the genocide scholarship’s discourse.  
 
180 Charny, “Classification,” 22. Charny uses the label “definitionalism” to point at “an insistence on 
defining cases of mass murders as not genocide.” See: Ibid. This not only fails to fairly describe the 
perspective of those who look to remain faithful to the actual convention in which genocide is legally 
defined, it also has the effect of presenting the genocide scholarship’s abuse of the term genocide as if a 
moral norm. Elsewhere, Charny writes that he worries “about the continuing definitionalism in legal circles 
that builds on the wasteful polemics of many genocide scholars who keep searching for a ‘pure’ definition 
and proof of ‘pure’ intentional genocide and are willing to skip past millions of dead bodies that are hardly 
anything but other versions and categories (or types) of genocidal mass murder.” See: Charny, “Requiem,” 
116. The misleading language describes an “intentional genocide” under the assumption that there is 
“genocide” without intent. Charny also recruits “millions of dead bodies” in a manner that leads the public 
away from the view that the usage of “genocide” charges needs to be controlled by a system of checks and 
balances within international law in order to discourage power—local power as well as great power—from 
being used to instigate mass violence. His moralistic display solidifies the genocide scholarship’s basic 
assumption that “genocide” can be, ought to be, or needs to be, defined in ways other than its one agreed-





Over time, the conviction that the definition is questionable started to present itself as 
second-hand information, as if an existing reality,181 and the definition of genocide—
treated as an idea—became wide open for application through biased imagination. 
 Furthermore, despite being a project that is located outside the realm of a 
competent tribunal, the genocide scholarship has been able to renegotiate the significance 
of intent in the legal definition through its work toward problematizing the Genocide 
Convention. The argument that “the elevation of the requirement of genocidal intent to a 
standard that is nearly impossible to satisfy” is “the greatest setback to genocide 
scholarship” illustrates how the genocide scholarship somewhat perversely considers 
itself inconvenienced by the Genocide Convention.182 It appears that the main reason for 
                                                          
181 In several instances, genocide scholars write about other genocide scholars who have “proposed” other 
definitions of genocide, or debated about them. See: Huttenbach, “Locating,” 293; Jonassohn, 
“Prevention,” 6; Moshman, “Conceptual,” 437; Schabas, “’Odious’,” 97; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 257. This 
has the effect of turning the genocide scholarship’s treatment of the Genocide Convention’s definition from 
a questionable agenda to an observed phenomenon. The genocide scholarship portrays a discourse in which 
“The range of definitions is very wide.” See: Semelin, “‘G’,” 26. If that is indeed an established truth, then 
it is the work of the genocide scholarship itself. This mentality that there are multiple definitions of 
genocide has penetrated the common language used by genocide scholars to the extent of producing 
phrases such as “depends on one’s definition of genocide” and “by your definition of genocide.” See: 
Sproat, “Researching,” 453; Martin Shaw and Omer Bartov, “The Question of Genocide in Palestine, 1948: 
An Exchange between Martin Shaw and Omer Bartov,” Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 3-4 
(September-December 2010): 246. 
 
182 Travis, “Original,” 30. Travis’ position that the requirement of intent has been elevated is itself a 
subjective presupposition. He also unconvincingly mixes mindfulness of intent with the expectation that it 
has to be proven that a state deliberately planned “to exterminate the members of an entire racial group, or 
a total genocide,” which he says is “At the root of this misunderstanding,” and to him the inclusion of “in 
part” in the definition explains that there is no need for intent to destroy all members of the group as such. 
See: Ibid. While there is little doubt that the “in part” part means that the extermination does not have to be 
total in order for it to be seen as a case of genocide, the assailant’s indicated desire to destroy members of 
the group as such, who are within reach, does not mean an ability to destroy the entire people worldwide, 
but the intent to destroy those who are within reach. Even the systematic execution of Jews by the German 
Nazis was “in part,” not “in whole,” as the American Jewry for instance was far removed from the 
extermination. Travis appears to have underestimated the meaning of intent, which makes the difference 
between the Nazi ambition to destroy virtually all Jews within reach but practically “in part,” and a 
nongenocidal “in part” that is indicative of no intent to destroy members of the group as such. The bottom 
line is that even if such a discussion needs to be had, it is for a competent tribunal to carry it out rather than 
it being first in the hands of the genocide scholarship that has the ability to affect public opinion and 






the genocide scholarship’s conflict with the importance of intent—and its undeniable 
place in the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention—is that it can be difficult 
to prove in court that the destruction of members of the group as such guided the 
assailant’s plans.183 That this is bothersome at all to the genocide scholarship points at a 
goal to make the use of genocide more operable than the Genocide Convention 
envisioned it to be.184 To this end, the genocide scholarship has taken an aggressive 
position against the legal definition’s requirement of intent.185  
                                                          
183 For instances of this being expressed, see: David Scheffer, “The World’s Court Fractured Ruling on 
Genocide,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 126; Goldsmith, “Issue,” 253; 
Travis, “Original,” 43. Ultimately, according to the Genocide Convention, this is a matter that is subject for 
consideration by competent tribunals. As an example of this affecting a particular campaign, the genocide 
scholarship notes the United Nations Commission of Inquiry’s decision that in Darfur “the government 
sponsored Janjaweed lacked a genocidal intent.” See: Lippman, “Darfur,” 207. Ironically, from the heart of 
its subjective project, the genocide scholarship issues a criticism of the Genocide Convention for leaving to 
competent tribunals “the subjective responsibility” of determining intent. See: Morton and Singh, 
“International,” 56. It is odd that the genocide scholarship expresses concern about having the judicial 
system determine intent when this is common practice in domestic law. The peculiarity of the opposition to 
“intention” in the definition is highlighted by the recognition that “Intentionality is an important element in 
domestic law.” See: Lewy, “Can,” 671. The opposition to “intention” reflects an attitude toward changing 
the law about genocide rather than an appreciation of the Genocide Convention’s accomplishment and 
coming to terms with the view that the wording in place is what member-states in the United Nations 
agreed to define as genocide.  
 
184 This might also explain the driving force behind the attempt to distinguish between premeditation and 
intent to suggest that “for the purposes of the genocide debate, premeditation is not important; genocide can 
be explored without considering premeditation.” See: Akçam, review of Armenian, 119. In this manner, it 
is argued that in order to prove “intent” in the context of genocide there is no requirement to show that the 
assailant’s plans to destroy involved preparation for the event. In Akçam’s work, this argument is used as 
part of his ongoing efforts to label the Armenian experience as genocide. Akçam’s commitment to using 
the term genocide in the Armenian case, be it as a matter of professional pursuit or personal investment 
after years of work on the issue, is foreign to the Genocide Convention itself. Such deliberations of what 
constitutes genocidal intent are reserved by the Genocide Convention for competent tribunals.   
 
185 In one article it is said that thought should be given “to modifying the intent requirement.” See: Matthew 
Lippman, “A Road Map to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 2 (June 2002): 188. This push to change the Genocide 
Convention “might involve” adding “negligent” genocide as a crime. See: Ibid. Similarly, it is suggested 
that broadening the “understanding of the mens rea” component would make the legal definition less 
ambiguous and more coherent. See: Novic, “Physical-Biological,” 77. The reaction to Guenter Lewy’s 
question in the title of his article, “Can There Be Genocide without the Intent to Commit Genocide?” shows 
the zealousness of the genocide scholarship regarding this matter, but also the ingenuity with which the 
genocide scholarship establishes its discourse. For Lewy to publish his article in JGR is akin to playing an 
away game in sports. In response to Lewy’s article, he is presented as one who looks “to restrict the 
definition and interpretation of genocide to an actual or putative court setting.” See: Barta, “Intent,” 111. 





 According to the Genocide Convention, genocidal intent does not exist in mass 
killings in which the assailant wishes to resolve an innerstate political conflict rather than 
destroy either an ethnical, national, racial, or religious, group as such,186 but the genocide 
scholarship has endeavored within its own genocide discourse to present members of 
persecuted political groups as victims in the context of “genocide.”187 While the group 
                                                          
genocide on events without any legal backing, Lewy is made to appear as an inadequate scholar who 
represents a negative attitude and is suspected of ulterior motives. Meaning, the framing of the discourse by 
the genocide scholarship is such that even by way of dissent Lewy contributes to the questioning of the 
legal definition because the genocide scholarship is able to control the context of the intellectual exchange 
and handily create for the public an association between his view about intent and a losing approach.  
 
186 If the political conflict is not immediately resolvable, then that could lead to the accumulation of many 
deaths. In such a scenario, the large number of fatalities does not mean that genocide is being perpetrated, 
but neither does it mean that from a humanitarian standpoint there is any less urgency to address the causes 
of it. There is reason to believe that the term genocide can draw more attention to ongoing suffering and 
help rally the international community to stop or limit violence. However, public awareness of atrocities as 
genocide does not necessarily translate into action toward relief, and when the use of the term genocide is 
in conflict with the Genocide Convention then the abuse of the term means that the functionality of 
international law is being compromised.  
 
187 A recent example of this involves the intervention in Libya, following the Libyan government’s attempt 
to quell a rebellion there. As NATO was using military force to weaken Muammar al-Gaddafi’s rule, an 
editorial in JGR referred to “rebels” in quotation marks twice as if to suggest that the local persecution was 
not caused by political conflict, and it was said that “One need not ascribe a genocidal intention to Gaddafi, 
as some have done, to justify action against the regime in Libya.” See: Jürgen Zimmerer, “Beyond Gaddafi: 
Sustainable Prevention in the Face of Environmental Injustice (Editorial),” Journal of Genocide Research 
13, no. 1-2 (March-June 2011): v. In this case the genocide scholarship did not officially label the situation 
as genocide in resolution-form, but promoted the notion that the bombardment is “a clear case of the 
efficacy of humanitarian intervention” that might be “a role model for dealing with cross human rights 
violations and genocide.” See: Ibid. This indicates that when an American-led international intervention is 
quickly organized without opposition or delay, then the genocide scholarship does not produce direct calls 
of “genocide.” Nonetheless, the genocide scholarship did seek to place the intervention in the context of 
“genocide,” which supports the promotion of the American program “responsibility to protect” (or, R2P). 
Interestingly, in the Libyan case United States President Barack Obama used the term genocide similarly, 
without issuing an accusation of genocide, but by framing the situation in Libya in the context of 
“genocide”: “Sometimes, the course of history poses challenges that threaten our common humanity and 
our common security—responding to natural disasters, for example; or preventing genocide and keeping 
the peace; ensuring security, and maintaining the flow of commerce.” See: White House, “Remarks by the 
President in Address to the Nation on Libya,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya (accessed, 1/23/2017). To this time, the genocide 
scholarship has not dedicated a single article to addressing the aftermath of the NATO intervention in 
Libya, and especially how the use of “genocide prevention” to justify intervention led to extended political 
turmoil in Libya. In the context of Darfur, IAGS produced a resolution, in which it presented itself as “a 
world-wide” organization, and called upon “the United Nations to authorize a coalition of member-states to 
organize and deploy a robust armed intervention force in Darfur, Sudan, in order to stop the ongoing war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide being perpetrated by Government of 
Sudan troops and Janjaweed Arab militias against Black African ethnic groups in Darfur.” See: 





identifier “political” is not among those that are listed in Article 2 of the Genocide 
Convention, the genocide scholarship has tried to establish public perception of political 
conflict as genocidal. Instead of bringing to light substantive reasoning why nation-states 
did not agree to list the persecution of political groups as genocide,188 the genocide 
scholarship has sought for ways to either bypass or expostulate the decision that political 
conflict is not a genocidal situation. In other words, the genocide scholarship either 
disregards the knowledge that political groups are not within the legal definition of 
                                                          
http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent-
page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS%20Resolution%20on%20Darfur-passed%207%20June%202005.pdf 
(accessed, 1/23/2017). The resolution lacks acknowledgement that the slaughtering of civilians is in the 
context of political conflict over governing authority. More recently, IAGS released a resolution on the 
“crimes committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)” in which it is stated that “ISIS is 
committing genocide and crimes against humanity against groups that do not conform to ISIS’ definition of 
‘true Islam’ and its vision for the ‘caliphate,’ including Ezidis, Christians, Shia Muslims, Sunni Kurds and 
other minority groups.” See: International Association of Genocide Scholars, “Resolution of the 
International Association of Genocide Scholars Concerning Crimes of ISIS,” 
http://www.genocidescholars.org/sites/default/files/document%09%5Bcurrent-
page%3A1%5D/documents/IAGS%20Resolution%20on%20ISIS%20-
%20passed%2018%20March%202016_1.pdf (accessed, 1/23/2017). Aside from lacking legal backing, this 
statement is made without recognition that the mentioned atrocities, which are described as genocide, occur 
within the context of political conflict over sovereignty. Also, it is worth noting that this statement by IAGS 
was published less than a fortnight after a similar statement was made by United States Secretary of State 
John Kerry about the group, also known as Daesh, saying: “My purpose in appearing before you today is to 
assert that, in my judgment, Daesh is responsible for genocide against groups in areas under its control, 
including Yezidis, Christians, and Shia Muslims.” See: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/254782.htm (accessed, 9/16/2016). The page can no 
longer be found, but a search for the quote on Google shows its previous existence. See: 
https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=%22My+purpose+in+appearing+before+you+today+is+to+assert
%22 (accessed, 1/23/2017). For a currently available webpage with the quote, see: U.S. Department of 
State, “#Daesh,” https://plus.google.com/+StateDept/posts/AH1DtBU7Tda (accessed, 1/23/2017).  
 
188 A group whose leadership makes claims against the right of the government to maintain its position, 
especially when such claims include positive statements about the attainment of political independence for 
the group through defiance of the current government’s authority on its territory, is a political group even if 
the group relies on ethnic identity to mobilize its members. The term national, as the basis for a group’s 
identity in the context of genocide, deserves separate attention because “nation” can suggest political 
organization. However, the decision that political groups are not victims of genocide provides a strong 
indication that “national” in the Genocide Convention means to protect from genocide the members of an 
already self-governed nation, not members of a rebellious group that is making national claims against the 
control of land by its existing government. It is reasonable for nation-states to be careful not to 
encourage—let alone protect—organized opposition to their sovereignty, but for a great power such as the 
United States it might seem advantageous to have the capacity to use the term genocide regarding political 
conflict in order to effectively challenge and possibly replace governments that it perceives as 






genocide,189 or seeks to dissuade the public from agreement with the Genocide 
Convention that political groups do not belong among victim groups in the definition of 
genocide.190  
                                                          
189 By producing definitions that rival the Genocide Convention’s wording and particularly broaden the 
definition in a manner that also includes political groups in the genocide discourse, the genocide 
scholarship bypasses the legal definition. For instance, this is the effect of definitions in which the list of 
the types of victim groups is replaced by the instruction that any victimized group that is seen as a group by 
the assailant is possibly the victim of genocide. See: Huttenbach, “Locating,” 297; Jonassohn, 
“Prevention,” 2. Another form of bypassing is the invention of alternative terms that directly address 
political persecution such as “democide” or “politicide.” See: Straus, “Contested,” 370; Matthew Krain, 
“The Effects of Diplomatic Sanctions and Engagement on the Severity of Ongoing Genocides or 
Politicides,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 1 (January 2014): 46. However, the use of “politicide” 
is not nearly as effective as using the term genocide because, unlike the latter, the former is not sanctioned 
by an international convention. One scholar warns that “The concept of ‘politicide’” might “be used to 
trivialize or minimize the genocide processes directed against political groups, blocking their inclusion into 
the structure of the concept of genocide. See: Daniel Feierstein, “Political Violence in Argentina and Its 
Genocidal Characteristics,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 2 (June 2006): 164. Thus, Feierstein 
expresses his own disregard for “genocide” as defined in the Genocide Convention by asserting that there is 
such a thing as “genocide processes directed against political groups.” The legal definition is also bypassed 
by the insistence that political crises or wars precede genocides or create a genocidal environment. For 
example, see: Fettweis, “War,” 235; Hiebert, “Theorizing,” 319. Furthermore, the genocide scholarship 
even tries to incorporate political groups into the discourse by showing their activities as part of a frame 
that is bigger than genocide: “I am advocating a change in theoretical perspective to situate genocide within 
the larger context of political violence instead of focusing solely on the study of genocide.” See: Verdeja, 
“Situating,” 83.     
 
190 The genocide scholarship uses language through which it is suggested that political groups were 
excluded or not included in the definition, thereby giving a sense that an omission occurred and that the 
definition is lacking wholeness because of it. For references to political groups being excluded from the 
Genocide Convention’s definition, see: Chalk, “Definitions,” 151; Samuel Totten, review of Lethal Politics 
by R. J. Rummel, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 6, no. 4 (1991): 432; Morton and Singh, “International,” 
56; Yusuf Aksar, “The ‘Victimized Group’ Concept in the Genocide Convention and the Development of 
International Humanitarian Law through the Practice of Ad Hoc Tribunals,” Journal of Genocide Research 
5, no. 2 (June 2003): 218; Feierstein, “Leaving,” 258, 261. Along these lines, it is argued that the definition 
“should include” political groups. See: Aksar, “‘Victimized’,” 218. Rather than saying that the Genocide 
Convention excluded political groups, a discourse that is respectful of the Genocide Convention could state 
that the occurrence of genocide is excluded from political conflict. This notion of exclusion has even been 
described by the genocide scholarship as a blind spot: “‘Political genocide’ is therefore a blind spot of 
genocide, which can be criticized but hardly ignored.” See: Menzel, “Justice,” 222. One more tactic 
through which the public is encouraged to disagree with the Genocide Convention is the suggestion that the 
Soviet Union was dominant in the decision that political groups do not qualify as victims of genocide 
because of its domestic agenda. See: Totten, review of Lethal, 432; Charny, “Classification,” 22-23; 
Stannard, “De´ja,” 131-132. Within the idea of “disagreements with the definition,” the matter of political 
groups is said to be a major one. See: Chalk, “Definitions,” 151. In response to the genocide scholarship’s 
verbiage on its idea of “genocide denial” regarding the Armenian experience (the accusation that refusal to 
accept as “genocide” events that were not found to be genocide in a competent tribunal is somehow 
immoral), the refusal by genocide scholars to accept the Genocide Convention’s definition can be described 
as genocide denial in a different sense because it involves a disinclination to recognize the actual definition 






 Therefore, it is seen that much of the genocide scholarship’s discourse relies on 
contempt for the Genocide Convention. Rather than recognize that their selected cases of 
“genocide” do not meet the definition of what “genocide” means, genocide scholars carry 
themselves as if the Genocide Convention has to catch up with their idea of 
“genocide.”191 This explains the simplicity with which cases that do not correspond with 
the Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide or process of charging genocide are 
treated as genocide.192 In its influential discourse, a nonlegal entity such as the genocide 
scholarship has rendered an international treaty such as the Genocide Convention 
malleable,193 and has taken it a step further by attacking those who defend the legal 
                                                          
191 For instance, it is suggested that the “narrow definition” presents a problem “because few or none of the 
mass atrocities since 1948 qualify as genocide.” See: Travis, “Original,” 42. Travis decontextualizes the 
genocide scholarship’s confrontation with the Genocide Convention by suggesting that the definition “was 
popularized by scholars.” See: Ibid. The genocide scholarship has made it seem like certain scholars such 
as Steven T. Katz, Guenter Lewy, and even William Schabas are markers of a narrow definition, but this is 
an attempt to cover up the blatant departure of the genocide discourse from the Genocide Convention. In 
relation to a specific case, it is argued that the “exclusion” of political groups from the definition “allowed 
the ghastly devastation in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge to pass as non-genocidal in the analyses of 
many human rights scholars.” See: Stannard, “De´ja,” 132. 
 
192 For instance, the genocide scholarship’s high regard for its own idea, or ideas, of “genocide” conceals 
the absurdity of a list—titled “Major genocides of the twentieth century”—that features fifteen cases even 
though at the time of its composition only two of them were legally charged cases of genocide. See: 
Bartrop, “Relationship,” 525.   
 
193 This discourse created space between the legal and the imagined, and enabled the creative usage of the 
term genocide on an academic platform. Paul Boghossian’s discussion of “genocide” in relation to the 
Armenian experience provides a vivid illustration of such a development. Boghossian argues against the 
conflation of “the concept of genocide” with “the legal convention” in reaction to the claims that the 
Armenians were victims of genocide. See: Boghossian, “Concept,” 72. This argument is based on the 
assumption, which has been cultivated by the genocide scholarship, that it is legitimate to conceptualize 
“genocide” separately from the legal definition and have it affect international relations. The argument is 
duplicitous because the genocide scholarship has not indicated that by phrases such as “Armenian 
Genocide” and more recently “genocide in Darfur” it does not mean to suggest that there is a legal 
component, and neither does Boghossian avoid switching back and forth from “concept” to “term” in his 
references to “genocide” as he discusses its usage regarding the Armenian experience. For instance, he 
shifts from regarding “genocide” as a term “provided by the UN” to regarding it as a concept without 
calling his readers’ attention to the difference that he assigns to these words. See: Ibid., 71. Moreover, he 
addresses the Armenian experience as genocide immediately after opening the article with a reference to 
the court rule that the massacre in Srebrenica was genocide, thus providing his claim about the Armenian 
experience with a legal context. See: Ibid., 69. Despite these deficiencies in the article, it is heralded in the 
genocide scholarship’s concept of commentary as “most thoughtful and provocative,” and Boghossian is 





power of the signed contract.194 
 Recent legal developments show that this tension between the legal definition and 
the genocide scholarship’s discourse is set to become more pronounced unless at least 
one of the two changes course. There is a gap between world public opinion about 
“genocide” as informed by the genocide scholarship, and the United Nations member 
states’ expectation of legal performance as agreed in the Genocide Convention. The 
opposing elements have been growing further apart since the genocide scholarship’s 
labeling habits began to trickle through public acceptance to certain domestic 
legislations,195 while the establishment of international court procedures for genocide 
                                                          
Paul Boghossian,” Journal of Genocide Research 12, no. 1-2 (March-June 2010): 101. Weitz takes this 
opportunity to echo, rather complacently, Boghossian’s sentiment by saying that “Virtually every scholar of 
the phenomenon knows that the definition of genocide that has come down to us from the UN Convention 
is deeply flawed.” See: Ibid.    
 
194 The genocide scholarship assails defenders of the legal meaning of an international convention by 
stating that “The definition of genocide under law … has also served as a basis for flagrant denials.” See: 
Charny, “Classification,” 22. It is also claimed that “a form of scholarship has emerged that very selectively 
… ends up constructing a strained and anti-victim meaning of key phrases in the treaty.” See: Travis, 
“Original,” 31. Member-states of the United Nations are admonished by the genocide scholarship for 
respecting the Genocide Convention as law rather than following the genocide scholarship’s own 
declarations of what genocide is thought to be. For example, it is said that Turkey refuses “to admit 
publicly that genocide took place in 1915.” See: Milivojević, review of Armenian, 306. This argument is 
made even though there is nothing legal to admit. Even a third party such as Israel is taken to task for 
having “avoided” the use of “the term ‘genocide’ toward the Armenian events of 1915.” See: Feinstein, 
review of Banality, 271.  
 
195 As articulated from the standpoint of the genocide scholarship, “many states have, in recent years, 
adopted much better legal definitions of genocide than that of the UNCG,” which is taken to mean that 
there is “fresh impetus to continue the struggle for a more precise international definition.” See: Feierstein, 
“Leaving,” 260. While Feierstein might believe that he is arguing for a “better” and “more precise” 
definition of genocide, the effect of this development is that the term genocide as defined in the Genocide 
Convention is made unstable by an environment in which state-governments are encouraged—under the 
influence of the genocide scholarship’s mentality about alternative definitions—to produce whatever 
definition of genocide that they prefer. For example, in Guatemala, “the words ‘as such’ are not included as 
part of the intent to destroy the group, in whole or in part (Guatemalan Penal Code, Article 376).” See: 
Elizabeth Oglesby and Diane M. Nelson, “Guatemala’s Genocide Trial and the Nexus of Racism and 
Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Genocide Research 18, no. 2-3 (June-September 2016): 138. This 
definitional difference meant that the court in Guatemala could recently decide in the case of the Ixil 
victimhood between 1982 and 1983 that the policy of the Guatemalan army at the time “was both 
counterinsurgent and genocidal.” See: Ibid., 139. Meaning, without “as such” in the wording of the law, the 
court was directed away from the Genocide Convention’s distinction between political and ethnic conflict 





charges since the 1990s have—with the exception of the Cambodian tribunal—generated 
a language that at least on a superficial level demonstrates a commitment to interpret the 
actual international convention and subject evidence to close inspection.196 It is here 
observed that even as the legal language on genocide increases through decisions by 
competent tribunals, its authority and legitimacy as international law will remain 
challenged as long as the narration by the genocide scholarship popularizes the defiance 
of the Genocide Convention.197  
 Having arrived at an understanding of the split between the genocide scholarship 
and the legal definition of genocide, the following questions are proposed for further 
research: To what extent have changes in political conditions necessitated the genocide 
scholarship’s calls for changes in the definition of genocide? How has the genocide 
                                                          
the genocide scholarship has instructed about the term’s meaning. The genocide scholarship’s reach is also 
noticeable in the legislation of several European states, particularly as it pertains to the Armenian 
experience. The genocide scholarship does not recognize its role in giving legislatures in states such as 
France and Switzerland the idea that “the negation of the Armenian Genocide” is to be prohibited. See: 
Schaller, “Lemkin,” 253. Instead, activity toward legislation in France is ascribed to “The Armenian 
community in France.” See: Schaller, “Editors: Judges,” 2. There is no study by the genocide scholarship of 
what cultural influences led the Armenians in France to think that they ought to demand genocide 
recognition despite the absence of legal backing to the claim, and in what circumstances the community’s 
claims about “genocide” began. If domestic legislation on genocide by a member-state of the United 
Nations does not correspond with the Genocide Convention, then that sways the public toward fanciful 
notions about genocide, and interferes with the ability of international judges to interpret the law according 
to the legal document that defined genocide and provided the basis for international agreement on what it 
means.  
 
196 When its platform is dedicated to analysis of court decisions, the genocide scholarship produces 
discussion that is more grounded by what the term means legally, such as how genocide is distinguished 
from “crimes against humanity” and “ethnic cleansing.” See: Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 98; Scheffer, “World’s,” 
131-132; William A. Schabas, “Whither Genocide? The International Court of Justice Finally Pronounces,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 9, no. 2 (June 2007): 183-192. In another article on the impact of the ICJ 
deliberations, Schabas conveys the significance of its input on standards of proof and the distinction 
between “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide.” See: William A. Schabas, “Genocide and the International 
Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crimes of Crimes,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, no. 
2 (Summer 2007): 108-109.  
 
197 A contextualized analysis of the legal developments regarding “genocide” since the ratification of the 






scholarship’s criticism of the legal definition affected the ability to charge genocide in 
courts even regarding cases of political conflict? What mechanism in international law 
might prevent a great power from using its influence to change the meaning of a term 
after it had been agreed upon in a convention? What type of scholarly information would 
be contributive to the understanding of the term genocide as a crime in international law? 
How are massacres in the context of political conflict to be addressed by international law 
without the charge of genocide? To what extent did the genocide scholarship play an 
indispensable role in the advancement of the term genocide despite the biased position 
against the wording in the Genocide Convention?  
 
Raphael Lemkin’s Centrality in the Origination of the Term 
Raphael Lemkin is credited with the authorship of the book in which the word 
genocide makes its first public appearance,198 and, correspondingly, in the genocide 
scholarship he is regarded as “the author of the monumental study” and “the author of the 
term genocide.”199 It is uncommon to challenge a publisher’s assignment of creative 
ownership to a person, but the outstanding impact of the term genocide and the 
circumstances surrounding Lemkin during the advent of the term—including the identity 
of the publisher—invite an intellectual curiosity regarding the writing process that 
produced Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.200 Nonetheless, the genocide scholarship does 
not express an interest in a detailed account of the book’s composition. Instead, it has 
                                                          
198 See: Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). 
 
199 Jacobs, “Papers,” 105, 111. 
 
200 The reasons for questioning the common knowledge that Lemkin is the author of the book are 





popularized the use in common language of the verb to coin in connection with Lemkin 
and the term genocide, as in saying that he “coined the term.”201 
Since the control of language about Lemkin is intertwined with the genocide 
scholarship’s narration of its own history and purpose, Lemkin’s central role is made to 
seem believable also through special issues and reviews of monographs that point at his 
centrality.202 Suggestions that this credit to Lemkin might be falsely based are 
nonexistent in the genocide scholarship and even discouraged while the opposite is 
announced as true: “he has finally gotten the recognition he deserves.”203 Only 
                                                          
201 For examples of “coined the term” being used as a phrase regarding Lemkin, see: Michael Freeman, 
“The Theory and Prevention of Genocide,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 6, no. 2 (1991): 186; 
Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 167; Levene, “Dissenting,” 154; Schaller and Zimmerer, 
“Guest Editors,” 447; Dan Stone, “Raphael Lemkin on the Holocaust,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, 
no. 4 (December 2005): 539; Christian Gerlach, “Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the 
Concept of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006): 464; Goldsmith, “Issue,” 
247; Totten, “State,” 212; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 245; Moses, “Revisiting,” 296; Robert Skloot, review of 
Totally Unofficial, edited by Donna-Lee Frieze, Genocide Studies International 8, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 110. 
For other appearances of the verb in the form of “coined” in this context, see: Bauer, “Essay,” 211; 
Dadrian, “Convergent,” 156; Freeman, “Theory,” 186; Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 167; 
Elder, “What,” 469; Anton Weiss-Wendt, “Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on ‘Soviet Genocide’,” 
Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (December 2005): 556; Boghossian, “Concept,” 70-71; Douglas 
Irvin-Erickson, “Genocide, the ‘Family of Mind’ and the Romantic Signature of Raphael Lemkin,” Journal 
of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 (September 2013): 273. For usage of the form “coining” in this context, 
see: McDonnell and Moses, “Raphael,” 501; G. Daniel Cohen, review of Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle 
for the Genocide Convention, by John Cooper, Holocaust and Genocide Studies 24, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 
130; Laban, “Critical,” 5; Theriault, “Grain,” 125. For usage of the noun “coiner” in this context, see: 
Elder, “What,” 488; Skloot, review of Totally, 110. The repetition of this phrase shows that the genocide 
scholarship is actively habituating language in which Lemkin is the sole authority behind the term genocide 
while avoiding the publication of research on the precise origination of the term. For instances in which 
“invented” is refreshingly used to present Lemkin as the source of the term genocide, see: Straus, 
“Contested,” 360; Bazyler, “In the Footsteps,” 51; Short, “Australia,” 46; Schabas, “’Definitional’,” 177. In 
the last cited source, it is added that Lemkin’s invention of “genocide” is something the “everyone now 
knows.” See: Ibid.  
 
202 In addition to the many references to Lemkin as an integral part of articles in the genocide journals, a 
special issue was dedicated to Lemkin as the main theme. See: Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 
(December 2005). Furthermore, Lemkin was extensively featured in two special issues on the field of 
genocide studies. See: Genocide Studies and Prevention 6, no. 3 (Winter 2011); Genocide Studies and 
Prevention 7, no. 1 (Spring 2012). In a favorable review, John Cooper’s work on Lemkin is described as a 
“meticulous account” and a “comprehensive biography.” See: Cohen, review of Raphael, 130. For reviews 
of books that present an edited publication of work that Lemkin could not publish, see: Skloot, review of 
Totally, 110-112; Smith, review of Lemkin, 136-138.  
 





cryptically, it is said that “As was the case with the letters and correspondence, most of 
the published articles, usually, but not always, were entirely written by Lemkin,”204 but 
this barely noticeable “not always” is quite possibly an enormous understatement and is 
almost lost in the sentence as if the matter does not pertain to the foundation of the 
genocide scholarship’s tower of claims. By holding on to Lemkin’s image as a pivot, the 
genocide scholarship has been meeting its main discursive objectives.  
Lemkin’s identity as a Jew likely contributed to the association of the term 
genocide with a believable representation of a victim group’s interests, especially the 
perception of him as an authentic advocate for the protection of Jewish communities is 
used for claims toward promoting comparisons to the Holocaust in academia and 
exploiting the magnitude of Jewish suffering in Nazi-controlled parts of Europe as a tool 
for lending credibility to the labeling of other events as genocide. The genocide 
scholarship’s many references to Lemkin’s Jewishness is not necessarily a natural feature 
of a discourse on the history and purpose of the term genocide.205 Lemkin’s personal loss 
of family members in the Holocaust is evoked by the genocide scholarship,206 and it 
enables the discourse to assume the voice of that particular victimhood through 
                                                          
204 Jacobs, “Papers,” 108.  
 
205 For examples of references to Lemkin in which he is introduced as Jewish, see: Chalk, “Definitions,” 
150; Melson, review of Little, 272; Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 167; Schaller and 
Zimmerer, “Guest Editors,” 447; Dominik J. Schaller, “Raphael Lemkin’s View of European Colonial Rule 
in Africa: Between Condemnation and Admiration,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (December 
2005): 531; Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 94; Schaller and Zimmerer, “Settlers,” 195;  Dominik J. Schaller, 
“Introduction: New Perspectives on Soviet Mass Violence,” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 2-3 
(June 2009): 207; Üngör, “Studying,” 68; Cohen, review of Raphael, 130; Benhabib, “Jews,” 367. Pointing 
at this aspect of the genocide scholarship is not intended to call into question Lemkin’s Jewishness, but to 
call attention to the existence and effect of this emphasis in the discourse. 
 
206 For instance, see: Segesser and Gessler, “Raphael,” 464; Schabas, “’Definitional’,” 178; Moses, 






biographical statements about him. Accordingly, Lemkin’s use of the term genocide is 
the basis for an argument that “The Nazi case was unprecedented but not wholly unique 
and incomparable.”207 Behind the emphasis on Lemkin’s identity, the following statement 
is made about the Holocaust’s comparability: “Lemkin did not restrict the definition of 
his term so that it referred solely to the murder of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe.”208  
Lemkin’s role as an endorser of the Holocaust’s comparability elevates the 
Armenian experience into prominence in a discourse that suffers from the lack of 
contextualization and source criticism. It is said about Lemkin that “In the mid-1940s he 
would be the first to use the term Armenian Genocide,”209 without recognition that the 
exact phrase “Armenian Genocide” as popularized by the genocide scholarship was not 
used by him, and without inquiring what prompted him to refer to the Armenian 
experience as genocide and how it fit into a greater American discourse about “genocide” 
at the time.210 Billed as the “originator of the term,” Lemkin is employed in the discourse 
as an authority in whose name the circumstances of the Armenian experience are said to 
have constituted genocide,211 thereby supplanting the Genocide Convention as the source 
for decisions on what qualifies as genocide. Anecdotal and unverifiable material is put 
                                                          
207 Freeman, “Theory,” 186. 
 
208 Stone, “Raphael,” 539. Such a phrasing also argues for the comparability of the Holocaust by way of 
relating restrictive and exclusionary qualities to its opposition. Furthermore, it offers an inaccurate 
representation of the relationship between the Holocaust’s memory and reference to “genocide,” as 
historically the former did not rely on the existence of the latter.  
 
209 Balakian, “Raphael,” 60-61. Balakian also suggests that Lemkin inaugurated the term in the 1940s. See: 
Ibid., 58. 
 
210 This is discussed here in Chapter 5.  
 
211 Levene, “Creating,” 395-396. Similarly, Lemkin is quoted as suggesting that there is “‘a great deal of 
resemblance between the Jews and the Armenians, who in 1915 lost more than one million of their people 






together through imaginative language, which is published in an academic journal and 
effectively genocidizes the Armenian experience, as in statements that “Lemkin’s 
thinking about genocide began in his childhood,” and that the massacres of the Ottoman 
Armenians “jolted the young Lemkin into a vision of what would become his life’s 
work.”212 In short, the genocide scholarship uses interpretations of an individual’s 
personal sentiment as part of an argument for the applicability of the legally defined label 
in the case of Armenian victimhood.  
For being of service to the genocide scholarship’s mission to pass as scientific, 
accounts of Lemkin’s feelings would not have sufficed, and it is noticeable that in this 
context his scholarly activities are aggrandized. The genocide scholarship’s professed 
comparative approach is shown as linked to Lemkin, whose work is regarded as “the first 
typology” that inspired study “by scholars for analytical and comparative studies of 
genocides.”213 In keeping with the genocide scholarship’s self-image, Lemkin is depicted 
as the field of study’s prototypical interdisciplinary scholar, who—aside from his 
background in the legal profession—is described as a social scientist and historian.214 
                                                          
212 Ibid., 57-58. Balakian also states that “The Armenian massacres preoccupied Lemkin throughout his life 
and influenced his understanding of the evolution of modern genocide.” See: Ibid., 60. On the same 
platform, the severe accusation of genocide against the Ottoman government is also given a boost by an 
anecdotal text about Lemkin’s alleged conversation with a law professor at University of Lwów regarding 
“the 1920 British release of the Turkish war criminals,” and about the meaning that Talaat Pasha’s 
assassination had in Lemkin’s professional development. See: Ibid., 58-59. For another display of source 
criticism being dismissed in this context, see: Goldsmith, “Issue,” 238, 255 (note 1). The anecdotal material 
regarding Lemkin is considered here in Chapter 5, section titled “Lemkin’s Intellectual Property.” 
 
213 Morton and Singh, “International,” 48.  
 
214 There are references that associate Lemkin with social sciences. For instance, it is said that “Lemkin 
apparently wrote voluminously on the subject of genocide” and that the writings are “both social scientific 
and legal.” See: Stein, “Geno- and Other cides,” 42. It is also said that “After the adoption of the UNCG, 
Lemkin’s interest in genocide became more and more social scientific.” See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 246. 
Moreover, Lemkin is associated with historiography. For example, it was stated in JGR’s special issue on 
Lemkin that “the Guest Editors hope that this collection of articles will provoke fruitful discussions and 
stimulate further research on Lemkin as a historian of mass violence.” See: Schaller and Zimmerer, “Guest 





Lemkin’s unfinished book project under the title “History of Genocide,” is studied by the 
genocide scholarship as his grand exploration of the term,215 even though it is simply a 
collection of randomly chosen and incomplete research endeavors of different historical 
cases that are united by the idea to label them as genocide, and it appears to be mostly the 
work of research assistantship that relies on secondary sources.216 Though it is considered 
that Lemkin was “a poor social historian,”217 nevertheless a controlled discourse on 
“genocide” and colonialism was established by showing him as “keenly interested in 
colonial genocides.”218 Hence, by presenting itself as interested in Lemkin’s supposedly 
scientific pursuits, the genocide scholarship was able to start a conversation of political 
significance without being obvious about it having an intended design, and began to 
approach the sensitive topic of Native American history within a general framework of 
                                                          
215 For instance, the work, which was far from being a finished manuscript, is described as Lemkin’s 
“masterpiece” and intended “magnum opus.” See: Elder, “What,” 478, 488; Short, “Australia,” 47-48.  
 
216 For the research material that is gathered under the title “History of Genocide,” see: Box 2, Raphael 
Lemkin Papers, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library. The genocide scholarship 
has produced some expressed awareness that Lemkin might not have had much to do with the written 
research. See: McDonnell and Moses, “Raphael,” 503; Jones, review of Lemkin, 234. Still, the genocide 
scholarship has kept clear from considering that just as there is reason to question Lemkin’s actual 
authorship of the written research for “History of Genocide,” there is also reason to question his authorship 
of Axis Rule, for which no manuscript is available. Instead, both are treated as Lemkin’s despite the 
indication of vast differences in quality, purpose, and style.  
 
217 McDonnell and Moses, “Raphael,” 515.  
 
218 Ibid., 501. It is stressed that colonialism had a role in the development of Lemkin’s thinking toward a 
concept of genocide. See: Ibid., 196-197. This language also carries the assumption that the term genocide 
was the product of Lemkin’s own conceptualization. Reference to “colonial genocide” as a “type of 
genocide” had already been made in the genocide scholarship prior to approaching the topic through 
Lemkin’s thoughts on the meaning of “genocide.” For example, see: Straus, “Contested,” 369; Barnes, 
“Functional,” 312. However, the number of references to “colonial genocide” or colonialism in connection 
to genocide rapidly increased since JGR’s special edition on Lemkin in 2005. For examples of later 
references to colonialism as genocidal, see: Shirleene Robinson and Jessica Paten, “The Question of 
Genocide and Indigenous Child Removal: The Colonial Australian Context,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 10, no. 4 (December 2008): 501-518; Gallois, “Genocide,” 70, 85; Guettel, “US,” 401-419; 
Heerten and Moses, 184-184; Tom Lawson, “Memorializing Colonial Genocide in Britain: The Case of 
Tasmania,” Journal of Genocide Research 16, no. 4 (December 2014): 441-461; Blatman, “Holocaust,” 26; 






colonial attitudes.219  
By showing Lemkin as an independent actor on the center stage of the genocide 
discourse, the genocide scholarship has diverted attention away from information about 
the role of the book’s publisher and the American political leadership in the entire 
production. The genocide scholarship stresses that Lemkin was Polish while it steers 
clear from descriptions that would lead readers to consider his American nationality when 
the term genocide was first publicized.220 Similarly, the genocide scholarship mainly 
presents Lemkin as a jurist or lawyer by profession,221 even though when Axis Rule was 
published he was already two years into his employment by the United States 
government as its foreign-policy specialist.222 Lemkin’s involvement in international law 
                                                          
219 For the discussion here of this aspect of the genocide scholarship, see the section titled “Controlled 
Information.” 
   
220 For instances in which Lemkin is introduced as Polish, see: Chalk, “Definitions,” 150; Melson, review 
of Little, 272; Jacobs, “Papers,” 105; Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 167; Cushman, “Is,” 
528-529; Schaller and Zimmerer, “Guest Editors,” 447; Schaller, “Raphael,” 531; Schaller and Zimmerer, 
“Settlers,” 195; Robinson and Paten, “Question,” 504; Schaller, “Introduction,” 207; Boghossian, 
“Concept,” 70; Cohen, review of Raphael, 130, 133; Benhabib, “Jews,” 367. In contrast, there are no 
known references to Lemkin by the genocide scholarship in which he is introduced as an American. 
Moreover, phrases such as “living in exile in the United States” and “his persistent Polish patriotism,” have 
the effect of turning readers away from considering Lemkin as an American national when the term 
genocide was invented. See: Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 94; Cohen, review of Raphael, 133. This also contributes 
to the genocide scholarship’s projection of its own international—rather than American-controlled—image.   
 
221 For examples of introductions to Lemkin as either a jurist, lawyer, or both, see: Melson, review of Little, 
272; Jacobs, “Papers,” 105; Straus, “Contested,” 360; Huttenbach, “Editor: Towards a Conceptual,” 167; 
Cushman, “Is,” 528-529; Schaller, “Raphael,” 531; Stone, “Raphael,” 539; Zayas, “Istanbul,” 139; Schaller 
and Zimmerer, “Settlers,” 195; Robinson and Paten, “Question,” 504; Boghossian, “Concept,” 70; Cohen, 
review of Raphael, 130; Totten, “State,” 212; Üngör, “Studying,” 68; Irvin-Erickson, “Genocide,” 273; 
Benhabib, “Jews,” 367. He is also introduced as an “international lawyer.” See: Schaller, “Introduction,” 
207.      
 
222 In a list of positions held by Lemkin between 1929 and 1957, it is stated that between 1942 and 1944 
Lemkin was “Chief Consultant” for the “Board of Economic Warfare and Foreign Economic 
Administration” in Washington, DC, before being employed as “Adviser on Foreign Affairs” for the “USA 
War Department” between 1945 and 1947. See: Box 2, Folder 1, Raphael Lemkin Papers. Rare, brief, and 
decontextualized references to Lemkin being an advisor to the United States government are far from being 
an effort toward understanding or explaining the circumstances in which the term genocide came into 
being. For examples of such references, see: Jacobs, “Papers,” 105; Elder, “What,” 471; Singleterry, 
“Ethnic,” 43. Elder also adds to the centralization of “Lemkin’s work” by placing as her article’s epigraph 





prior to WWII receives a treatment by the genocide scholarship that is disproportionate to 
the focus of his career until that time,223 and the significant work by American experts 
regarding international law in and around the government or at leading universities 
toward the advent of the term genocide is absolutely ignored.224 According to the 
genocide scholarship’s choice of emphasis, the worldwide acceptance of the Genocide 
Convention is not only unrelated to American strategy, but it is described as the product 
                                                          
lecture that he gave on Lemkin, which is titled “The Legacy of Raphael Lemkin” and includes the 
following misleading information: “Acting as a private citizen, without state support or salary, he 
singlehandedly drafted and lobbied for the passage of the Genocide Convention.” See: Michael Ignatieff, 
“The Legacy of Raphael Lemkin,” in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Website, 
http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/speakers-and-events/all-speakers-and-events/the-legacy-of-
raphael-lemkin (accessed, 1/23/2017). It is also said in the lecture that “when Lemkin coined the word 
‘genocide’ in 1943, while writing his great work, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, while at Duke University 
in the United States,” even though in actuality Lemkin’s employment by Duke University ended in 1942, 
and by 1943 he was already employed by the United States government. Compare: Ibid.; Box 2, Folder 1, 
Raphael Lemkin Papers. A statement such as this adds a layer to the misperception about the connection 
between the United States government and the origination of the term genocide. The notion that Lemkin’s 
work was “Totally Unofficial,” as the title of his autobiography suggests, seems to fly in the face of the 
knowledge that he had been officially employed by the United States government, or at the very least it 
reduces awareness of such knowledge. Despite this, it is said that Lemkin “labored totally unofficially.” 
Skloot, review of Totally, 110.  
 
223 It is listed that between 1929 and 1934, Lemkin worked as “Deputy Public Prosecutor” in Warsaw, 
Poland; that between 1934 and 1939 he was engaged in “General Practice of Law” there; and that between 
1929 and 1939 he was “Professor of Family Law at Tachkomi College.” See: Box 2, Folder 1, Raphael 
Lemkin Papers. However, the genocide scholarship emphasizes the knowledge of a paper that Lemkin 
submitted to the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in 1933, which was held in 
Madrid. See: Jacobs, “Papers,” 106; Stein, “Geno- and Other cides,” 42; Segesser and Gessler, “Raphael,” 
457; Elder, “What,” 470; Goldsmith, “Issue,” 238; Schaller, “Lemkin,” 245; Balakian, “Raphael,” 59. 
While Jacobs claims that Lemkin went to Madrid in 1933, Balakian states that Lemkin was prevented from 
attending the conference due to “Antisemitic pressure by Germany.” Compare: Jacobs, “Papers,” 106; 
Balakian, “Raphael,” 59.   
 






of Lemkin’s work alone,225 work with the “underdeveloped world,”226 and even work 
against the interests of the United States government.227 References to Lemkin’s personal 
frailty distract from consideration of the United States’ great strength in the international 
scene,228 and the portrayal of Lemkin as a morally concerned person who conceptualized 
                                                          
225 There is use of the phrase “single-handedly” to express Lemkin’s work for the advancement of 
“genocide.” See: Cohen, review of Raphael, 131. Furthermore, Lemkin is described as advocating, 
campaigning or fighting tirelessly, which suggest an overexertion of one individual that does not typically 
reflect the designed operation of a system. For instances in which Lemkin is described in this manner, see: 
Stone, “Raphael,” 539; Singleterry, “Ethnic,” 43; Totten, “State,” 212; Hinton, “Critical,” 5. In general, the 
centrality of Lemkin sustains a language that can be described as having the effect of “Lemkining,” “he-
ing” and “his-ing” the origination of the term genocide as it builds the discourse by describing action in the 
narrative on the advent of “genocide” through Lemkin. For example, as part of an effort to explain how the 
term genocide originated, it is suggested that “On hearing Winston Churchill’s 1941 speech referring to the 
situation in occupied Europe as ‘a crime without a name,’ Lemkin realized that he needed to find the 
appropriate name for this crime.” See: Goldsmith, “Issue,” 239. Similarly, Lemkin—rather than a powerful 
governing entity—is said to have “recognized the need for a new term to describe the type of human 
destruction that no other legal term had adequately covered up through World War II.” See: Scheffer, 
“Genocide,” 230. Along these lines, it is suggested that the temporary “disuse” of the term is connected to 
Lemkin’s death. See: Üngör, “Studying,” 68-69.    
 
226 See: Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 95. In the genocide scholarship’s discussion of the process that led to the 
Genocide Convention, the American role is minimized by calling attention to the role of Cuba, India, and 
Panama as the member-states of the United Nations who reacted positively to Lemkin’s efforts to persuade 
them of the convention’s importance. For references to Cuba, India, and Panama as the states that 
submitted the initial proposal for consideration by the United Nations, see: Morton and Singh, 
“International,” 53; Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 95-96; Schabas, “’Definitional’,” 178. The genocide scholarship 
refers to Cuba, India, and Panama as if they were independent actors on the international stage, without 
qualifying that at the time there was direct Anglo-American influence over these governments. Thus, there 
is no analysis of the extent to which power paved the way toward the Genocide Convention, and the readers 
are made to see the Genocide Convention as largely a project of weak nation-states that were encouraged 
by Lemkin to pursue their own interests. 
 
227 It is suggested by the genocide scholarship that Lemkin had to act opposite to the United States 
government. Instead of examining how American interests were served by the introduction of the term 
genocide, it is claimed that during the great suffering in WWII Lemkin lobbied to make the United States 
government realize that it had “to take action to stop these atrocities.” For example, see: Goldsmith, 
“Issue,” 239. This is in addition to the usage of the verb to lobby in relation to the Lemkin and the 
Genocide Convention, which suggests an individual and nongovernmental effort. See: Elder, “What,” 481; 
Weiss-Wendt, “Hostage,” 556; Goldsmith, “Issue,” 239.   
 
228 For example, the genocide scholarship fills its discourse with descriptions of Lemkin’s personal well-
being. The narrative includes information about him being “hospitalized” and “going through a period of 
great physical and emotional turmoil.” See: Schabas, “’Definitional’,” 178. Moreover, the story of the 
Genocide Convention’s “difficult beginnings” is intertwined with “the tragic fate of Raphael Lemkin.” See: 
Schaller, “Lemkin,” 248. It is further pointed out that he devoted himself to the Genocide Convention “at 
great cost to his physical health and financial situation.” See: Cohen, review of Raphael, 132. This line of 
argument also includes a conjecture such as saying that “his fierce determination to do literally everything 
within his power to realize the passage of the Genocide Convention evidently prevented him from 





the term genocide impedes knowledge on how he functioned within a powerful American 
network.229       
 As the genocide scholarship’s designated father of the Genocide Convention,230 
Lemkin is not only credited for the work of many others, his name is also awarded a 
parental precedence to, or ownership of, the Genocide Convention and its definition of 
the term genocide. Criticism that his definition of genocide in Axis Rule is “narrow,” 
“broad,” or both,231 might give the appearance that Lemkin is not put on a pedestal by the 
genocide scholarship but it also has the effect of separating between Lemkin’s thoughts 
on genocide and the legal definition in the Genocide Convention, and thereby 
legitimizing the definitional attempts by different scholars within the genocide 
                                                          
specifying that “his life was despoiled by financial distress, importuning and threatening bill collectors, 
relentless adversaries, and deteriorating physical and mental health,” taking a “terrible toll on his finely 
calibrated sense of rectitude and idealism.” See: Skloot, review of Totally, 111.   
 
229 It is asserted that Lemkin invented genocide and campaigned for the Genocide Convention “Out of his 
moral concern with the plight of the defenseless innocents” and it is added that this was so “even prior to 
World War II,” which even further separates the perception of American influence on his life and actions. 
See: Jacobs, “Papers,” 111. Lemkin is presented as an example “of the singular power of one individual to 
move and mobilize others to overcome the mountain of human indifference and apathy.” See: Ibid. 
Ignatieff is quoted as saying that Lemkin displayed a “‘supreme act of the moral imagination.’” See: Ibid., 
112. Also, it is suggested that Lemkin was selfless. See: Charny, “Requiem,” 110.  Thus, the origin of the 
term genocide is not seen in the context of American interests, but Lemkin’s own quest to “pierce the 
sovereignty of states and ensure the survival of their national minorities.” See: Travis, “United,” 133. By 
relating the political aspect of the term genocide to Lemkin’s personal ideology, the genocide scholarship 
denies information that would adequately identify “genocide” within the development of international law. 
Instead, it offers simplistic observations that Lemkin “was an ardent anti-Communist” and that he “sought 
to indict the Soviet Union.” See: Schaller, “Lemkin,” 246; Hinton, “Critical,” 6. This is argued even though 
the book under his name, Axis Rule, contains no genocide accusations against Soviet officials. 
 
230 For instance, see: Jacobs, “Papers,” 105; Schaller, “Raphael,” 535; Bohdan Klid, “The Black Deeds of 
the Kremlin: Sixty Years Later,” Genocide Studies International 8, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 224; Benhabib, 
“Jews,” 367.  
 
231 William Schabas argues that “Lemkin’s definition is narrow, in that it addresses crimes directed against 
‘national groups’ rather than against ‘groups’ in general” and that “it is broad, to the extent that it 
contemplates not only physical genocide but also acts aimed at destroying the culture and livelihood of the 
group.” See: Schabas, “‘Odious’,” 96. Even through this kind of criticism, the discourse creates an 
assumption that one may understand the definition as Lemkin’s, without recognizing how he was 






scholarship. The introduction into language that Lemkin had a “concept” or “conception” 
of genocide has provided a basis for the genocide scholarship to pursue an agenda that 
does not accord with the Genocide Convention.232 As a result, the practice of interpreting 
the letter of the international law is challenged by speculations about what Lemkin had 
intended by “genocide,”233 and then those who control the information on what Lemkin 
thought are able to determine what most people are to think that the term genocide means 
regardless of what the Genocide Convention says.     
In consideration of how the genocide scholarship’s designation of Lemkin as an 
                                                          
232 For instances in which it is said “Lemkin’s concept of genocide,” see: Straus, “Contested,” 360; Schaller 
and Zimmerer, “Guest Editors,” 449; Weiss-Wendt, “Hostage,” 551; Martin Mennecke, “What’s in a 
Name? Reflections on Using, not Using, and Overusing the ‘G-Word,’” Genocide Studies and Prevention 
2, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 66; Schaller and Zimmerer, “Settlers,” 196. For instances in which it is said 
“Lemkin’s conception of genocide,” see: Singleterry, “Ethnic,” 44; Thomas M. Butcher, “A ‘Synchronized 
Attack’: On Raphael Lemkin’s Holistic Conception of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 3 
(September 2013): 255; Smith, review of Lemkin, 137. A phrasing such as “the roots of the concept in 
Raphael Lemkin’s work” is indicative of the genocide scholarship’s direction away from the Genocide 
Convention’s wording. See: Jones, “Diffusing,” 270. The genocide scholarship does not just treat a legal 
definition as a concept, but it seeks to offer insight into “The core idea in Lemkin’s concept of genocide,” 
thereby opening the discourse for discussions of “genocide” as an idea within a concept. See: Straus, 
“Contested,” 360. The genocide scholarship imposes an evolution of the genocide discourse from the 
Genocide Convention’s legal definition, to Lemkin’s definition, to Lemkin’s conceptualization, and to the 
subjective conceptualizations of “genocide” by the genocide scholars. Through the distinction between 
what Lemkin intended and what was drafted, the genocide scholarship has been able to forward the claim 
that it “was never carefully assessed whether” the term genocide “actually meant what it was supposed to 
mean.” See: Huttenbach, “Locating,” 291. Then, once the discourse is characterized in part by alternative 
definitions and applications, the Genocide Convention suffers a loss of authority.  
 
233 The genocide scholarship focuses on what it claims that Lemkin had intended rather than what 
competent tribunals might interpret the Genocide Convention to mean. This is directly expressed in a 
commitment to use the term genocide “in the original sense that its creator Raphael Lemkin intended.” See: 
Pohl, “Stalin’s,” 271. Starting a sentence with “For Lemkin, the key purpose of the Convention was…” is 
reflective of the mentality in the discourse. See: Goldsmith, “Issue,” 253. Within this framing, it is possible 
to claim that a certain meaning of intent that is promoted by the genocide scholarship “is what was always 
intended by Lemkin and the drafters when they decided to adopt” the Genocide Convention. See: Ibid., 
255. The interest in what Lemkin “believed” is combined with the assertion that the Genocide Convention 
is “not an end in itself.” See: Smith, review of Lemkin, 138. In connection with the genocide scholarship’s 
descriptions of Lemkin as a moral actor, the notion of “moral consequences” is presented as justification 
for sidestepping the Genocide Convention’s “legal implications.” See: Ibid. This corresponds with the 
presentation of Lemkin as the first among scholars to make “efforts to rectify” a “deficient definition.” See: 
Tatz, “Genocide,” 234.  Meaning, the genocide scholarship suggests that there is a long tradition of 
criticizing the Genocide Convention, and also that there is a normative expectation that future genocide 






essential component of its discourse has pulled research away from questioning ground 
assumptions about the history and purpose of the term genocide, it is here asked: How is 
the advent of the term genocide related to previous scholarly works in the United States 
rather than to Lemkin’s personal biography? What available information might shed light 
on the reasons for which the United States government employed Lemkin? What was the 
process in which the book Axis Rule was written? What effect did the association of 
Lemkin’s personal identity with the term genocide have on world public opinion about 
“genocide” as the subject matter of an international convention?  
 
Conclusion 
This literary review has found that major themes in the genocide scholarship have 
not yet been subjected to scholarly scrutiny. The genocide scholarship has a distorted and 
limited view of its own history and purpose. It has used the stature of the Holocaust to 
initiate—by way of selective and biased comparisons—a discourse on “genocide” that is 
independent of the legal definition in the Genocide Convention. In particular, the 
comparative approach and the unsanctioned labeling of genocide have focused on the 
Ottoman Armenian experience in WWI without examination of how the characterization 
of this past event as genocide might serve the interests of those who created the genocide 
scholarship. While the genocide scholarship claims to be following a social-scientific 
method, it is observable that it employs rhetorical and discursive tactics to control 
information in accordance with American preferences regarding international history and 
current affairs. As seen in its general premise and the treatment of cases involving 





language and assumes a non-American identity as it attempts to affect public opinion 
toward views that serve the United States government. Significantly, the genocide 
scholarship’s production of such a discourse, in which it assigns genocidal intent to cases 
of political conflict, greatly relies on defying the meaning of “genocide” as defined in the 
treaty that had been approved by many member states in the United Nations. Lemkin’s 
personal biography has been constructed in a manner that glues together the main aspects 
of the genocide scholarship’s agenda, and decontextualizes the role of the term genocide 
in the development of international law.  
 Therefore, it is here suggested that the theory of power as understood in the study 
of politics is absent from the genocide discourse because the concept’s ability to explain 
the literature’s existence as political and, specifically, American-controlled, defeats the 
purpose of the genocide scholarship. What immediately follows in this work is an 
introduction to the theory of power as a foundation for an approach toward describing the 
function of the term genocide in the progress of international law within a framework of 
modern international power relations. The advent of the term genocide is shown in the 
context of American accumulation of hard power, its conversion into soft power, and its 
maturation into legal power, in a dialectical process. Ultimately, the story of the term 
genocide is not the moralistic tale that is narrated by the genocide scholarship but a 









CHAPTER 3  
 
A POWER-BASED APPROACH TO “GENOCIDE” 
 
Having examined the major themes in the three journals whose main subject is the 
study of genocide, it is held here that the genocide scholarship can be generally 
characterized as moralistic. Meaning, the supposedly academic discourse appeals to the 
readers’ beliefs of right and wrong, and then frames a selective group of historical events 
as instances of genocide to establish a mental connection between certain parties and 
criminality. Thus, in a variety of cases, the subject matter is presented as genocide 
regardless of whether or not there are court decisions in these cases, even though the legal 
definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention specifies in Article 6 that the process 
of charging a person with genocide has to go through a competent tribunal. Moreover, the 
genocide scholarship suggests that the advent of the term genocide lay in one man’s 
concern on behalf of humanity. The genocide scholarship denies its own politicization of 
historical events by shying away from acknowledging both the power that it possesses as 
an international discourse-making regime and the great power that has been the source of 
its empowerment. 
 It therefore follows that there is a clash between the content produced by the 
budding field of genocide studies and the ground assumptions of the deeper rooted field 





governing of human affairs—both domestically and internationally—is largely shaped by 
the intentional execution of those who have the power to do so. The genocide scholarship 
has conspicuously left the theory of power and the relevant power holders out of the story 
about “genocide” and also left out power-based considerations of the genocide 
scholarship’s purpose as an enterprise that frames a discourse of great international 
significance. As conspicuous as the omission of power by the genocide scholars has been, 
political scientists have not issued a reverberating critique of this phenomenon thus far.  
 First, it is asked: What is power? The task of articulating a power-based approach 
to the study of the term genocide necessitates a thorough exploration of what such an 
approach means in the study of politics. The effort to understand power in its many ways 
is done in consideration of what has been said about power in influential scholarly works, 
while avenues for contributions to power’s definition still open up in congruence with the 
new context in which power is considered. The inquiry into power is both basic and 
complex: its overall consistency is at the same time contrasted and thickened by the 
variance of its manifestations. Whatever power is, the thinking in terms of power—the 
immersion in the philosophy of it—is foundational not only to many works of political 
scientists but to the identity of political science. It will be shown that there is a significant 
difference between the frame of mind that surrounds the political realist’s concept of 
“power” as a creature of foreign policy and that of the political scientist. In addition, it 
will be argued that the commitment of political scientists to study power does not always 
share the same purpose as the social-scientific work on power.         
 Second: How is the formation of law a manifestation of power? In order to 





necessary to understand how power and law are related. Considering that “genocide” 
became an officially defined crime in an international convention, it is critical to know 
how power is embedded in the making of law, and especially how the dynamics of power 
and law explain the unique qualities of international law. Hence, the course of “genocide” 
may be illuminated by first seeing what law does to governance and what goes into 
making law work.  
 Third: In what ways does the term soft power provide the political scientist with 
tools to examine the work of the genocide scholarship? After locating soft power within 
the discussion on power and identifying that legal standing partly depends on legitimacy 
in the first two main questions of this chapter, the third question is set to draw an 
illustration of how soft power explains the process in which the term genocide acquires 
legitimacy. Soft-power efforts in this instance are embodied by the genocide scholarship. 
It is also claimed that the American influence over the discourse that has been generated 
by the genocide scholarship has meant that the term has acquired an inherent bias in its 
popular usage. As soft power, the genocide discourse has directed public opinion toward 
an acceptance of unified standards of governance and greater safety for civilians 
worldwide, but it has done so by promoting narratives that are guided by biased views 
regarding points of conflict between nation-states.    
 Finally: How does legal power, according to its definition here, reveal the path of 
“genocide” within the destination of international law? The appearance of tension 
between the work of soft power and the impartial use that one would expect of a legal 
term in courtroom judgements creates space for a conceptualization that would 





of “genocide” toward the attainment of an effective legal status in worldwide governance 
and international law depends on both the dominance of soft-power effects as a prior 
condition for its development and on the eventual control of soft power to function under 
law. “Legal power” contains within it the dialectical progress of three stages: hard power, 
soft power, and a heightened form of hard power. It means that legal power is an elevated 
form of hard power that includes within it the imprint of soft power. It is soft power that 
works at inspiring consent that, in turn, advances governing from the style of coercion in 
a conflictual reality to a state of consent to be coerced in a legal structure. This 
heightened form of hard power is reflective of the legitimacy that is associated with 
effective law: consent to be coerced. This consensus about the use of force is the apex of 
governance.     
 By presenting an understanding of power as the theoretical framework within 
which this work proceeds, it will become possible to view the origination, development, 
and maturation, of “genocide” within the historical context of the quest for international 
law. Correspondingly, it will become possible to identify the thin line—thin, yet of great 
demarcating properties—between the consent that is the outcome of soft-power efforts 
and the consent that is the outcome of legal power. An arrival at causal connections 
between the invention of the term genocide and its effects may ultimately be an exercise 
of the mind, but the design for an international law is viewed as concrete when one 
considers the power behind it. As a function of power, “genocide” is studied as a prism of 
a law that is under construction. It is a creature of the process in which power turns into 






Power and Political Science 
In the era of political science, academic discussions about power as a concept 
began to surface between WWI and WWII, following a surge in Anglo-American 
writings on the balance of power in Europe.1 While the balance of power was an old and 
revisited concept,2 the renewed debate about it in the interwar period seems to have led to 
novel deliberations about power itself. However, to this day, many works that attempt to 
describe power still put forth a disclaimer. Power is seen as steadily and obviously placed 
at the heart of politics, yet essentially elusive. To put it poignantly, scholars are in 
agreement that there is disagreement about power’s definition,3 mainly due to its 
perceived ubiquity and ambiguity.4  
                                                          
1 For a sample of works that reflect the rise of interest in the “balance of power” in the interwar period, see: 
S. C. Vestal, “World-Equilibrium,” The Atlantic Monthly (October 1921): 550-560; A. F. Pollard, “The 
Balance of Power,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs 2, no. 2 (March 1923): 51-64; 
Carl Murchison, Social Psychology: The Psychology of Political Domination (Worcester, MA: Clark 
University Press, 1929), 32-33; Carl Joachim Friedrich, Foreign Policy in the Making: The Search for a 
New Balance of Power (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1938), 119-131. In the context of the 
League of Nations being set up to affect international—particularly European—politics, the emphasis in 
this literature was more about the attainment of balance among rivals than a meditation on the meaning of 
power.   
 
2 Inspired by Britain’s unique position in relation to Europe, and by David Hume’s articulation of it, the 
balance of power was already a popular source of British foreign policy long before the twentieth century. 
See: Gould Francis Leckie, An Historical Research into the Balance of Power in Europe (London: Taylor 
and Hessey, 1817); Henry Brougham, Historical and Political Dissertations (London: David Griffin and 
Company, 1857), 1-50; David Hume, “Of the Balance of Power,” in Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, 
ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London: Longmans, Green, 1875), 1:348-356.  
 
3 For examples of this, see: Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” American 
Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 947; Jack H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of 
Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), 4; Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The 
Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 3; John J. Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 55.  
 
4 References to ubiquity and ambiguity stand out in the language that is used about power. Ubiquity is 
mentioned in the following works: Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2, no. 3 
(1957): 201; James March, “The Power of Power,” in Varieties of Political Theory , ed. David Easton 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 68; Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis, 4; Stefano Guzzini, “The 
Use and Misuse of Power Analysis in International Theory,” in Global Political Economy: Contemporary 
Theories, ed. Ronen Palan (London: Routledge, 2000), 53. The first editorial of an academic journal that is 
dedicated to political power features the word ubiquity in the title, and it offers an observation that “To the 





 The following evaluation of how power has been defined in major works is based 
on assuming a political scientist’s perspective, which is shaped by the conviction that 
political science is committed to the study of governing. As such, the political scientist’s 
idea of what governing involves is expected to include a mindfulness of law as a form of 
power. Informed by such a point of view, this work seeks to contribute to the prominent 
efforts in academia to define power while setting out to apply much of what has already 
been expressed about power in the overall critique of the genocide scholarship. The main 
point of contribution to the general definitions of power will be the filling of a missing 
legal mentality in the conceptualization of power. In the various existing definitions of 
power, law is not typically analyzed as a manifestation of power. 
 By adding a law component to the elements that have been commonly put into 
power definitions, the definition of power is expected to widen by three new angles. First, 
in addition to the distinguished qualities of consent and force,5 power can possess the 
                                                          
Haugaard and Sinisa Malesevic, “Editorial: The Ubiquity of Power,” Journal of Political Power 1, no. 1 
(April 2008): 1. Ambiguity is mentioned in the following works: R. H. Tawney, Equality (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1931), 228; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework 
for Political Inquiry (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950), 88; Robert Bierstedt, “An Analysis of 
Social Power,” American Sociological Review 15, no. 6 (December 1950): 732; Robert A. Dahl, Who 
Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961), 89; 
David A. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World 
Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 161; Larry E. Greiner and Virginia E. Schein, Power and Organization 
Development: Mobilizing Power to Implement Change (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1988), 13. Power has also been described as a troublesome concept, see: Robert Gilpin, War and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.      
 
5 Carl Joachim Friedrich presented as “axiomatic” the idea that power is based on varying ratios of force 
(constraint) and consent as two separate qualities. See: Carl Joachim Friedrich, Constitutional Government 
and Politics: Nature and Development (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937), 14. Similarly, according to 
Talcott Parsons, “power is ‘essentially’ a phenomenon of coercion or of consensus.” See: Talcott Parsons, 
“On the Concept of Political Power,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107, no. 3 (June 
1963): 258. According to Klaus Knorr, power is used coercively and noncoercively. See: Knorr, Power, 4. 
Wrong qualifies that in power relations there is no consent or agreement, but rather the alternative to 
coercion is manipulation or fraud. See: Dennis H. Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Oxford: 






dialectical quality of consent to regulate the use of force. Second, in addition to the 
treatment of action-outcome situations in the definitions, the diffuse quality of law once it 
is “set in stone” could mean an indefinite timeframe for its effects and a remoteness 
between cause and effect.6 Third, in addition to the focus on the effects of power on 
others, the rule of law dictates that lawmakers as power holders are themselves also 
obliged by their doing.7 A relatively recent definition by Michael Barnett and Raymond 
Duvall in their work on global governance stands out for not displaying a mental 
exclusion of the legal manifestation of power, but stops short of a specification that 
would call attention to the unique qualities of regulated power: “Power is the production, 
in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine 
their own circumstances and fate.”8 
                                                          
6 The definitions in the following sources suggest that power is only exercised when there is a specific 
outcome, be it an action or an inaction. However, these scenarios do not seem to include law as a power 
situation, which is based on performance according to an already instituted code of behavior. See: Tawney, 
Equality, 230; Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1938), 35; Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, “Types of Power and Status,” American Journal of 
Sociology 45, no.  2 (September 1939): 171; Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1947), 152; 
Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour: An Empirical Approach (London: Routledge and 
K. Paul, 1948), 37; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two,” 952; Dahl, “Concept,” 202; Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1977), 11. The definitions by the following began to develop an expectation of identifiable 
causation in studies of power without distinguishing power that is regulated, such as that of law: Nagel, The 
Descriptive Analysis, 24, 29; Baldwin, “Power Analysis,” 163. Also, it is noted that there is gender bias in 
the language used in some of the often cited definitions of power.  
 
7 The idea that power, by definition, is exercised over another or others without affecting oneself is 
expressed in the following: Tawney, Equality, 230; Russell, Power, 35; Goldhamer and Shils, “Types,” 
171; Weber, Theory 152; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 13; Dahl, “Concept,” 202; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View 
(London: Macmillan, 1974), 34; Nagel, Descriptive, 29; Keohane and Nye, Power, 11; Wrong, Power, 2; 
Greiner and Schein, Power, 13. These definitions portray power relations as competitive: driven by one’s 
wants and often confronted by another’s resistance. However, laws under the rule of law present a power 
situation in which the lawmakers are as bound by it as others.   
 
8 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in Global Governance,” in Power in Global Governance, 






 Political power has been set apart as a special kind of power.9 On a fundamental 
level, political power is said to pertain to “power over other men” as opposed to power 
over nature.10 Furthermore, a distinction between political power and other social power 
identifies the former as the control over policy-making power,11 or in other words, within 
the realm of social relations and terminology, political power is “sought by persons 
committed to a cause or collective goal” and not some “primitive craving.”12 However, if 
political science is indeed committed to studying all forms of governance in society, it 
would be unnecessary or perhaps even a misdirection for a political scientist to relate 
political power specifically to “the power to control the machinery of the state,”13 since 
the question of rules and laws is not exclusively posed by the task of governing a national 
constituency. Political power is similarly a matter for other domains, of small or large 
geographical and demographical sizes: it is as crucial for running a borough as it is for 
world affairs.14 As suggested here, there is a close link between how political science 
organizes its study of politics and how the different forms of power in politics have been 
laid out. 
 Forms of power have been addressed as such on the basis that they reflect 
                                                          
9 Tawney, Equality, 229. 
 
10 Lasswell and Kaplan, Power, 75.  
 
11 Ibid., 86; Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1976), 9. 
 
12 Wrong, Power, 236-237. 
 
13 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 18.  
 
14 While not considered a public domain, the household is the most compact social environment that is 






situations in which the result is that the power subject meets the power holder’s interests 
through the infliction or threat of “appropriately adverse consequences,” the promise of 
compensation, or the conditioning of beliefs.15 Many different words have been used to 
describe forms of power such as different assets of power, bases, categories, controls, 
elements, instruments, means, methods, ranges, resources, scopes, situations, sources and 
strengths, and though the difference is not always just semantic, it is mostly equivocal.16 
Nonetheless, the idea that power outcomes are characterized by attainments of objectives 
in varying rates of imposition or permission has been a constant feature in works on 
power. The question of how one uses power has generated more interest than the question 
of what gives one power.17 Thus, the most common presentation of different power forms 
reflects an interest in learning how at a particular point of time regarding a particular 
matter one employs resources to influence another toward either accepting or submitting 
to a particular agenda.  
 A popular distinction between forms of power is that between military, economic, 
and cultural, power. The neatness of this labeling has become entrenched in political 
science since its repeated publication within one decade in Bertrand Russell’s and E. H. 
                                                          
15 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Anatomy of Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983), 4-5. 
Galbraith uses the words condign, compensatory, and conditioned to represent these three different modes.  
 
16 For instance, John Kenneth Galbraith sorts power according to one set of three instruments of power and 
another set of three sources of power. See: Galbraith, Anatomy, 4-6. By “instrument,” he means how 
acceptance or submission is won by power; by “source,” he means through what power itself is attained. 
However, in the common usage of these words, the difference between source and instrument is sometimes 
unmarked. While Galbraith sees wealth as a source of power, it may also be considered to be an instrument 
of it. The phrases “wealth is a source of success” and “wealth is an instrument of success” could be used 
interchangeably to mean that wealth is a factor in the attainment of success.  
 
17 Robert Bierstedt lists three sources of power: numbers of people, social organization, and resources. See: 
Bierstedt, “Analysis,” 737. These are nearly matched in Galbraith’s list of three sources: personality, 






Carr’s work on the eve of WWII and the work by Hans Morgenthau in the aftermath of 
the war.18 Over the years, much of the discourse on power has consisted of a discussion 
about the distinctive qualities of the three forms. Military power has been described as 
naked power,19 being the most obvious and crudest form of power,20 whose most far-
reaching consequences in international affairs are the toppling of a government or a 
territorial conquest.21 This form of power is the one that is most associated with 
coercion,22 typically by way of threat.23 David A. Baldwin comments about “the neglect 
                                                          
18 Russell was the first to divide power according to this format, distinguishing between “direct physical 
power,” “rewards and punishments,” and “influence on opinion.” See: Russell, Power, 36. Carr’s division 
into three categories of military power, economic power, and power over opinion, came with a footnote that 
expresses an acknowledgement of Russell’s work. See: Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 
1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939), 139. 
During WWII, both of these works are cited as having articulated that “Military power, economic control 
and command of opinion” present three aspects “of the same phenomenon.” See: Georg Schwarzenberger, 
Power Politics: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations and Post-war Planning (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1941), 98. Morgenthau reiterates the “triple distinction,” but does not show recognition of 
being inspired by Russell’s distinction, and presents the forms of power as “three types of imperialism.” 
See: Morgenthau, Politics, 38. Later on, similar divisions show some variance in how the third form is 
described. Klaus Knorr distinguishes between military, economic, and political penetrative power. See: 
Knorr, Power, 6. Robert Gilpin suggests that “power simply refers to the military, economic, and 
technological capabilities of states.” See: Gilpin, War, 13.    
 
19 Russell, Power, 39. 
 
20 Morgenthau, Politics, 38. 
 
21 Other forms of power may also take part in leading to such consequences. It has been suggested that 
hard-power considerations stress these consequences as a goal. Russell’s claim that “Every state which is 
sufficiently powerful aims at foreign conquest” can be seen as speculative and even prescriptive. He then 
mentions the United States as an exception to this “principle.” See: Russell, Power, 161-162.  
 
22 John R. P. French and Bertram Raven, in their sociological perspective on power, avoid using the 
military label, and point at a coercive power that is both related to rewarding power and in opposition to it. 
See: John R. P. French Jr. and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in Studies in Social Power, 
ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 156-157. This division between 
coercion and reward does not mirror the division between military and economic power, for economic 
power can also be used coercively. However, it can be argued that when economic matters are affected by 
sanctions against certain parties it is implicitly, if not explicitly, enabled by military power. In Dennis H. 
Wrong’s elaboration of force, he distinguishes between physical and psychic forms, and within the physical 
form he includes both violent and nonviolent means as options. Meaning, he counts economic sanctions as 
the use of physical force. See: Wrong, Power, 23-27. Barnett and Duvall’s version of coercive power is 
identified as compulsory power, which also includes the forms of military and economic power that are 
elsewhere known as distinct. See: Barnett and Duvall, “Power,” 3.    
 





of non-military forms of power” among scholars of international politics being the result 
of “the propensity to treat military power resources as the ‘ultimate’ power base” and to 
overestimate its effectiveness.”24    
 Economic power is not as primary as military power, and is seen as 
instrumental.25 In an early discussion of power by an economic historian, R. H. Tawney, 
it is claimed that “most forms of power have some economic roots, and produce, in turn, 
some economic consequences.”26 In comparison to military power, economic power 
might be as unobtrusive and indirect as Morgenthau suggests,27 but the acts of buying 
consent or issuing threats of sanctions directly address the other about matters of interest, 
unlike cases in which power is used to structure situations without it being precisely 
stated to what end and to whose benefit. Much like military power, one’s economic 
power can be used to weaken or strengthen others, and to do so directly.28 Inducements 
are thought to be effective alternatives to threats of deprivation in the quest for 
compliance,29 but the basic need to gain or secure resources before any inducements can 
be offered relies on military power.  
 The third form of power has earned an assortment of endeavors to capture its 
                                                          
24 David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 184, 192. John 
J. Mearsheimer’s work provides an example of the rhetoric that Baldwin was criticizing by declaring that 
“a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the 
military forces of rival states.” See: Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 55. 
 
25 To Russell, economic power is “derivative.” See: Russell, Power, 120. 
  
26 Tawney, Equality, 231.  
 
27 Morgenthau, Politics, 39.  
 
28 Knorr, Power, 6.  
 






essence accurately,30 and it is described here as cultural power for its aim to control the 
attitude and behavior of power subjects by the production of knowledge and the 
instillation of values. Morgenthau’s reference to this form of power highlights the 
cultural aspect, and he succinctly describes it as aiming to control the mind,31 but he 
underplays the role of this power by positioning it as “subsidiary to the military and 
economic varieties.”32 In some ways, the effect of this power can precede military power 
for it operates at the establishment of beliefs: it affects the manner in which the human 
resources at the basis of military power are inclined to be mobilized for the successful use 
of force or the credible threat of it, and it affects the opinion of the power subjects to the 
extent that agreement with the power holders’ interests may be reached without having to 
use force or even appear to be in conflict.33  
 Joseph Nye’s distinction between hard power and soft power has given impetus 
and a terminological toolset to scholarly efforts involving the relationship between 
concrete power and cultural power. Although economic power is associated with the 
hard-power choice between the carrot and the stick,34 it is nonetheless observed that 
                                                          
30 In light of its complexity, French and Raven discuss three different forms of power that are here 
considered to be part of cultural power: legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. See: French 
and Raven, “Bases,” 158-163. Knorr describes this power as political penetrative, which stresses an ability 
to attain favorable outcomes from within the inside of the power subject’s decision-making process. See: 
Knorr, Power, 6.   
 
31 Morgenthau, Politics, 40. 
 
32 Ibid., 42.  
 
33 Russell sees opinion as omnipotent, and, thus, it can be argued “that all other forms of power are derived 
from it,” including that of soldiers. See: Russel, Power, 136. Knorr defines as “nonpower influence” this 
ability “to affect the behavior of another society without any adversary resort to superior strength, military 
or economic” and without restricting that society’s choices. See: Knorr, Power, 311. 
 






economic resources are part of both hard power and soft power.35 Their distinction can be 
a question of effect: is it achieved strictly and knowingly in accordance with what the 
power holder wants, or is it achieved because the power subject has been long 
conditioned to want an outcome that is in service of the power holder’s interests? As Nye 
aptly puts it, soft power “co-opts people rather than coerces them.”36 Nye’s full definition 
of soft power describes it as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of 
framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain 
outcomes.”37 Unlike hard power’s command of change, soft power seeks to control 
agendas and establish preferences.38 The difference is also seen in the quality of the effect 
itself: the power holder may expect that the indirect style of control, as accomplished 
through institutions, means that the effect of soft power is likely to have a long term 
quality of cooperation that is absent in hard-power cases.39 While Nye makes the 
argument that soft power is as important as hard power, and can be more cost-effective,40 
                                                          
35 Tanks and jets require money, and so do schools and newspapers. Nye associates money, upon its 
tangibility, with the resources of hard power without noting that it plays an indispensable role in facilitating 
the intangible factors of soft power such as ideas and values. See: Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power: 
Its Changing Nature and Use in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 21. Benjamin 
Ginsberg stresses the connection between economic power and mass opinion. See: Benjamin Ginsberg, The 
Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 149. 
 
36 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It 
Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8.  
 
37 Nye, Future, 20-21. 
 
38 Ibid., 10-11.  
 
39 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Autumn 1990): 167; Barnett and Duvall, “Power,” 
3. Forcing or inducing a certain behavior suggests that similar influence will have to be exerted to maintain 
such behavior, whereas the institutionalization of behavior allows for an expectation that there will be a 
recurrence of the desired behavior (meaning, the behavior would be a norm).  
 






he also states that soft power is a function of hard power.41  
 Much of the study about the fungibility of military, economic, and cultural, power 
has centered on the exchange between resources of power as separate entities,42 or their 
importance in relation to one another,43 rather than the advancement of power itself by 
way of its particularization. For instance, Russell points out that the advent of the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company at the time was owed to Britain’s triumph at war, and that, 
conversely, economic power may sponsor military or propaganda power.44 When 
criticism of power fungibility ensues, such as claiming that the discussion of fungibility is 
exaggerated,45 it adds to the predominant discourse and has the effect of keeping the 
focus away from considering the idea that the interaction between the forms of power has 
evolutionary effects on power itself.       
 When it comes to the vital study of power in the context of governing, political 
science has been hindered mainly by two commitments. One commitment is to being a 
social science. The expectation of a systematic body of knowledge has consigned 
scholars of the field to operate within an existing scientific discourse. Similar to how the 
idea of path dependence is related by political scientists to political actors, claiming that a 
path of self-reinforcement is followed potentially at the expense of efficient policy-
                                                          
41 Ibid., 21. 
 
42 Wrong, Power, 66; Baldwin, “Power and International,” 180; Ginsberg, Captive, 89. 
  
43 Lasswell and Kaplan, Power, 93. 
 
44 Russell, Power, 120, 129. 
 
45 Baldwin, “Power Analysis,” 192. Despite his earlier suggestion of an overall exaggeration in the debate 
about the fungibility of power, Baldwin also calls for further study of “the fungibility of military force.” 
See: Baldwin, “Power and International,” 187. In the criticism of fungibility, it is argued that power is not 






making,46 it may be claimed that the current language about power in political science is 
conditioned toward reification.47 The path on which political scientists tread in matters of 
power conceptualization was set in keeping with Robert A. Dahl’s work. His definition of 
power that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do,”48 and his directive to examine power according to base, means, 
amount, and scope49 have been the source of scholarly debates that fashioned the field’s 
discourse on power.50 The preoccupation with the scientific language on power as 
measurable instances of causation has featured a point of departure that is different from 
                                                          
46 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 264. 
 
47 The phenomenon of reification may be related to other productions of content in academia. In the context 
of the proclivity to use a compartmentalized terminology of “isms,” it has been argued that the tendency to 
reify research traditions is a pathology that affects the quality of explanations. When mandatory literature 
involves the classification of research in a particular manner, a field of study can be directed by the sense of 
its own tradition. See: David A. Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects 
as Impediments to Understanding and Progress,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 2011): 
467.  
 
48 Dahl, “Concept,” 202.  
 
49 Ibid., 203.  
 
50 For instance, the discourse-enhancing debate about the “faces of power” has had the effect of positioning 
Dahl’s definition as a starting point of conversation. See: Bachrach and Baratz, “Two,” 947. This “faces of 
power” debate has been promoted as critical to the study of power in politics, and even expanded to 
discussions of three and four faces of power. See: Lukes, Power, 34; Kenneth E. Boulding, Three Faces of 
Power (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989); Peter Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power,” Journal 
of Politics 54, no. 4 (November 1992): 977-1007; Baldwin, “Power and International,” 179. There are 
numerous ways to add to or detract from Dahl’s definition, but then the discourse on power becomes 
defined by previous work rather than the study of governing situations. Put differently, the categorization of 
power is located in the abstract, and hence an insistence on erudition could impede innovation in the effort 
to articulate governing strategies effectively. This critique of a scientific field’s “traditionalism” does not 
suggest that there is no value in an established language of distinctions in the efforts to discuss power in 
governing, such as: “power to” and “power over”; direct and indirect power; and realized and potential 
power. However, the critique here does include questioning the existence of a language that evaluates the 
accomplishments of political science in the study of power according to the production of generalizable 
knowledge or theories of predictive causation. See: Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Who Gets Power and Why,” 
World Politics 2, no. 1 (October 1949): 121; Herbert A. Simon, “Notes on the Observation and 
Measurement of Political Power,” Journal of Politics 15, no. 4 (November 1953): 515-516; March, 
“Power,” 40; Nagel, Descriptive, 169-170, 177; Baldwin, “Power Analysis,” 163-164, 194. The power to 






conceptualizing power to fit particular governing situations. In other words, in its 
discourse on power, political science has built itself more as a social science rather than 
as an academic field of government-related inquiries. Thus, the current scientific interests 
in power have rewarded political scientists who maintain a conversation with Dahl’s 
social-scientific work and the works on Dahl’s work, while leaving behind, out of sight 
and out of mind, the regulated form of power, which is law.   
 The second commitment is to the nation-state. In the study of international 
politics, this has meant that power relations have been expressed through a perspective 
that associates power with struggle.51 The basic observation about the distribution of 
power being such that there is asymmetry in power relations was applied in the works of 
realists under a foreign-policy influence that sees the nation-state as competing with other 
nation-states over profit or for survival. Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis, which was the first 
to describe international politics in actual realist terms, refers to a period of time that the 
author served as an officer of the British Foreign Office;52 Morgenthau’s Politics among 
Nations, which is seen as the first critical effort to package realism in the study of 
international politics, sets out to “reflect on the problems which confront American 
foreign policy in our time;”53 and Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, 
which is seen as the first methodologically-inclined work of political realism, shifted—
paradoxically yet effectively—the realist discourse from the practical to the theoretical 
but did so while maintaining a power framed gaze that “begins with assumptions about 
                                                          
51 This view has been related to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. See: John H. Herz, Political Realism 
and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 24. 
 
52 Marnie Hughes-Warrington, Fifty Key Thinkers on History (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2014), 26. 
 






states,” which “try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to 
achieve the ends in view.”54 Years later, in a widely taught book, John Mearsheimer 
declares that “For all realists, calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think 
about the world around them,” and that “Power is the currency of great-power politics, 
and states compete for it among themselves.”55 This power-based approach to 
international politics has controlled the rhetoric in IR theory, and thereby its function 
within political science. The attempts to negate it by pointing at incentives that mitigate 
power relations (liberalism) or by challenging the reality of power relations 
(constructivism) are not power-based critiques of realism. A legal minded power-based 
approach to international politics would call attention to power from the perspective of 
governing interests rather than competing nation-state interests.56  
 To see power from a legal perspective, the political scientist might have to draw 
inspiration from a sociologist’s IR-free view of the concept: 
It must be evident that power is required to inaugurate an association in the first 
place, to guarantee its continuance, and to enforce its norms. Power supports the 
fundamental order of society and the social organization within it, wherever there 
is order. Power stands behind every association and sustains its structure. Without 
power there is no organization and without power there is no order.57   
                                                          
54 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1979), 118. 
 
55 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 12.  
 
56 The prevalence of the orientation to reflect state interests in works on power is evident in works by 
scholars who are not known to be realists. See: Adolf A. Berle, Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1969), 506; Gilpin, War, 31; Nye, “Soft Power,” 166, 168; Nye, Paradox, 8, 12; David P. Calleo, 
Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 135. This 
mentality has also penetrated the study of power in the context of international law, as it is believed “that 
States are the principal actors in the process of customary international law.” See: Michael Byers, Custom, 
Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13. Later in his work, Byers reconsiders the validity of the statist 
assumption, but does so while popularizing the belief that “States have created that legal system by and for 
themselves” without noting that this too is a statist-related assumption. See: Byers, Custom, 218. 
 





The realization of the significance of power in the function of government and as a 
concept of political science58 invites the political scientist to study how the synthesis of 
hard power and soft power relates to the formation of law within the context of governing 
endeavors.59 Such an examination will then help to place “genocide” as a function of 
power within an ongoing effort to develop an international law of governing capabilities.  
 
Hard Power and Law 
Authority is the power to give orders, and it is here likened to the effect of hard 
power. Legitimacy is the power to be authorized—have the orders be agreeable—and is 
here likened to the effect of soft power. Law is the power of legitimate authority. First 
there is authority, then there is legitimacy, and finally there is law. In keeping with this 
progression toward law, it is asked: What is law in terms of the relationship between hard 
power and soft power? To provide an answer, one must engage in a study of how 
authority and legitimacy are attained, and how they are related to each other and to law. 
Consequently, it would become possible to evaluate their relationship in the international 
setting. 
 Accounts of Western history have shown that power is sparked by a human 
interest before it drives toward law, but also that the continued effect of human interest 
                                                          
society” and that “nothing whatever is accomplished without it.” See: Galbraith, Anatomy, 13.  
 
58 Lasswell, Analysis, 6; Lasswell and Kaplan, Power, 75. 
 
59 An awareness of this synthesis is lacking in IR studies. The IR discourse popularizes the belief in two 
separate, and even opposite, ideas of power, but does not offer a focus on how their distinct qualities turn 
into a complex unity. For instance, see: Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 42-44. According to Reus-Smit, matieral power is nonsocial whereas ideational 







on existing law damages its credibility and may lead to challenges against the legitimacy 
of authority. In two separate works of two volumes each, Harold J. Berman, and then 
Francis Fukuyama, survey the major trends that took place throughout an extensive 
timeframe to explain the particular form of law in Western society. It is said that after the 
wars from 1076 to 1122 the papal authority sought to maintain unity under its control by 
advocating a system of law that would codify the legitimacy of the central ecclesiastical 
government.60 In other words, the interests of those who governed through the Church 
were served by observing that the hard-power conditions following the wars were to be 
converted into a new system of law through soft-power efforts. Thus, the authority of the 
Church was in position to earn legitimacy through the rationalization of a systematized 
legal order.  
In correspondence with the lasting effects of church law on the Western cultural 
tradition, the chain of significant revolutions that transpired over the course of centuries 
were triggered by a sentiment that the authority of the powerful could not continue to 
dictate the law.61 Specifically, the Protestant frame of mind cultivated a body of 
practitioners and knowledge that dedicated itself to the separation of divinely inspired 
law that is the property of the entire community and human-authority interests, or what is 
                                                          
60 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 520-521. Law and religion have intertwined in other profound ways and 
in earlier situations, but this account gives heed to historical developments of law in Western society that 
could shed particular light on the character of international law. Within this context, it is relevant to 
consider that European law owes its origination and character to religion and the culture that is associated 
with it. See: Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French 
Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 245.  
 
61 Such was the reasoning behind the German Lutheran Revolution, the English Revolution, the French 
Revolution, the American Revolution, and the Russian Revolution. See: Harold J. Berman, Law and 
Revolution, II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, 






also known as the rule of law.62 Meaning, the application of soft power on top of hard 
power might legitimize an authority to a great extent, but the Western legal tradition is set 
to be dismissive of it when efforts toward the legitimization of human interests threaten 
the independent quality of the law.   
John Austin’s nineteenth-century clear-cut jurisprudence provides an insightful 
reflection of the development of positive laws alongside divine laws as having the 
“proper” authority of command in Britain’s Protestant culture on the eve of the Victorian 
period. The philosophy of law during Britain’s imperial century, in which its influence 
overseas was in the midst of rising to new heights, ascribes command value to “laws 
which are set by God to his human creatures” and to laws “which form the appropriate 
matter of general and particular jurisprudence.”63 In order for laws set by “men to men” 
to resemble laws set by “God to his human creatures,” and be properly called laws, these 
laws have to be “set by political superiors to political inferiors.”64 According to this, the 
authority behind the law depends on certain humans being better positioned than others to 
command, in what is characterized as a relationship of “sovereign and subject.”65 To him, 
                                                          
62 Fukuyama states that the rule of law in Europe was rooted in the institutional form of Western 
Christianity, and notes that it became embedded in European society before the rise of democracy. See: 
Fukuyama, Origins, 262, 275, 288. Without reducing the significance of the philosophical connection 
between Protestantism and the rule of law, Fukuyama recognizes that the position of the Roman Catholic 
Church in relation to the political authority of “kings and emperors” had a deep effect in the development 
of the rule of law in Western Europe. See: Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From 
the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 
11. Fukuyama places law, along with state and accountability, as the central feature in his narrative on 
political development. See: Ibid., 540.    
 
63 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: John Murray, 1832), vii.   
 
64 Ibid., 1-2. In a manner, the coupling of divine laws and positive laws suggests that from the standpoint of 
delivering a command, the ontological superiority that is ascribed to God is imitated in the form of political 
superiority among humans. Austin clarifies that “the term superiority signifies might: the power of 
affecting others with evil or pain, and of forcing them, through fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to 
one’s wishes.” See: Ibid., 19.  
 





laws are properly called that when they are empowered by a command that obliges 
conduct, and conduct is obliged when there is a chance of incurring a disadvantage in 
case of disobedience by either the ability to sanction or enforce.66 Interestingly, Austin 
stresses that public opinion without the authority of God or human political dominion is 
the source of moral rules that are not positive law, and would be improperly called 
laws.67 In line with this thinking, Charles E. Merriam states: “The legal is likely to 
emerge with the crown of victory, other things being equal.”68      
Hence, the process through which “might is right” involves the power holder’s 
successful conversion of coercive authority into legitimate authority.69 Legitimacy 
promotes compliance by establishing the belief among the governed that the law should 
be obeyed.70 This is especially relevant in an international setting that consists of 
sovereign nation-states that do not respond to coercion as the individual person does,71 
                                                          
66 Ibid., 10, 18.  
 
67 Ibid., 3. Moral rules “are not commands” because they “have nothing of the imperative character.” See: 
Ibid., 21.  
 
68 Charles E. Merriam, Political Power (New York: Collier Books, 1964), 25. Russell also alludes to this: 
“The power conferred by military conquest often ceases, after a longer or shorter period of time, to be 
merely military. See: Russell, Power, 83-84. Internationally, the “right to rule” is said to be based on 
“victory in the last hegemonic war” and the ensuing ability to enforce will. See: Gilpin, War, 34.  
 
69 Wrong, Power, 85-88. In other words, while coercion (hard power) is the first source of authority and the 
final resort, the legitimacy of authority is a cultural task (soft power). Thus, while Austin’s jurisprudence 
teaches that morality is not authoritative law without the power of command, it lacks a consideration that 
law is not legitimate without the power of morality.  
 
70 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 161, 170.  
 
71 It has been suggested that currently international law resembles club membership rather than a body of 
law because it has not been sufficiently developed by “the activities of courts, legislatures, executive 
departments and police forces.” See: Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 39. Therefore, Frank argues that international law is at a stage of 
development in which, like a club that seeks to obtain and maintain members, the focus is on the legitimacy 






and also in an environment such as that of the young United States, which depended on 
the authority of law being internalized as well as followed so that it may be practiced and 
enforced across the vastness of its federal territories by individuals of different cultural 
backgrounds placed out of their original cultural context. Among his observations of the 
American democracy in the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville notes that when 
laws are legislated by a government in consideration of the opinion of the governed, then 
it is expected that the laws will be respected because the governed will feel as if the laws 
were made by them and to their benefit.72 It therefore follows that law’s legitimacy 
thrives in democratic conditions where public opinion is satisfactorily reflected in 
legislation. When the legislation is shown to be supported and even inspired by public 
opinion,73 it legitimizes law on arrival well ahead of entering courtrooms. 
However, according to what is taught by the concept of soft power, one cannot 
assume that public opinion is free from being subjected to information that prepares the 
public mind toward embracing a particular legislation as its own, or rejecting it, long 
before the legislation is up for public debate.74 Power holders are at an advantage when it 
                                                          
72 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley, rev. Francis Bowen, trans. Henry 
Reeve (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 1:248. Fear, which Austin associates with the politically 
inferior, is related by Tocqueville to the rich in the United States, who have to be apprehensive about the 
legal consequences of power abuse. Tocqueville was impressed by an overall emphasis on the authority of 
the legal profession in the United States and its governing effect. See: Ibid., 1:272.   
 
73 The term public opinion does not include all opinions, but represents an idea of a belief that is shared by 
most people in relation to “the issue or situation that defines them as a public.” See: David B. Truman, The 
Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public opinion, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1971), 220. 
 
74 This assumption is explicitly upended in Morgenthau’s remark that “the government must realize that it 
is the leader and not the slave of public opinion,” meaning that the ability to lead public opinion toward 
being in agreement with the policies that are desired by power holders is essential for effective governing. 
See: Morgenthau, Politics, 146. However, the prevalent notion, which has been suggested in classic works 
over a century ago, especially regarding the role of public opinion in the United States, has been that in a 
democracy public opinion towers over legislation. See: James Bryce, The American Commonwealth 
(London: Macmillan, 1888), 3:25, 34; A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public 





is believable that public sentiment is independent of control because then the lawmaking 
is dissociated from their power and enjoys legitimacy. A deep understanding of soft 
power leads one to recognize that even a celebration of democratic processes could be 
part of effective governing through controlled information. For example, the legal 
scholar, Cass Sunstein, who was positioned as the Administrator of the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs for the United States government between 2009 and 
2012, has both praised the democratic processes and advocated ways around them in the 
context of public opinion. On the one hand, Sunstein argues that “in a well-functioning 
deliberative democracy,” the legitimacy of the legal reasoning is primarily gained by the 
public’s freedom to debate,75 yet on the other hand, he has taken part in presenting 
ingenious tactics for controlling the public’s decision-making without being seen as 
doing so.76  
 International law is commonly seen as distinguished from state law by emphasis 
on the former’s lack of authoritative power to legislate laws and enforce them,77 but it is 
here suggested that a less apparent difference of significance lies in the power to affect 
opinion through information. Can world public opinion ever be subjected to information 
                                                          
Public opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green, 1913), 4. 
 
75 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
53, 195-196.  
 
76 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Cass R. Sunstein and Adrien Vermeule, 
“Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures,” Journal of Political Philosophy 17, no. 2 (June 2009): 202-227.  
 
77 For deliberations on this distinction between international law and state law, and the questioning that 
international law is really “law” by definition, see: Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New 
York: Rinehart & Company, 1952), 18-19, 402; H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), 210, 215-216, 226; Anthony D’Amato, “Is International Law Really ‘Law’?” Northwestern 
University Law Review 79, no. 5-6 (December-February 1984-1985): 1293-1314; Franck, Power, 28-29, 






control like the national citizenry of a state? Even when a great power such as the United 
States manages to affect public opinion in other countries, what of the states that 
persistently block American influence on their people? The legitimacy of international 
law is doubtful because of an inability to control world public opinion as exhaustively 
and unitedly as within the territory of a sovereign state. The international society as a 
whole was not endowed with the level of unified cultural tradition that is ascribed to the 
development of law in the Western society, in which the legitimacy of laws has been 
based on a shared culture.   
 Custom among nation-states is based on a relatively recent development in 
international interactions and progresses slowly without having been translated into a 
worldwide lawmaking regime.78 Once the engagement between nation-states becomes 
routinized in a certain way, the practice may be accepted as conventional and thereafter 
officially recognized as such between certain nation-states in a bilateral or multilateral 
contract, known as a treaty. Thus, the two pillars of international law, custom and treaty, 
are interrelated in the sense that custom leads to the documentation that is the treaty, and 
the treaty confirms norms that have become customary.79 Both represent two meanings of 
convention: custom is unofficial convention, whereas the treaty is convention made 
                                                          
78 It is said that “The starting-point of all custom is convention rather than conflict, just as the starting-point 
of all society is co-operation rather than dissension.” See: Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making, 6th 
edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 68. Allen points out that custom is not just a source of 
law but is at the root of social growth. See: Ibid., 143.  
 
79 The two are presented as sources of international law, but not without qualification of what “sources” 
means in this instance. See: Kelsen, Principles, 304; Anthony A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in 
International Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), 4; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler 
Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 1. Treaties are considered secondary to custom because they are typically 






official.80 It has been suggested that if norms are seen as reflecting standard international 
conduct, then international law may gain legitimacy by basing its rules on them, just as in 
state-law legitimacy is earned when public opinion is thought to be reflected in 
legislation.81 
 The question here regarding norms among nation-states is not whether they do or 
do not have the power to “impose an absolute obligation” on states,82 but to what extent 
norms in the international environment are manifestations of power themselves. As Hans 
Kelsen points out, there are cases in which “general international law is applied to states 
which never had the opportunity to participate in the establishment of the law-creating 
custom.”83 Thus, the suggestion that norms are derived from a vague “intersection of law 
and morality”84 or defined by “interpretive communities”85 is to tell half the truth. Rather, 
it is here claimed that international norms are affected by conscious efforts of soft power, 
                                                          
80 Be it official or unofficial convention, the term is distinguished from law in the following manner: 
deviation from a convention results in “disapproval” whereas deviation from a law results in “physical or 
psychic sanctions aimed to compel conformity or to punish disobedience, and applied by a group of men 
especially empowered to carry out this function.” See: Weber, Theory, 127.  
 
81 In other words, “the validity of customary international law” is reasoned by the juristic interpretations of 
custom as norms, and by the consent to them, thereby making international law into a “normative order.” 
See: Kelsen, Principles, 93, 314-317. However, according to Austin’s view, for custom to turn into positive 
law in the state, it has to be “adopted as such by the courts of justice” and “enforced by the power of the 
state.” See: Austin, Province, 27-28. 
 
82 Franck, Power, 36. 
 
83 He gives the examples of states that previously did not have sea access or newly born states who do not 
have a long established practice in some or all situations regarding which norms have been created. See: 
Kelsen, Principles, 311-313. 
 
84 D. P. O’Connell, “The Role of International Law,” in Conditions of World Order, ed. Stanley Hoffmann 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), 55.  
 
85 Ian Johnstone, “The Power of Interpretive Communities,” in Power, Barnett and Duvall, 185-204. The 
term is used broadly, especially when it is accompanied by the undiscerning declaration that “International 






which is made possible by the unbalanced distribution of hard power that goes into the 
makeup of international bilateral relations, multilateral relations, and organizations. As 
long as the interpretive community of judges is confused with the interpretive 
communities of soft-power agents such as political leaders, diplomats, scholars, and 
nongovernmental actors, as it is in Ian Johnstone’s conceptualization,86 then international 
law will not be able to emerge free of the dominant cultural power. When norms are 
incorporated into the legal language of courtrooms, then, and only then, do they become 
the subject of a professional interpretive process that is worthy of being called legal 
discourse,87 but not while international institutions are influenced by, and influencing 
others to absorb, norms whose acceptance as such is based on the ability of particular 
cultural sources to dominate the available information according to the interests of power 
holders. 
 Efforts toward global civil society88 or global governance89 are stifled by the 
continued exposure of international institutions to soft power that is oriented toward 
serving the greatest power within an inter-national mentality rather than catering to the 
needs of a unified quality of worldwide governance.90 To put it in clear power terms, the 
                                                          
86 Ibid., 190-191. 
 
87 This is in agreement with the observation that “legal practice is an exercise in interpretation” and “Law is 
an interpretive concept,” but, it is also emphasized that legal interpretation is carried out by judges: “Judges 
should decide what the law is by interpreting the practice of other judges deciding what the law is.” See: 
Ronald Dworkin, “Law as Interpretation,” Texas Law Review 60, no. 3 (September 1982): 527; Ronald 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 410. 
 
88 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003). 
 
89 Barnett and Duvall, Power.  
 
90 The hyphenation in “inter-national” is used here to distinguish a mentality of competition between 
nation-states, as opposed to “international,” which typically means the setting that is inclusive of all nation-
states. An international system that is dominated by a superpower is thought to mean that the world would 





overwhelming disbelief in internationalism as a concept and in “the harmony of interests” 
as a doctrine in Europe just before WWII broke out91 was based on indications that 
international law was a set of norms that were established by soft power only to be cast 
aside by the hard power of dominant nation-states when the norms interfered with their 
interests.92 A wedge had not—and has not since then—been driven between the power 
that legitimizes norms as items of international law and the power that would credibly 
guarantee the protection of international law from abuse. In many ways, among which is 
the way of the genocide scholarship, soft power is still used to serve the interests of 
power holders in the popular discourse on “genocide,” despite it being a legal term. The 
genocide scholarship manages to affect many minds and assign a high cultural value to its 
use of the term genocide, but it tampers with the legitimacy of “genocide” as a legal term, 
and with the legitimacy of international law in general.    
        
Soft Power and the Genocide Scholarship 
Soft power effectively leads power subjects to absorb the beliefs that power 
holders desire that they have when credibility is attached to the produced information.93 
                                                          
superpower is able to maintain its superiority by the establishment of regional balances of power so that no 
government may acquire enough power to challenge the direction of international affairs. The designation 
“inter-national” law illustrates how international law might be used to focus on how power is balanced 
between nation-states, but as “international” law the focus may be on unifying governing qualities among 
governments through an aspiration toward a worldwide code of governance.   
 
91 Carr, Twenty, 108.  
 
92 For instance, Carr intimates that Woodrow Wilson had expressed the view that “a state had the power to 
denounce any treaty by which it was bound at any time.” See: Ibid., 234. Carr also mentions a saying that 
was attributed to Theodore Roosevelt regarding the Panama crisis—“Damn the law, I want the Canal 
built”—to show that for powerful nation-states legality is secondary to self-interest in international affairs. 
See: Ibid., 236. 
 
93 The United States generates the vast majority of information around the world. Even before the advent of 





As Nye puts it, “The best propaganda is not propaganda,” because “Soft power depends 
upon credibility, and when governments are manipulative and information is seen as 
propaganda, credibility is destroyed.”94 He also adds that “Information that appears to be 
propaganda may not only be scorned, but it may also turn out to be counterproductive if it 
undermines a country’s reputation for credibility.”95 Back when state propaganda was 
commonly used more directly in democracies, Russell observes that “the average citizen” 
in a democracy is “easier to deceive, since he regards the government as his 
government.”96 As the existence of such phrasing in Russell’s text indicates, citizens of 
democracies were becoming more aware that the government might manipulate 
information, and, thus, state information, while not necessarily considered untrustworthy, 
is connected with an agenda. Since the days of its effective use in WWI and WWII, 
propaganda, upon its association with state interests, has become “chiefly derogatory in 
its connotations,” and associated with “distortion and fabrication.”97 Nevertheless, even 
nowadays propaganda might effectively control public opinion when, in situations of an 
outside threat,98 the public is led to urgently choose between believing its own 
government and an external rival, and would likely favor the former over the latter. 
 Considering that soft power is directed toward having a desired effect,99 the use of 
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state agenda and what the public is expected to typically believe about state agenda could 
nonetheless be a means to an end if it lends credibility to other avenues of information 
through which power holders may lead power subjects into adopting a certain intended 
view. While it is recognized that a government exercises soft power invisibly, from 
behind the scenes,100 it is also the case that certain government interests might be 
advanced indirectly, in soft-power fashion, even by way of depicting a visible 
government as having a position that is against the desired public sentiment. Hence, by 
way of misdirecting the power subjects, the soft-power invisibility of purpose is 
maintained. The popular Orwellian image of the government’s control of opinion directly 
and forcefully,101 which seems to dominate the information about information-control, 
fails to capture the essence of soft power, and, being such a prevalent notion, it might 
even be within a government’s soft-power toolset.    
For example, when the NYT publishes a headline that says “U.S. and Turkey 
Thwart Armenian Genocide Bill,”102 it relies on the already affected public opinion about 
government agenda in general so that the public may be directed to put stock in the 
information about “genocide” that is provided by selected scholars. This soft-power tactic 
relies on the public’s assumption that scholars are independent of government service. 
                                                          
100 Russell, Power, 48. Klaus Knorr develops the term informal access, which is also known as informal 
penetration, and relates it to a government’s ability to reach the citizens of a foreign state through agents in 
order to shape public opinion. See: Knorr, Power, 15-16; Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: 
Intervention in an Age of Interdependence (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1982), 3-8.   
 
101 Ginsberg, Captive, ix.  
 
102 Carl Hulse, “U.S. and Turkey Thwart Armenian Genocide Bill,” New York Times, October 26, 2007. By 
suggesting that the bill did not pass due to political pressure that was exerted by the United States 
government, the public is invited to see the government as obstructing a “truth” that is expressed in the 
article by “historians” who say that genocide was committed. Also, by putting the name of the bill in the 







Therefore, if in actuality the scholars are operating under the influence of American 
power holders, then the scholars will be made even more effective agents of American 
soft power thanks to the negative portrayal of the American government. By the narration 
of this influential American newspaper, both the party that is presented as lacking 
credibility, the United States government, and the party that is presented as credible, the 
genocide scholars, are of utility in leading the public to the desired soft-power effect, 
which is a certain belief about “genocide.” The power holders’ own government can be 
presented as fallible,103 or even untrustworthy, if it means that such a presentation would 
bestow genocide scholars with a high level of credibility and, thereby, with the ability to 
disseminate information toward the desired beliefs, without it being public knowledge 
that this is done in accordance with governing interests.104  
Since credibility is a key component of a successful soft-power effort, soft-power 
material is effective when produced by nongovernmental sources of information. As 
awkward as it might be for scholars to acknowledge their role as agents of soft power,105 
they—as experts—are positioned to become trusted sources of knowledge. It has been 
                                                          
103 The ability of a government to lead to desired soft-power effects by depicting itself as fallible calls into 
question the accuracy in Robert Gilpin’s decision to settle for the concept of “prestige” in the effort to sum 
up the “psychological and frequently incalculable aspects of power and international relations.” See: 
Gilpin, War, 30-31. Also, Niall Ferguson supposes that soft power is designed to make people “love the 
United States more.” See: Niall Ferguson, “Think Again: Power,” Foreign Policy 134 (January-February 
2003): 21. This presentation of soft power fails to consider that “love” may also be a means to an end, and 
that American interests might be served by implicit or explicit criticism of the American government. 
 
104 This tactic can be described as manipulative, being that it is a “deliberate and successful effort to 
influence the response of another where the desired response has not been explicitly communicated to the 
other constitutes manipulation.” See: Wrong, Power, 28.  
 
105 Nye mentions nongovernmental organizations as having their own soft power. See: Nye, Future, 83. 
This means that he views such organizations, and those who operate within them, as independent power 






established that the views of experts have power over public opinion.106 Their very 
occupation as academic practitioners calls for the production of knowledge, and therefore 
their body of work is widely seen as authoritative information while not readily suspected 
of having a confirmation bias in service of a politically desired outcome. Consequently, it 
has been recommended that the government would make use of experts in its efforts to 
control information: 
Government can partially circumvent these problems [of conspiracy theories] if it 
enlists credible independent experts in the effort to rebut the theories. There is a 
tradeoff between credibility and control, however. The price of credibility is that 
government cannot be seen to control the independent experts. Although 
government can supply these independent experts with information and perhaps 
prod them into action from behind the scenes, too close a connection will prove 
self-defeating if it is exposed—as witnessed in the humiliating disclosures 
showing that apparently independent opinions on scientific and regulatory 
questions were in fact paid for by think-tanks with ties to the Bush 
administration.107 
 
This potential of service by an expert for the government means that there is incentive for 
government to empower experts.  
 Education and the press frame discourses that give experts the ability to affect 
public opinion, who, in turn, make the discourses more believable. Thus, the power 
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107 Sunstein and Vermeule, “Conspiracy,” 223. Also, it is conceivable that a similar function may apply to 
public figures, who are known worldwide due to their high status in cultural niches as the performing arts, 
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government can be used to influence public opinion regarding political issues. Examples are provided by 
the publicized views of George Clooney and the Dalai Lama on genocide. See: Caryn James, “A Movie 
Star for All Eras, Even the Present,” New York Times, January 6, 2008; Somini Sengupta, “Dalai Lama 
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relations that are inherent in the ability of power holders to control the information that is 
available for power subjects becomes less pronounced when the information consists of 
seemingly neutral and credible knowledge. In his study of education as a form of cultural 
imperialism, Martin Carnoy finds that the presentation of schooling as a liberating force 
is in practice “a necessary prerequisite for nations to participate with the developed 
countries in the world project of material advancement.”108 A search on ProQuest for 
either “expert” or “experts” in titles of articles published by the NYT in the decade 
between 2000 and 2010 shows a total of 1,514 results.109 A theory known as nudge, 
which makes the case for the subtle and skillful use of power to affect people’s daily 
choices, sees the expert as a “choice architect” because of the ability to employ expertise 
to frame the context in which people make their decisions, and through these experts it is 
possible to alter “people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives.”110 Through the infrastructure of 
education and the press, the genocide scholars are presented as experts, though the 
precise nature of their expertise is not self-explanatory. Genocide scholars make 
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Almost three decades later, James L. Hevia examines a specific case of cultural imperialism, which he 
describes as imperial pedagogy, in the British treatment of nineteenth-century China. Hevia describes the 
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109 See: ProQuest, “ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times,” 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/advanced?accountid=14677 (accessed, 1/23/2017). These 
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determinations about the use of the genocide label without legal sanction but with public 
approval because they are empowered in the information that is generated.  
 The framing of a discourse is soft power’s most basic mode of operation in its 
treatment of public opinion, and the creation of the genocide field of study is an example 
of a carefully framed platform. Erving Goffman describes social frameworks as “guided 
doings.”111 Framing comes equipped with rhetorical devices that encourage a particular 
manner through which words and contexts are to be interpreted.112 While it is shared 
knowledge that governments have their preferred frames, there is scarce public 
information on how political framing is carried out through academia. Framing is a core 
method of soft power, and it is commonly applied in efforts to influence public opinion 
toward a desired governance. 
However, framing cannot be a method of legal power. It can lead public opinion 
to support the existence of legal procedure in indirect ways, but it cannot be used to 
determine the outcome of legal procedure. The genocide scholarship has promoted the 
idea of international criminal law, but its continued ability to shape the discourse about 
“genocide” is an abuse of international criminal law. It frames the discourse in an 
academic guise,113 and then the popularity of its discourse carries over to framing the 
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legal procedure. When the framing of the genocide discourse is connected to the 
advancement of power holders’ interests in a manner that intensifies conflict between 
member states, then it is the kind of soft power that might affect public opinion but does 
not gain legal power.  
 Soft power in and of itself is neutral: its effects are not inherently good or bad.114 
However, by its very essence, as a manner in which power manifests itself, its effects are 
linked to interests. A power-based approach to the study of “genocide” will view the 
term’s history within the context of international law as an idea that was based on hard 
power, and will see the origination and development of “genocide” as the effort of soft 
power.115 An expansive power-based study of the history of “genocide” will shed light on 
how “genocide” is employed as soft power to frame the knowledge that is consumed by 
the public; how the control of information affects public opinion in a variety of locations; 
how the affected public opinion pushes for legislation in state law; how legislation in 
state law affects what is considered to be common knowledge regardless of evidence; and 
how the sum of common knowledge in many nation-states creates a sense of an 
                                                          
Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), 5. It is here argued that the genocide scholarship offers all of these. Furthermore, it is 
considered that by adding claims of “genocide denial” to its claims of “genocide,” the genocide scholarship 
shields its framed discourse by excluding others from the conversation without calling attention to its 
dominance of information: the “other” who is trying to add a dissenting voice is portrayed within the 
framed discourse as an immoral intruder.  
 
114 This follows Nye’s view of soft power as a concept that is descriptive rather than normative. Its specific 
purpose is determined by the power holder in a particular situation. See: Nye, Future, 81. 
 
115 Michel Foucault’s work on power and knowledge will not be used here, mainly because his rhetoric is 
not relatable to this work’s focus on particular power holders and their effect on international politics. For 
instance, Foucault writes of “history” as an actor and assigns to it verbs such as to undertake, to transform, 
and to decipher, as if to suggest that “history” is an actor in history. See: Michel Foucault, Archeology of 
Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 2003), 7. The presentation of history as an 







international consensus. This international consensus is such that certain perspectives are 
considered to be factual when at their core they are in accordance with the interests of 
American power holders but in tension with the interests of rival power holders.  
 The abuse of “genocide” as a legal term calls for an effort to conceptualize 
international law more effectively.116 Even though the idea of international law was 
birthed by hard power and has been given its image by soft power, the execution of 
international law cannot continue to be dominated by American soft power and expect 
worldwide legitimacy. The very first featured article of the American Journal of 
International Law (AJIL) in 1907, which was written by Elihu Root who at the time was 
both the United States secretary of state and the founding president of the American 
Society of International Law (ASIL), was dedicated to the idea that international law has 
to be popularized,117 and this objective was accentuated during WWI, when Root’s 
following statement was quoted by the NYT:   
Many States have grown so great that there is no power capable of imposing 
punishment upon them, except the power of the collective civilization outside of 
the offending State. Any exercise of that power must be based upon the public 
opinion. Without such an opinion behind it no punishment of any kind can be 
imposed for the violation of international law.118  
 
During the intense power struggle with Germany, and the pronounced unpopularity of 
international law among German power holders, there was an apparent need to advance 
international law through greater emphasis on soft power. However, much has changed 
                                                          
116 It has been suggested that international law lacks, or is on the verge of, an adequate theoretical 
formulation. See: O’Connell, “Role,” 52; D’Amato, Concept, xi; B. S. Chimni, International Law and 
World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 15, 17. 
 
117 Elihu Root, “The Need of Popular Understanding of International Law,” American Journal of 
International Law 1, no. 1, (January-April 1907): 1-3. 
 






since then, and now international law seems to be at a stage of progression where the 
acceptance of it as an idea is less of a concern than the approval of its execution.  
Mindful of the costly conflict with German power, Root’s project of international 
law was based on the premise that “The public opinion of mankind is so mighty a force 
that it is competent to control the conduct of nations as the public opinion of the 
community controls the conduct of individuals.”119 The function of the genocide 
discourse as a tool for directing public opinion toward the popularization of international 
law is in keeping with Root’s vision, but he was also aware that the progress of 
international law is a long and gradual process: 
The process will be slow, but all advance of civilization is slow. Not what 
ultimate object we can attain in our short lives, but what tendencies towards 
higher standards of conduct in the world we can aid during our generation, is the 
test that determines our duty of service. The conditions which will hinder and 
delay effective action for the re-establishment of law are many and serious, but 
we must prepare.120  
 
It seems likely that as a professional lawyer Root recognized the difference between a 
judicial system that is supported by public opinion and one that is run through it. The rule 
of law does not allow for the control of the judicial system through the control of public 
opinion. In international law, as in domestic law, the separation of powers has to be 
visible. For the separation of powers to be visible, the source of power has to be clearly 
stated. In contrast, soft power is in full swing when one has the ability to capitalize on 
another’s inability to connect between power and outcome, and the influence of 
information on public opinion is a fertile ground for it.    
                                                          








A different form of power is required in order for international law to gain the 
status of a separate power in world politics. The recognition of legal power’s significant 
quality requires a mental switch through which international law changes from an arena 
for inter-national power struggles to a habitat for the exertion of power toward the orderly 
governance of all people. Unlike individual subjects of domestic law, member states of 
the United Nations may simply reject aspects of international law of which they are not 
convinced or even seek to withdraw from the international community. This means that 
while public opinion may advance the popularity of international law among the people, 
the governments of existing nation-states would be more likely to cooperate if they are 
considered as equal partners in the governance of world affairs rather than as part of the 
public. The idea of international law might be American, but its execution has to be 
international.   
 
Legal Power and International Law  
Legal power is a heightened form of hard power, which includes soft power’s 
effects within it, but not the continued application of soft power as such. It is to exist in 
international law as the product of a dialectical progress. First, international law was 
made possible by the particular hard-power conditions that were established by the 
struggle between nation-states, and it came into being as a facilitator of hegemonic 
interests to maintain a status quo in power relations. Then, it turned into the subject of 
soft-power promotion while creating channels through which norms that are agreeable to 
the dominant power may be effectively spread and absorbed. Finally, as international law 





language through the term genocide, it is to be examined how this development stands in 
relation to legal power. Law’s form of power is an evolved manifestation of the original 
hard-power circumstances that still owes itself to the effects of soft power, but is driven 
by its own quality to reject soft-power operations according to narrow inter-national 
interests, and, instead, generate global governing solutions. 
 International law’s legitimate authority is based on hard power’s internalization of 
soft power’s mission, toward the aim of consent to be coerced,121 but without the political 
reasoning that caused the project of international law to move forward in the first place, 
for such a reasoning is steeped in inter-national bias. According to Kelsen, the idea that 
all states have given their consent to customary international law is “a political fiction,” 
and certain states might find themselves bound by international norms without having 
participated in interaction to establish them.122 The attainment of consent in international 
law involves a set of conditions that are vastly different from how consent is reached in 
state law, and therefore the study of it could benefit from an innovation in the relevant 
terminology. In identifying three dimensions of an international regime’s “organizational-
design,” John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil point at the significance of transparency 
and legitimation, as well as the epistemic reality of international organizations that are 
used as vehicles through which the international agenda of certain nation-states passes as 
                                                          
121 The legitimation of power by “the consent of the governed” is said to characterize the success of state 
government in the West, and that “Much of modern political philosophy is a search for the conditions that 
make a government based on consent possible.” This implies an agreement that “governments must rule by 
laws that are rational and consistent.” See: Calleo, Follies, 128. In the international setting, the engine of 
rationality and consistency is the courtroom to a greater extent than in the state, for the legal discourse is to 
be developed there before it can have its impact on the style of lawmaking.  
 






knowledge.123 Thus, it is proposed here that clarity of mind might be served well by 
highlighting the following qualities in the dialectical relations within international law: 
the apparentness of hard power, the invisibility of soft power, and the transparency of 
legal power.  
 By seeing the dialectical progress as that which proceeds from the apparent, 
through the invisible, toward the transparent, it becomes clear that the properties of legal 
power are different from those of what Nye calls smart power. The idea of smart power 
holds on to the perspective of the great power in the midst of an inter-national 
competition as “the combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft 
power of persuasion and attraction.”124 Legal power does not represent the sum of hard 
power and soft power, but rather a separate and unique quality that is created by the 
process in which each cancels the other. Legal power is a form of hard power that is still 
committed to coercion, and that—having experienced the contrastive quality of soft 
power—maintains the commitment to achieving consent, but seeks to establish consent 
without hiding its coercive abilities. It is not simply the ability to have others do what 
they otherwise might not do, but rather it is the ability to do on behalf of governing what 
otherwise could not be done. 
 The concept of legal power presents a vision of a one-way fungibility. This is so 
because of its diffuse quality. While legal power might lead to its own effects on hard 
power and soft power, it is nevertheless a power that is severed from its original holders. 
                                                          
123 John Gerard Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art 
of the State,” International Organization 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 772.  
 
124 Nye, Future, xiii. Moreover, Nye explains that the purpose for the development of “smart power” was in 






This means that those in whose interest different power resources were transferred into 
international law might enjoy the effects of legal power but cannot treat it as a power 
resource that is under their control. In order for legal power to be maintained, it cannot be 
undone or re-sorted. Logically, it is a separate power that cannot be unseparated, similar 
to how an omelet cannot be converted into eggs. While legal power centralizes the 
judicial ability to govern world affairs, it is set to decentralize the source of power in 
inter-national politics. Thus, it motions in one direction as it carries power from inter-
national purposes to worldwide governor-to-governed purposes.  
 This repurposing of power elevates it to a higher level of responsibility.125 A 
culture in which the role of evidence ascends as a prerequisite for integrity126 may 
generate its own norms,127 which will be both advanced and preserved as the legal 
language grows.128 In this manner, legal language will have its constructive effect on 
                                                          
125 It has been suggested that “Law endows power with authority and prestige,” and “elevates power from 
the position of a brute-fact to that of a value-charged fact.” See: Nathan Rotenstreich, Order and Might 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 42. Rotenstreich provides a concise phrasing of the 
relationship between law and power: “Law grants power a meaningful status of authority and power grants 
law a factual foundation of enforcement.” Ibid., 43.  
 
126 A “principle of inclusive integrity” is embedded in the “concrete interpretations” of judges. This quality 
distinguishes adjudication from legislation. See: Dworkin, Law’s, 410.   
 
127 Johnstone refers to the legal discourse as “a form of productive power,” which is also what the 
discourses of soft power are considered to be. His view on the legal discourse does not offer a theoretical 
framework for a distinction between the legal discourse and the discourse that is generated by the genocide 
scholarship. See: Johnstone, “Power,” 186. However, the primacy of procedure, evidence, and 
contextualization, in the legal discourse is unmatched in soft power discourses such as that of the genocide 
scholarship: “If judges disagree over the actual, historical events in controversy, we know what they are 
disagreeing about and what kind of evidence would put the issue to rest if it were available.” See: Dworkin, 
Law’s, 3.  
 
128 By “legal language,” the meaning is the production of communication by the judiciary rather than the 
legal-styled communication between state diplomats as official representatives of their state interests. It has 
been pointed out that “much of the content of intergovernmental communications is self-consciously 
grounded in legal terminology,” and that it constitutes a “legal language.” See: D’Amato, “Is,” 1301. 
However, here, “legal language” relates to a discourse by the actual legal profession that from its quality as 






world governance as it successfully had in the development of federal law in the United 
States. Tocqueville’s description of what was effective in the American inter-state system 
could be applied in an inter-national system, if powered toward such an outcome:  
The language of the law thus becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the 
spirit of the law which is produced in the schools and courts of justice, gradually 
penetrated beyond their walls into the bosom of society where it descends to the 
lowest classes, so that at least the whole people contract the habits and the states 
of the judicial magistrate.129  
 
The popularization of the legal language is the destination of international law, but the 
negotiation between national identities and unified standards of governance is a delicate 
matter. Unlike the American states in the United States, nation-states are motivated to 
blend identity with sovereignty. While the use of “genocide” as a legally sanctioned 
punishable crime is designed to protect national identities, it might be that the protection 
of “national identity” from informational abuse in the legal language is a prerequisite for 
international law to attain a universally legitimate authority. For the approval of 
worldwide governing standards to become an overarching identity itself, the execution of 
the law—upon its moral assumptions—must be free from national identity-based interests 
and prejudice, and also avoid the exaggerated or false assignment of nonpolitical group 
identity markers to those who are involved in political conflicts.  
 However, the term genocide interlocks the protection of conceptual and cultural 
group identities with the legal language, and, thus, it inherently injects subjective 
elements of soft power into international law. Meaning, “genocide” is not just a tool of 
soft power in the sense of its promotional quality as an attractive term that popularizes 
the idea of international criminal law in public opinion, but it is also a tool of soft power 
                                                          






by providing avenues for discourses about group identity to shape the execution of law. 
Due to the popular usage of genocide, the group identity of an alleged victim is not 
necessarily defined in reflection of the assailant’s view of the victim’s identity but 
according to the wishes of those who have the power to construct the public discourse 
about a publicized event of mass violence. In other words, common usage of the term 
genocide has the power to encourage and perpetuate a politicization of group identities 
that is not conducive to the culture of law that is supposed to unite them under the 
promise of effective governance. This dissertation shows how in recent cases the 
genocide discourse was solidified by the introduction of language that emphasizes 
divisions between political groups in ethnic terms and generates public belief in 
assumptions about intent to destroy groups as such.      
Legitimate authority is spoken in a language of already shared norms and values, 
but only when these are fixed as laws and no longer subject to soft-power designs. Such 
is the language of legal power: it is defined by comprehensiveness rather than persuasion. 
The legal language has the effect of capturing existing norms as they are and crystallizing 
them. Legitimate authority echoes and stays when the language is of equality and 
stability. When power is focused on order-making rather than conflict perpetuation, and 
the conversation is based on procedure, evidence, and contextualization, before judgment 
and moral justification,130 then power becomes accountable, steadied, and tidied. 
Following its legal culture, the process of legalization in international law, which lacks 
formal centralization, will adopt norms through legal power rather than soft power. Thus, 
while hard power remains apparent, with its inequality in distribution and its possibility 
                                                          






of war, still, through legal power’s transparent quality, the ability of governments to 




It is seen that a power-based approach to the phenomenon of “genocide” has roots 
in political science. The genocide field of study engages, by definition, in the assignment 
of a legal term that denotes a serious crime, which is typically related to members of a 
government. This has an impact on international relations, especially on those nation-
states who are directly implicated or related to the accusations in some manner. Such a 
political project has carried itself through a moralistic discourse without publicly 
recognizing its own source of power and the interests it serves by affecting public opinion 
on matters regarding how world affairs are being governed. In the field of genocide 
studies, academia hosts an overt agenda to politicize past and present events, and a 
disregard for the legal profession. The assignments of the genocide label that are made by 
genocide scholars are nonsanctioned yet they influence public opinion to the extent of 
affecting legislation and judgments.  
Therefore, it is the task of the political scientist to identify the power of 
“genocide” as it relates to the term’s ability to affect governance globally, and as it relates 
to the power behind its origination, development, and maturation. The premise of 
political science is to examine phenomena according to their governing utility and 
effects, and it warrants an approach to the field of genocide that the genocide scholarship 





terminological treatment of power as a political concept is found to be most helpful in the 
endeavor to place “genocide” in a theoretical framework of political science. While hard 
power explains the conditions that inspired international law and the term genocide 
within its context, soft power explains how “genocide” was used both to promote the idea 
of international law among the nation-states and to control how it is used. A new concept 
of legal power is proposed, as a power that is formed from within the judicial 
performance of international law, to make the claim that the governing utility and effects 
of “genocide” within international law depend on the dialectical progress of hard power 
through soft power toward legal power.  
The study of the history of “genocide” within international law from a power-
based standpoint is set to offer an opportunity to apply this conceptualization and become 
acquainted with its ability to elucidate the state of international law: first, by studying the 
power-based reasoning behind the push for international law and the advent of the term 
genocide; then, by considering the power-based reasoning behind the particular uses of 
“genocide” outside of the legal domain; and finally, by examining the tension between 
the legal and nonlegal usages that has been building up since the term’s ratification by the 
United States led to opportunities for legal power to manifest itself in competent 
courtrooms but also to an increase in the use of “genocide” by agents of soft power. The 
question regarding the use of the term genocide is critical for understanding the 
performance of international law. The envisioning of legal power as a broker between 
governor and governed stands as an opposing element to soft power’s serviceability as a 
tool of narrow interests in international politics. For governments to regulate power 





CHAPTER 4  
 
THE INITIATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870s-1944 
 
“Genocide” is a term that came into being within the development of international 
law. The cultivation of international law, as that of domestic law, is based on conditions 
of hard power and has been carried out by those who seek to maintain their relative 
advantage in the possession of this power. To understand the meaning, origin, and 
purpose, of the term genocide, it is necessary to know the modern history of international 
law as driven by power considerations. As a prerequisite to the task of unfolding the story 
of the term genocide from a power-based approach, the following critical questions are to 
be addressed: What characterizes the concept of international law in modern times? Who 
wanted to initiate international law? Why was international law wanted? What is the 
history of international law according to those who seek to promote it? What is the 
connection between international law and major events in recent history such as the 
world wars? What is considered to be progress in international law? How is international 
law in a predicament due to the relationship between of morality and power? How is 
international law shaped by the complex dialogue between ethnic and civic elements of 
governance in national and international politics? This chapter considers these themes 
and is divided into sections that range from the circumstances in which international law 





in the 1870s to the occasion in which the term genocide was introduced to the public in 
1944. It is designed to shed light on the current status of “genocide” in international law 
by pointing out the power that initiated the project of order between nations and how this 
agenda necessitated work toward linking identity groups with political purpose.  
 
The Balancing of Power in Europe 
Prior to the push for international law, the balancing of power in Europe was a 
highly regarded policy. It was given life when Britain was trying to keep its hard-power 
superiority in relation to the potential rival powers in Europe from which it was removed 
by sea. The concept of balancing power is currently regarded in academia mainly as a 
general realist theory within the study of IR,1 but its original popularity in modern times 
is due to Britain’s specific situation as a powerful political entity that is just outside of the 
European landmass. Chief among its traits were the geographical separation from Europe 
and the technological ability to dominate the seas. During the days of Britain’s thriving 
imperial position, before the rise of France’s power under Napoleon Bonaparte, David 
Hume’s essay in 1752, “Of the Balance of Power,” called attention to the difference 
between the balance of power as an idea that was already considered in ancient history 
and as a phrase that was becoming used in British political circles.2 To him, it was 
important to warn those who were leading Britain’s foreign affairs and seemed to focus 
                                                          
1 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian 
Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 141. 
 
2 Hume, “Balance,” 1:348. To him, “the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on 
common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, 
where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment.” See: Ibid., 352. 
While the idea was by no means a new one, its exact usage in Britain, which turned it into a basic item in 






more on achievements in faraway places like America and India that it would be “totally 
careless and supine with regard to the fate of Europe,” if Britain were to neglect 
European affairs by failing to take sides in its contests.3 Britain, as did the United States 
government to an even greater extent in later years, was able to maintain a power 
advantage over European governments by exerting influence toward an equilibrium 
between the powers of Europe, which would thereby challenge each other and restrain 
each other’s ability to dominate the governance of the continent. 
 When France presented a threatening force throughout Europe in the early 
nineteenth century, Britain’s efforts to perform an offshore balancing of power in the 
continent were given a German voice through the internationally recognized publicist, 
Friedrich von Getz, who exclaimed “That if ever a European state attempted by unlawful 
enterprizes [sic] to attain to a degree of power (or had in fact attained it,) which enabled it 
to defy the danger of a union of several of its neighbours, or even an alliance of the 
whole, such a state should be treated as a common enemy,”4 and thus lent support to 
British interests in the name of preserving “the states system of Europe.”5 Through his 
work, the balance of power in Europe was promoted as if it were a European rather than a 
British maxim, namely that “no one of its members must ever become so powerful as to 
be able to coerce all the rest put together,”6 because of its ruinous consequences. This is 
reflective of a British soft-power effort to convince those who neighbored France in the 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 355. 
 
4 Friedrich von Gentz, Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe, translated from German (London: 
M. Peltier, 1806), 62. 
 








continent that it was politically wise to oppose any rising power from within Europe. The 
French dramatization of how a failure to maintain a balance of power could disrupt 
Britain’s global interests elevated the notion of balancing power in Europe to a great 
height in British political consciousness.    
 Britain’s experience of the Napoleonic challenge furthered the articulation of its 
design for Europe. In 1803, the same year that Britain went to war against France, Henry 
Brougham, who would later serve as lord chancellor, wrote that Britain’s consideration of 
interference “with those concerns of its neighbours” is “different” because “she is, by 
nature, insulated from the rest of Europe.”7 In the face of an “awful crisis,” he urged 
Britain’s diplomats to not only increase “internal resources” but “constantly look also 
from home” because “each state forms a part of the general system.”8 Following the 
Napoleonic Wars, it was acknowledged in Britain that “the consolidation of the continent 
into one vast empire would in the end be fatal to its independence,”9 and that the “best 
policy” for the government of the British Isles is “to establish and preserve a steady 
balance” between the European powers.10 As indicated in the statement that “Nations 
would probably degenerate without occasional war,”11 the outsider’s project of balancing 
power in Europe, to keep its peoples from consolidating into one powerful unit, exceeded 
the mere support of the weak against the strong as a balancing act and extended to the 
                                                          
7 Brougham, Historical, 14. 
 
8 Ibid., 50.  
 
9 Leckie, Historical, vii. 
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encouragement of split group identities and interstate rivalries even if it led to armed 
conflict. 
 By the 1870s, the British idea of stifling the growth of a European power before it 
becomes hegemonic required an upgraded strategy and received an American innovation. 
From a soft-power perspective, it was no longer seen as effective to accuse a conquering 
state of unlawfulness without the backing of an actual legal framework. Despite the later 
endeavors to dichotomize the balance of power and international law,12 the 
unprecedented circling of international law in the 1870s around the concept of arbitration 
sought to bring into regulated practice the core idea behind balancing power. The rallying 
of European states against a dominant European empire was based on the ability to 
persuade them “that nations, like individuals, have their duties as well as their rights, and 
that the neglect of one, or carelessness in regard to the other, is sure, sooner or later, to 
meet with punishment.”13 Germany’s unification in 1871 demanded a more persuasive 
brand of balancing; its very existence signaled that, possibly, what the traditional policy 





                                                          
12 Shortly after WWI, the balance of power was depicted as a “general idea” that stood in contrast to the 
efforts of the League of Nations toward international law. See: Pollard, “Balance,” 51. This distinction was 
promoted by the association of war-making capacities with the balance of power, and peace-making efforts 
with the League of Nations, even though both share the same purpose of creating an environment in which 
no hegemonic power would take over Europe. For instance, see: Ibid., 63.    
 
13 Frederic Maurice, The Balance of Military Power in Europe: An Examination of the War Resources of 






The Unification of Germany 
Following “a thousand years of chequered life,”14 the German nation grew from 
the muffled heartbeat of the Holy Roman Empire to a large unified body at the center of 
the European continent. While the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 solidified the governing 
of territories by the German princes and enhanced political influence on the German 
population,15 in the late eighteenth century the Reich was still divided into hundreds of 
small states.16 It was both the arrival and departure of the French that instigated a major 
change: the Napoleonic rule introduced reforms in bureaucracy that centralized German 
governance;17 the liberation from this foreign rule presented an exciting moment for the 
collective, as such, and inspired an interpretation of patriotic acts as national feelings.18 
This was complemented by the recovery of territories through the Congress of Vienna in 
1815, and in effect served a vital transitional role from the phase of “agrarian revolution” 
to the phase of “economic prosperity,” which meant that Germans were situated to 
translate modernity and rationality “to an immense increase in productive efficiency.”19 
As the basis for German union was put in place, aptitude created an appetite for power 
growth. 
                                                          
14 William Harbutt Dawson, The German Empire: 1867-1914 and the Unity Movement, vol. 1 (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1919), 1.  
 
15 Ibid.  
 
16 Eric Dorn Brose, German History 1789-1871: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich 
(Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 4.  
 
17 Ibid., 54-55. 
 
18 Ibid., 74. 
 
19 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, trans. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg 






 Power in Europe appeared to have become drastically and increasingly 
imbalanced in 1871. After a long process in which a fragmented rural society became an 
industrial and industrious nation, the Germans showcased their advancement in three 
victories in just six years.20 The wars were significant because of the results’ meaning but 
also because of what the German style of fighting spelled for the future of Europe and 
beyond. After the defeat of Denmark in 1864, Germany’s war against Austria left a 
reverberating impression. It is said that “Modern technology had gone to war for the first 
time in 1866, and nothing would ever be quite the same again.”21 This technology 
sparked a staggering leap of capability in mobility and weaponry. The combined 
incorporation of the railway system and advanced artillery into its military strategy 
revolutionized the use of infantry in combat.22 In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the 
Germans were able to speedily move a great force of 800,000 soldiers,23 besiege Paris 
within a fortnight,24 and take a rich territory from France, including 1,600,000 of its 
population.25 The efficiency with which the Germans covered ground made conquest and 
commercial influence much more attainable objectives. Suddenly, the Anglo-American 
superiority at sea was countered by an astounding German application of the ability to 
traverse land. Thus, Germany’s hard power illustrated that “Machines made their own 
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21 Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany 
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1975), 226.  
 
22 Ibid., 14-15.  
 
23 Dawson, German, 364. 
 
24 Brose, German, 364. 
 






laws,”26 and marked the void of any other law among nations.   
Even though the birth of the German Empire, which was made official in 
Versailles on January 18, 1871, is commonly viewed in relation to the two world wars,27 
the Anglo-American historiographical discourse mainly suggests that its rise was met by 
a lack of interest.28 Furthermore, while the policy of maintaining a balance of power in 
Europe is offered as an explanation why during the Palmerstonian years Britain valued 
German strength as conducive to keeping both France and Russia in check,29 the 
eagerness with which international law was presented before the Anglo-American public 
following 1871 is absent from the mainstream literature on the circumstances that led to 
WWI. It is maintained that “The significance of these changes was to be seen only at a 
later date,”30 but, in actuality, the reaction in the United States to the rise of the German 
entity in Europe was rather immediate. The seeds of an international law were planted 
just as these winds of change began to blow strongly from across the Atlantic Ocean.    
International law as a manifestation of American power began with a pair of 
synchronous American responses to the formative wars that the Germans had against 
Austria and France. David Dudley Field, an American expert on the codification of law 
who was instrumental in the reform and reconstruction of how the United States 
                                                          
26 Showalter, Railroads, 47.  
 
27 As Showalter puts it, this German state twice “challenged Europe and the world,” and “Historians 
seeking the origins of the Third Reich are paying more and more attention to the nature of Bismarck’s 
Germany.” See: Ibid., 9.  
 
28 For instance, see: Dawson, German, 291. Dawson even claims that “Germany was herself to blame for 
the indifference which was felt towards her.” See: Ibid., 296. 
 
29 Ibid., 294, 358.  
 






government administered its legal affairs at a time when it had still followed English 
common law under the influence of its colonial history,31 initiated the push for the 
codification of international law. Following the conclusion in 1866 of the German 
triumph against the Austrians, by the start of September the North German states agreed 
to form a confederation,32 and in that same month, “At the meeting of the British 
Association for the Promotion of Social Science, held at Manchester,” Field proposed 
“the appointment of a committee to prepare and report to the Association the Outlines of 
an International Code.”33 Then, only a few months after the Germans instituted the 
imperial constitution on May 4, 1871, to cap off their stunning victory against the 
French,34 Field’s lengthy outlines of over 450 pages for international codification were 
published as both a draft and a book in a hurry, and without the input of other committee 
members under the claim of convenience.35 The profoundly significant and previously 
nonexistent aspect of international law that was featured in Field’s work in 1872 was the 
notion that a “High Tribunal of Arbitration” was to be formed and that every nation as a 
party to the code would be bound by the tribunal’s decisions.36 
                                                          
31 Henry M. Field, The Life of David Dudley Field (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1898), vii-xi. 
 
32 Dawson, German, 262. 
 
33 David Dudley Field, Outlines of an International Code (New York: Diossy & Company, 1872), i. 
Interestingly, it was anticipated that “The year 1866 will be memorable in history as that in which two 
hemispheres were united, so that it could be said, in a real and true sense, that there was no more sea!” It 
was further commented that “The honor of that great achievement belongs to an American.” See: Field, 
Life, 219. However, since the time of this text much had happened to direct those who hold power over 
historiographical production to prefer not to highlight the timing or the American source of the project.  
 
34 Wehler, German, 52.  
 
35 Field, Outlines, i-ii.  
 







In the Anglo-American literature on the history of international law, it is taught 
that the concept of a law among nations is observed in the dealings of rulers in ancient 
times before the advent of monotheism;37 was reflected as an aspiration in the Hebrew 
Bible;38 shares an affinity with the Greek ability to inspire cohesion under a common 
cultural denominator;39 and was blueprinted by the Romans.40 Among a list of notable 
early contributors to the idea of international law, the father of international law is said to 
be a non-American and a noncontemporary: Hugo Grotius, a Dutch publicist whose work 
on the law of war and peace, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), appeared during the Thirty 
Years’ War (1618-1648) and is associated with the Peace of Westphalia at the conclusion 
of the war.41 It is also noted that Jeremy Bentham was the one who coined “international 
                                                          
37 Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (New York: Century, 1924), 7. 
 
38 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, 4th ed., ed. Arnold D. McNair (London: 
Longmans, Green, 1926), 1:57. 
 
39 Fenwick, International, 10; Oppenheim, International, 4th ed., 1:58. 
 
40 Fenwick, International, 11-13; Oppenheim, International, 4th ed., 1:61. 
 
41 For instances in which Grotius is described as the father of international law (or the law of nations), see: 
Amos S. Hershey, “History of International Law since the Peace of Westphalia,” American Journal of 
International Law 6, no. 1 (January 1912): 31; Fenwick, International, 50; Oppenheim, International, 4th 
ed., 1:68; G. Howard-Ellis, The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1928), 270. For examples in which Grotius’ work is incorporated into the discourse on 
international law, see: Andrew Carnegie, A League of Peace: A Rectorial Address, Delivered to the 
Students in the University of St. Andrews, 17th October, 1905 (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1906), 13; 
Antonio S. de Bustamante, “The Hague Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
and Persons in Land Warfare,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (January 1908): 95; James 
Brown Scott, “The Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 4 
(October 1908), 803; Julius Goebel Jr., “The International Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained by 
Aliens on Account of Mob Violence, Insurrections and Civil Wars,” American Journal of International 
Law 8, no. 4 (October 1914): 802; Elihu Root, “The Outlook for International Law,” American Journal of 
International Law 10, no. 1 (January 1916): 10; Leonard S. Woolf, International Government: Two Reports 
(London: Fabian Society, 1916), 12; James Brown Scott, “Society for the Publication of Grotius,” 
American Journal of International Law 11, no. 2 (April 1917): 409; George Grafton Wilson and George 
Fox Tucker, International Law, 7th ed. (Boston: Silver, Burdett and Company, 1917), 31-32; Simeon E. 
Baldwin, “The Membership of a World Tribunal for Promoting Permanent Peace,” American Journal of 





law” as a term in 1789.42 The last of the major non-American historical marks in this 
context, the Geneva Convention, was signed on August 22, 1864, while the Germans and 
the Danes were locked in battle, and presents a European affair in modernity that sought 
to establish rules of conduct for wars.43 However, both the harnessing of great hard-
power resources toward a permanent source of arbitration at the core of international law 
and the dedication of sophisticated soft-power means toward its realization were without 
example in history until 1871. As part of this study’s commitment to understand the 
meaning of “genocide” in international law through a power-based approach, it focuses 
on the period from the 1870s to WWI not because of any claim that the idea of 
international law started then but because the source of power that produced the term 
                                                          
International Law and the Relation of the Doctrine to the Treaty of Versailles,” American Journal of 
International Law 14, no. 4 (October 1920): 563; Elbridge Colby, “How to Fight Savage Tribes,” American 
Journal of International Law 21, no. 2 (April 1927): 280; J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An 
Introduction to the International Law of Peace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 19. In a more recent work 
by a scholar of international law, it is stated that “while Hugo Grotius is generally regarded as the principal 
forerunner of modern international law, historians of the discipline trace its primitive origins to the works 
of Francisco de Vitoria, a sixteenth-century Spanish theologian and jurist.” See: Antony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: University of Cambridge 
Press, 2005), 13. In this manner, not only does the positioning of Grotius in the history of international law 
become reified in the discourse of international law scholarship, but it is also suggested that international 
law had an even earlier beginning. Such a narration leads the public away from seeing the construction of 
international law as a project that originated among lawyers who were associated with the American 
political leadership. Anghie presents Vitoria’s sixteenth-century question regarding the property rights of 
aborigines as the first among his studied cases of the “civilizing mission” through international law. See: 
Ibid., 18. By doing so, he detaches the history of international law from following a power-based 
theoretical approach that understands “international law” as a project that was constructed according to 
particular capabilities and interests. The thread of power that runs from the 1870s to the modern-day 
infrastructure of international law does not link, as such, to Vitoria or Grotius. The power-based approach 
that is taken by this dissertation also carries an understanding why the power holders of international law 
would want to depict instances that precede the 1870s as manifestations of international law to deflect 
attention: it preserves the soft-power condition of influencing indirectly.  
 
42 Ernest Nys, “The Codification of International Law,” trans. Clement L. Bouvé, American Journal of 
International Law 5, no. 4 (October 1911): 872 (note 1).  
 
43 For references to the Geneva Convention of 1864 in the foundational literature on international law, see: 
Henry B. Brown, “The Proposed International Prize Court,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 
3 (July 1908): 485; James W. Garner, International Law and the World War (London: Longmans, Green, 






genocide and organized the post-WWII structure of international law began to articulate 
its idea of international law in direct terms during this rise of German power in the 1870s. 
International law offered a strategic framework for the political containment of the 
German government.   
 On May 8, 1871, just four days after constitutional unity was reached in Berlin 
under Otto von Bismarck’s guidance, Britain and the United States signed a treaty that 
functioned as the first government-sanctioned draft of outlines toward the advancement 
of international arbitration.44 Considering the timing and the eventual effect of this 
monumental treaty, known as the Treaty of Washington, there is reason to be of 
conviction that its introduction of codes in which governments may settle disputes 
through arbitration greatly outweighs in significance the particulars of the dispute itself, 
which centered on the Alabama Claims.45 The actual “provisions for the settlement of 
arbitration” centered on the “injuries alleged to have been suffered by the United States” 
as a result of British involvement during the Civil War,46 and included in the wording that 
the successful reconciliation warranted a British recognition of its “obligations of 
neutrality” as “imposed on her by the law of nations.”47 Thus, what Field laid out in 
theory was concomitantly displayed in practice by the governments of Britain and the 
                                                          
44 Caleb Cushing, The Treaty of Washington: Its Negotiation, Execution, and the Discussions Relating 
Thereto (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1873), 13.  
 
45 Ibid., 15-16. Despite this, the American historiographical view of this treaty, as expressed during WWII, 
emphasizes the American grievances that the treaty addressed but disregards its designed significance in 
the development of international arbitration in connection to the growth of German power. See: Goldwin 
Smith, The Treaty of Washington, 1871: A Study in Imperial History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1941), xi, 12-13. 
 
46 Cushing, Treaty, 13.  
 
47 Ibid., 16. Other articles in the treaty provided a structure for other areas of potential contention such as 
“the permanent regulation of the coast fisheries” and “the reciprocal free navigation of certain rivers.” See: 





United States, and thereby an invitation by way of a set example was extended for other 
nations to follow suit. By 1875, James B. Miles led the efforts to co-opt the nations of 
Europe into engagement in the project through trips to the Hague, and the operations of 
the Institute of International Law and the Association for the Reform and Codification of 
the Law of Nations.48    
 The idea for a “league of nations,” which was turned into an actual organization 
by that name after WWI, is in actuality almost as old as this conceptualization of 
international arbitration itself, because it was believed that such a league was necessary in 
order to facilitate arbitration by serving in lieu of elected representatives in the direction 
of members to seek settlement through a permanent tribunal.49 From what the NYT 
brought into public awareness at the time, it is observed that there was an International 
League of Peace advocacy group in the 1880s, which acted toward a “permanent treaty of 
arbitration” in congruence with the official policy of United States President Rutherford 
B. Hayes to form a permanent source of arbitration with France.50 Moreover, in that same 
                                                          
48 For the text of the paper that Miles prepared for the international conference at The Hague in September 
of 1875, see: James B. Miles, “An International Tribunal: The Grounds for Confidence in the Effectiveness 
of Its Decisions [1],” The Advocate of Peace 6, 5 (May 1875): 28-29; James B. Miles, “An International 
Tribunal: The Grounds for Confidence in the Effectiveness of Its Decisions [2],” The Advocate of Peace 6, 
6 (June 1875): 33-35. For descriptions of the activities at The Hague during that time, see: “The Conference 
at Hague,” The Advocate of Peace 6, 5 (May 1875): 31-32; “The Hague Conferences,” The Advocate of 
Peace 6, 10 (October 1875): 63.  
 
49 Prior to WWI, this was the function of the Interparliamentary Union about which it was said in an 
address in 1909 that “within a few weeks adopted a form of organization, and chosen a permanent 
secretary, whose headquarters are eventually to be in the Peace Palace at The Hague itself,” and that at the 
time attracted “to its membership representatives of almost every parliamentary body in existence.” See: 
Nicholas Murray Butler, The International Mind: An Argument for the Judicial Settlement of International 
Disputes (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1912), 38-39. 
 
50 “Arbitration in Treaties,” New York Times, October 29, 1881. In addition, Hayes’ involvement in 
international arbitration would later include leading the arbitrational process in the dispute between the 
Argentine and Paraguayan republics, which earned him the honor of having Villa Occidental named Villa 
Hayes by the Paraguayan government, following his decision in its favor. See: “President Hayes an 
Arbitrator,” New York Times, July 15, 1879. Later, it was publicized that United States President William 





decade there was the International Arbitration League, which had the support of the 
former United States President Ulysses S. Grant.51 In 1890, United States President 
Benjamin Harrison reportedly “transmitted to Congress the recommendations of the 
International American Conference” and stated that their ratification toward the 
establishment of international arbitration “will constitute one of the happiest and most 
hopeful incidents in the history of the Western Hemisphere.”52 As Germany was growing 
in power, there was an American “effort to initiate the policy of a peaceful adjustment of 
international disputes and difficulties.”53 Not only did the names of the relevant lobbies 
for international arbitration and their activities prefigure the creation of the League of 
Nations three decades later,54 but an article in 1887 under the foreshadowing title, “A 
Court of Nations,” directly refers to a “dream of a league of nations not limited to any 
continent.”55 
 However, the dream proved to be complicated not only because it was against 
German interests to become bound by it, and not simply because of the novelty of an 
international court, but also because those who had the power to push for international 
                                                          
“Will Ask America to Mediate,” New York Times, January 3, 1900. Also, see: “Appeal to Mr. McKinley,” 
New York Times, January 5, 1900. It is seen that, in tandem with the discourse-making services of the NYT, 
political leaders in the United States sought to demonstrate the efficacy of international arbitration, and at 
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dispute with Mexico over “the Pious Fund Claims.” See: “The First Hague Conference and the Second: A 
Historical Résumé,” Outlook 86, no. 4 (May 25, 1907): 157. 
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law assigned an exclusive quality to their notion of “nations.” While the Anglo-American 
construction of international law had hard-power implications that would have halted 
German growth, the soft-power method was to clothe this political struggle with a moral 
and culturally sanctioned narration of international law. The public was instructed that 
international arbitration was “the voice of reason and Christianity” and ought to be 
considered as one of “the ideas of the Christian religion.”56 It was argued that arbitration 
is to be favored over armed conflict because “war is a reproach to Christian nations.”57 
The language was directed to Christians “throughout Christendom,” in the hope that “war 
among Christians would be replaced by methods like those by which honest men settle 
their disputes.”58 Even several years after WWI, it was still believed that “International 
law, as we know it today, is essentially a Christian doctrine.”59 Meaning, power relations 
determined both the structure for international justice and the identity of those who may 
seek it. For the German way of power, Christianity was an identity marker that 
represented a history of intergroup separation within Europe, whereas for the American 
way of power Christianity presented a potential for offshore balancing of power in 
Europe through the claim of a civilizational commitment to honor European identity 
groups as members of a Family of Nations.   
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The Civilizational Criterion 
At its core, the campaign for an international system of law was stimulated by the 
powerful leaders of a powerful society who looked to maintain their material advantages 
by codifying behavior between societies, internationally, according to their civilizational 
preferences.60 This is pronounced in the late nineteenth-century writings of Andrew 
Carnegie, a Scottish-American steel mogul,61 whose idea of international arbitration was 
intertwined with his hope for greater cooperation between the governments of Britain and 
the United States in an Anglo-American union of interests. Under the title Imperial 
Federation, his essay in 1891 called for a court, similar to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, that would “judge between the nations of the entire English-speaking 
race,” and which, along with a council of English-speaking nations, will exert “influence 
over the race, and through the race, over the world.”62 His proposal was to establish a 
tribunal, which would reflect “The commanding position of our race,” and “would wield 
such overwhelming power that resistance would be useless” by instituting that “its word 
would be law.”63  
                                                          
60 When the significance of civilizational differences was reintroduced into the political discourse on a 
prominent platform following the decline of the Cold War discourse, the text’s brief historical account 
omitted the civilizational indoctrination that is described here. See: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of 
Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 23. Furthermore, this article, and the book that 
followed it, popularized the assumption that Huntington’s perceived “major civilizations”—“Confucian, 
Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization”—had not 
been already subjected to heavy influence by the American-led Euro-Christian civilization to which 
Huntington referred as “Western.” See: Ibid., 25.  
 
61 A list of “The Great American Fortunes of 1901-14” informs that Carnegie’s amount of wealth during 
that period, $400 million, was second only to John D. Rockefeller’s $1 billion. See: Kevin Phillips, Wealth 
and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), 50. 
 
62 Andrew Carnegie, Imperial Federation (Edinburgh: Darien Press, 1891), 34. Although it is unclear to 
what extent “race” in this context had a genetic component, Carnegie seems to use it as a marker of a 
shared civilizational root. The etymological connection between the words race and root might seem to 
suggest that a biological meaning is implied, but “root” is commonly used in language as a metaphor.      
 





As an impetus for the execution of such a project, Carnegie cited the Triple 
Alliance that Germany—just several years after its unification—signed with Austria-
Hungary and Italy, about which he wrote that “what this Alliance aims to do for the three 
countries concerned for a few years, the true federation of the English-speaking race 
would be able to do permanently for the world.”64 Carnegie saw the “reunion of the 
Anglo-Americans” as the cultural basis for “a race confederation” that “would be 
unassailable upon land by any power or combination of powers that it is possible to 
create.”65 His power-based and culturally biased approach had a moral appeal: 
The new nation would dominate the world and banish from the earth its greatest 
stain—the murder of men by men. It would be the arbiter between nations, and 
enforce the peaceful settlement of all quarrels, saying to any disputants who 
threatened to draw the sword: “Hold! I command you both; The one that stirs 
makes me his foe. Unfold to me the cause of quarrel, and I will judge betwixt 
you.”66 
 
The vision of an Anglo-American “giant among pigmies”67 later mutated into including 
France as well in a group of “three free nations” whose cooperation “for peace among 
nations and for higher civilization” might persuade “the extraordinary man who guides 
the destinies of Germany” to “reveal himself as intensely as the friend of peace as either 
of the heads of the triarchy.”68 Toward an evolved realization of this aim, Carnegie gave 
$1,500,000 in 1903 to build the Peace Palace at The Hague where a tribunal may operate 
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66 Ibid., 693-694. 
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permanently,69 and he financed soft-power efforts that ranged from an attempt to simplify 
English spelling70 to the creation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(CEIP) 1910.71  
 Indeed, the information that was being developed about international law, and as 
international law, exhibited processes of categorization, selection, and education, in 
determining a Family of Nations for whom the concept applies. It was essential that for 
international law to function, first there must be a division of groups into nations within 
which there is a sustainable sentiment of particular patriotism, and then to secure the 
existence among them of the recognition that their interests as nations have “become 
intertwined and interblended that when one suffers, all the others suffer with it.”72 This 
double requirement is the basis of the push-and-pull that is observed between 
ethnonationalism and civic nationalism in the progression of international law in 
particular, and of the international society in general. Accordingly, to say that “True 
                                                          
69 R. Floyd Clarke, “A Permanent Tribunal of International Arbitration: Its Necessity and Value,” American 
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Created (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941), 6, 81. 
 
70 “Carnegie Assaults the Spelling Book,” New York Times, March 12, 1906.  
 
71 “The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” American Journal of International Law 5, no. 3 
(July 1911): 757-760. In 1910, Carnegie gave CEIP’s trust fund a sum of $10,000,000. See: Lester, Forty, 
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journals ($361,440.14), societies and other organizations ($125,287.73), aid to international law treatises 
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sessions, conferences, and exchange of international law professors ($135,721.57), assistance on 
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internationalism is not the enemy of the nationalistic principle,”73 might be seen as 
understating a relationship in which internationalism is the nourisher of national beings.74 
Each member of the Family of Nations must be able to carry itself as a nation. 
However, nationalistic thinking was originally a civilizational quality, and the 
ability to engage in international communication, especially through law, was seen as “a 
glorious step in Christian progress.”75 In Lassa Oppenheim’s influential scholarly work 
on international law as a discipline it is stated clearly that the legal intercourse between 
states does not concern states that are outside the circle of nations, and to him “That this 
intercourse and treatment ought to be regulated by the principles of Christian morality is 
obvious.”76 It therefore follows that when “the members of the Family of Nations deal 
with such States as still remain outside that family,” they are expected to use “discretion” 
rather than international law.77 Meaning, in their dealings with those other non-Christian 
                                                          
73 Edward Marshall, “Dr. Butler Prophesies ‘The United States of Europe’,” New York Times, October 18, 
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74 Without the principal actors acting as national units, and continuing to do so, a system cannot become or 
remain international. A global administration of law without the intermediacy of national governments 
would be more appropriately called world law. Thus, though it might seem counterintuitive today, the 
project of establishing international law necessitated the establishment of nation-states. Neither of the three 
major works that seek to explain nationalism lead their readers to consider how nationalism in the period 
that is considered here may have been indoctrinated by American power so that nation-states might fit the 
American vision of international law in opposition to German power or any other emerging power. The 
structural depiction of nationalism being rooted in the requirements of industrial society offers a broad view 
of modern history that considers the nation-state’s function in general society but not its function as part of 
an international system that is designed by great power. See: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). The constructivist perspective stresses how the enhanced usability of 
language boosted the sense of national identity in modernity, but its main work does not consider how a 
great power’s means of communication may have produced information toward the creation of certain 
nation-states so that international law may be engaged. See: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). The focus on the ethnic roots 
of nationalism creates a theoretical frame that looks away from national identity as a taught quality. See: 
Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
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entities who were outside the circle, the Christian powers were allowed to act as their 
own judge.78 
 Within the space outside the circle there existed further differentiation between 
group entities and their relationship to international law. While Oppenheim maintained in 
1905 that both “the Mahometan State of Turkey and the Buddhistic State of Japan” exist 
within “the dominion of the Law of Nations,” this was conditioned on the acceptance of 
the civilizational authority of the Christian powers, as for instance Oppenheim himself 
noted the anomaly that placed foreigners in Ottoman territory “under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their consuls.”79 Regarding great countries such as China and Persia, 
Oppenheim explains that “Their civilisation is essentially so different from that of the 
Christian States that international intercourse with them of the same kind as between 
Christian States has been hitherto impossible.”80 The exclusion of such states was by no 
means a permanent feature of the relationship with them, and there was an openness to 
welcome them into the circle of nations as “International Persons” upon their 
demonstration of the ability to “send diplomatic envoys” and “enter into treaty 
obligations,” but the character of such exchanges would be according to what is held by 
the Christian powers to be “progress of civilisation.”81 In the language of those who 
                                                          
78 This might explain why—aside from morality’s subordination to power—in the Treaty of Washington in 
1871 it was stated that England was under obligation to maintain neutrality during the American Civil War 
(for references here, see: Chapter 4, notes 428-431) , but a similar claim on behalf of the Vietnamese was 
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described as a civil war between North and South Vietnam.  
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sought to promote international law, a distinction was made between those non-Christian 
group entities who interacted with the Family of Nations from outside the circle and were 
considered semicivilized, semibarbarous, or imperfectly civilized,82 and between non-
Christian group entities who could not be easily brought to shake hands or hold a pen and 
were considered to be barbarous or savage.83 As shown by official documents from the 
early period of modern international law, colonized and semicolonized groups whose 
cultural distance from the Euro-Christian civilization rendered them impervious to 
immediate indoctrination were nonentities in international law.84 From this perspective, it 
was argued that principles of international law do not apply “when ‘civilized’ troops 
make war on ‘uncivilized’ peoples.”85       
                                                          
82 For examples, see: William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
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Documents (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1919), 187, 196. 
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Macmillan Company, 1922), 229; Oppenheim, International, 4th ed., 2:161. 
 
84 For instance, the “Treaty Between the United States and Russia Ceding Alaska to the United States,” 
which was signed on March 30, 1867, states in Article 3 that “The inhabitants of the ceded territory … may 
return to Russia within three years; but if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the 
exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of 
their liberty, property, and religion.” See: Richard W. Flournoy and Manley O. Hudson, eds., A Collection 
of Nationality Laws of Various Countries as Contained in Constitutions, Statutes and Treaties (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1929), 578. Also, a law of May 6, 1882 [8 U.S. Code, 363], states that “hereafter 
no State court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship.” See: Ibid., 579. 
Furthermore, it was considered “evident that the term ‘treaty,’ as applied to an agreement between a 
civilized State and an aboriginal tribe is misleading.” See: Snow, Question, 128. 
 
85 Colby, “How,” 288. This view was expressed in an article that considers the French bombardment of 
Damascus in 1925. It featured the question: “Does international law require the application of laws of war 
to people of a different civilization?” The answer was that it cannot be considered a violation of 





 Power relations dictated that neither the fully nor partially “barbarous” were able 
to seek justice in the Anglo-American idea of an international court,86 and both sets of 
non-Christians were to remain without rights in international law “So long as they lack 
the capacity or disposition to accept the burdens of European civilization.”87 It is because 
of power relations that they had to accept the Christian civilization’s standards of 
behavior, and their contribution to the codification of international conduct was not even 
a thought at the time. Their only chance of admission was through being educated by the 
American-led Euro-Christian civilization into becoming national beings that would fit the 
mold of international law. For such group entities “survival of the fittest” meant that their 
existence among the Family of Nations would be decided by their proclivity to absorb the 
teachings of the more powerful civilization and adjust their identity accordingly. Hence, 
it is no accident that those “countries not accepted as full-fledged members of the family 
of nations” were subjected to “American missionary enterprises,” which were protected 
by the United States government.88 The potential rise of new nation-states, which were 
believed to meet the civilizational expectations of international law and accommodate 
Anglo-American preferences, was advanced by the claim that intervention in the affairs 
                                                          
Syrians only one side—the French—was mandated to act. See: Quincy Wright, “The Bombardment of 
Damascus,” American Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (April 1926): 266, 277-278. After the 
experience of the American war in Vietnam, civilizing wars were conducted as civil wars. In this manner, 
the birth pangs of governance in accordance with the Euro-Christian civilization would not appear as great-
power bombardments of native populations but as a conflict between local groups, which happen to be 
equipped by great power.    
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(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1922), 1:50. 
 






of semicivilized states was warranted and certainly not prohibited by international law.89 
 
The Eastern Question 
When considering the Eastern Question under this light, it is seen that the 
“question” mainly framed doubts that the non-Christian governance of the Ottoman 
territories was adequately “civilized” to administer the type of law and order that would 
serve and protect Anglo-American interests in the region.90 As narrated in the NYT’s first 
reference to the Eastern Question in 1851, the question was raised in reaction to Russia’s 
increasing ability since the second half of the eighteenth century to conquer land of the 
Ottoman state, and the latter’s decreasing ability to prevent the former from doing so, 
especially triggering concern over how the trend might affect British operations in 
India.91 In Britain, the status of hard power in the East received greater attention as a 
result of the Crimean War (1853-1856). It inspired a soft-power preparation of minds 
toward the conviction that the Turks, as non-Christians, are unable to govern.  
The infusion of a religion-based cultural reasoning was effective because it 
appealed to the public’s identity and the rhetoric resonated with sentiment that dated back 
to the Christian loss of Constantinople in 1453. John Henry Newman, an influential 
                                                          
89 This means that the American-led civilizational criterion would determine if a state’s right of 
independence is to be respected. An example of this is the acceptance that “Not infrequently a so-called 
protectorate is established by a State over a territory or country unfamiliar with and not possessed of what 
is known as European civilization, or over a region which may be fairly deemed to be uncivilized.” See: 
Hyde, International, 36. Another example is found in the belief that “interventions of civilized States in the 
affairs of semicivilized States” is “an extension of national sovereignty.” See: Snow, Question, 196. 
 
90 The attempt to usher in a new culture of governance was on display in the period of the Tanzimat (1839-
1876), in which a wide range of reforms was designed to produce a Europeanized form of government that 
is administered by a centralized bureaucracy and follows liberal sensibilities.  
 






clerical figure in Britain and an early mentor to William Ewart Gladstone,92 lectured 
before audiences that “wretchedness is found … wherever Turks are to be found in 
power,”93 and that “the Turkish power certainly is not a civilized, and is a barbarous 
power.”94 While invoking “the interest of Christendom” and the memory of “the taking of 
Constantinople,”95 Newman also engaged in the politics of how states are run, pressing 
that in the matter of governance there is a broad division between “barbarous and 
civilized.”96 Significantly, he preached that “Mahometanism is essentially a consecration 
of the principle of nationalism,”97 and that, correspondingly, the state of the Mahometans 
is “cut off from the family of nations.”98 From the pulpit, he issued a warning that “such 
barbarians, unless they could be placed where they would answer some political purpose, 
would eventually share the fate of the aboriginal inhabitants of North America; they 
would, in the course of years, be surrounded, pressed upon, divided, decimated, driven 
into the desert by the force of civilization.”99 
Gladstone, who was bestowed with Britain’s premiership on four different 
occasions between 1868 and 1894, publicly led a verbal onslaught on the Turkish image 
                                                          
92 In 1879, Gladstone intimated that as a student at the University of Oxford he was fascinated with 
Newman’s charisma and attended his sermons on Sundays. See: Mountstuart E. Grant Duff, Notes from a 
Diary, 1873-1881 (London: John Murray, 1898), 2:121.  
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by British clergymen, historians, and politicians, which persuaded the masses that the 
destruction of the Ottoman state on account of its perceived civilizational backwardness 
would be morally correct.100 In Gladstone’s case, this was a direct continuation of notions 
about civilizational superiority that were held by his father, John, one of Britain’s 
wealthy slave owners who advocated African slavery and anti-Ottoman insurrection in 
the 1820s.101 The belief in the replacement of the Ottoman state with Christian 
governance was given its moral seal of approval from religious leaders such as Malcolm 
MacColl, Gladstone’s close friend, who stated that it would be a misnomer to call the 
                                                          
100 Gladstone argued that the “thorough riddance” of the Turk in Europe was a duty performed in the name 
of “the moral sense of mankind.” See: William E. Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the 
East (London: John Murray, 1876), 61. Also, see: William E. Gladstone, A Chapter of Autobiography 
(London: John Murray, 1868), 61; William E. Gladstone, “England’s Mission,” The Nineteenth Century 4 
(September 1878): 574. According to Gladstone, the “equal rights of all nations” was at the core of his 
“Right Principles on Foreign Policy” and “the very basis and root of a Christian civilization.” See: William 
E. Gladstone, “Right Principles of Foreign Policy,” in Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-
1914, ed. Edgar R. Jones (London: Humphrey Milford, 1914), 373, 382. Even when Gladstone guided his 
foreign policy according to imperial interests, it was depicted as a moral approach to imperialism. British 
political involvement in the affairs of non-Christians such as the Turks or the Africans was viewed as the 
beneficent mission of the Christian civilization, thereby considering British control of land to be for the 
betterment of its natives. See: Richard Koebner, Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political 
Word, 1840-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 216. 
 
101 For a description of John Gladstone’s involvement with slavery, and reference to a situation in which 
tens of the slaves in one of his plantations were either “hanged,” “shot down,” or “torn in pieces.” See: 
John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (New York: Macmillan Company, 1903), 1:22-23. This 
biography also includes a list of the churches that John Gladstone financed. See: Ibid., 11 (note 1). It is 
noteworthy that while this information is illuminating, the biographer of the book admitted his own bias in 
favor of William Gladstone’s life and memory. See: Ibid., 5. In his own writing, John Gladstone argued for 
the slave’s deprivation of freedom and against the activities of William Wilberforce. See: West India 
Association, The Correspondence between John Gladstone and James Cropper on the Present States of 
Slavery in the British West Indies and in the United States of America and on the Importation of Sugar from 
the British Settlements in India (Liverpool: West India Association, 1824), 16-17. Furthermore, he 
rationalized his slavery business by claiming that the Africans were better off being worked as slaves. See: 
Ibid., 22, 99. During this time, William Gladstone, then a freshly elected Member of Parliament 
representing Newark, defended his family’s moral standing against accusations that sugar cultivation in 
their estates in the West Indies was increasing while slaves were dying off in equal proportion. See: 
Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 3d ser., vol. 18 (1833), cols. 330-337. In addition to the enslavement of 
those outside of his Euro-Christian civilization, John Gladstone endorsed Greek insurrection against the 
Ottoman state and promoted a town meeting in Liverpool to show support for the Greek rebels. See: Alfred 
F. Robbins, “Mr. Gladstone’s Ancestry and Early Years,” in The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, ed. 






Ottoman rule a government, and that “the evil, though aggravated and crystallized in the 
Turk, is inherent in all Mussulman Governments.”102  
The backing from academia was largely provided by Goldwin Smith and Edward 
Augustus Freeman, who occupied the chair of Regius Professor of Modern History at the 
University of Oxford in different times.103 Smith wrote that “Islam … is not a religion of 
humanity” and “is essentially anti-human.”104 According to Smith, the situation in Europe 
had also called attention to the “tendencies of Judaism,” which he saw as being “a 
religion of race” that belongs among “the circle of primitive religions.”105 As part of 
Smith’s commitment to civilization, he argued that it was a misconception to think that 
Jews could be made into citizens of Europe.106 Freeman, too, mixed anti-Semitic beliefs 
into his efforts to stir anti-Ottoman feelings. His claim that the “so called Turkish 
government is … no government at all”107 was linked to a theory of the Euro-Christian 
civilization that had a deep racial component to it regarding Jews. In the Eastern 
                                                          
102 Malcolm MacColl, The Eastern Question: Its Facts and Fallacies (London: Longmans, Green, 1877), 
232. MacColl declared that “The poison of the Sick Man is Islam.” See: Ibid., 233. In addition, he 
expressed the belief that “when a Mussulman people rules over a non-Mussulman population it cannot 
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103 Freeman’s appointment in 1884 was “on the recommendation of Mr. Gladstone.” See: James Bryce, 
“Edward Augustus Freeman,” English Historical Review 7, no. 27 (July 1892): 497.   
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107 Edward A. Freeman, “The True Eastern Question,” The Fortnightly Review 18 [24] (July-December 






Question’s highest point of public awareness, while Benjamin Disraeli’s policy as the 
British premier remained opposed to change in the status quo, Freeman exclaimed that 
“Throughout the East, the Turk and the Jew are leagued against the Christian.”108 
According to Freeman’s commentary, one’s Jewishness seemed consuming and 
unchangeable: 
The Jews must be very nearly, if not absolutely, a pure race, in a sense in which 
no European nation is pure. The blood remains untouched by conversion; it 
remains untouched even by intermarriage. The Jew may be sure of his own stock, 
in a way in which none of the rest of us, Dutch, Welsh, or anything else, can be 
sure, the gens remains a gens by birth, and not by legal fiction.109 
 
This idea that Jews were defined not by their choices but by their very existence, is 
echoed in The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century by Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain,110 who, in his youth, before becoming the author of this book that guided 
                                                          
108 Edward A. Freeman, The Ottoman Power in Europe, Its Nature, Its Growth, and Its Decline (London: 
Macmillan, 1877), xix. He then argued that “The Jew is the tool of the Turk, and is therefore yet more 
hated than the Turk.” See: Ibid., xx. Freeman proceeded to rationalize the Serbian intolerance of Jews, and 
suggested that because “blood is stronger than water,” the British public should be mindful of “Hebrew 
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of Aryan blood and speech.” See: Ibid., 5.    
 
109 Edward A. Freeman, “The Jews in Europe,” The Saturday Review 43, no. 1,111 (February 10, 1877), 
162. Freeman’s perspective on Jews was also articulated in private, as one of his letters states, in his habit 
of writing the word Jews with a lowercase letter J: “As I said aforetime, Let every nation wallop its own 
jews.” See: W. R. W. Stephens, The Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman (London: Macmillan, 1895), 
1:428. Freeman’s racial philosophy points at how the campaign to adjust global governance to the Euro-
Christian civilization created an opening for appeals to the public’s disdain for those who were seen as unfit 
for it. While in the United States, Freeman saw the situation of the Chinese in the United States as “the 
exact parallel to the Jews in Russia.” See: Ibid., 254. He argued that “every nation has a right to get rid of 
strangers who prove a nuisance, whether they are Chinese in America, or Jews in Russia, Servia, Hungary, 
and Roumania.” See: Edward A. Freeman, Some Impressions of the United States (London: Longmans, 
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man and a brother” because “He cannot be assimilated; the laws of nature forbid it.” See: Ibid., 144. 
 
110 For instance, Chamberlain wrote about the Jews: “This one race has established as its guiding principle 
the purity of the blood; it alone possesses, therefore, physiognomy and character.” See: Houston Stewart 






Nazi Germany’s racial ideology,111 was a proud supporter of Gladstone.112 In general, the 
public discourse in Britain about the Eastern Question, especially during Disraeli’s term 
as the government’s leader (1874-1880), was structured to persuade the public to support 
the supplanting of the Ottoman government with Christian states by enmeshing 
intensified beliefs about non-Christians with a focus on race and in the name of morality. 
 Before Gladstone’s essay in 1876, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the 
East,113 turned the fate of the Bulgarians into a matter of public debate in Britain, 
American missionaries had toiled within the Ottoman Empire to organize Bulgarian 
nationalism toward the alignment of governance in the East with Christian civilization. 
The great industry of the Americans on Ottoman land was based on an ability to become 
a source of information for the Christian communities through a highly financed 
establishment of educational facilities and production of reading material.114 In the case 
                                                          
111 Chamberlain’s racial theory is considered to have been “the most important” in the development of the 
Third Reich’s racial thought. See: George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of 
the Third Reich (New York: Universal Library, 1964), 93.  
 
112 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, The Ravings of a Renegade: Being the War Essays of Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain, trans. Charles H. Clarke (London: Jarrold & Sons, 1915), 128.  
 
113 In this publication, following reports of massacres against Bulgarians, Gladstone ended his hiatus and 
stormed back into political activity on the wings of strong claims against the Ottoman government, calling 
upon its Turkish leadership, “one and all, bag and baggage,” to “clear out from the province they have 
desolated and profaned.” See: Gladstone, Bulgarian, 62. Upon receiving a copy of the pamphlet from 
Gladstone himself, Disraeli commented in a personal letter that it is an outrageous essay whose “point was, 
for ethnological reasons no less, to expel the Turk as a race from Europe.” See: Marquis of Zetland, ed., 
The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 
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Robert Blake, Disraeli (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), 259. Gladstone’s bombastic essay was a 
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Gladstone (New York: Macmillan Company, 1903), 2:552. Britain’s evangelical public, which was not yet 
acquainted with the concept of propaganda and far from being immersed in the complex political situation 
within the Ottoman Empire, readily bought into the idea that Gladstone was championing morality.  
 
114 It was reported that from 1831 to 1915 the American Bible Society gave $2,804,104 toward the 





of the Bulgarians, Zornitsa, the only Bulgarian newspaper when founded by Americans 
in 1862,115 and Robert College, the American school that was opened by Cyrus Hamlin in 
1863 and for years led in the cultivation of Bulgarian national leadership within the 
Ottoman Empire116 as a direct continuation of the boarding school at Bebek that he began 
to operate in 1840,117 were markers of a time in which the country’s population adopted a 
new collective identity.118 More specifically, the American soft-power endeavor through 
education and the press did not just produce a national culture among Bulgarians, but 
fostered a direct line of influence between American power and Bulgarian 
representation.119 This cultural transformation was part of an American vision for a 
governance in the region that would be in keeping with Christian civilization, as indicated 
                                                          
See: Joseph K. Greene, Leavening the Levant (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1916), 137, 156. The economic 
power of such sums today would amount to hundreds of millions in United States dollars. 
 
115 Constantine Stephanove, The Bulgarians and Anglo-Saxondom (Berne: Paul Haupt, Librairie 
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George Washburn, who was president of Robert College, referred to the school as “a nursery for Bulgarian 
statesmen.” See: George Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople: And Recollections of Robert College 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), 241. These also included future prime ministers of Bulgaria 
such as Constantine Stoiloff. See: Hall, Puritans, 101. 
 
117 H. G. O. Dwight, Christianity Revived in the East, or, A Narrative of the Work of God among the 
Armenians of Turkey (New York: Baker & Scribner, 1850), 96. 
 
118 As reported at a time that preceded the advent of Zornitsa and Robert College, there were no detectable 
elements of a national identity in the country. See: Alexander William Kinglake, Eothen, or, Traces of 
Travel Brought Home from the East (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1845), 17-18. 
 
119 For instance, it is said that the two individuals who represented Bulgaria in the international peace 
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in the following words published by the NYT in 1881 on the work of the American 
missionaries there, particularly through Robert College: 
…they did not aim alone at the conversion of the few who might abandon Islam, 
but they sought to prepare the half-civilized races, such as the Bulgarians, 
Armenians, Servians, and Greeks, for the higher Christian civilization which 
ought now to take possession of the Danubian Countries, and later of 
Constantinople and Armenia. 
By most who know Turkey well it is believed that the race who will come to the 
front, when the possessions of the Sick Man are divided, will be the Bulgarians. 
Though depressed by long oppression, and of somewhat heavy temperament, they 
show many of the best capacities for civilization, and they number many millions. 
The Armenians, too, have a future of importance, and they appeal especially to 
the sympathies of our religious community. Fortunately for the youthful college, 
it attracted these two nationalities to its halls, and subsequently was able to be of 
especial service to the oppressed and afflicted Bulgarians. All the assistance it 
rendered to this unhappy nationality cannot be detailed at this period of history, 
but the whole race feel that the American college is their friend and has aided 
them immensely at a critical moment. As a consequence, some three hundred of 
its graduates are found filling the Administration of Bulgaria, and President 
Washburn is received as a pater Republicae on the banks of the Danube.  
There is something profoundly interesting and inspiring in the thought that an 
American college will prepare the minds and characters of the youth who shall 
sway the new State, and lay the foundations for a new Christian civilization on the 
site of the capital of the Eastern empire—a civilization not to be led by monks and 
autocrats, but by intelligent citizens and enlightened teachers.120    
 
While refraining from making reference to a great-power competition with Germany’s 
growing influence in the region, the article nonetheless reveals a significant American 
design in leading Ottoman Christian groups into having national identities that aspire for 
political independence on Ottoman ground. Unlike the Bulgarians who were positioned to 
eventually gain sovereignty, the Armenians were not well-endowed to succeed in the 
endeavor to secede. 
 
 
                                                          






The Armenian Question 
In the early 1820s, as the Russian threats of invasion into Ottoman territory 
became more evidently credible, and as the potential for threats from within the empire 
was dramatized by the Greeks, American missionaries began to scout the land and 
examine its peoples for possible receptivity to their influence. While the main 
geographical attraction for the missionaries was notably the biblical land,121 this foray 
had the form of an anthropological project that included an engagement in “conversation 
with several Armenians,”122 who at the time did not call themselves by that name but 
referred to themselves as Haik.123 Following an official decision in 1829 “to establish a 
mission among the Armenians of Turkey,”124 and soon after traveling through eastern 
                                                          
121 American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Instructions to the Missionaries about to 
Embark for the Sandwich Islands and to the Rev. Messrs. William Goodell and Isaac Bird, Attached to the 
Palestine Mission Delivered by the Corresponding Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1823), 17. 
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that the Americans had on that people’s group identity from the arrival of the missionaries in the area to 
this day. Also, it calls attention to the possibility that the insistence on referring to the people by using a 
name that is linked to an ancient political entity was guided by considerations of its effect on public 
opinion, being that the name Haik was not recognizable in the Euro-Christian culture whereas the name 
Armenia was related to an ancient sovereign. 
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Anatolia in 1830 with the support of the United States government,125 the Americans 
were able to conclude that the people whom they regarded as “the Armenian nation,” 
lacked “the modern improvements in primary education,”126 practiced “image 
worship,”127 and lived in a “spiritual state” that from an American perspective was 
characterized by “superstition and ignorance.”128 Nonetheless, the Americans were driven 
by the following belief about their presence inside the Ottoman Empire: “…by laboring 
among Christians, we gain an easy entrance into the heart of our enemy’s territory.”129 
Accordingly, by the early 1830s it was already determined that American efforts out of 
Constantinople were to be directed to the Armenians, “to have schools established among 
them” even if such efforts would be opposed by the Armenians themselves.130 
 The Americans were only able to position themselves as a source of civilizational 
influence among the Armenians through overpowering the preexisting Armenian 
leadership. As the leader of the American team that operated among the Armenians, H. 
G. O. Dwight acknowledged that the mission was “a great work of reform … in the 
Armenian Church.”131 This meant that the American missionaries had to persuade the 
Armenian people to reject the teachings of their own traditional Armenian leadership and 
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revolutionize their social structure. According to Dwight, the Armenian Church was seen 
by the Americans as “strongly tainted with error,”132 and “only an obscured 
Christianity.”133 To have the Armenian Church “cleansed from its multiform errors,”134 
the Americans had both soft- and hard-power objectives. In terms of soft power, they 
considered the revival of the Armenian “vernacular language” as vital to establishing a 
fruitful mode of communication.135 In this regard, Dwight recalled that already prior to 
the 1840s he felt that “The kingdom of Christ now began to make evident inroads on the 
kingdom of Satan.”136 In terms of hard power, the Americans identified the Armenian 
bankers, who were “capitalists” and only “nominally Christians” according to Dwight, as 
being the beneficiaries and guardians of the Armenian hierarchy, and in control of 
electing and deposing the patriarchs.137 Once the relations between the Americans and a 
certain sect of the Armenian people grew sufficiently strong, a “rupture between the 
bankers and the tradesmen” had important bearings within the Armenian society,138 and 
Britain’s leverage was employed to clear up legal space for Protestant Armenians to 
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Testament was completed in 1841 and published in 1842. See: Dwight, Christianity Revived, 145. 
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become a free community in the records of the Ottoman government.139  
 Confronted by these developments, the original Armenian leadership tried to 
preserve the community’s identity and maintain its traditional way of living, but to no 
avail. While the Americans claimed that their Armenian followers were subjected to 
persecution,140 from the local leadership’s perspective those Armenians who became 
faithful adherents of American teachings were no longer of the community. Patriarch 
Matteos issued an anathema in which he decried what to him appeared as wickedness and 
false prophecy.141 In another anathema, Matteos implored his people, who were 
undergoing a process that was set to de-Haikize them, to defend themselves from this 
powerful foreign influence by turning members of the community against associations 
with the American-educated Protestant Armenians:  
Let such persons know that they are nourishing a venomous serpent in their 
houses, which will one day injure them with its deadly poison, and they will lose 
their souls. Such persons give bread to Judas. Such persons are enemies of the 
holy faith of Christianity, and destroyers of the holy orthodox Church of the 
Armenians, and a disgrace to the whole nation.142    
                                                          
139 Ibid., 225; Dwight, Christianity in Turkey, 237. As commented later, the diplomatic “interference” led 
by the British ambassador, Stratford Canning, was critical in the development of Armenian evangelicalism 
because it allowed them to maintain their newly acquired collective identity as such “under Turkish license, 
and were promised protection by the Turkish police.”  See: E. D. G. Prime, ed., Forty Years in the Turkish 
Empire, or, Memoirs of Rev. William Goodell (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1876), 313. 
Bureaucratically, this also meant that the “said Protestants” would be able to “keep a separate register of 
their births and deaths … according to the system observed with regard to the Latin subjects.” See: Dwight, 
Christianity Revived, 285-286 (Appendix G: “Translation of an Order, Obtained from the Sublime Porte by 
the Right Honorable Lord Cowley, in Favor of the Sultan’s Protestant Subjects”).  
 
140 The Patriarch Matteos is described—in uppercase letters—as the persecutor of Protestants in Turkey. 
See: Ibid., 38. Furthermore, it is claimed that “The Armenian Patriarchal power at Constantinople has 
always been a persecuting power.” See: Dwight, Christianity in Turkey, 89. Dwight infuses his narrative 
with references to persecution of the evangelicals by the Patriarch. For instance, see: Ibid., 104, 164, 237, 
271. For another work that describes the events as persecution, see: Rufus Anderson, History of the 
Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches (Boston: 
Congregational Publishing Society, 1872), 1:114, 123. 
 
141 Dwight, Christianity Revived, 268 (Appendix A: “First Anathema of the Priest Vertanes”).  
 
142 Ibid., 271 (Appendix B: “Second Anathema of the Armenian Patriarch, Anathematizing the Whole Body 





However, his warning went mostly unheeded. The Ottoman government agreed to protect 
the American-influenced Armenians, and “the First Evangelical Armenian Church of 
Constantinople” was constituted on July 1, 1846,143 and organized under the supervision 
of American missionaries, with Dwight acting “as helper in the pastoral office.”144 The 
Armenian—or rather Haik—leadership that had cooperated with the Ottoman manner of 
government began to wane, and the American influence over the Armenians was well 
placed for growth. Later, after registering success in the conflict within the Haik people 
whom he called Armenians, Dwight’s original impression of their church as being cruel, 
duplicitous, and selfish145 was replaced by praise that the Armenians “have shewn 
themselves to be superior to the other races around” and that “they are the Anglo-Saxons 
of the east.”146    
 The political effects of this transformation, in which a peaceful ethnoreligious 
group by the name of Haik was led into seeing itself through American eyes as Armenian 
and becoming amenable to American interests, started to surface on an international level 
in 1876, when at the height of the Eastern Question, in the midst of the Bulgarian 
Agitation, James Bryce, who had been mentored by Smith, Freeman, and Gladstone,147 
began to raise the Armenian Question.148 While the title of his book on the subject in 
                                                          
143 Dwight, Christianity in Turkey, 264; Greene, Leavening, 105. 
 
144 Anderson, History, 1:418. 
 
145 Dwight, Christianity Revived, 264. 
 
146 Dwight, Christianity in Turkey, 14. 
 
147 For a discussion of this, see: Hugh Tulloch, James Bryce’s “American Commonwealth”: The Anglo-
American Background (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 1988), 35-44, 66-69. 
 
148 At the prestigious St. James’ Hall in London, on December 8, 1876, during a conference that centered 
on the status of Christians in European Turkey, Bryce had a leading role in calling attention to the situation 





1877 might claim spontaneity,149 Bryce’s impressions following a journey to the 
Caucasus in 1876 are deeply aligned with American interests to bring the region closer to 
nationally inspired forms of governance in the spirit of the Christian civilization that 
would be conducive to international law: “It is not a matter of race, but of religion, which 
is far more serious. No Mohammedan race or dynasty has ever shewn itself able to 
govern well even subjects of its own religion; while to extend equal rights to subjects of a 
different creed is forbidden by the very law of its being.”150   
The narrative that was unfolded in Bryce’s book presented features that would 
dominate public opinion on the Armenian issue through WWI: that the Armenians are, by 
their nature and history, “the most vigorous and progressive Christian people of the 
East”;151 that as “the bulwark of Christianity in Asia,” Armenians have suffered from 
“religious intolerance and persecution” for centuries;152 and that this “timid and 
inoffensive people, who have never meditated insurrection” are becoming ripe for 
political activity, as they “are being slaughtered by thousands in their blazing villages.”153 
Within this narrative, the significant work of American missionaries among Armenians in 
                                                          
draft the Armenian appeal” that was circulated on that occasion, and two years later, before he was even 
elected to parliament, he organized Armenian-related political activities in Westminster. See: H. A. L. 
Fisher, James Bryce (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), 1:183. 
 
149 James Bryce, Transcaucasia and Ararat: Being Notes of a Vacation Tour in the Autumn of 1876 
(London: Macmillan, 1877). Considering that this book was published by a prominent company and was in 
its third edition by 1878, it is reasonable to think that the political elite saw significance in the execution of 
this project.  
 
150 Ibid., 402.  
 
151 Ibid., 234.  
 
152 Ibid., 313.  
 
153 Ibid., 402. This description of Armenians being massacred by the thousands, long before the massacres 
of the mid-1890s, shows that the Anglo-American discourse about Armenians had an affinity toward the 






shaping their collective identity was absent, nor is there mention of how the Ottoman 
government approved and facilitated the religious liberty with which the Armenians 
became organized to follow an American-taught version of Christianity.154 By WWI, as 
expressed in the Blue Book that was sanctioned by the British government and 
supervised by Bryce, the American missionaries who worked in the area were presented 
to the public as either witnesses and reporters of atrocities or providers of care and 
relief,155 but not as an active element that played a crucial role in transforming the 
attitude and behavior of the Armenian people in general and in relation to the Ottoman 
                                                          
154 Bryce did not just omit the work of American missionaries from his narrative on Armenian identity, but, 
as seen in the fourth edition of Transcaucasia and Ararat following the wave of violence in 1894, he also 
obliterated it from public memory by using the label “Armenian Question” to frame the Armenian issue 
within a discourse that considers the matter to have started in 1878 because only then it became “a matter 
of international concern … when it was dealt with in the Treaty of Berlin.” See: James Bryce, 
Transcaucasia and Ararat: Being Notes of a Vacation Tour in the Autumn of 1876, 4th ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1896), viii. However, this aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the Treaty of 
San Stefano belongs in a greater context of an Anglo-American effort to establish nation-states in the spirit 
of the Christian civilization toward their inclusion among the circle of nations that would promote 
international law in the region. Thus, the agenda of Ottoman reform that was presented in the Treaty of 
Berlin is not seen as simply an observer’s reaction to the condition of Armenians, but as an occasion to 
promote the already well thought-out idea of international law. In the prevalent scholarly discourse on the 
period, the diplomatic developments of the time, and the wars that followed, have not been shown as linked 
to the project of international law. Even an analysis that considers the imposition of the Euro-Christian 
civilization on the non-Western governance of the Ottoman state does not consider how the American-led 
vision of international law required a civilizational commonality. For instance, in a volume that is dedicated 
to the study of the implications that the Treaty of Berlin had for the Ottoman Empire, the observation is 
made that “It would not be wrong to treat the wars after the 1878 treaty as a function of the principle of 
homogenization” but without pointing out directly that the Western effort to achieve a civilizational 
uniformity in governance through nation-states served a purpose in the construction of international law. 
See: M. Hakan Yavuz, “The Transformation of ‘Empire’ through Wars and Reforms: Integration vs. 
Oppression,” in War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of Berlin, ed. M. 
Hakan Yavuz with Peter Sluglett (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011), 28.   
 
155 His Majesty’s Stationery Office, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16, 
Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by Viscount 
Bryce with a Preface by Viscount Bryce (London: Sir Joseph Causton and Sons, 1916), xxxvi. During 
WWI, Bryce was in correspondence with James L. Barton, of the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Affairs, and the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, not simply for purposes of 
collecting reports but also in coordination of efforts regarding public opinion. See: MS. Bryce 202, fols. 85, 
119-121, 145-146; MS. Bryce 203, fols. 56-58, 102; MS. Bryce 204, fols. 14-17, 46-47, 50-52, 82-83, 101, 
136, Catalogue of the Papers of James Viscount Bryce, 1826-1958, Department of Special Collections, 
Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Bryce had already engaged in correspondence with American 
missionaries in previous years, as, for example, attested by letters from Frederick D. Greene, in 1895, 





government long before the war. 
 Under American direction, the Armenians acquired a sense of national self-
determination,156 and were motivated to claim an Armenian state on Ottoman land by the 
time Bryce first publicized the idea of it in 1878, decades prior to WWI. He declared that 
“Turkey is dead,”157 pointed out that the Ottoman “misgovernment of both Moslem and 
Christian subjects is no less ruinous in Asia than in Europe,”158 and argued that “The only 
Christian race that offers any promise” as “a civilizing and organizing influence in these 
neglected countries … is the Armenian.”159 He then outlined the Ottoman territory that 
ought to come under Armenian sovereignty: “Speaking roughly, one may say that it 
extends from Trebizond on the Black Sea to Tavriz in Persia, and from Delijan (a little 
south of Tiflis) … to near Diarbekir.”160 Backing himself with claims that “outrages” 
have afflicted the Armenians “for generations past,”161 Bryce explained that it was time 
for the creation of “a strong local militia … consisting largely of Christians” and “a 
system of local self-government,”162 because the Armenians are ready to be “delivered 
                                                          
156 The introduction of the Protestant mentality was a factor in this development. First, the Armenians 
adopted the Protestant tradition of rejecting an older religious authority, and separated themselves 
organizationally from the traditional religious hierarchy that cooperated with the Ottoman government. 
Then, as an organized collective that was influenced by American values, it was prepared to pursue its 
political separation from the Ottoman government, and in essence became a political group whose 
leadership claimed to have a national right to take away Ottoman land. Their cultural instruction toward 
becoming a Protestant-type religious society equipped them with the social organization that was necessary 
for running a Western-civilized state.   
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from their present wretchedness,”163 and conditions were right for “the uprising of a 
progressive Christian people, which may ultimately grow into an independent Christian 
State” that will offer “the best chance for the future of the Asiatic provinces of 
Turkey.”164 As “the principal advocate” of the Armenians in London, Bryce organized 
the politicization of the new Armenian group identity by becoming “the founder and first 
President of the Anglo-Armenian Society,”165 and also inspired the activities of 
Armenians within the Ottoman Empire itself.166 In addition to his publications on the 
subject in Britain and the United States, Bryce performed in the House of Commons as an 
agitator of the Armenian Question.167 The many instances in which reform of the 
Ottoman government was brought up by Anglo-American publicists, in the name of the 
Armenian people though out of concern that Germany would continue to extend its 
influence eastward, have erased from popular memory the knowledge that before the 
failure of Ottoman reform became the pretext for Armenian rebellion, the success of 
                                                          
163 Ibid., 935. 
 
164 Ibid. To this day, the discourse does not include consideration of who turned the Armenians into a 
“progressive” people and why, but instead it is simply assumed that they were progressive by virtue of their 
Christianity. However, as seen in the discussion above, from an American standpoint upon initial contact, 
the local people they called Armenians were neither progressive nor “Christian” in the Protestant sense.    
 
165 Fisher, James, 1:183. 
 
166 For instance, in a letter to Bryce from Constantinople, dated April 6, 1878, dozens of people among the 
Ottoman Armenian leadership who signed the document wanted to express their gratitude for, and belief in, 
Bryce’s narrative, according to which “the only possible means to effect the salvation of their father-land—
which has been the cradle of the human race—depend upon an immediate reform which in order to be 
radical and efficient, should be the grant of autonomy.” See: MS. Bryce 191, fols. 13-18. 
 
167 For instance, see: Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 3d ser., vol. 319 (1887), col. 66; Hansard 
Parliamentary Debate, 3d ser., vol. 325 (1888), cols. 1225-1226; Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 3d ser., 
vol. 345 (1890), cols. 159-160; Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 3d ser., vol. 347 (1890), cols. 1763-1766; 
Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 3d ser., vol. 348 (1890), cols. 169-208; Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 
4th ser., vol. 12 (1893), cols. 1054-1055; Hansard Parliamentary Debate, 4th ser., vol. 37 (1896), cols. 73-






reforming the Armenians as an organized community had allowed the Anglo-American 
union to use them as a pawn against German progress.168 
 Bryce is mostly remembered in historical accounts as the friend of Armenians,169 
who championed their cause,170 and who was “unremitting in his exertions for the relief 
and protection of the Armenian race,”171 but it is questionable that Bryce did things for 
the Armenians rather than to, and through, them. Bryce established himself in three 
profound ways before becoming specialized in the Armenian Question. First, Bryce was 
an expert on German history and culture. His debut work as a book author was titled, The 
Holy Roman Empire, which was published in 1864,172 and revised several times in less 
than a decade (1866-1875) during a formative period in Germany’s process of 
                                                          
168 On the eve of WWI, Bryce helped to promote two monographs through introductions in which he called 
attention to the group quality of the Armenians as valorous, patriotic, suffering, and loyal Christians, and 
said that “Britain has a plain moral responsibility in the matter.” See: James Bryce, introduction to The 
People of Armenia, by Archag Tchobanian (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1914), vii; James Bryce, 
introduction to Travel and Politics in Armenia, by Noel Buxton (London: Smith, Elder, 1914), x.   
 
169 This is how he is presented in a genocidized discourse by scholars of Armenian heritage in works that 
have been published by Anglo-American companies. Bryce’s involvement in the Armenian Question is 
offered minimal or no context. For an example of this, see: Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the 
Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Providence: Berghahn 
Books, 1995), 131. In Guenter Lewy’s work on the conflict, Bryce is presented as “a great friend of the 
Armenians.” See: Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide (Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), 8. Bryce is described as someone who was dedicated to human 
liberty. See: Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 117-118, 120. According to another account, Bryce was a “staunch 
Armenian advocate.” See: Suzanne E. Moranian, “A Legacy of Paradox: U.S. Foreign Policy and the 
Armenian Genocide,” in The Armenian Genocide, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2007), 313. The limited information could lead readers into believing that all that 
Bryce had to do with the atrocities was gather testimonies due to some vague sense of devotion to the 
Armenians. For example, see: Marc Nichanian, “Testimony: From Document to Monument,” in The 
Armenian, Hovannisian, 46. Such decontextualized references to Bryce do not even hint at the possibility 
that he was organizing the Armenians into a political unit because of Anglo-American power 
considerations. 
 
170 Fisher, James, 1:159. 
 
171 Ibid., 2:143. 
 
172 Bryce based this work on “the winning essay in the competition for the Arnold Prize in 1862.” See: 






unification.173 Hence, it may be considered that Bryce’s primary quality, which may have 
set him apart before embarking on a career path, was that he could grasp the essence of 
the greatest threat to Anglo-American power. Second, Bryce was fascinated by Roman 
Law, with an eye to comprehending “foreign systems of jurisprudence and the whole 
fabric of international law.”174 On April 11, 1870, when Gladstone was in office as the 
leader of the British government he offered Bryce the position of Regius Professor of 
Civil Law at the University of Oxford.175 This signaled Bryce’s early commitment to 
international law, which was complemented by his ability to analyze how Germany might 
be persuaded to agree to international arbitration, or be most effectively bound by it. 
Third, Bryce “fell in love with the United States”176 well ahead of finding a voice on the 
situation of the Armenians. As the Franco-Prussian war was changing the international 
scene, he went to the United States and was admitted into the social circle of the very 
people among the American elite who worked toward creating a system of international 
arbitration.177 Therefore, a learned consideration of Bryce’s crucial work on the 
                                                          
173 First, Macmillan published an edition in 1866, and then three more in 1870, 1873, and 1875. The fifth 
edition was published in 1904, and Bryce dedicated it to Goldwin Smith, whom he described as “the 
honoured patriarch of English historians. From whom forty-three years ago, when he was professor at 
Oxford, I received my first lesson in modern history, and whose friendship I have ever since been 
privileged to enjoy.” See: James Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan 
Company, 1904), vi. In his analysis of the new Pan-Germanic phenomenon, he found that “Unlike its 
venerable predecessor, this new Empire rests on a national basis.” See: Ibid., 493. The wide dissemination 
of the book is attested by Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s citing of the French translation of it in The 
Foundations of the Nineteenth Century. See: Chamberlain, Foundations, 1:165 (note).  
 
174 Fisher, James, vol. 1, 133.   
 
175 Ibid., 130.  
 
176 Ibid., 137. Later, Bryce professed that American culture is an extension of English culture, and that the 
United States is an advanced stage in the history of the “English stock.” See: James Bryce, The Study of 
American History: Being the Inaugural Lecture of the Sir George Watson Chair of American History, 
Literature and Institutions (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922), 21-25.  
 
177 Charles W. Eliot, the president of Harvard University between 1869 and 1909, is mentioned as someone 





Armenian Question involves the understanding that even at the peak of Armenian 
suffering in WWI he was driven by Anglo-American interests, which meant the 
employment of soft-power tactics to discredit Germany by sensationalizing the 
victimhood of Armenians178 and to advance international law by leading public opinion 
                                                          
States. See: Fisher, James, 1:136. Following his time as president of Harvard University, Eliot was 
appointed by Carnegie to become one of the original members on CEIP’s board of trustees, and remained 
on the board until 1919. See: Lester, Forty, 55. Bryce himself later became a member of one of Carnegie’s 
trusts, as an original member of the board of trustees overseeing the trust for universities of Scotland 
between 1901 and 1922. See: Ibid., 23. As the Bryce collection of papers at the University of Oxford 
shows, in addition to Eliot and Carnegie, he was in communication with American leaders such as Lyman 
Abbott, Nicholas Murray Butler, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Elihu Root, as well as United States presidents 
Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. His study of how the United States is 
governed, The American Commonwealth, was published in three volumes. It celebrated “the political 
genius … of the Anglo-American race,” and described the United States Supreme Court as “the living 
voice of the Constitution.” See: Bryce, American, 1:34, 363. The significance of the Constitution for the 
governance of affairs is a central feature of the book. See: Tulloch, James, 45. In the preface to American 
Commonwealth, there is mention of “Mr. Theodore Roosevelt of New York,” among the names of those to 
whom Bryce expressed an indebtedness. See: Bryce, American, 1:ix. This indicates that Bryce and 
Roosevelt had a personal relationship that predated the most notable accomplishments in the latter’s 
political career. It is said that for Roosevelt, “Bryce had long cherished both on private and public grounds, 
an affectionate regard, based on an acquaintance dating back to Roosevelt’s first entry into politics.” See: 
Fisher, James, 2:6. Bryce was given frequent access to the American public, especially through his 288 
contributions between 1875 and 1910 to the influential weekly, The Nation, which was edited by E. L. 
Godkin. See: D. C. Haskell, ed., The Nation: Index of Titles and Contributors, v. 1-105 (New York: New 
York Public Library, 1951-53); Fisher, James, 1:178. Godkin studied law under the tutelage of Field, 
whose leading role in the introduction of outlines for the codification of international law in 1872 is 
discussed above. See: William M. Armstrong, E. L. Godkin: A Biography (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1978), 45. Moreover, the Bryce collection of papers includes letters from employees of 
the NYT such as the newspaper’s editor-in-chief Charles Random Miller, as well as John H. Finley, Rollo 
Ogden, and Charles H. Grasty. The collection also shows communications from Edwin M. Hood of the 
Associated Press. It is claimed that “When Bryce was appointed to the Embassy at Washington, the general 
sentiment in Britain was that no better choice could have been made.” See: Fisher, James, 2:2. A notable 
indicator of Bryce’s place among the political elite in the United States is that while serving the British 
government as its ambassador to Washington (1907-1913), Bryce was the president of the American 
Political Science Association (1908), during the organization’s formative period. See: American Political 
Science Association, “Officers of the American Political Science Association for the Year 1908,” in 
Proceedings of the American Political Science Association (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1909), 5:5.  
 
178 Prior to the publication of the Blue Book on the treatment of Armenians, Bryce headed the report of a 
committee in which it was claimed as proven “That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and 
systematically organised massacres of the civil population” and “That looting, house burning, and the 
wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army.” See: 
Committee on Alleged German Outrages, Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages: 
Appointed by His Britannic Majesty’s Government and Presided over by The Right Hon. Viscount Bryce 
(New York: Macmillan and Company, 1915), 60. The report’s concluding sentence expressed “hope that as 
soon as the present war is over, the nations of the world in council will consider what means can be 
provided and sanctions devised to prevent the recurrence of such horrors as our generation is now 
witnessing.” See: Ibid., 61. This shows that the promotion of international law was literally the bottom line 





toward the conviction that the Ottoman government must be terminated and replaced with 
governance in accord with the Euro-Christian civilization and American power.179 This 
was the development of a strategy since the 1870s, which was made possible by the work 
of the American missionaries since the 1820s.   
 During WWI, American publications were active in advancing the Armenian 
Question by illustration of great Armenian suffering to the effect of leading the public 
toward the opinion that Germany was villainous, and that the land under Ottoman rule 
required a different governance. The discourse was framed around notions of Ottoman 
dysfunctionality and American neutrality. In the NYT, excitable headlines regarding the 
treatment of Armenians, and criticism—especially from former United States President 
                                                          
treatment of Armenians was based “do not, and by the nature of the case cannot, constitute what is called 
judicial evidence, such as a Court of Justice obtains when it puts witnesses on oath and subjects them to 
cross-examination,” he nonetheless used them as “historical evidence,” whose soft-power effect was to 
present the Germans as the Turks’ “apologists.” See: His, Treatment, xxvi-xxvii.  
 
179 In his preface to the Blue Book, he states that accounts seek to describe “what seemed to be an effort to 
exterminate a whole nation … the subjects of a Government devoid of scruples and of pity,” but he also 
mentions “the purpose of enabling the civilised nations of Europe to comprehend the problems which will 
arise at the end of this war, when it will become necessary to provide for the future government of what are 
now the Turkish dominions.” See: Ibid., xxi. Meaning, while the effort to affect public opinion toward 
international law dictated an emphasis on moral concern, the text suggested that governance in the region 
was the political destination to which the anticipated public sentiment was being directed. Despite Bryce’s 
claims that during the summer of 1915 the accounts on what was happening in the Ottoman Empire were 
“few and scanty at first,” according to Boghos Nubar’s collection, when Nubar met with Bryce in London 
on July 2, 1915, weeks after knowing that as part of the Ottoman wartime measures many Armenians had 
been expelled from their homes, Bryce informed him of a plan to publicize a memorandum on the situation 
of the Ottoman Armenian but that “he had to wait for the right moment to do so.” Compare: Ibid; Vatche 
Ghazarian, Boghos Nubar’s Papers and the Armenian Question, 1915-1918: Documents (Waltham, MA: 
Mayreni Publishing, 1996), 131. This might serve as an indicator of the precedence of public opinion in the 
Anglo-American treatment of the Armenian issue. An example of the centrality of public opinion during 
WWI is presented by Arnold Toynbee’s markedly changed tone about the events. Toynbee, who edited the 
documents of the Blue Book on behalf of the British government, shifted over the course of decades from 
stating during WWI that the Blue Book presented “evidence” that was “correct” in showing that “the 
Central Government at Constantinople … planned the systematic extermination of the Armenian race in the 
Ottoman Empire,” to admitting in retrospect that the Blue Book was an exercise in propaganda. Compare: 
Arnold J. Toynbee, Turkey: A Past and a Future (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917), 20; Arnold J. 
Toynbee, Acquaintances (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 151. Still, Toynbee maintained—rather 
unconvincingly—that both he and Bryce were “innocent” because they were “unaware of the politics that 






Theodore Roosevelt, who was perceived as dissociated from the United States 
government—attracted attention to the storyline, which employed means of persuasion to 
point at an American dilemma rather than strategy regarding the war.180 The perceived 
neutrality of the United States government during the first stages of WWI enabled the 
American sources of information to narrate the story of the war according to American 
interests without the appearance of doing so because they enjoyed credibility in the 
public eye that saw the United States government as if unattached to the war interests.  
On platforms such as the review of a book titled Sixty American Opinions on the 
War, the text in the NYT cemented what was considered the consensus among the public:  
Three outstanding facts appear upon reading this book through. One is the 
overwhelming moral reprobation felt by Americans against the German 
Government for planning and precipitating this war for purposes of international 
plunder. The second is the universality with which Americans perceive that 
England and the Allies are fighting for the democratic ideals of freedom, which 
are our own ideals, and that German victory would imperil our own liberties. The 
third is the indignant disgust produced on the American mind by the pro-German 
propaganda in this country.181 
 
The NYT also publicized on its front page the release of a committee report that provided 
an earlier American version in 1915 of the British Blue Book under Bryce’s name in 
1916.182 The report, which is nowadays ignored by many in the public discourse on the 
Armenian suffering, is—like the Blue Book—based on a biased view that highlights 
Christian victimhood and is an unreliable depiction of the general state of affairs. 
Nonetheless, it shows that the goal at the time was not to criminalize the leaders of the 
                                                          
180 For instance, see: “Roosevelt Heaps Blame on America,” New York Times, December 1, 1915; “Mr. 
Roosevelt at Lewiston,” New York Times, September 1, 1916.  
 
181 “The War as It Will Affect Africa,” New York Times, September 12, 1915. 
 






Ottoman government, but to suggest that they were incapable of maintaining adequate 
governance:  
The following is the text of the government order covering the case. Art. 2nd. 
“The commanders of the army, of independent and army corps and of divisions 
may, in case of necessity, and in case they suspect espionage or treason, send 
away, either or [sic] in mass, the inhabitants of villages or town, and install them 
in other places.” 
The orders of commanders may have been reasonably humane; but the execution 
of them has been for the most part unnecessarily harsh, and in many cases 
accompanied by horrible brutality to women and children, to the sick and the 
aged.183 
 
According to this, the Ottoman government was focused on “suspected espionage or 
treason,” and sought to set up “in other places” those civilians who would be sent away. 
Meaning, when considering the disastrous wartime conditions of the Armenians, this 
committee found no Ottoman intent to destroy their Armenian subjects, but rather 
incompetence in how the Ottoman plans were performed. The report made the argument 
for international law by showing chaos rather than malice. Among the members of this 
committee were members of CEIP’s board of trustees: Cleveland H. Dodge, and Oscar S. 
Straus.184 Also among the members of the committee were trustees of Carnegie’s Church 
Peace Union (CPU), which was established in 1914 and is currently known as the 
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs: David H. Greer, Frederick Lynch, 
                                                          
183 Committee on Armenian Atrocities, Report of Committee on Armenian Atrocities (New York: 
Committee on Armenian Atrocities, 1915), 2.  
 
184 Compare: Committee, Report, 1; Lester, Forty, 55-56. Straus’ other major biographical aspects are 
notable. He served the United States government officially as its ambassador to Constantinople and as its 
secretary of commerce and labor. Furthermore, he was the founding president of the American Jewish 
Historical Society, which currently keeps one of the three main Raphael Lemkin collections that are 
available to the public. Also, Straus was the founding vice-president of the American Society of 
International Law and chairman of its executive committee. See: American Society of International Law, 
“History of the Organization of the American Society of International Law,” in Proceedings of the 






John R. Moot, and George A. Plimpton.185 Significantly, the person who served as the 
United States ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during that time, Henry Morgenthau, 
joined CPU’s board of trustees in 1920.186 
 Morgenthau’s account of the Armenian experience is based on the belief that as 
the ambassador of the United States he was an impartial observer, but his description of 
the events was the punctuation point of a long process in which American power de-
Haikized and nationalized the Armenians toward the ousting of the Ottoman government 
and the establishment of Christian governance that would be more inclined to participate 
in the American idea of international law. It was a century long American production: 
from the work of the American missionaries to create the Armenian actors, to the words 
of the American ambassador that narrated the drama at the conclusion of the war. From 
within the same circle of American soft power but in a later effort to push for Turkish 
criminality, the report of the 1915 committee was cleared off the stage for claims of 
“systematic extermination,”187 and an entirely different approach: “It is absurd for the 
Turkish Government to assert that it ever seriously intended to ‘deport the Armenians to 
new homes’; the treatment which was given the convoys clearly shows that extermination 
was the real purpose of Enver and Talaat.”188 However, it was not simply that the 
“Turkish Government” asserted this, but rather that according to the 1915 report by those 
Americans with whom Morgenthau would go on to share a Carnegie trusteeship, the 
                                                          
185 Compare: Committee, Report, 1; Lester, Forty, 80.  
 
186 Ibid. When Lester’s book was released in 1941, Morgenthau’s membership was still ongoing.  
 
187 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 
1918), 311 
 






policy included resettlement.  
Despite the discrepancy between the committee’s report and the ambassador’s 
story, it appears that the latter is an evolved narrative of the former, and generated by the 
same fountainhead of information. Burton Hendrick, whom Morgenthau thanks “for the 
invaluable assistance he has rendered in the preparation of the book,”189 and who is said 
to have not only authored it but conceptualized its writing,190 was later also Carnegie’s 
biographer in a book by Doubleday,191 which had also published Morgenthau’s 
memoir.192 Although Morgenthau’s published account is structured as an anti-German 
wartime propaganda,193 it would be misguided to think that to examine the origin of the 
book project one “must begin” by studying the correspondence between Morgenthau and 
United States President Woodrow Wilson after the United States entered WWI.194 The 
                                                          
189 Ibid., vii. 
 
190 Heath W. Lowry, The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990), 7. 
 
191 See: Burton J. Hendrick, The Life of Andrew Carnegie (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & 
Company, 1932). 
 
192 By the time that Carnegie’s biography was published Doubleday’s official company name had become 
differently associated from when Morgenthau’s memoir was published.  
 
193 The book is designed to stress German responsibility for the war and its atrocities, and the chapters 
frame the discourse to focus on German agency. The preface starts with the assumption of a consensus 
view “that the Germans deliberately planned the conquest of the world.” See: Morgenthau, Ambassador, 
vii. Many of the book’s chapter headings present Germany as the subject. The titles of the chapters lead 
readers into relating wrongdoing and responsibility to Germany. Also, the text relates to Hans von 
Wangenheim—who was posted by Germany to lead the Ottoman Empire’s war efforts—the belief that 
“Germany was inevitably destined … to rule the world.” See: Ibid., 5-6. In addition, the text refers to “Dr. 
Lepsius,” by emphasizing that he is a German who, as “a high-minded Christian gentleman,” opposes the 
German government’s involvement in the treatment of Armenians. See: Ibid., 343. Johannes Lepsius had 
already become active in the Armenian issue during the massacres of the 1890s and had a book published 
in London: Johannes Lepsius, Armenia and Europe: An Indictment, ed. J. Rendel Harris (London: Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1897). Being German, his criticism of Germany had the potential of enjoying credibility in 
the public eye.  
 
194 Lowry, Story, 1. Lowry emphasizes “America’s war effort” as the impetus for the book. See: Ibid., 4. 
According to him, the advent of American “war policies” explain the difference in Morgenthau’s opinion 
between the time of “his departure from Turkey at the beginning of February 1916 and two years later 





political worth of the Armenian issue to the American political leadership did not start to 
materialize only after April, 1917, but rather Ambassador Morgenthau’s book project was 
the informational pinnacle in the American effort since the 1870s to use the Armenian 
Question toward the acceptance that international law is the answer for international 
relations.   
 
The Macedonian Question 
No Macedonian “people” existed in the beginning of the 1870s,195 but the 
developments in Germany meant that there were growing American interests in 
connection with the “Macedonian” region of the Ottoman Empire, which consisted of 
three Ottoman vilayets: Monastir, Skopje, and Thessaloniki.196 Already by the 1860s, 
Americans were engaged in substantial commercial activity in the area, as American 
ships—one ship was even named “Macedonia,” ahead of the modern usage by the people 
of the land—would dock in Thessaloniki.197 The American ability to use the land would 
                                                          
Armenian affairs since the 1820s and the American involvement in raising the Armenian Question since the 
1870s.  
 
195 In 1876, the region was mostly regarded as having a Slavonic population, without Macedonian 
designation. For instance, see: William Forsyth, The Slavonic Provinces South of the Danube: A Sketch of 
Their History and Present State in Relation to the Ottoman Porte (London: John Murray, 1876), 3. This is 
also reflected in a late nineteenth-century discussion on how despite the Gladstonian call to give Macedonia 
to the Macedonians, “There is no Macedonian nationality.” See: William Miller, Travels and Politics in the 
Near East (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1898).  
 
196 There are various spellings and pronunciations of these vilayets.  
 
197 Hristo Andonov Polyanski, The Attitude of the U.S.A. towards Macedonia: The 19th Century and during 
the Ilinden Uprising, 1903, trans. Synthia Keesan (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 1983), 29. 
According to Polyanski, by 1888, the cargo of American ships that were docked in the Thessaloniki port 
weighed a total of 2,492 tons. An American ship was named “Macedonia” before there were Macedonian 
people in modern times, which indicates that the concept of a Macedonian people is in line with an Anglo-
American cultural background rather than the local one. The absence of a Rumelian people in Anglo-
American lore might explain why there was never a Rumelian national identity to serve as the basis for a 






have been compromised if Germany’s dominance in the continent were to spread 
eastward either through conquest of Ottoman territory or cooperation with the Ottoman 
government. Eventually, the extension of German influence was slowed by the Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913),198 and halted with the eruption of WWI. Much like the Armenian 
case, rebellion against the Ottoman government was preceded by a new national 
organization of Christians who had come under the influence of American missionaries, 
and fought for the establishment of governance in accordance with the Euro-Christian 
civilization. In both cases, not only the Christian leadership presented a prospect of 
participation in international law, but the tremendous suffering that accompanied the 
violence of rebellion were used in the Anglo-American discourse to persuade public 
opinion that there is a need for a Euro-Christian international order.  
 As in the case of the modern-day Armenians, the concept of a “Macedonian” 
people resonated with the Anglo-American public opinion because of the existence of 
that name in the Anglo-American discourse of ancient history, but unlike the Armenians 
who presented a human core that was known as Haik at the time, there was no unified 
identity among the Christians of the region that was designated as Macedonia and the 
foundation of activities toward a national revolt had to be initially organized and 
                                                          
198 Interestingly, a series of translated essays on the Eastern Question was published by AJIL in 1911-1912, 
on the eve of the Balkan Wars. This may serve as an indication that the articles were given a platform for 
historical orientation in anticipation that the situation in the Balkans was bound to draw more public 
attention. See: Georges Scelle, “Studies on the Eastern Question [1],” trans. Charles G. Fenwick, American 
Journal of International Law 5, no. 1 (January 1911): 144-177; Georges Scelle, “Studies on the Eastern 
Question [2],” trans. Charles G. Fenwick, American Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (April 1911): 
394-413; Georges Scelle, “Studies on the Eastern Question [3],” trans. Charles G. Fenwick, American 
Journal of International Law 5, no. 3 (July 1911): 680-704; Georges Scelle, “Bulgarian Independence [1],” 
trans. Theodore Henckles, American Journal of International Law 6, no. 1 (January 1912): 86-106; 
Georges Scelle, “Bulgarian Independence [2],” trans. Theodore Henckles, American Journal of 






executed through Bulgarian agency. In the 1890s, while Bulgaria was being governed by 
hundreds of Robert College graduates,199 both the organization that became known as the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization but was originally named the Bulgarian 
Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Committee or the Central Committee, and the—
supposedly external—Supreme Macedonian-Adrianople Committee, were Bulgarian.200 
The latter was based in Sofia and developed under the direct control of the Bulgarian 
government, which was led by Constantine Stoiloff, a graduate of the American 
college;201 the former was based in Thessaloniki, which by that time had become a zone 
of American influence,202 and its operations were carried out by Bulgarian bandits.203 The 
                                                          
199 See the discussion above in the section “The Eastern Question.”  
 
200 Gotsé Delchev, who led this organization, was a Bulgarian whose education in Thessaloniki was 
influenced by the American operations in the region. See: Mercia MacDermott, Freedom or Death: The 
Life Gotsé Delchev (London: Journeyman Press, 1978), 60. General Ivan Tsonchev, who enjoyed a 
proximity to Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria and an association with both organizations, was another 
Bulgarian who had a leading role in the strategic planning of the revolutionary efforts. See: Ibid., 213-214, 
226-227, 251, 254.  
 
201 Stoiloff was “a member of the class of 1871” at the college. See: Miller, Travels, 414. It is said that 
“Under Stoiloff the Macedonian movement began.” See: Hermenegild Wagner, With the Victorious 
Bulgarians (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913), 54.  
 
202 Following the growth of American economic activities in the city, an American mission was opened 
there in 1894, and it was stated in 1901 that “The main reason for choosing this place as a mission station 
for Bulgarian work is the fact that Salonica is the governmental center for a very large Bulgarian 
population.” See: J. F. Clarke, Sketch of the European Turkey Mission of the American Board (Boston: 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1901), 14. In 1899, the vision of a Macedonian 
state included the recognition of Thessaloniki as its capital. See: J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: 
An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918), 415-416. 
Depictions of Bulgarian agency in the revolutionary effort without regard to American influence are 
inaccurate. For an instance of such a depiction, see: M. Edith Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle 
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1920), 92. The association between the development of national identity 
in the city and the American presence there has not been widely recognized in academic works. 
Thessaloniki was also the site where the Young Turk revolution received its inspiration. See: Barbara 
Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2:95. 
 
203 As seen in the reports by the NYT about the Ellen Stone case, in which the unclear circumstances 
regarding the alleged kidnapping of an American missionary ended with the payment of ransom that funded 
revolutionary activities in the area, the bandits involved were described as Bulgarian. See: “The Capture of 
Miss Stone,” New York Times, September 25, 1901; “Will Not Pay Ransom,” New York Times, September 
28, 1901. For a consideration of how this case led to the payment through which Bulgarian brigands could 





revolutionary goal of these two Bulgarian organizations was on the line in 1903 with the 
commencement of the uprising that is now commonly called the Ilinden,204 but the 
violence did not immediately lead to loss of Ottoman sovereignty. 
 The revolt in 1903 failed to replace the Ottoman rule with a Christian government 
in large part because the Christian population in the area had already developed separate 
loyalties to national identities and could not be aligned under a Bulgarian premise. On the 
one hand, it disappointed those who had hoped that the Ottoman government would be 
perceived by the local Christians as a common enemy, but on the other hand, it also 
produced encouraging signs for those same strategists who mainly wanted to prevent 
Germany from dominating Europe. The signs were a source of encouragement because 
they indicated that the Christians of the Balkans had arrived at a level of nationalism that 
leads them to deny any attempt by a foreign entity representing a nation that is not their 
own to take over what they came to believe was their territory. In the aftermath of the 
failed revolt, the Balkan Committee, which was directed by Bryce in London, adjusted 
itself to Balkan politics, and endeavored to generate information toward national unity 
among the Christians of Macedonia—be they Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Romanian, or 
Serbian—based on the common “economic causes” there.205 In other words, it was 
                                                          
Sherman, Fires on the Mountain: The Macedonian Revolutionary Movement and the Kidnapping of Ellen 
Stone (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 80. 
 
204 The name refers to St. Elijah Day, and thereby points at the activities on that day, August 2, in Monastir, 
as the beginning of the uprising. The effect of this name is to turn attention away from Thessaloniki and the 
events there several months prior to that, such as the attack on the local branch of the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank in April, which is reported to have been anticipated by at least one American missionary. See: 
Frederick Moore, The Balkan Trail (New York: Macmillan Company, 1906), 105. Until WWII, Anglo-
American accounts of the uprising did not include the name Ilinden. 
 
205 MS. Bryce 200, fols. 1-18, The Balkan Committee, “The Present Economic Condition of the 
Macedonian Vilayets of Monastir and Skopie,” 1. Thessaloniki was not included as one of the Macedonian 





recognized that because the population in the region was divided “by nationality,”206 the 
most effective national identity would not be founded on any one of the existing group 
identities but rather on the connection of local dwellers to the land, whose optimal 
production was said to be negated by the Ottoman government.   
 Hence, the post-1903 Anglo-American information that sought to construct a 
Macedonian national identity incorporated references to a Macedonian people into the 
language, enhanced the public’s sense of Ottoman wrongdoing, and avoided the 
presentation of the uprising as Bulgarian-operated. In 1904, the events of the preceding 
year were described in an American publication as “the deliberate and systematic 
extermination of the Macedonian people by the Turkish authorities.”207 In an effort to 
establish Christian solidarity toward a Christian governance of the region, the description 
“Christian Macedonian” was used.208 Later, after the Ottoman control of the Balkans was 
replaced by nation-states that represented the Christian civilization, and the uprising of 
1903 became a matter for historians, historiographical emphasis on the ethnic diversity of 
Macedonia removed from memory the knowledge that the fire of the Macedonian 
                                                          
argument about the other two vilayets, or perhaps because the inclusion of Thessaloniki would have been a 
reminder of the revolt that was organized as a Bulgarian affair.  
 
206 According to the report in the beginning of 1904, “In Macedonia,” 1,100,000 were Bulgarians, 500,000 
were Albanians, 410,000 were Turks, 150,000 were Serbians, 100,000 were Muslim Bulgarians, 72,000 
were Romanians, and 50,000 were Jews. See: Ibid., 18. However, it is unclear to what extent the fluidity of 
one’s national identity in the region was taken into consideration when the numbers were tallied. For 
instance, according to one account a person from Monastir said that his village used to be Greek before 
turning Bulgarian, and the reason he gave for the change was that the Bulgarians provided the village with 
a priest and free teaching. See: H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (London: 
Methuen, 1906), 102-103.    
 
207 George N. Chakaloff and Stanislav J. Shoomkoff, The Macedonian Problem, and its Proper Solution 
(Philadelphia: John C. Winston, 1904), 5. 
 






Question was first fueled by the American-guided Bulgarian nation.209 The political 
efforts to “Bulgarize Macedonia”210 were converted into historiographical efforts to 
Macedonianize the once Bulgarian quality of the revolutionary movement against the 
Ottoman government.211 This made the historiographical omission of the American 
involvement less noticeable, and it became the standard form of the discourse following 
CEIP’s report on the Balkan Wars.212  
                                                          
209 For examples of the focus on the multiple group interests in the region in a manner that comes at the 
expense of acknowledging that the revolutionary movement was specifically Bulgarian, see: Chakaloff and 
Shoomkoff, Macedonian, 60-61; Robert W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (London: 
Constable and Company, 1917), 129; Marriott, The Eastern, 409; Ferdinand Schevill, The History of the 
Balkan Peninsula: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1922), 436; Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1950), 9-11, 15; L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Holt, Reinhart 
and Winston, 1958), 517; Jelavich, History, 2:89-91; Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian 
Interventions in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914: The Emergence of a European Concept and International 
Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 230.  
 
210 As Edward Dicey phrased it in the 1890s, while referring to the region in its Anglo-American 
geographical name, there was an agenda to “Bulgarize Macedonia.” See: Dicey, Peasant, 257. 
 
211 Works of Anglo-American historiography label the committee in Thessaloniki as internal and the 
committee in Sofia as external. For examples, see: William Le Queux, An Observer in the Near East 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), 292; Stavrianos, Balkans, 520; Marin V. Pundeff, “Bulgarian 
Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1969), 130; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire 
and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:209; Dimitrije Djordjevic and 
Stephen Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1981), 178. The effect of this labeling is to create a false perspective of how the revolutionary movement 
was organized. The so-called internal committee was no less Bulgarian than the so-called external one. The 
authentic designation was that the one in Sofia was superior, being in proximity to government operations, 
and the other was central, being closer to where the revolutionary action was taking place. Moreover, the 
eventual Ottoman loss of “Macedonia” in the Balkan Wars is characterized as “the birth of a nation” from 
an American missionary’s perspective. See: J. M. Nankivell, A Life for the Balkans: The Story of John 
Henry House of the American Farm School, Thessaloniki, Greece (New York: Fleming H. Revell 
Company, 1939), 163. In addition, Delchev, the Bulgarian who led the Central Committee, is said to have 
been the leader of “a more genuinely Macedonian body” and one of “a handful of Macedonian 
intellectuals.” See: Barker, Macedonia, 16; Mark Biondich, The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political 
Violence since 1878 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 67. This kind of discourse suppresses 
Delchev’s Bulgarian identity, and, as a result, the movement’s Bulgarian identity is suppressed as well. 
  
212 In this report, the Bulgarian revolutionary movement that operated in the American-influenced 
environment of Thessaloniki is described only as an “internal organization” whose commitment was to the 
“Christian population” in Macedonia. See: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the 
International Commission: To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, 1914), 33. In keeping 





Accordingly, the Macedonian case has not been identified in the context of 
American power considerations regarding German spheres of influence prior to WWI, 
and has remained isolated from the Armenian case and the greater understanding of how 
the rise of nation-states within the Ottoman Empire was related to the development of 
international law. It is here considered that the modern creation of this Christian nation 
under the Macedonian name did not merely set up a Euro-Christian defiance of Muslim 
rule. The rallying of Christians under a newly invented collective identity was conducive 
toward establishing another political unit in the Balkans that would stop German 
expansion and participate in the international law that would give the division of 
European property between existing nation-states a legal protection. This prevention of 
land from coming under German governance was initially attempted through a quest for a 
greater Bulgaria, but after the failure to unite the people under the Bulgarian national 
identity in 1903 the Anglo-American language presented a Macedonian national identity. 
Either option—Bulgarian or Macedonian—was bound to strengthen the legal marking of 
non-German land in Europe through international law, and thereby establish a Christian-
based normative opposition to changes in the status quo between European sovereignties. 
Just as the Armenians were cultivated to become a political buffer against German 
expansion on the Asian side of the Ottoman Empire, the Macedonian national existence 
was an extension of the effort to obstruct German governance on the European side of the 
Ottoman Empire. In both cases, international law was designed to secure their sovereign 
                                                          
population” rebelled against the Ottoman government. See: Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended 
Peace: The Road to 1914 (New York: Random House, 2013), 244. For other recent examples of 
monographs that cement the concealment of American involvement by using language that creates an 
assumption of a non-Bulgarian identity during the time of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement in the 
region, see: Rodogno, Massacre, 229-246; Ipek K. Yosmaoglu, Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the 






right over territory, and their status as such presented the potential of shaping governance 
through international law.    
 
Before Victory 
Much like the project of genocide scholarship, leading IR works, which unfold 
history through theoretical frames, offer a limited view of the circumstances that led to 
WWI, particularly as it regards American strategy and the promotion of international law. 
Chief among such works213 is G. John Ikenberry’s After Victory, whose main claim is that 
“states,”214 after winning “major wars,” are in a situation of power advantage that invites 
them “to find ways to set limits on their power and make it acceptable to other states.”215 
Ikenberry’s work obstructs the view of international law as a manifestation of American 
                                                          
213 Some IR monographs, though popularly used in classes of political science, display a disregard for the 
study of American interests prior to WWI but the avoidance of American power considerations is not an 
inherent part of their theoretical premise. In one work that calls attention to power, simplistic historical 
arguments are made without being required by a theoretical approach, such as “modern Germany would 
have been secure had it only behaved itself,” and “Germany sought a wide empire, and World War I grew 
largely from the collision between German expansionism and European resistance to it.” See: Stephen Van 
Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 191, 
202. The emphasis on “German expansionism” is noticeable throughout the book, and is coupled with the 
strictly Euro-centric focus that does not consider American interests as a factor. Germany is presented as 
the main actor, and is assigned the main bulk of verbiage about political strategy that is associated with 
self-interest. In another work that centers on power in its theoretical approach, Germany’s role as an actor 
is similarly highlighted by accusations such as: “in the decade before World War I, Germany attempted to 
intimidate its European rivals,” and “Germany’s leaders were principally responsible for starting World 
War I in the summer of 1914.” See: Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 152, 188.  
 
214 The reference to states rather than the United States in particular is typical of the theorizing quality of IR 
works, and it structurally diverts attention from discussions about the one main actor in the international 
scene, the United States, which also happens to be the home of IR studies. The theoretical approach is 
empowered by the assumption that this brand of political study is a matter of social science.   
 
215 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), xi. Ikenberry’s confidence in the 
generalization rests on his survey of only three major wars and their aftermaths. He determines state 
behavior according to war, rather than consider that even the major wars are engaged as part of a 
preexisting strategy toward an idea of international order. As his double usage of the word after in the full 
book title suggests, Ikenberry’s work popularized a language that trains people to consider American 






strategy, and it does this through his markings of timeframe, language, agency, and 
power. Firstly, by claiming to have identified “An historical pattern” that necessarily 
involves postwar evaluations by the victors,216 he designs a framework that excludes 
significant developments that occurred before the victory. Secondly, rather peculiarly, he 
refrains from using the term international law, and, instead, the text is filled with 
references to international order.217 Thirdly, by the placement of Woodrow Wilson at the 
center of the narrative about the advent of the League of Nations,218 he directs the study 
                                                          
216 Ibid., 4. 
 
217 Ikenberry expresses his interest to be in “The debate about the sources of international order,” without 
ever clarifying his choice to focus on order rather than law. See: Ibid., 10. Even when describing “mutually 
agreed-upon rules and principles,” which seem to be law by definition, he prefers to describe them as 
“order.” See: Ibid., 12. This odd insistence on order rather than law is seen as related to his choice of 
timeframe, considering that the American promotion of international law is recorded to have begun long 
before WWI and would have frustrated the core of his thesis and negated the very title of the book. Even 
when overlooking the American campaign for codification of international law and international arbitration 
since the 1870s, the mainstream historiography cannot deny that ASIL was assembled in 1906, and made 
its first official publication in 1907. For instance, see: Frederic L. Kirgis, The American Society of 
International Law’s First Century, 1906-2006 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 1.   
 
218 For example, in reference to the League of Nations as a postwar phenomenon, Ikenberry describes it as 
“Woodrow Wilson’s proposal,” regardless of whether or not Wilson was involved in the original 
conceptualization of the league prior to the war. See: Ibid., 117. Similarly, it is suggested that “Wilson 
presented a case for a new international organization to supervise and guarantee the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and reinforce democratic government worldwide, most critically in Europe,” without regard to the 
relevant developments that preceded Wilson’s public treatment of this concept in the context of WWI. See: 
Ibid., 127. According to Ikenberry, it was “in Wilson’s view” that “The League of Nations … was a vehicle 
to lock European states into a new type of order.” Ibid., 139. Meaning, this statement erroneously suggests 
that American efforts toward international arbitration did not effectively happen before WWI, and ought to 
be reduced to Wilson’s publicized wartime conveyance of them rather than considered in the context of 
great endeavors by a host of others since the 1870s. In passing, and literally between dashes, Ikenberry 
mentions that “Roosevelt had proposed the league concept in 1905.” See: Ibid., 150. This statement, which 
is given without citation or context, has the capacity to upend Ikenberry’s entire after-victory premise 
regarding Wilson and the League of Nations, yet it is placed in the text casually and as if barely relevant. 
The one-leader approach is adopted by Ikenberry in general, as he associates 1815 with Viscount 
Castlereagh, and 1945 with Harry Truman. See: Ibid., xi. It is here suggested that the association of 
national self-determination as a concept with Wilson’s approach to WWI and its aftermath is also a narrow 
view that disconnects the concept from an American vision that was in existence long before WWI. The 
concept is not seen as part of a greater process because it follows an approach that compartmentalizes 
history according to presidential administrations. Moreover, this approach is common in the rhetoric of 
popular Anglo-American media outlets about politics, such as the NYT, The Economist, and Foreign 
Affairs, in which the narrative is characterized by a focus on the agency of highly elected officials such as 
presidents and prime ministers. Ikenberry is a regular contributor to the last mentioned magazine, and his 





of the phenomenon away from principal actors and their agenda. Finally, his discussion 
of power does not include the distinction between hard and soft, and, consequently, the 
meaning of the theoretical premise is that it considers soft power to be limited power, or 
less power in comparison to hard power. The historiographical perspective that Ikenberry 
proposes is in agreement with the belief that—in the spirit of George Washington’s 
farewell address in September, 1796, and in accordance with James Monroe’s doctrine of 
1823—“the United States observed a policy of non-intervention with respect to the affairs 
of European States”219 until it joined WWI in April, 1917.220     
 In addition to the complex facilitation of the international environment toward 
international arbitration that had taken place since the 1870s, the specific idea of a league 
of nations preceded WWI and was not conceived by Wilson or any other American 
                                                          
Foreign Affairs’ publisher—the Council on Foreign Relations—and the author of its first featured article, 
might be in line with the magazine’s president-centric style but is at odds with its own history. 
 
219 Hyde, International, 124. The United States government presented this notion as true in its reservation 
upon signing the pre-WWI convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, in which it stated 
that it has a “traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political 
questions or policy or international administration of any foreign State.” See: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Signatures, Ratifications, Adhesions and Reservations to the Conventions and 
Declarations of the First and Second Hague Peace Conferences (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1914), 6. 
 
220 Ikenberry tells the story of the League of Nation’s creation without the context of the power 
considerations that preceded WWI. He mentions that after the war had started, “a group of unofficial 
British internationalists, organized around former ambassador to the United States Lord James Bryce” and 
that it was “They” who “urged” the Americans into taking the lead in the league project, and that they 
continued to press the Wilson administration toward this goal even after the United States had joined the 
war. See: Ikenberry, After, 142. According to such an account, Bryce is depicted as if part of a “British” 
entity that is separate from the American interests and activities that had been carried out for decades. It is 
to be noted that this vision of history is supported by the information that was produced in Britain at the 
time: “At the outbreak of war a group of men in England thought they might do useful service, not only for 
their country but for the greater cause of civilization, by getting into touch with American opinion, and 
bringing thoughtful men in England and America together.” See: Charles Robert Ashbee, The American 
League to Enforce Peace: An English Interpretation (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917), 13. 
However, this information was already devised to have a particular effect on public opinion, which was the 
promotion of the belief that the war prompted the assembly of the league rather than seeing the league as a 






president. In 1905, through the suggestion of a Christian civilizational underpinning,221 
Carnegie presented international law as the final triumph of what is just and merciful,”222 
and explained that through the support of conferences at The Hague “we shall have the 
germ of the Council of Nations,”223 which would realize his long held vision of 
international arbitration: 
Five nations co-operated in quelling the recent Chinese disorders and rescuing 
their representatives in Pekin. It is perfectly clear that these five nations could 
banish war. Suppose even three of them formed a League of Peace—inviting all 
other nations to join—and agreed that since war in any part of the civilized world 
affects all nations, and often seriously, no nation shall go to war, but shall refer 
international disputes to the Hague Conference or other arbitrary body for 
peaceful settlement, the League agreeing to declare non-intercourse with any 
nation refusing compliance. Imagine a nation cut off to-day from the world. The 
League also might reserve to itself the right, where non-intercourse is likely to fail 
or has failed to prevent war, to use the necessary force to maintain peace, each 
member of the League agreeing to provide the needed forces, or money in lieu 
thereof, in proportion to her population or wealth. Being experimental and upon 
trial, it might be deemed advisable, if necessary, at first to agree that any member 
could withdraw after giving five years’ notice, and that the League should 
dissolve five years after a majority vote of all members.224  
 
Less than two years later, in the context of the second international conference at the 
Hague, Carnegie called for “the formation of a League of Nations similar to that formed 
in China recently for a specific object, which was successfully accomplished.”225 In 
October of 1914, soon after WWI had started, Carnegie was found ready to articulate the 
lessons of the war and the scenario following its conclusion: “Germany and Austria 
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should be the first invited by the Allies to join in forming a League of Peace.”226 When 
Wilson gave the famous address in which he presented an argument for “a League of 
Peace” as an idea that had been “taking form in my mind,”227 it was more than a decade 
after Carnegie had done so, and decades after the initial American efforts toward 
establishing international arbitration. Even regarding the two presidents who preceded 
Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, who were active toward the 
promotion of peace through arbitration at The Hague, it cannot be said that they were the 
source of the American quest for international law.228 
 Through financial contributions from Carnegie, the realization of international 
                                                          
226 Andrew Carnegie, “A League of Peace—Not ‘Preparation for War,’” Independent 80 (October 19, 
1914): 89. This statement by Carnegie was also the subject of an article by the NYT, in which it is written in 
uppercase letters that he “favors league of nations.” See: “Carnegie Lays War to Gigantic Armies,” New 
York Times, October 15, 1914. 
 
227 Woodrow Wilson, A League for Peace: Address of the President of the United States, Delivered before 
the United States Senate on January 22, 1917, Submitting Certain Conditions upon Which This 
Government Would Feel Justified in Approving Its Formal and Solemn Adherence to A League for Peace 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1917), 3-4.  
 
228 It can be said that all three of these presidents, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, who were placed in 
competition with one another as candidates for presidency in 1912, operated at one point or another within 
Carnegie’s network. One of Carnegie’s biographies depicts a relationship in which Carnegie in 1910 
funded, along with J. P. Morgan, “Roosevelt’s mass slaughter of African wild life … in the name of science 
under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institutions,” while “In return, Roosevelt would visit the Kaiser and 
press the cause for a ‘League of Peace.’” See: Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), 929. For his part in the arrangement, Roosevelt had requested to rely on 
instructions given to him by Elihu Root. See: Hendrick, Life, 2:326, 330. It is stated that “Carnegie also 
provided a $10,000 annual pension for David Lloyd George and former President Taft.” See: Wall, 
Andrew, 1043. According to a record of Carnegie’s trusts, “Pensions for Ex-Presidents of the United States 
were proposed by Mr. Carnegie in 1912 when he requested that part of the income of Carnegie Corporation 
of New York be used for such a purpose,” but “the Corporation voted, on January 9, 1918, not to apply any 
part of the income towards ex-Presidential pensions.” See: Lester, Forty, 76. However, it is added that 
“Under Mr. Carnegie’s will … Mrs. Cleveland (now Mrs. Thomas J. Preston), Mrs. Edith Roosevelt, 
President Taft, and other personal friends received life annuities in varying amounts which are paid by the 
Home Trust Company, trustee under the will.” See: Ibid., 77. Taft was a member of CPU’s board of 
trustees between 1918 and 1930. See: Lester, Forty, 80. Prior to running for election as president, Wilson 
was on the board of trustees of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching since its 
inception in 1905 and until 1910. See: Ibid., 49-50. This information offers a wider view of the work 
toward international law, and it puts the publicized wartime polemic between Roosevelt and Wilson under 






order via international law had been converted into language through scholarly 
publications before WWI. In 1907, on the first issue of AJIL, the journal that was 
dedicated to international law, Elihu Root promoted the notion that there is “popular 
control over national conduct” and argued for public awareness of international law.229 At 
its prewar period, the publication was like a newsletter for activities at The Hague, and 
tried to suggest ways through which the establishment of a permanent court of arbitration 
there could be made practical.230 Following the two conferences of 1899 and 1907, there 
was expressed optimism that there would be a third conference “in or about the year 
1915.”231 However, by 1915, it had become clear that after decades of American 
facilitation toward a system of international law that would stop Germany in its tracks, 
the imposition of legal authority over Germany would only be made possible after its 
defeat.  
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230 For example, see: Jackson H. Ralston, “Some Suggestions as to the Permanent Court of Arbitration,” 
American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (April 1907): 321-329; William L. Penfield, “International 
Arbitration,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (April 1907): 330-341; Clarke, “A 
Permanent,” 342-408; David J. Hill, “The Second Peace Conference at the Hague,” American Journal of 
International Law 1, no. 3 (July 1907): 671-691; “The Second Peace Conference of the Hague,” American 
Journal of International Law 1, no. 4 (October 1907): 945-954; James Brown Scott, “The Work of the 
Second Hague Conference,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (January 1908): 1-28; Amos 
S. Hershey, “Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences,” American Journal of 
International Law 2, no. 1 (January 1908): 29-49; Bustamante, “Hague,” 95-120; Charles Noble Gregory, 
“The Proposed International Prize Court and Some of Its Difficulties,” American Journal of International 
Law 2, no. 3 (July 1908): 458-475; Brown, “Proposed,” 476-489; Thomas Raeburn White, 
“Constitutionality of the Proposed International Prize Court—Considered from the Standpoint of the 
United States,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 3 (July 1908): 490-506; William I. Hull, 
“Obligatory Arbitration and the Hague Conferences,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 4 
(October 1908): 731-742; Scott, “The Proposed,“ 772-810; Elihu Root, “The Relations between 
International Tribunals of Arbitration and the Jurisdiction of National Courts,” American Journal of 
International Law 3, no. 3 (July 1909): 529-536; Heinrich Lammasch, “Compulsory Arbitration at the 
Second Hague Conference,” American Journal of International Law 4, no. 1 (January 1910): 83-94; James 
Brown Scott, “The Evolution of a Permanent International Judiciary,” American Journal of International 
Law 6, no. 2 (April 1912): 316-358. 
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 WWI presented a new possibility for the progression of a preexisting strategy. 
Bryce offered the following words in 1915: “The frightful catastrophe of the present War, 
involving more than half the human race, and bringing grave evils on neutral nations also, 
has driven thoughtful men to reflect on the possibility of finding means by which the risk 
of future wars may be dispelled, or at least largely reduced.”232 The confidence in a 
German loss presented a significantly improved opening for international arbitration to be 
organized through a council of nations after the war, but as this rhetoric in the midst of 
the warring suggests, it was perceived even before the war’s conclusion that for the sake 
of gains in public opinion, the war itself—rather than the prewar hard-power 
considerations—had to be seen as the impetus for international law. Accordingly, the 
difference between before and after the American victory in WWI as it regards 
international order, was not a matter of a newly emerging American idea on how to use 
newly acquired relative power, but rather it was the ability after the war to use the 
experience of the war as an opportunity to promote international institutions toward law 
and arbitration as conceived before the war. Put differently, the desired transition from 
hard power through soft power to legal power could not be continued because the 
German resistance to the status quo in hard-power relations meant that an important 
component of the international political scene considered the American production of soft 
                                                          
232 James Bryce, preface to Proposals for the Avoidance of War with a Prefatory Note by Viscount Bryce, 5, 
https://archive.org/details/proposalsforavoi00brycuoft (last accessed, 1/24/2017). This prefatory note was 
part of a version that was prepared in February, 1915, by G. Lowes Dickinson, who is listed as “the 
Secretary of the Group.” It was not for publication. For the revised version that appeared two years later, 
see: James Bryce, Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1917). 
The period of two years between the original and the published version suggests that it was possibly 
understood that what Bryce and associates articulated about the purposes of the war in 1915 would have 







power to be unconvincing. Since law requires legitimate authority, it became apparent 
through WWI that there had been no universal sense of authority despite the growing 
existence of information that advocated for international law.    
 
The League of Nations 
Fighting Germany in WWI was not only a basic feature of hard power, but also 
material for a soft-power campaign to create awareness, with greater oomph, of legal 
responsibility between nations. While the war was ongoing, and atrocities were being 
prominently advertised, CEIP produced publications to remind the public of the 
international conventions of 1899 and 1907 that had been signed at The Hague.233 
Without calling attention to American leadership in organizing and promoting the prewar 
movement toward international arbitration at The Hague,234 the existence of documented 
agreement regarding “the principle of compulsory arbitration” was recalled.235 The war 
provided images through which the Americans could illustrate what was meant by the 
prewar ideas for considering certain acts of war to be a crime. Thus, the promotion of an 
international judicial system received a great measure of strength from the credible 
                                                          
233 For instance, see: The Hague Conventions of 1899 (II) and 1907 (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915); The Final Acts of the 
First and Second Hague Peace Conferences, Together with the Draft Convention on a Judicial Arbitration 
Court (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915). 
 
234 One way in which the information on the history of the first conference at The Hague leads the public 
away from seeing international law as largely an American project is that it highlights what was merely a 
symbolic invitation by the Czar of Russia as if he was the one to initiate the meeting for the purpose of 
agreeing on an international convention. For examples of this, see: Carnegie, League, 21; “First,” 155; 
Fenwick, International, 28; Michael Rosenthal, Nicholas Miraculous: The Amazing Career of the 
Redoubtable Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 163. The effect of 
such information is that the American conceptual and organizational leadership becomes less pronounced.  
 






wartime and postwar depictions of a need for international legal authority to be exercised 
in matters of criminal conduct by governments.  
 When unaffected by current Anglo-American historiographical preferences, the 
view of the Anglo-American interests regarding international law before, during, and 
after WWI, shows that the project was mainly designed to contain German power or 
prevent a similar power from developing, and did not concern itself with the 
criminalization of the Ottoman government or any other government. As stated by the 
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties at the Peace Conference in Paris (1919): “The Allied and Associated Powers 
publicly arraign William II of Hoenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”236 It was clarified in 
the report of the preliminary peace conference commission that the responsibility of the 
war “rests first on Germany and Austria, second on Turkey and Bulgaria.”237 Moreover, it 
narrated that “A few months before war broke out, Turkey handed over the command of 
her military and naval forces to the German General Liman von Sanders and the German 
Admiral Souchon,”238 and it regarded Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha as “German agents” 
                                                          
236 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Violation of the Laws and Customs of War: Reports of 
Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of 
Responsibilities, Conference of Paris, 1919 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919), vii. The collection of reports 
was approved in signature by Robert Lansing. See: Ibid., 1. 
 
237 Ibid., 4.  
 
238 Ibid., 9. In another publication through CEIP, later in the interwar period, a similar argument is made. 
There is it said that “The whole Turkish nation was dragged into the War as a result of a fait accompli, the 
work of a German admiral who received his orders from the Kaiser.” See: Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the 
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in the war.239 The Ottoman government was not even seen as an independent actor in the 
war, and the American vision aimed at achieving German recognition of international 
legal authority.240  
 As the post-WWI international treaties show, there was an emphasis on burdening 
the future moves of a major power in Europe by producing more treaties to that effect. 
Initial hints of “genocide” as a legal term were not found in a threatening wartime letter 
that was sent from one belligerent side to another or in a focus on the Turkish courts-
martial (1919-1920) that involved specific wartime violations in the battlefield, but rather 
in the treaties of the new postwar states, “Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State, Roumania, Greece, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey, for the just 
and equal treatment of their racial, religious, and linguistic minorities.”241 In other words, 
the grain of “genocide” was not in the experience of any particular wartime suffering, nor 
in the adjudication of any particular wartime offender, but in the specialized legislation 
that was worded in the postwar treaties. In the context of circumventing future German 
expansion in Europe, the treaty that was signed with Poland by the United States, Britain, 
                                                          
239 CEIP, Violation, 11. The report provided a selective listing of murders and massacres during WWI in 
Belgium, France, Greece, and Poland, and included reference to the Armenians as victims under “Greece.” 
See: Ibid., 29-31. Also, it mentioned deportation of civilians in France, Greece, Italy, Romania, and Serbia, 
and included reference to the Armenians as victims under “Greece.” See: Ibid., 35-36.   
 
240 Accordingly, the wording of the commission’s report asked “That the enemy Governments shall … 
recognise the jurisdiction of the National Tribunals and the High Tribunal, that all enemy persons alleged to 
have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity shall be 
excluded from any amnesty to which the belligerents may agree, and that the Governments of such persons 
shall undertake to surrender them to be tried.” See: Ibid., 25. By aiming thus, the lack of precedent in 
international law would become covered by the German agreement for such legal practice.  
 
241 Oppenheim, International, 1:582. The text also lists details about the relevant information in the treaties. 
This is part of Oppenheim’s discussion of the protection of minorities as part of the agenda of international 
law. The matter was not related to wartime suffering, but rather emphasized state policy during peace. See: 






France, Italy, and Japan, was primary, and the first of such treaties. It was signed at 
Versailles, on June 28, 1919, and its wording and meaning in Article 12 have points of 
similarity with that of the Genocide Convention: 
Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect 
persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute 
obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the 
League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of 
the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, 
France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any 
modification in these Articles which is in due form assented by a majority of the 
Council of the League of Nations. 
Poland agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall 
have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger 
of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the council may thereupon take 
such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the 
circumstances.242  
 
Thus, long before WWII, the protection of minorities, according to their “racial, religious 
or linguistic” affiliation, was established in international law piecemeal by way of treaties 
with the new European states that were east of Germany, all the way to the Middle 
East,243 in the same territories that the German Empire treated as its spheres of influence 
on the eve of WWI. 
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America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and Poland, Signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1919), 12. This aspect was also secured in article 
93 of the treaty with Germany itself, in which it is stated: “Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty 
with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said 
Powers to protect the interests and inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in 
race, language or religion.” See: Allied and Associated Powers, Treaty of Peace with Germany 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1919), 139.  
 
243 Regarding the Middle East, the League of Nations also served in the authorization of the relationship 
between Britain and France of the Allied Powers and the territories in the Middle East. This was a matter 
for one of the committees of the League of Nations. See: Howard-Ellis, Origin, 135. Thus, the newly 
defined nation-states, regardless of their specialized national character, were directed toward governance 
that would fit the expectations of the Family of Nations for a law among nations in the spirit of the Euro-
Christian civilization, in accordance with the American vision that dates back to the 1870s. Also, the 
mandates were considered as a new and different type of relationship between great power and “native 
agencies.” See: Geddes W. Rutherford, “Spheres of Influence: An Aspect of Semi-Suzerainty,” American 






   Therefore, the League of Nations was set to function toward the postwar 
fulfillment of a prewar plan. It was programmed to be governed by a council, settle 
disputes by an international court, and enforce international law by sanctions and a 
readiness to go to war.244 It was promoted as “a League of war against war,”245 in the 
belief that “If ever there is to be an organized world society guaranteeing peace it must be 
based on a world law.”246 While the protection of minorities in Europe had not yet been 
described as a matter of crime prevention and punishment, the League of Nations 
administered a detailed bureaucratic set of procedures that established responsibility 
among the member states.247 In the interwar period, the following observation was made 
in an official publication by the League of Nations:  
The protection of minorities is one of the most difficult and delicate tasks which 
the Peace Treaties laid on the League and one which places the greatest 
responsibility upon the Members of the Council. It is primarily political and, this 
being so, it is not surprising that the subject has been widely discussed both inside 
and outside the League during the past ten years.248  
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R. Duke, 1918), ix. 
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247 The guarantee of the League of Nations was designed to facilitate a protocol for interaction between the 
Council of the League of Nations and the relevant nation-states. For information on how the protection of 
minorities was monitored, see: Eric Drummond, Ten Years of World Cooperation (London: Secretariat of 
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from Upper Silesia)” were addressed to the League of Nations between 1921 and the writing of the book, 
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When considered in retrospect, the “Minorities Treaties” were the blueprint for the 
Genocide Convention, and this view is supported by the wording of the resolution that 
was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in expression of  
…the hope that the States which are not bound by any legal obligations to the 
League with respect to minorities will nevertheless observe in the treatment of 
their own racial, religious or linguistic minorities at least as high a standard of 
justice and toleration as is required by any of the Treaties and by the regular 
actions of the Council.249 
 
This use of language shows that before “genocide” had been coined, related to Lemkin, 
and made into a crime of international law through the United Nations’ Genocide 
Convention, there had already been an official endeavor by the League of Nations to turn 
the protection of minority groups into an international norm based on the legal existence 
of the individual treaties with the new nation-states that covered significant land between 
Germany and the Middle East.  
 
“Genocide” 
National existence around Germany was both the original foundation and 
destination of the international-law program. Different peoples were not just informed 
that they are separate nations and had to act as national entities to be members in the 
Christian civilization’s Family of Nations, but they were also protected, as such, by one 
of international law’s most basic elements: recognition of national sovereignty. As early 
as 1872, Field’s initial articulation of the American project to design an international 
code was based on the notion that “Every nation is sovereign within its own jurisdiction; 
that is to say, it is, of right, independent of all foreign interference, and free to express 
                                                          






and enforce its will, by action within its jurisdiction, without opposition from any foreign 
power.”250 Hence, international law negated conquest against recognized sovereignties or 
the attempt to unite territories of European nation-states into one German-led federal 
government,251 while disregarding the kind of informational influence that was exerted by 
the Anglo-Americans on these sovereign nations. Situated in the center of the European 
continent, German power was contained by surrounding nation-states, which were 
empowered by international law. In order for German power to grow after WWI, it 
sought to bypass international law by denationalizing the European nation-states and 
renationalizing Europe under a national-socialist agenda. 
 Denationalization in the language of international law was a matter of a state’s 
denial of citizenship rights by claiming that the denationalized is for some reason no 
longer legally recognized as a national member,252 or a state’s forced denationalization of 
a population in an occupied territory.253 However, it gradually became apparent that the 
experience of Nazi Germany exceeded the limits of the term. The Nazi government not 
only introduced unprecedented domestic laws in which the old fashioned 
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denationalization was put into effect,254 and, once WWII began, it did not simply 
“impose” its own “national characteristics on the population.”255 Significantly, Germany 
used its power to cancel the existing connections between nation and state, and inspire 
the broad denationalization of European nations that were previously recognized as states 
by international law and the mechanisms of the League of Nations.256 Germany broke 
through the shield of nationalities, as solidified by the League of Nations and its 
supervision of the Minorities Treaties, by way of identifying an international common 
denominator whose soft-power potential was great enough to challenge international 
law’s instruction for common behavior among states: anti-Semitism. The Nazis portrayed 
an imagined civilizational war with the Jews, and the credibility of this portrayal was 
strong because the ideology rested on many layers of previously absorbed anti-Semitic 
information. It was aligned with the pre-WWI British emphasis on the shared Teutonic 
heritage,257 which at the time attempted to establish a sense of racial bond with the 
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States. See: Edward A. Freeman, History of Europe (London: Macmillan, 1876), 9, 12; Goldwin Smith, 
“The Greatness of England,” The Contemporary Review 34 (December 1878): 2; Edward A. Freeman, 
Lectures to American Audiences (Philadelphia: Porter & Coates, 1882), 45, 78, 134, 137. In this last 
publication, it is stated: “I tremble as I speak of Aryan settlers who are not of the Teutonic race.” See: Ibid., 
200. It is further said: “Not a few of the primitive institutions of the Teutonic people sprang again to life 
when the English settlements were made on American soil.” See: Ibid., 366. Smith warned against the 
influences of “the Jewish influence” on “the great Teutonic nation.” See: Smith, “Jewish,” 509. According 
to Smith, “The British constitution is no doubt Teutonic.” See: Goldwin Smith, Commonwealth or Empire: 
A Bystander’s View of the Question (New York: Macmillan Company, 1902), 45. The critical connection 





Germans that might prevent war; in its Nazi post-WWI manifestation, the ideology of 
racial unity was more emphatically about racial hatred of the “other,” and it served a 
crossborder purpose of attracting Pan-European support against the status quo that had 
been enjoyed by the Anglo-American union.  
 E. H. Carr’s attempt to appeal to Adolf Hitler scholarly on the eve of WWII by 
justifying Hitler’s defiance of international law has been used to shape IR studies to this 
day. From his Anglo-American perspective, as the Woodrow Wilson Professor of 
International Politics at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth and a former employee 
of the British Foreign Office, Carr presented a critique of internationalism to show that 
Hitler’s grievances in Mein Kampf were understood and respected,258 but Carr’s work had 
                                                          
the Orient” and Wilhelm Marr’s anti-Semitic belief that Jews were plotting “to exterminate the Teuton race 
altogether” was made in 1881. See: Lucien Wolf, “A Jewish View of the Anti-Jewish Agitation,” The 
Nineteenth Century 9 (February 1881): 340-343, 353. In the early twentieth century, prior to WWI, Bryce 
sought to advance the idea of Teutonic unity: “All the Teutons are strong, resolute, even willful.” See: 
Bryce, University, 52. Much like Freeman, he taught that “from Rome descend the institutions of law and 
government under which the modern world lives, though modified in Great Britain and America by 
Teutonic ideas and traditions.” See: Ibid., 331. During WWI, Bryce described Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain, in the context of Chamberlain’s The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, as an “able and 
very learned Anglo-German writer.” See: James Bryce, Race Sentiment as a Factor in History: A Lecture 
Delivered before the University of London on February 22, 1915 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915), 4. 
Chamberlain, the British expatriate, claimed that the Jewish and Teutonic races were competing over the 
dominance of their influence: “To this day these two powers—Jews and Teutonic races—stand, wherever 
the recent spread of the Chaos has not blurred their features, now as friendly, now as hostile, but always as 
alien forces face to face.” See: Chamberlain, Foundations, 1:256-257. Chamberlain’s text may have been 
produced at the start of the twentieth century in a pre-WWI attempt to establish Anglo-German unity by 
pointing at a greater cultural enemy in the form of the Jews, but it was only after WWI that Chamberlain’s 
teachings were adopted as the basis for the ideology of the governing party in Germany. 
    
258 In this work by Carr, Hitler’s Mein Kampf receives more references than any other publication. See: 
Carr, Twenty. In this first edition of the book, Carr not only justifies Hitler’s actions, but he also dignifies 
him with the designation “Herr,” such as writing that “Herr Hitler is right in discounting ‘the talk of the 
“peaceful economic” conquest of the world’ by Great Britain.” See: Ibid., 147. There are several points in 
the text that reflect an effort to win Hitler’s favor, such as the condemnation of the agreement that was 
reached in Versailles after WWI; the agreement with Hitler’s plight against internationalism; the agreement 
with Germany’s claim of another nation-state’s territory; and the approval of totalitarianism as a form of 
government. See: Ibid., x, 178, 282, 288. Thus, it can be posited that Carr’s treatment of international 
politics through the distinction between the realist and the utopian was not just affected by Hitler’s claims, 
but largely dictated by a policy to publicize an agreement with him. However, the process of 
decontextualizing Carr’s original work began with the later editions of it, which omitted illuminating parts 






since been misinterpreted and decontextualized.259 When seen through the power-based 
lens of that precise historical moment, Carr may be interpreted as expressing a realization 
that without a clear Anglo-American demonstration of authority over Germany, the 
information system that had been operating through the League of Nations became futile, 
and international law lost its required sense of legitimate authority. In Carr’s view, the 
realist approach, which is straightforwardly cognizant of power considerations, precedes 
the internationalist’s language of harmony. This view corresponds with the relationship 
between hard power and soft power. In Carr’s case, he had to show the soft-power 
effort—internationalism—as bogus because of how Nazi Germany forced an Anglo-
American reconsideration of power relations. Otherwise, the power-based idea of 
international law still involved the successful realization of internationalism in a manner 
that would elevate the once crude realism to a new international reality. Carr only 
knocked internationalism to appear genuine in Hitler’s eyes, when in actuality 
internationalism is the endeavor of the political realist. Hitler’s sense of Anglo-American 
                                                          
259 An article about Carr’s work by a leading IR scholar offers an interpretation of Carr as a symbol of the 
realist battle against idealism, and, by not mentioning Hitler or Mein Kampf even once, it avoids 
recognition of the exact political circumstances in which Carr was operating. See: John J. Mearsheimer, “E. 
H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On,” International Relations 19, no. 2 (June 2005): 139-152. 
Mearsheimer presents Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis as a philosophy that is serviceable in IR discourse 
about theory without expressing a mindfulness of the political situation in which the work was originally 
composed. One cannot understand, or successfully teach, Carr’s argument without delving into his 
correspondence with Hitler’s expression of German frustrations with international law. Instead, in 
Mearsheimer’s account, Hitler and Mein Kampf do not exist, and Carr’s dialogue was with “British (and 
American) intellectuals for largely ignoring the role of power in international politics.” See: Ibid., 140. 
Thus, Mearsheimer’s discourse relieves itself from the burden of detailing what was at stake, and what 
practical effect was sought by Carr’s publicized criticism of internationalism. This then enables the 
perpetuation of an ill-founded assumption that the quest for international law was a manifestation of 
idealism and not a power calculation. See: Ibid., 142. The suggestion that the establishment of international 
law—through what Carr described at a particular moment in time as utopian or idealist internationalism—
was not a measure of power, raises a basic point of contention between this dissertation and the mainstream 
discourse in IR, be it by supposed realists like Mearsheimer or nonrealists who support the discourse in 
their treatment of realism. It is here argued that internationalism was a manifestation of power—nowadays 
known as soft power—that encountered difficulties and criticism because of its interwar-period disharmony 






pretense, which Carr channeled pacifyingly, resonated because the information upon 
which international law was based did not seem convincingly international but was rather 
traceable to its Anglo-American source.    
Therefore, while Carr’s part in the appeasement of Hitler’s Nazi Germany is 
worthy of attention in the study of history, the use of the claims made in The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis as the basis for theoretical paradigms regarding realism and idealism in 
international relations would be, and has been, misleading. It is erroneous to see 
internationalism as a philosophy of foreign policy unto itself that is in competition with a 
realist approach. In the context of the conflict with Hitler about international law’s anti-
German structure, Carr tried to placate Hitler by stating the obvious: the international 
code—as planned pre-WWI and instituted post-WWI—had been cracked by the Nazi 
rise. Despite this crisis, international law, as an idea, had remained a tool of Anglo-
American power that would be reinstated once the means for it would be reestablished. 
By saying that morality is “a function of politics,”260 Carr was describing in other words 
that soft power is a function of hard power. The American restoration of order in Europe 
first and foremost demanded another military triumph, and already during WWII 
preparation was made for a new legal terminology and a renewed effort to establish 
international law.        
 Since nation-states were stripped of their statehood by Germany, international law 
could not relate to this phenomenon as interstate or innerstate.261 Instead, it appeared as a 
                                                          
260 Ibid., 129. 
 
261 The impression is that Germany was able to circumvent international law in more ways than one. During 
WWII, one monograph expressed frustration that following WWI “German industry took back control of 
crucial fields despite all the laws enacted here to prevent their doing so,” explaining that the “ruse of the 
Germans” that confused the “legal minds” was how Germans engaged in “lawful ‘purchase’ of resources, 





matter between one state, Germany, and linguistic, racial, and religious groups anywhere 
in Europe. However, to preserve their—suddenly theoretical—identity as nation-states, 
they had to be identified as victims of an assault against their nationality. The Minorities 
Treaties did not have the national component among their description of victim groups. 
Consequently, the term genocide was introduced to the public during WWII in a CEIP 
publication, Axis Rule, out of Washington, DC, in continuation of CEIP’s commitment to 
international law since 1910, and in keeping with the decades-old vision of those among 
the American political leadership who founded CEIP in view of Germany’s increasing 
power since its unification in 1871.  
The ascription of the book project to “a noted Polish scholar and attorney” as its 
author had the effect of lending credibility to the claim that Germany is an occupying 
force in Poland against the wishes of a Polish national population,262 but it is questionable 
that Lemkin was the originator of the text.263 One would not expect the quality of his 
                                                          
Germany’s Master Plan: The Story of Industrial Offensive (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), 
311, 313. 
 
262 In the book’s foreword, George A. Finch, the director of CEIP’s Division of International Law at the 
time (signed on August 18, 1944), referred to Lemkin as Polish, but not as Jewish. See: George A. Finch, 
foreword to Axis, vii. This is notable because it indicates, along with the book’s content, that what later 
became known as the Holocaust was not the subject-matter of the project in which “genocide” was 
introduced, and also that Lemkin’s Polish identity was emphasized even though at the time he was an 
American national. The reference to Lemkin as “a noted … scholar and attorney” lends credibility to him 
as a qualified person. However, while in Poland, Lemkin’s professional focus was not international law. 
See: Box 2, Folder 1, Raphael Lemkin Papers. Furthermore, a document shows that in the academic year of 
1944-1945, Lemkin sought education in law, and took five classes at Georgetown Law School. The 
subjects were Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Sales, Statutes, and Wills and Administration, and the 
grades that he received were, in that same order, D, 70, 81, 72, and D. See: Box 1, Folder 13, Raphael 
Lemkin Collection, American Jewish Historical Society, New York.  
 
263 There are other productions in the English language prior to the publication of Axis Rule that add to the 
sense that the authorship of material in association with Lemkin’s name has not been subject to adequate 
consideration in academia. In 1942, a raw and restricted version of Axis Rule appeared, and on its first page 
there is a note that says the following: “This collection was compiled by Dr. Raphael Lemkin partly when 
serving on the faculties of the Universities of Stockholm, Sweden, and of Duke University, North Carolina, 
and partly when serving as a consultant with the Board of Economic Warfare.” See: Key Laws, Decrees 





English to match the demands of published material in the language within less than three 
years on American soil,264 and in the preface there is an acknowledgement that is directed 
“to Miss Mary Emily King for her intelligent and considerate aid in the arduous task of 
transcribing the entire text and in certain phases of reference work.”265 Despite this 
expression of gratefulness by the author, it is here seen as unlikely that one graduate of 
Duke University transcribed the hundreds of pages in this CEIP publication.266 There is 
no information in the preface regarding what language or method of communication was 
                                                          
It is notable that the text does not suggest that Lemkin was the author of the documents in their English 
form. There is no mention of the documents being transcribed or translated. As produced, the collection 
consists of over 8,800 pages in English, and the vastness of the collection calls into question how might one 
individual—while a refugee—generate this much information and in what form. In 1942, one year removed 
from Lemkin’s arrival at the United States, an article was published under his name without there being an 
indication that the text had been either the product of transcription or translation. See: Raphael Lemkin, 
“The Treatment of Young Offenders in Continental Europe,” Law and Contemporary Problems 9, no. 4 
(October 1942): 748-759. In an article that was published two years later, there is an acknowledgement 
“made to Philip Nochlin, student of Oberlin College, for assistance in the preparation of this article.” See: 
Raphael Lemkin, “Orphans of Living Parents: A Comparative Legal and Sociological View,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 10, no. 5 (July 1944): 834. There is no specification that this assistance was 
actually the act of writing the entire text. Philip Nochlin earned a BA at Oberlin College and an MA at 
Columbia University before becoming an instructor in philosophy at Vassar College. See: “Vassar College 
Commences Fall Term with New Faculty in 19 Departments,” Vassar Miscellany News, September 27, 
1951, 1. Furthermore, according to letters from 1947, material that was set to be produced under Lemkin’s 
name had a different authorship. In a letter of grievance to Lemkin from Kurt R. Grossman, which is dated 
October 21, 1947, Grossman expressed frustration with Lemkin’s argument in prior letters and sought to 
remind Lemkin that regarding “a memo on the subject, ‘Economic Consequences of Genocide’,” for which 
Lemkin was commissioned by an unspecified organization, “the Study which I wrote was a Study written 
by me and not by you.” See: Box 1, Folder 5, Raphael Lemkin Collection. The consideration of authorship 
regarding material that was published under Lemkin’s name does not just involve academic adequacy, but 
may also shed light on the purpose of Lemkin’s employment by the United States government.  
 
264 It is also noted that the English language was not as available then as it is today in countries like Poland 
where English is not the first official language. Regarding this topic of Lemkin not being a native speaker 
of English, it can be argued that as primarily a Polish speaker he would be less culturally inclined to think 
of a neologism such as the term genocide, considering that this was the practice of languages such as 
English and German, in which the mixture of words that might originate in Greek or Latin had been 
combined to produce new meanings, such as the words eugenics and ecology.    
 
265 Lemkin, Axis, xv. 
 
266 The book’s last numbered page is 674. A person by the name of Mary Emily King Bailey is listed as 
having graduated from Duke University in 1936. See: Anne Garrard, “News of the Alumni,” Duke Alumni 






used by Lemkin in his dictations to King, assuming that the story about the text’s 
transcription is to be believed. Moreover, in the preface, there is also an 
acknowledgement that “In the preparation of this volume the author was fortunate in 
having the invaluable assistance of individual persons and institutions.”267 The list of 
those who are mentioned as having assisted in producing the work comprises of 
American professionals in matters of government policy, international relations, and law, 
who appear to be by far more qualified to lead a CEIP book project than Lemkin, such as: 
George A. Finch,268 Alan T. Hurd,269 Ruth E. Stanton,270 Bryan Bolich,271 Robert T. 
                                                          
267 Lemkin, Axis, xiv. The list includes both policy experts and academic scholars. See: Ibid., xv.  
 
268 Finch had been elected as the assistant secretary of CEIP in 1929. See: “Again Heads Peace Fund,” New 
York Times, May 15, 1929. Previously he had served as assistant to James Brown Scott, director of CEIP. 
See: “President Starts Abroad,” New York Times, December 5, 1918.  
 
269 Hurd had been employed by the United States Department of State. See: U.S. Department of State, 
Register of the Department of State (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1924), 144. 
 
270 Stanton had done preparation work for AJIL. See: American Society of International Law, “Minutes of 
the Meeting of the Executive Council: November 13, 1920,” in Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law at the Meeting of Its Executive Council (Washington: American Society of International 
Law 1921), 14:9.   
 
271 Bolich was a professor of law at Duke University. See: Duke University Libraries, “Guide to the W. 







Cole,272 Gabriel Dichter,273 Eleanor Lansing Dulles,274 Florence J. Harriman,275 Malcolm 
McDermott,276 and Robert R. Wilson.277 When considering that Lemkin was surrounded 
                                                          
272 Cole was a professor of political science at Duke University. See: Duke University Libraries, “Guide to 
the Robert Taylor Cole Papers, 1933-1991,” http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingaids/uartc/ (last 
accessed, 1/24/2017).  
 
273 Dichter was a publicist. For instance, he was the Paris correspondent for Lepoca. See: “Expects 
Rumania in the War Speedily,” New York Times, July 18, 1915. Dichter was also associated with the Office 
of Strategic Services at the time of the project. See: Office of Strategic Services Collection, “Records 
Relating to Oil Industry Analyst Gabriel Dichter, October 1942-June 1944,” 
https://archive.org/details/2171WN26523RecordsRelatingToOilIndustryAnalystGabrielDichterOctober194
2June1944 (last accessed, 1/24/2017).  
 
274 Dulles’ grandfather was United States Secretary of State John W. Foster. Her uncle was Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing, who served as CEIP’s vice-president. See: “Carnegie Peace Fund Elects Lansing,” 
New York Times, April 22, 1926. Her brothers were John Foster Dulles and Allen D. Dulles. See: “Mrs. 
Allen M. Dulles,” New York Times, June 9, 1941. In 1944, she was employed by the United States 
Department of State. See: “3 Women Recommended,” New York Times, March 24, 1944.    
 
275 In 1940, Harriman became the United States Minister to Norway. See: “Women Cited for Service,” New 
York Times, November 27, 1940. When in Norway, she relocated to Sweden due to the movement of the 
Nazis during the war, and observed that “In Stockholm in 1940 there were refugees from all quarters of the 
world.” See: Florence Jaffray Harriman, Mission to the North (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 
1941), 290. It is quite possible that—while in Sweden—she was one of the first officials of the United 
States government to interact with Lemkin, who was there in 1940-1941. See: Box 2, Folder 1, Raphael 
Lemkin Papers. Prior to representing the United States government, Harriman was a contributor to the NYT. 
For instance, see: Florence J. Harriman, “Colorado’s Reopened Industrial Wound,” New York Times, 
August 26, 1915. 
 
276 McDermott was professor of law at Duke University, and is said to have “secured a position for Lemkin 
with Duke University.” See: Duke Law, “Malcolm McDermott,” 
https://law.duke.edu/history/faculty/mcdermott/ (last accessed, 1/24/2017).  
 
277 Wilson’s resume presents an illuminating contrast to Lemkin’s as he fits the profile of a person one 
would expect to be the coiner of “genocide.” As Lemkin was teaching family law at a Polish college, 
Wilson was working for the Treaty Division of the United States Department of State; Wilson was twice 
awarded the Carnegie fellowship while earning his Ph.D. at Harvard University, before becoming the first 
to head the Department of Political Science at Duke; Wilson was a member of the Executive Council of 
ASIL in 1929-1932 and 1936-1939, as well as the Executive Council of the American Political Science 
Association in 1938-1941. See: David R. Deener (ed.), De Lege Pactorum: Essays in Honor of Robert 
Renbert Wilson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1970), vii-ix. Between the start of WWII and the 
publication of Axis Rule, five articles by Wilson pertaining to issues that are relevant to Axis Rule were 
published by AJIL. See: Robert R. Wilson, “Gradations of Citizenship and International Reclamations,” 
American Journal of International Law 33, no. 1 (January 1939): 146-148; Robert R. Wilson, “Standards 
of Humanitarianism in War,” American Journal of International Law 34, no. 2 (April 1940): 320-324; 
Robert R. Wilson, “Some Aspects of the Jurisprudence of National Claims Commissions,” American 
Journal of International Law 36, no. 1 (January 1942): 56-76; Robert R. Wilson, “Treatment of Civilian 
Alien Enemies,” American Journal of International Law 37, no. 1 (January 1943): 30-45; Robert R. 
Wilson, “Recent Developments in the Treatment of Civilian Alien Enemies,” American Journal of 






by experts who were immersed in American policy and international law, who were heirs 
of the American project to build up international law, it seems likely that the United 
States government paid him his daily salary during the production of Axis Rule278 not for 
his innovation but for his image as a Pole. 
The bulk of the book’s focus was to present Germany as an occupier in Europe,279 
whose method of “military occupation” was against the spirit “of the laws and customs of 
war as codified by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,” and with an eye to the 
“Measures of personal and property reparation” that “must precede the rebuilding of a 
peaceful world founded upon law and order.”280 Axis Rule is not simply the work of an 
individual person, but the American literary fulfillment of a policy that was signed by the 
leaders of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Declaration 
of German Atrocities on October 30, 1943, at the Tripartite Conference in Moscow. The 
declaration focuses on the identity of territories rather than the identity of any particular 
group as victim, and it states that—toward the judgment and punishment of the Nazi 
German officers—“Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries 
having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, 
                                                          
278 Lemkin’s own list of “Offices Held” shows that he was paid “$25 a day” as “Chief Consultant, Board of 
Economic Warfare and Foreign Economic Administration, Washington, D. C.” between 1942 and 1944. 
Following the publication of the book, Lemkin became “Adviser on Foreign Affairs” for the “USA War 
Department” and was compensated “$7,500 a year.” See: Box 2, Folder 1, Raphael Lemkin Papers. 
 
279 In addition to both “Occupied” and “Occupation” appearing in the full title of the book, each of the 
book’s three parts is titled according to this theme. Part I is “German Techniques of Occupation;” Part II is 
“The Occupied Countries”; and Part III is “Laws of Occupation.”  
 






Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.”281 Such lists were 
produced in both parts II and III of Axis Rule, regarding occupied territories in “Albania,” 
“Austria,” “Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia),” “Belgium,” Czechoslovakia,” 
“Danzig,” “Denmark,” “English Channel Island,” “France,” “Greece,” “Luxemburg,” 
“Memel Territory,” “the Netherlands,” “Norway,” “Poland,” “Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics,” and “Yugoslavia.”282 Meaning, Axis Rule was a manifestation of the official 
American-led program for postwar Germany. 
Within this specific purpose of rebuking Germany in legal terms, and salvaging 
the national identity of the former states whose territories it consolidated under Nazi rule, 
the term genocide was offered as signifying “The practice of extermination of nations and 
ethnic groups as carried out by the invaders.”283 As seen in Axis Rule, “genocide” was 
invented to negate Germany’s conduct as an invader, and it emphasized national victims 
in occupied areas by articulating Germany’s wartime actions through new and 
unprecedented lingo in international law, under the tagline that “New conceptions require 
new terms.”284 To cement the connection of “genocide” with both Lemkin and Nazi 
Germany as coiner and abuser, respectively, it is said that “The alarming increase of 
                                                          
281 The declaration was released on November 1, 1943. See: James K. Pollock and James H. Meisel, 
Germany under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents (Ann Arbor, MI: George Wahr, 1947), 
21-22. 
 
282 For contents of Part II and III, see: Lemkin, Axis, xix-xxxviii. 
 
283 Ibid., Axis, xi.  
 
284 Ibid., 79. The chapter on “genocide” opens with this statement. As expressed in the text, there was an 
attempt to link Nazi conduct with the original wars toward Germany’s unification under the label of 
“German militarism,” as it is said that “Germany has attacked her neighbors five times since 1864, and in 
every one of these five wars the methods of occupation and spoliation increased in thoroughness inversely 
as the ethical level of the aggressors sank lower and lower.” See: Ibid., xiv. This draws a line between Axis 






barbarity with the advent of Hitler led the author to make a proposal to the Fifth 
International Conference for the Unification of Penal law (held in Madrid in 1933, in 
cooperation with the Fifth Committee of the League of Nations) to the effect that an 
international treaty should be negotiated declaring that attacks upon national, religious, 
and ethnic groups should be made international crimes.”285 Thus, via a narrative on a 
discarded written proposal that was sent to an international conference, Lemkin’s agency 
in the development of “genocide” became accentuated, while the workings of American 
power in the modern history of international law were designed to remain in the shadows.            
 
Conclusion 
This chapter opens the dissertation’s narration of the modern initiation of 
international law with a focus on power. Unlike the prevalent discourse that shows the 
history of international law as an amalgamation of influences and developments 
throughout the course of centuries, this account identifies a concerted effort by a 
particular power source regarding power considerations in a precise point in time. A 
powerful community of Anglo-American entrepreneurs and legal experts was able to 
devise a strategy that would present a permanent offshore balancing of power in Europe, 
which benefited from the opinion-making capacity of clerics, historians, journalists, and 
politicians. When Germany achieved unification in 1871 it triggered the execution of a 
vast project to create a legal system between nations that would impede the expansion of 
a rival: German governance. The success of the project relied on the unprecedented 
                                                          
285 Ibid., xiii. Lemkin’s list of “Offices Held” shows that during this time he was “Professor of Family Law 







facilitation of international arbitration. New infrastructure was created for both 
processing judgments between nations and promoting the idea of it. The Genocide 
Convention is a creature of this infrastructure. 
“Genocide” was born in the aftermath of WWII in the context of a deep and 
intricate relationship between international law and national identity. It is seen that the 
concept of law among nations required the existence of identity groups that would be 
organized toward political independence, claim recognition as nation-states, and 
participate in the American-led Euro-Christian culture of law. In the century that 
preceded WWI, significant cultural work was done to cultivate different group identities 
among the Christians of the Ottoman Empire and direct their new social organization 
toward self-rule. In theory, these identity-based political units would interfere with any 
attempt by one power source to assume the direct governance of Europe, and in practice 
the revolts in eastern Anatolia and the Balkans challenged Germany’s ability to increase 
its influence on Ottoman land on the eve of WWI. During WWII, the same power source 
that instituted the means for international law prior to WWI issued a publication in which 
“genocide” was defined as a crime through which the American political leadership and 
its allies could accuse Nazi Germany and its allies of wrongdoing. This was an element in 
a discourse whose effect could solidify the assignment of villainy to Nazi Germany, 
persuade toward greater acceptance of international criminal law as a concept, rally 
support for the enhancement of international law in world affairs, and also entrench the 
political aspect of the identity groups that existed as nation-states prior to their 
populations’ assimilation during the Nazi occupation in WWII. By the time of the 





information about the racial-based systematic extermination of Jews in occupied Europe 
and the unique intent to destroy that guided the Nazi policy.  
Thus, this examination of international law’s initiation articulates its hard-power 
root and soft-power route. The introduction of “genocide” as a crime that aims at the 
protection of certain identity groups complemented the politicization of these group 
identities toward participation in an international society under a shared law. While the 
full intention of the power holders who direct humanity on a course toward international 
law is a matter of speculation, it is considered that the narrow interest of stopping 
German governance in Europe—the hard-power root of international law—involved a 
broader pursuit—the soft-power route toward international law—that has allowed for 
advantages in other situations of power struggles but has also affected the standards of 
the relationship between governments and civilians worldwide. The commitment to 
persuade people into accepting international law as a manifestation of a liberal order 
worldwide is considered in connection to historiographical efforts to depict the 
phenomenon as if detached from a power source. In other words, the soft-power route is 
advanced by denial of the hard-power root, which complicates the progression of 
international law, and gives it a dialectical character. As the next chapter illustrates, the 
running of legal procedure regarding “genocide” would not commence before public 
opinion reached a certain level of preparedness through the popularization of the term’s 









 THE DEVELOPMENT OF “GENOCIDE,” 1945-1988 
 
Within the progression of international law as a manifestation of power, the term 
genocide has come to play a crucial role. After two world wars against the German 
adversary, the initial hard-power inclination to institute control through concrete plans for 
international law had become more detailed, and the post-WWII hard-power conditions 
were highly favorable for establishing international cooperation toward an international 
system of law. The development of “genocide” from its invention to its ratification as 
part of the law of the land in the land where it was first produced—and upon its 
introduction of an innovation in international law—is characterized by its soft-power 
efforts. The Cold War, as the main feature of international relations in the period of time 
that is covered in this chapter, 1945-1988, served as the stage on which the term genocide 
was shown to the world. In a manner, the label of “cold war,” as opposed to actual war, 
points at the war’s quality as an environment that is a setting for a war of words, and 
fitting for the advancement of the newly made word: genocide. It will be shown here that 
despite the Genocide Convention, which was facilitated by the United Nations and 
adopted by a substantial number of member states, the use of “genocide” during this 
period was not legal in the traditional sense but subject to information from nonlegal 





not involved in judicial exercises of authority, but rather it was employed to invite the 
public to think in terms of international criminal law. The following sections reveal how 
content and infrastructure solidified information on, and through, “genocide.”   
 
The Reeducation of Germany 
When the term genocide made its first appearance, WWII had not been concluded 
yet and the advent of “genocide” mirrored the American vision of transition from 
defeating Germany to handling it. The American program for Germany was ascribed to 
United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr., whose father’s publicized 
narrative about the treatment of Ottoman Armenians was predominant in the vilification 
of Germany near the twilight of WWI. The Morgenthau Plan, which guided United States 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s position in September 1944 at the Second Quebec 
Conference, called for the imposition of foundational measures after the war, and this 
meant Germany’s demilitarization, denazification, reterritorialization, decentralization, 
deindustrialization, decartelization, and reeducation.1 Within this ambitious and weighty 
strategy, there was also a declaration of intent to punish the Nazis for “War Crimes and 
Treatment of Special Groups.”2 In addition to providing an opportunity to put the Hague 
Conventions into legal effect under circumstances of moral consensus and advance 
                                                          
1 There were two titles to the Morgenthau Plan in two different versions of it: one was “Program to Prevent 
Germany from Starting a World War III,” and the other was “Suggested Post-surrender Program for 
Germany. Compare: Henry Morgenthau Jr., Germany is Our Problem (New York: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1945), appendix; Internet Archive WayBack Machine, “Text Version” of “Suggested Post-
Surrender Program for Germany,” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130531235410/http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297a01.html 








international law, the exhibition of Nazi wrongdoing in a courtroom was significant to the 
drastic project of Germany’s thorough reform.      
 There were three main stages of development in the treatment of “genocide” in 
the term’s early pre-Genocide Convention period: first, during WWII, the literature on 
“genocide” was mainly directed at protecting European nation-states from Nazi-control; 
second, as WWII came to a close, information about the victimhood of the Jews started to 
redefine the meaning of a “genocide” perpetration; and third, following the conclusion of 
WWII, the language about the term genocide began to relate the crime to other cases in 
history. Before the actual commencement of Germany’s occupation under military 
government, as the hard-power consequences of WWII became increasingly clear, the 
pre-occupation agenda of soft power was different from the postwar one. As the war’s 
end became a clearer sight, the meaning of “genocide” was still strictly associated with 
the ramifications of Nazi policies, as in Axis Rule, but a difference between the term’s 
first usage and the one that took form a few months later was the added emphasis on the 
victimization of European Jews: 
There were unspeakable atrocities at Auschwitz and Birkenau. But the point about 
these killings is that they were systematic and purposeful. The gas chambers and 
furnaces were not improvisations; they were scientifically designed instruments 
for the extermination of an entire group. On the scale practiced by the Germans, 
this is something new. And it is this purpose which human beings find it [sic] 
difficult to believe or understand. Yet it is a purpose which Hitler has openly 
avowed.3   
                                                          
3 “Genocide,” Washington Post, December 3, 1944. While Axis Rule introduced the term genocide in 
relation to Nazi-led policies in occupied territories throughout Europe that combined invasion with 
destruction of group identities toward the consolidation of conquered peoples under one federal 
government, this article presents “genocide” as mainly referring to physical extermination, primarily of the 
Jews. The lack of such reference in Axis Rule is concealed by a rhetorical manipulation: after stating that 
“genocide” was coined and defined in Axis Rule, the text in the article continued with “Thus Jews were 
gassed at Birkenau and Aryan Poles and Russians and Slovenes were otherwise butcherd [sic], not for any 
crime or any resistance to Axis authority but because the Nazis wished to exterminate the ethnic groups to 
which they belonged.” See: Ibid. The shock value of the Nazi program of extermination was higher than 





At this stage, the mortifying rather than illegal elements of Nazi conduct had to be 
stressed to the effect of persuading public opinion that the atrocities during WWII were 
unique to Germany’s situation. This gave the control of Germany post-WWII the 
appearance of an American gift to humanity, which Morgenthau, while a highly ranked 
government official, laced with a religious sense of righteousness: “It is a task worthy of 
the highest, most selfless missionary spirit. To redeem this virile, capable people from 
their worship of force and their lust for war would obviously be one of the noblest 
services that could be performed for mankind.”4 When “genocide” was introduced, the 
popularization of international law seemed to coincide with the condemnation of 
Germany’s wartime activities, but the arrival at Germany’s submission introduced a new 
set of considerations. For postwar Germany to be cooperative with the international 
community, and for “genocide” to be more usable, the term’s meaning became less 
concentrated on the Nazi practices.  
 While bringing Germans to agree with the forcing of foreign-controlled education 
on them required their deep sense of humiliation by a worldwide condemnation of Nazi 
behavior, the actual process in which Germans were to be educated would have been ill-
served by heightening the association of it with a form of punishment. Germany’s 
democratization was seen as the positive aspect of the same program whose negative 
                                                          
much more convincing that a wrong had been done, and this article superimposed this new focus on the 
“genocide” project of Axis Rule, even though the book did not contain references to specific death camps 
and did not even consider Aryanism as part of the Nazi racial philosophy. In Axis Rule, it is not that the 
Nazi treatment of Jews inspired the term genocide, but that the Jews were “one of the main objects of” a 
greater and already ongoing “German genocide policy.” See: Lemkin, Axis, 78.   
 






aspect was denazification.5 It was believed that “Democracy, by its nature, cannot be 
imposed.”6 Therefore, as the American ability to institute democracy in Germany was 
undeniably made possible by “the power of a conqueror and the authority of a military 
government,” 7 the effectiveness of the American educators who were involved in this 
process of assimilating democracy into German culture was helped by sympathetic 
gestures that mitigated the unpleasant and undemocratic dynamics of occupier and 
occupied.8 Such an effect would have been negated by the reiterated accusation of an 
international crime that singles out Germany.     
 In addition, the view of “genocide” as a specifically German set of techniques 
would have seemed especially hypocritical to the Germans who as a society were 
undergoing a forced transformation that was similar in many ways to the initial meaning 
of the term genocide. The “1945 Directive to the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces 
of Occupation,” also known as JCS 1067, stated that a “system of control over German 
education and an affirmative program of reorientation will be established designed 
completely to eliminate Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the development 
of democratic ideas.”9 In essence, such a coordinated policy is set to align the identity of 
the occupied group with the interests of the occupier. Even if in the name of “the 
                                                          
5 George Frederick Zook (chairman), Report of the United States Education Mission to Germany 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 10. 
 
6 Ibid., IV. This was stated in a letter of transmittal, which is dated October 12, 1946, from William Benton, 
who was the United States assistant secretary of state, to United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. 
 
7 Robert E. Keohane, “Dilemmas of German Re-education: Reflections upon an Experiment Noble in 
Europe,” The School Review 57, no. 8 (October 1949): 405. 
 
8 Ibid., 405-406.  
 
9 U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Washington: United States 






pacification of Europe,” the United States government nonetheless engaged in activities 
so “that Germany be psychologically disarmed” and made to absorb American-taught 
“cultural and spiritual concepts.”10 This involved the elimination of material from 
textbooks and curricula,11 and the control of all media.12 
There are noticeable similarities between the American policy of occupation in 
Germany and what is described in Axis Rule among “The techniques of genocide, which 
the German occupant has developed in the various occupied countries” and “represent a 
concentrated and coordinated attack upon all elements of nationhood.”13 It said that in an 
execution of the cultural technique of genocide in Luxemburg, “German teachers were 
introduced into the schools and they were compelled to teach according to the principles 
of National Socialism.”14 Moreover, as regards the political technique of genocide, the 
                                                          
10 U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1947), 61.   
 
11 Ibid., 62. To facilitate a smooth transition to the American-designed teaching material, the Military 
Government made the new textbooks, as well as tuition, free of charge by law. See: John P. Bradford, 
“Democratic Development: How MG Aids Progress in Bavaria,” Information Bulletin: Magazine of US 
Military Government in Germany, September 6, 1949, 12. 
 
12 U.S. Department of State, Occupation, 65. It is uncertain to what extent this control of information 
affects German media to this day. A discussion by officially sanctioned American educators on how to pass 
on radio administration to German authority indicates that even when the information was to appear more 
German it still followed an American direction. See: Report, 38. During this critical time of 
institutionalizing the American control of information in Germany, it was recognized that “The 
newspapers, motion pictures, books, magazines, radio and the church are great agencies of education which 
powerfully supplement and often overshadow in importance organized education in the schools and 
institutions of higher education.” See: Ibid., 50. To be effective, this information, despite being controlled 
by a foreign occupier, needed to appear authentically local as much as possible. Over the course of time, 
these institutions of information in Germany may have increased their ability to persuasively pass as 
unrelated to American influence rather than having experienced a significant departure from American 
influence.   
 
13 Lemkin, Axis, 82.  
 
14 Ibid., 84. Similarly, in a separate attempt to clarify what “genocide” means, the text explains the cultural 
technique of genocide by stating that “The Germans sought to obliterate every reminder of former cultural 
patterns.” See: Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide: A Modern Crime,” Free World 9, no. 4 (April 1945): 40. This 





claim in Axis Rule that “In the incorporated areas, such as western Poland, Eupen, 
Malmédy and Moresnet, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine, local institutions of self-
government were destroyed and a German pattern of administration imposed”15 seems to 
be reproduced by the American policy to partition Germany into zones and decentralize 
its government by dividing it into Länder units and smaller and more local Kreis units.16 
Hence, if the meaning of “genocide” were to maintain the focus on occupation techniques 
post-WWII, then there would have been an increased likelihood that the American 
occupation policies in Germany at the time may have themselves been seen as a 
perpetration of genocide.17 
Furthermore, in order for “genocide” to become a recognized crime in 
international law it had to be seen as capturing actions that have precedence in world 
history, and as applicable to situations that are likely to recur and whose recurrence could 
                                                          
this chapter do not include mention of the text being transcribed or translated. Meaning, no accounting was 
given for the processes through which information was presented before the public under Lemkin’s name.  
 
15 Lemkin, Axis, 82. In the other version about the techniques of genocide, the text states that “The political 
cohesion of the conquered countries was intended to be weakened by dividing them into more or less self-
contained and hermetically enclosed zones, as in the four zones of France, the ten zones of Yugoslavia, the 
five zones of Greece; by portioning their territories to create puppet states, like Croatia and Slovakia; by 
detaching territory for incorporation into the Greater Reich, as was done with western Poland, Alsace-
Lorraine, Luxembourg, Slovenia.” See: Lemkin, “Genocide: A Modern,” 40.  
  
16 Report, 41-43. In Morgenthau’s book, the twelfth chapter is titled “Divide and Conquer,” and includes a 
statement that “Two Germanys would be easier to deal with than one.” See: Morgenthau, Germany, 155.  
 
17 In 1946, the text of an article written under Lemkin’s name does not refer to techniques but to a single 
“technique of genocide,” and there is no recognition in the text of this analytical shift. Previously, there was 
a method of explaining genocide by reference to political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, 
religious, and moral, techniques. See: Lemkin, Axis, 82-90; Lemkin, “Genocide: A Modern,” 40-42. This 
method of explaining “genocide” was abandoned in the Lemkin literature after the conclusion of WWII. 
According to Lemkin’s post-WWII literature, the cultural aspects were related to consequences of genocide 
but not highlighted as part of the genocidal activities. The focus turned to actions that were designed to 
carry out “mass starvation,” “mass confiscations,” “mass endangering of health,” and “mass executions.” 
See: Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide: A New International Crime: Punishment and Prevention,” Revue 






be prevented by codification and legal implementation. The American molding of the 
term genocide shaped its meaning after WWII into being less about occupation 
techniques, and also less about what made the Nazi policies unique. Before the end of 
WWII, the texts under Lemkin’s name would justify the newness of the term genocide by 
pointing at the newness of the Nazi programs. In the book’s introduction of “genocide,” it 
is stated that “Hitler’s Mein Kampf has essentially formulated the prolegomenon of 
destruction and subjugation of other nations.”18  
In 1945, the transition in the function of “genocide” from a focus on Germany’s 
subjugation to broader international affairs was detectable in two contradictory 
arguments. The momentary showing of conflicting ideas reflected the changes in 
American power considerations as they were happening. An article that is ascribed to 
Lemkin and was published in April 1945 contains the claim that he had invented the term 
genocide because “The crime of the Reich” is “new in the civilized world,” and that “It is 
so new in the traditions of civilized man that he has no name for it.”19 Around the same 
time, the Lemkin texts started to display an utter reversal in the approach to how 
“genocide” relates to history. An article that was published in two installations in 
February and March of 1945, which is likely to have been written prior to the April 
article, contains the following words: 
There have been many instances of states expressing their concern about another 
state’s treatment of its own citizens. The United States rebuked the governments 
of czarist Russia and Rumania for the ghastly pogroms they instigated or 
tolerated. There was also diplomatic action in behalf of the Greeks and Armenians 
                                                          
18 George A. Finch, foreword to Axis, xiii. Interestingly, in the order of the readers’ contact with the written 
material, the first encounter with the term genocide is not in reading the text that is ascribed to Lemkin, but 
in reading Finch’s foreword. See: Ibid., xi.   
 






when they were being massacred by the Turks.20  
 
Not only was this passage later on self-plagiarized by Lemkin, or possibly self-
plagiarized by way of committee,21 but on August 26, 1946, the editorial direction of the 
NYT displayed remarkable unison with the new Lemkin-ascribed or -transcribed approach 
and phrasing when it announced the following: “Genocide is no new phenomenon, nor 
has it been utterly ignored in the past. Both Czarist Russia and Rumania were rebuked by 
this country for pogroms which were either officially instigated or condoned. The 
massacres of Greeks and Armenians by Turks prompted diplomatic action without 
punishment.”22 Meaning, there was a noticeable change of direction in how the term 
genocide was explained in the texts that carried Lemkin’s name: from being designated 
as a description of unprecedented Nazi crimes, it became used as a label for other events 
in history.  
After the initial signal of change in what is supposed to be Lemkin’s historical 
vision, the new discourse about the term genocide being inspired by past events adopted a 
set of cases that were repeatedly mentioned in mantralike fashion in both the Lemkin 
texts and the NYT, spanning from the victimization of the Carthaginians to that of the 
Armenians.23 It was at this juncture that references began to be made to Winston 
                                                          
20 Raphael Lemkin, “The Legal Case against Hitler [2],” The Nation, March 10, 1945, 268. 
 
21 Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide,” The American Scholar 15, no. 2 (Spring 1946): 227. In this article, the 
three sentences quoted above are presented in the same exact wording. Since it is unlikely that Lemkin 
wrote these lines in their first publication, it is uncertain whether or not it would be fitting to call it self-
plagiarism when the same lines appear again in a separate article under Lemkin’s name.  
 
22 “Genocide,” New York Times, August 26, 1946. 
 
23 For instance, see: Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide,” 227; Lemkin, “Genocide: A New,” 366-367; Waldemar 
Kaempffert, “Science in Review: Genocide is the New Name for the Crime Fastened on the Nazi Leaders,” 
New York Times, October 20, 1946; Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law,” 
United Nations Bulletin, January 15, 1948, 70; Gertrude Samuels, “U.N. Portrait,” New York Times, March 





Churchill’s comment in 1941 about being “in the presence of a crime without a name,” to 
persuade the public that “genocide” refers to acts that were criminal even before they 
were named and designated as a crime.24 It was then that phrases to the effect of 
suggesting that the name “genocide” might be new but that the practice of it is old started 
to dominate the discourse.25 These phrases made the genocidization of history become a 
matter of common language.   
 The conspicuous absence of “genocide” from the verdict in the first Nuremberg 
trial after the term had been inserted into the indictment might reflect a change in 
American power considerations regarding Germany, but it might also be the result of 
soft-power strategy. Although the sessions started in November, 1945, the trials were the 
product of a wartime effort,26 and as such they acted toward the interests of the 
American-led group of belligerents. In the context of American strategy, it is considered 
that by mentioning “genocide” in the indictment but not in the verdict, the United States 
government was able to eat the cake and have it too. The Nuremberg platform propagated 
“genocide” by the mere mention of it and provided a hook with which the American 
                                                          
reference in some of them to the wars waged in the Crusades and for Islam, to the Albigenses, and to the 
Waldenses. Neither of these references involved labeling the events as “genocide.”  
 
24 For instance, see: Lemkin, “Genocide,” 227; “Genocide,” New York Times; Kaempffert, “Science,” New 
York Times; Samuels, “U.N.,” New York Times.  
 
25 For examples, see: John H. Fenton, “Approval Is Urged for Genocide Pact,” New York Times, June 30, 
1949. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (Historical Series): Volume II, Eighty-First Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1949-1950 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), 782; Oliver Schroeder Jr., International 
Crime and the U.S. Constitution (Cleveland: Press of Western Reserve University, 1950), 1; Philip B. 
Perlman, “The Genocide Convention,” Nebraska Law Review 30, no. 1 (November 1950): 1; “Wanted: A 
Genocide Treaty,” New York Times, January 2, 1950; Gabriela Mistral, “An Appeal to World Conscience: 
The Genocide Convention,” United Nations Review 2, no. 12 (June 1956): 16.  
 
26 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal had been prepared months before the trial and 







media could call attention to “genocide,” while the plans to use the term’s potent ability 
to inspire an unprecedented international treaty were not spoiled by what would have 
been an unnecessary use of it in the specific courtroom war-criminalization of the Nazis 
regarding whom public opinion had already reached a consensus long before the verdict. 
In the NYT, two articles within less than two months of each other between August and 
October of 1946 use the same phrase regarding the reference to “genocide” in the 
Nuremberg trial, saying that it “cropped up” there.27 The omission of “genocide” from 
the verdict not only preserved the term for broader use, it even provided an impetus for 
its incorporation into international law. The use of the term by Hartley Shawcross, 
Britain’s attorney general in the Nuremberg trial, was quoted in articles that conveyed a 
message regarding what ought to lie ahead for the term.28  
 By the promotion of it as an international crime that did not fit within the 
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg trial, “genocide” was salvaged from being limited to Nazi 
war crimes, and bestowed with a distinctive quality that as a convention would lead to a 
breakthrough in international law. When “genocide” was first made known to the public 
                                                          
27 Compare: “Genocide,” New York Times; Kaempffert, “Science,” New York Times. The persistent choice 
of words in these efforts leads the readers to believe that the term genocide was used in Nuremberg in a 
sudden or unexpected manner. This persistence leads the public away from considering aspects of strategy 
in this context. In both articles, the mention of “genocide” in Nuremberg was converted into a used 
opportunity to expand on the meaning of “genocide.” The newspaper also used the occasion to bring 
“genocide” into the public discourse in the format of questions and answers. See: “Fifteen New Questions,” 
New York Times, August 4, 1946; “Answers to Questions on Page 2,” New York Times, August 4, 1946. 
This effort to promote the term by placing it in front of the public eye had already been executed in an item 
by the Associated Press, saying that “last week’s United Nations indictment against German war criminals 
had brought a new word into the English language—genocide—and that it has been [sic] coined by a Duke 
University professor.” See: “New Word ‘Genocide’ Used in War Crime Indictment,” New York Times, 
October 22, 1945.  
 
28 For instance, see: Lemkin, “Genocide,” 229; Lemkin, “Genocide: A New,” 360; Kaempffert, “Science,” 
New York Times; Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law,” American Journal of 
International Law 41, no. 1 (January 1947): 147. In one of these articles under Lemkin’s name, it is stated 
that the concept of “genocide” was brought “into international law” by the indictment. See: Lemkin, 






in 1944, it was described strictly as a German wartime phenomenon.29 While WWII was 
still being fought in 1945, the idea of genocide being perpetrated outside the realm of war 
was introduced in the question: “Why not treat it as an internal problem of every country, 
if committed in time of peace, or as a problem between belligerents, if committed in time 
of war?”30 In 1946, following the indictment in the first Nuremberg trial, the possibility 
of genocide in a time of peace was implied in the statement that “A ruthless regime finds 
it easiest to commit genocide in time of war.”31 The reference to “A ruthless regime”—
meaning, any regime—rather than to the Nazi regime, or German practice as before, 
demonstrates that the liberation of “genocide” from being exclusively a wartime feature 
coincided with freeing it from being a Nazi crime. Consequently, before three weeks had 
passed from the verdict in Nuremberg, Military Government Ordinance No. 7, on the 
Organization and Powers of Certain Military Tribunals, was established as an ordinance 
to authorize tribunals for war criminals basing their jurisdiction, in addition to the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal, on Control Council Law No. 10 for the 
“Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Peace and against 
Humanity.”32   
The new function of “genocide” as a term that is not limited to the Nazi-led 
crimes of WWII involved a universalized meaning that was conductive to its further 
                                                          
29 Not only was “genocide” presented in the context of German methods in WWII, the claim was made that 
there was a genocidal pattern in the German “methods of occupation” in each of its five major wars since 
1864. See: Lemkin, Axis, xiv. 
 
30 Lemkin, “Genocide: A Modern,” 42. 
 
31 Lemkin, “Genocide,” 229.  
 






utilization in international law. Even though the development registered a moment of 
triumph for the Americans who had been toiling for years to advance international law, 
the sense of achievement could not have been publicized without having a detrimental 
effect on the international semblance of the movement toward its adoption as a 
convention. Instead, the discourse portrayed the absence of “genocide” in the Nuremberg 
sentence as a setback for international law,33 or as a personal disappointment for 
Lemkin.34 In 1947, a text that is ascribed to Lemkin presented a false and misleading 
assumption that “genocide” always meant “acts committed before the outbreak of the 
war.”35 Thus, the strategic elements that pushed the term genocide toward the attainment 
of its status as the subject of an international convention were not plain to see. At any 
rate, for the first time the proponents of international law were able to lead nation-states 
to agree with the idea that what sovereign governments do to their own people is not 
simply reserved for domestic law but is a matter of international law, and that this idea is 
not merely a matter of conjecture or assumed custom but to be documented in a 
multilateral international treaty.   
 For the prevention of another Nazi Germany from rising, the meaning of 
“genocide” was separated from exclusive reference to the Nazi policies, and the usage of 
                                                          
33 It was urged that the term would be included in the Nuremberg sentence. See: “Genocide,” New York 
Times. 
 
34 Before the modern-day genocide scholarship adopted it as a theme, Gertrude Samuels of the NYT offered 
Lemkin’s personal situation as a rhetorical focus that distracts from consideration of power: “Lemkin was 
bitterly disappointed when Nazis were absolved from crimes against humanity which they had committed 
in peace time (1933-1939).” See: Samuels, “U.N.,” New York Times.  
 
35 Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime” (1947), 148. According to this explanation that the term genocide was 
left out of the judges’ decision in Nuremberg because the trial’s jurisdiction only permitted them to punish 
wartime offenses, the readers are led to assume that “genocide” is a term that refers to acts in times of 
peace. This presentation of “genocide” is in disharmony with its original meaning in Axis Rule, but the text 






the term was incorporated into the popular narration of international politics toward a 
normative absorption of “crime” as a concept in international law. The people of 
Germany were among the intended audience. “Genocide” was placed on a course of soft-
power usage that paralleled the reeducation of Germany. Until Germany would be made 
ready for its new role in international relations, “genocide” would be defined by 
information that was generated outside competent tribunals. The development of 
“genocide” would be played out before German eyes as part of the American-Soviet tug-
of-war that did keep Germany divided for decades, and walled German attention within 
the confines of the Cold War discourse throughout the process of reeducation.36 The 
discourse on “genocide” enlivened the sense of danger in Germany. It placed a spotlight 
on existing threats in Germany from both Left and Right political extremes, without 
which the American military presence may not have seemed warranted.37 It so happens 
that the United States government finally ratified the Genocide Convention in the same 
year that the Iron Curtain dropped and the Berlin Wall fell. By that time, “genocide” had 
become a household name for a crime without being considered by a single judge in a 
                                                          
36 The Americans who were involved in Germany’s reeducation expressed an awareness that this was to be 
a long-term project. Henry Morgenthau Jr. commented that “Before that deep educational force can be 
overcome, a whole new generation of parents must be born and raised in an entirely different atmosphere.” 
See: Morgenthau, Germany, 150. This view was confirmed by the United States Department of State in the 
following words: “The task of German reeducation is viewed as a long-range undertaking which may 
require a generation or more to complete and which can only be developed gradually as German economic 
and political life is reconstituted.” See: U.S. Department of State, Occupation, 63. The remaining effects of 
this intergenerational process regarding information in Germany have been largely understated if not 
completely ignored in current descriptions by the mainstream media of Germany’s role in international 
relations.    
 
37 In a discussion of dangerous embers in Germany in 1950, it is considered that from an American 
perspective “if there were no danger in Germany we would not be there.” See: John J. McCloy, “Progress 
Report on Germany,” The Department of State Bulletin February 6, 1950, 197. News items that alert about 
such lingering political dangers in Germany had the effect of maintaining public support for the 
continuation of the American military presence in Germany. For instance, see: “Hitler Social Aids Still 






competent courthouse.  
 
Lemkin’s Intellectual Property 
Much of the credibility in the claim that “genocide” was Lemkin’s invention 
rather than an American project through-and-through lies in the popular discourse about 
the proposal that he sent to the Fifth Conference for the Unification of the Criminal Law, 
which was held in Madrid in 1933. The basic notion that Lemkin was concerned about 
the protection of minority groups in international law and acted toward the codification of 
an international convention that would penalize offenses against them years before his 
association with the United States meant that he would be readily perceived as an 
independent actor in the project of “genocide.” This has had the effect of making 
“genocide” appear as the moral plight of a dedicated individual whose identity carries an 
immediate representation of two victim groups in WWII, the Jews and the Poles. The 
neatness of this narrative is called into question by a mindfulness of the great soft-power 
worth that is accrued by having the origination and development of “genocide” be 
perceived as unrelated to the American political leadership. An awareness of how soft 
power works means that the very persuasiveness of this one aspect in Lemkin’s personal 
history was seen as the grain from which the narrative about him may grow. As it turns 
out, the details of the information about Lemkin’s proposal are affected by disinformation 
and misinformation. 
 Upon the American introduction of Lemkin and “genocide” to the public in Axis 
Rule, the two references to Lemkin’s proposal from 1933 involved framed and falsified 





decontextualized its place within the existing features of international law at the time. 
According to the information in Axis Rule, the proposal centered on the idea of barbarity 
and vandalism as crimes against groups,38 two acts that are seen as located within the 
concept of genocide, but barbarity and vandalism are only specified in two of seven 
articles in Lemkin’s proposed text for the international convention, which mainly sought 
to address the “large variety of different criminal acts” that could be included within the 
use of “terrorism” as a legal concept.39 Furthermore, the information in Axis Rule does 
not give its readers an accurate view of what had been accomplished in international law 
regarding the protection of groups that were defined in the Minority Treaties who were 
identified by either racial, religious or linguistic traits.40 Framed in this way, the 
information does not convey the sense that the League of Nations administered a special 
procedure “for dealing with petitions presented by minority groups,”41 but instead it lets 
                                                          
38 Lemkin, Axis, 91. This was repeated in a later text that was also ascribed to Lemkin, in which it is 
claimed that the proposal “envisaged the creation of two new international crimes: the crime of barbarity … 
and the crime of vandalism.” See: Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime” (1947), 146. 
 
39 For an English translation of the proposal, which is said to have originally been published in French, see: 
Raphael Lemkin, “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences against the 
Law of Nations,” trans. Jim Fussell, in Prevent Genocide International, 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm (accessed, 1/26/2017). The other articles 
of the proposed text regarded suggestions of penalties for other acts: knowingly causing catastrophes or 
interruptions in international communication, and knowingly spreading different kinds of contagion. It is 
noted that the editor of the material on the webpage, which is run by the organization Prevent Genocide, 
used bold fonts to highlight the mention of “offense of barbarity” and “offense of vandalism” in the text, 
which is taken here as an act that is designed to direct the public toward a subjective reading of the text. 
Despite this, the subjective reading of the proposal was then disseminated by AJIL as part of the narrative 
on the origination and development of “genocide.” See: Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime” (1947), 146; Josef 
L. Kunz, “The United Nations Convention on Genocide,” American Journal of International Law 43, no. 4 
(October 1949): 738. It was later adopted by the genocide scholarship. For instance, see: Goldsmith, 
“Issue,” 238; Steven Leonard Jacobs, “Raphael Lemkin,” in The Armenian Genocide: The Essential 
Reference Guide, ed. Alan Whitehorn (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2015), 165. 
 
40 The information in Axis Rule briefly mentions the Fifth Committee of the League of Nations as the 
overseer of the conference, but it was the League of Nations’ Sixth Committee that handled “procedure in 
minorities questions.” See: Howard-Ellis, Origin, 135.  
 






Lemkin’s proposal appear innovative in this matter.  
In actuality, there had already been a program in place through the League of 
Nations to protect minority groups from abuse. The program directed a weekly bulletin to 
inform on the subject, and oversaw a Minorities Committee for each petition, which by 
average reviewed two or three dozens of petitions each year during its first decade of 
operation in keeping with specific guidelines.42 Moreover, the procedure also provided a 
link to the Permanent Court of International Justice whose opinion would be consulted 
via referrals from the Council of the League of Nations.43 A great amount of detail went 
into the League of Nations’ efforts to protect minorities through international law, and 
Lemkin’s proposal did not stand out for its attention to the protection of groups but 
perhaps as an attempt to gather together an assortment of crimes under the term 
terrorism, which was a subject for development by the League of Nations during that 
time.   
 A significant innovation that was introduced within the concept of “genocide” in 
relation to the Minority Treaties of the interwar period—the inclusion of the national 
identifier among the identities of groups to be protected—is concealed by the falsification 
of information. In Axis Rule, it is twice claimed that Lemkin’s proposal to the conference 
had already included the criminalizing of acts against national groups.44 However, the 
                                                          
42 Drummond, Ten, 369, 372, 374. 
 
43 Ibid., 375. 
 
44 In both cases, “national” is the first identifier: “attacks upon national, religious, and ethnic groups”; 
“oppressive and destructive actions directed against individuals as members of a national, religious, or 
racial group.” Compare: Lemkin, Axis, xiii; Ibid., 91. This falsification was later amplified when the 
discourse on Lemkin was reintroduced in time for the gradual preparation of public opinion for the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention in the United States. In the passage, which also contains highly 
questionable information regarding the Armenian massacres in this context, the identifier “national” is 





text of Lemkin’s proposal in 1933 refers to “hatred towards a racial, religious or social 
collectivity” without mentioning a collectivity of the national kind.45 Nazi Germany was 
able to expand territorially by dismissing the sovereignty of nations that were member 
states in the League of Nations, and in order to stifle such activities, as was the design of 
Axis Rule, the groups that had to become protected were national ones. Accordingly, the 
first page of the chapter on genocide in Axis Rule is dominated by references to national 
groups alone, expressive of a particular concern for “the destruction of a national 
pattern.”46 This information about Lemkin’s personal background has created a narrative 
that distracts from a thorough study of “genocide” as a function of power. Ultimately, it 
is seen that Lemkin’s proposal in 1933 was not a unique effort to prevent genocide before 
the term was invented, but rather the invention of “genocide” in Washington, DC, is 
likely what made Lemkin’s proposal in 1933 seem serviceable toward the production of 
believable information about “genocide” through him.     
 By the time of Lemkin’s demise in 1959, more emphasis was given to the creation 
of information about him rather than through him. This custom-made information on 
“genocide” promoted a moral interpretation of international law, but negated the 
understanding of how legal power requires a certain visibility of authority for information 
to be accountable. The narrative on Lemkin signifies a culture of manipulative 
information for the sake of moral persuasion. Lemkin’s past became a breeding ground 
                                                          
1933: “he began a study of the Armenian massacres that culminated in his proposing before the League of 
Nations in 1933 that the crime of ‘barbarity’—the ‘destruction of national, religious and racial groups’—be 
declared an international offense alongside piracy, slavery, and drug smuggling.” See: Steven Schnur, 
“Unofficial Man: The Rise and Fall of Raphael Lemkin,” Reform Judaism 11, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 10. 
 
45 Lemkin, “Acts.” 
 






for fictional tales that served a purpose of calling attention to his personal aspirations, and 
away from the power considerations that explain the origination and development of the 
term genocide within international law. The main innovative quality of the Genocide 
Convention in international law—being the first international treaty through the United 
Nations that instructs sovereign states on how they should govern their own internal 
affairs—is not considered as a particularization of power toward international order but 
through mythic literature about Lemkin’s beliefs as a young adult. Moral anecdotes about 
the ethical growth of this one man offered a storyline about the conceptualization of 
“genocide.” However, to garner the kind of support that would award such stories with a 
lasting effect despite their flimsiness, the Lemkin narrative was intermeshed with the 
narrative that has cultivated an Armenian sense of injustice.47 As a result, the promotion 
of the Lemkin narrative has become an Armenian interest, and as such it is sustained 
through the semblance of an Armenian desire, instead of considering the core of the 
power behind the function of “genocide.”   
 An inspection of this literary material shows that, ironically, the American efforts 
to codify standards of governance through an imagined Lemkin involve the dissemination 
of information that does not meet American academic standards of source criticism. 
While the short references to Armenians in the texts that were supposedly authored by 
Lemkin began to appear as soon as the post-WWII international setting established a new 
set of power relations, the work on the creation of a written biographical account that 
depicts a young Lemkin as concerned about, and inspired by, the fate of the Ottoman 
Armenians did not come into fruition until the late 1950s. By this time, the Armenian 
                                                          






narrative under American direction had made major advances toward becoming solidified 
and readied for the systematic superimposition of the genocide label. In a book that was 
dedicated to the argument that certain male figures are shaping the world admirably, 
Robert Merrill Bartlett included Lemkin as one of them. Bartlett presented an unsourced 
narrative about Lemkin in the style of a moral tale, which presented the Armenian 
experience as the subject matter of a pivotal moment in Lemkin’s life.  
The following dialogue—allegedly from 1921—about Lemkin’s reaction to the 
assassination of Talaat Pasha by Soghomon Tehlirian was offered without any note to 
suggest that it is a fabrication: 
Raphael took the problem to one of his professors. “Did the Armenian try to have 
the Turk arrested for the massacre?” 
The professor shook his head. “There was no law under which he could be 
arrested.” 
“But Talaat was responsible for the death of those people,” Raphael retorted.  
“Consider the case of a farmer who owns a flock of chickens. He kills them and 
this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.” 
“But the Armenians are not chickens. Certainly—” 
The professor continued: “You cannot interfere with the internal affairs of a 
nation without infringing on that nation’s sovereignty.” 
Raphael stood his ground. “It is a crime for Teilierian to kill a man, but it is not a 
crime for his oppressor to kill more than a million men. This is most 
inconsistent.” 
“You are young and inexperienced, Lemkin, and tend to oversimplify. You should 
learn more about international law.”48 
 
The text has the markings of fictional material that is designed to be an instruction aid for 
youths. Certain literary tactics are employed in this text for a didactic outcome, such as 
depicting an unfriendly professor who cuts off Lemkin in midspeech and speaks 
arrogantly to him, which leads the readers to connect their unfavorable view of the 
                                                          
48 Robert Merrill Bartlett, They Stand Invincible: Men Who Are Reshaping Our World (New York: Thomas 






professor with an unfavorable view of his opposition to the idea of incorporating internal 
state affairs into international law. This ties in with another rhetorical tactic, which is the 
association of the main innovation of “genocide” in international law with Lemkin’s 
personal growth, as if “genocide” was the product of Lemkin’s maturation process rather 
than an American ingenuity. Also, it contains a simplistic statement about Talaat as 
“responsible for the death of those people,” and presents this as if it is a matter of 
common knowledge that is not even part of Lemkin’s disagreement with the professor. 
However, the most striking aspect about this dialogue is that has been presented as 
authentic information by those who influence the discourse on “genocide.”  
In a massively acclaimed and promoted book, Samantha Power relayed this 
dialogue without any reservation, as if describing documented history:  
Lemkin asked why the Armenians did not have Talaat arrested for the massacre. 
The professor said there was no law under which he could be arrested. “Consider 
the case of a farmer who owns a flock of chickens,” he said. “He kills them and 
this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.” 
“It is a crime for Tehlirian to kill a man, but it is not a crime for his oppressor to 
kill more than a million men?” Lemkin asked. “This is most inconsistent.”49 
 
The credibility that was lent to Power’s book project by a variety of influential outlets of 
information has enabled the passing of this piece of fiction as part of the mainstream 
narrative on the origination and development of the term genocide. In turn, Power’s 
credibility was then lent to works of education on the subject.  
By way of an organization called Facing History and Ourselves, which was 
originally funded by the United States government,50 youths in the United States, and in 
                                                          
49 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
2002), 17. In an endnote, Power identifies Bartlett’s book as her source, but does not mention that the 
dialogue there is presented without the citation of a source. See: Ibid., 521 (note 1).   
 
50 Facing History and Ourselves was funded by Title IV of the Higher Education Act (1965), which 





other locations “around the world,”51 are being taught to think that this conversation 
between Lemkin and his professor really took place: 
Journalist and human rights activist Samantha Power writes that the trial of 
Soghomon Tehlirian stirred up deep moral reflection in Raphael Lemkin, a 21-
year-old Polish Jew studying linguistics at the University of Lvov. He raised the 
issue with a law professor. Power describes the exchange. 
Lemkin asked why the Armenians did not have Talaat arrested for the massacre. 
The professor…52    
 
However, Power’s description of the exchange not only presented an unsourced material 
as a matter of fact, it also involved another version of similar but not quite the same 
content, and Power did not note that she consolidates two different versions into one 
narrative.53 The other version was taken from the manuscript of Lemkin’s autobiography, 
which was developed around the same time as Bartlett’s text but markedly of a separate 
literary effort: 
At Lwow University, where I enrolled for the study of law, I discussed this matter 
with my professors. They evoked the argument about sovereignty of states. “But 
sovereignty of states,” I answered, “implies conducting an independent foreign 
and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of 
                                                          
Strom and William S. Parson, Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior (n.p.: 
Margot Stern Strom / Williams S. Parsons, 1977), iii; Margot Stern Strom and William S. Parsons, Facing 
History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior (Watertown, MA: International Educations, 1982), 
18. 
 
51 In addition to ten locations that include American cities and London, the organization’s website mentions 
having “educational partnerships” in China, France, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. See: Facing 
History and Ourselves, “About Us,” https://www.facinghistory.org/about-us (accessed, 1/26/2017). It is 
noteworthy that even though the current website does not mention Switzerland among the international 
locations, in another source the organization lists Switzerland along with American cities as the only 
regional office internationally. See: Facing History and Ourselves, Crimes against Humanity and 
Civilisation: The Genocide of the Armenians (Brookline, MA: Facing History and Ourselves, 2004), vi. 
 
52 Ibid., 184. This dialogue is presented as a matter of fact in the introduction, stating that “When Raphael 
Lemkin, a young Polish Jew, learned about the massacre of the Armenians, he asked a law professor why 
no one had indicted the perpetrators for murder.” See: Ibid., vii. Similarly, another text book by Facing 
History and Ourselves narrates the story as if a matter of recorded history. See: Facing History and 
Ourselves, Totally Unofficial: Raphael Lemkin and the Genocide Convention (Brookline, MA: Facing 
History and Ourselves 2007), 3.  
 






activity directed toward the welfare of people.”54 
 
While the message about the sovereignty of states is essentially the same, the details of 
this account are different from the Bartlett one. In addition to the difference in the 
wording and the absence of the reference to chickens, in this account there are professors 
rather than a single professor, and Lemkin is at the university to study law rather than 
linguistics. Moreover, in the Bartlett version it is said that upon killing Talaat, Tehlirian 
shouted “‘This is to avenge the death of my family!’” whereas in the manuscript for the 
autobiography it is claimed that at the time of shooting Tehlirian said “‘This is for my 
mother.’”55 Nonetheless, the consolidation of these two versions into one narrative, as 
done in Power’s book, is then repeated by scholars such as John Cooper,56 Steven L. 
Jacobs,57 and Taner Akçam.58 On its own, the version from the autobiography has also 
                                                          
54 Donna-Lee Frieze, ed., Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2013), 20. The text appears under the title “Early Adult Years,” as if to suggest that this 
period in Lemkin’s life was marked by the Armenian experience. This account also includes a use of 
language that frames the suffering of the Armenians as an injustice through a view that is limited to 
accusations of Turkish wrongdoing. 
 
55 Compare: Bartlett, They, 96; Frieze, Totally, 20. 
 
56 John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 15. In Cooper’s consolidation of the two versions, Lemkin says to the one professor, 
who made the comment about chickens in the Bartlett account, what he said to professors in the manuscript 
of his autobiography. 
 
57 Jacobs, “Raphael,” 164. Like Cooper, Jacobs inserts Lemkin’s words from the manuscript of the 
autobiography in the context of his university professors into the setting of a conversation with one 
professor as presented in the Bartlett text. This same Jacobs is identified by Power as having “the most 
complete collection of Lemkin’s files and correspondence.” See: Power, “Problem”, 521 (note 1). Jacobs 
is described as a scholarly authority in the study of Lemkin’s biography. See: Adam Jones, review of 
Lemkin on Genocide, edited by Steven Leonard Jacobs, Journal of Genocide Research 15, no. 2 (June 
2013): 233. 
 
58 Taner Akçam, “Lemkin and the Question of Armenian and Kurdish Reforms,” in the Armenian National 
Committee of American Website, https://anca.org/akcam-lemkin-and-the-question-of-armenian-and-
kurdish-reforms-2/ (accessed, 1/26/2017). In an address at the 2015 International Hrant Dink Award 
ceremony in Istanbul, Akçam’s presentation joined together the two versions into one that includes the 
mention of both the chickens and what sovereignty implies: “‘But,’ Lemkin then objected, ‘people are not 





been presented by scholars as a transcript even though it is by no means a reliable 
source.59 
 Both versions, upon their utilization in the genocide discourse, make the same 
significant point about letting international law hold states accountable for the handling 
of innerstate affairs while relating it to Lemkin, as if to show that the Armenian 
experience was foundational in the mental processes that he experienced on his way to 
introducing “genocide” to the world. This is not the only attempt in history to use an 
anecdote for didactic purposes, and it is understandable that the profound concept of 
unified standards of governance through guiding states on how to treat their own people 
is not necessarily an American interest alone. It does become an international problem 
when seemingly credible scholars present the material as historically accurate. Such 
practice is not scholarly, and it suggests that the project of international law is associated 
with insincere story-telling.  
Not only is this Lemkin narrative historically unfounded, it also interferes with 
the knowledge of meaningful moments in history. One major aspect of this is that history 
is undermined for the sake of establishing Lemkin rather than the United States 
government as the main actor in the origin and development of “genocide.” Thus, the 
                                                          
internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed toward the 
welfare of people.’”  
 
59 For instance, based on this narrative, it is said that Lemkin “became obsessed with the current debate 
about the sanctity of state sovereignty.” See: Paul R. Bartrop and Samuel Totten, “The History of 
Genocide: An Overview,” in Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources, ed. Samuel 
Totten (Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004), 32. Similarly, based on the words that are 
attributed to Lemkin as a university student, it is determined without qualification that because of the 
Armenian experience in WWI a deeply shocked Lemkin “was willing to limit state sovereignty.” See: 
Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, “Introduction: The Origins of Genocide—Raphael Lemkin as a 
Historian of Mass Violence,” in The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass 






focus on this one individual’s supposed youthful insistence on limiting the sovereignty of 
states leads the public away from recognizing that states were already asked to account 
for the treatment of their own peoples by the procedures of the League of Nations 
overseeing the Minority Treaties long before the invention of “genocide.” Another, 
perhaps more fateful, aspect is that the Lemkin narrative purposely spreads false 
information about the relevance of the Armenian experience in the conceptualization of 
“genocide.” This aspect has had the effect of putting “genocide” on many lips, but at the 
expense of what many others are willing to believe about international law.  
 It is plainly true that Armenians are not chickens, but as humans they were 
capable of being turned against their own government, and the popular claim that Lemkin 
invented “genocide” because the Turks were not punished for the Armenian victimhood 
is one strong example of how the current discourse on “genocide” reflects poorly on the 
prospects of international law. On the one hand, the fictitious combination of the Lemkin 
and Armenian elements into one narrative has added fuel to the fire of genocide 
discussion, all but ensuring that “genocide” would penetrate popular culture and public 
consciousness as a heated topic of debate; on the other hand, it is based on a manipulative 
presentation of history that has cast a great shadow of doubt regarding the dependability 
of information that penetrates the performance of international law. While the design of a 
moral narrative through a fancied portrayal of Lemkin has successfully generated much 
consumed knowledge on “genocide,” it has neglected to mind the dark side of an interest-
riddled discourse on “genocide.” To see how the term genocide has been used, light has 
to be shed on the manner in which the American political leadership dissociated itself 





shown as dissociated from the effort to persuade. The depiction of the American political 
leadership as disinterested in, or ambivalent about, the term genocide was conducive to 
leading the general public toward the perception of “genocide” as an authentic expression 
of universal morality.     
 
American Display of Dissociation 
Despite “genocide” being a legal matter, it was primarily a product of soft power, 
and had to remain as such for the foreseeable future. The term genocide could not acquire 
legal power upon arrival. Even though “genocide” was introduced from the top down, it 
had to be believed from the ground up. There are three main reasons that may explain 
this. First, even as the United States had showcased its physical superiority in comparison 
to the other powers in WWII, international law lacked the enforceability of domestic 
law,60 and the prevention of international crimes through the use of force is tantamount to 
war.61 Since there was no inherent sense of authority to international law, putting the 
enforceability of genocide verdicts to the legal test would have risked exhibiting 
disinclinations to comply and failures to compel, both of which would have presented the 
international court system as ineffective and, consequently, would have discouraged 
further international cooperation toward the advancement of international law. Putting 
                                                          
60 This is seen as possibly the most pertinent cause to question that international law is actually law in the 
full sense of the word. Throughout the Cold War the enforceability of law against either the United States 
or the Soviet Union seemed particularly unlikely. See: D’Amato, “Is,” 1293. In his analysis, “International 
law is enforced by … reciprocal-entitlement violation,” and the view that it is not “really ‘law’” does not 
consider the effect of norms. See: Ibid., 1313. A different view holds that the absence of an enforcement 
bureaucracy that is similar to that of the state means that “International ‘law’ is not of a legal order of 
obligation, despite the important resemblances.” See: Franck, Power, 39.  
 
61 Unlike the state’s ability to enforce domestic law, “the main sanctions established by international law 






“genocide” into an immediate legal effect threatened to force the United States to assume 
the role of a worldwide enforcer, which would have led to more measures of hard power 
rather than results of legal power. 
Second, the indirect approach presented itself as the United States could not 
directly control the legal administration of “genocide” without it appearing as an 
American rather than an international project. The German resistance to international law 
was not only manifested in two vivid tests of hard power, but it also sent a message that 
the arguments for international law were not persuasive enough to assuage geopolitical 
challengers because they could be easily connected to Anglo-American interests.62 
Greater efforts of soft power were required in order to keep other states, especially the 
powerful ones among them, from viewing the organization of law among nations as an 
American concept in keeping with American interests.63 In relation to other aspects of 
international law, “genocide” necessitated the appearance of separation from the United 
States government even more. Unlike the international treaties that codified the conduct 
between states,64 a treaty against “genocide” focuses on how each state governs its own 
                                                          
62 On the eve of WWII, the conviction that the international treaties were functions of Anglo-American 
interests was so strong that in his chapter on international treaties E. H. Carr toiled to lead readers to agree 
with the observation that was made by “Herr Hitler”—as Carr addressed him in the first edition—who said 
that “’Once it [i.e. the nation] is in danger of oppression or annihilation … the question of legality plays a 
subordinate role.’” See: Carr, Twenty, 236.  
 
63 Through the process of Germany’s reeducation post-WWII, the American soft-power effort was much 
more foundational than trying to convince German leaders that international law is not an American 
interest. It sought to influence the German mind to the extent of changing the local thought “about the role 
of Germany in the world of nations,” in a “mammoth enterprise, involving teachers, text and trade books, 
pamphlets, newspapers and periodicals, publishing, and libraries, to mention only a few of its 
ramifications.” See: Telford Taylor, “The Struggle for the German Mind,” New Republic, January 30, 1950, 
17.  
 
64 Until the Genocide Convention, treaties were seen as aimed to regulate relations between states rather 
than within them. For instance, see: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The International Law of 
the Future: Postulates, Principles and Proposals (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 






affairs and exposes each state to outside involvement through international law. By 
openly involving itself in the codification of “genocide,” the United States would have 
communicated to the other member states of the United Nations that the term genocide is 
made to justify military intervention by the very government that is most capable and 
likely to carry it out.  
 Third, being a freshly invented term, which in addition to its legal 
unprecedentedness had experienced early shifts in definition due to the highly unsettled 
quality of the international setting during its initial public appearance, there was no clear 
understanding of what “genocide” meant and how it would be legally applied. Unlike 
intentional homicide, the identification of genocide involves the subjective assignment of 
identity to the victim.65 This suggests that without a set discourse to illustrate what 
genocide means, the determination of its legal application would have presented judges 
with an overwhelming amount of space for discretion, and without the equivalent of 
common law. Therefore, the term genocide became a matter of judicial execution by 
international professionals only after the utilization of power to control the narration of 
instances that would serve as platforms for the exploration and interpretation of what is 
meant by “genocide.” The American ability to narrate the advent of “genocide” through 
the agency of a seemingly independent expert, and then the use of it through the claims of 
victimhood by identity groups, is an example of soft power.  
 Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that during those critical days for 
                                                          
65 In several instances the term genocide was explained as being the group version of homicide, without 
considering that this analogy directs attention away from the subjective assignment of identity that is 
inherent in genocide claims but not in the determination of intentional homicide. See: Otto D. Tolischus, 
“Twentieth-Century Moloch: The Nazi-Inspired Totalitarian State, Devourer of Progress—and of Itself,” 
New York Times, January 21, 1945; Kaempffert, “Genocide,” New York Times; Lemkin, “Genocide,” 228; 





international law after WWII the United States government distanced itself from the legal 
initiation of “genocide.” There was no visibility of American leadership in the process of 
drafting the convention, and once the treaty was adopted, there were publicized 
hesitations regarding its ratification in the United States. Much like the coinage of the 
term genocide,66 the orchestration of the Genocide Convention was tightly narrated as 
being Lemkin’s doing.67 Time and again, Lemkin was described as either the “father” of 
                                                          
66 For examples of the many usages of the verb to coin in relation to Lemkin and the term genocide, see: 
Genocide,” Washington Post; Tolischus, “Twentieth-Century,” New York Times; “New,” New York Times; 
“Answers,” New York Times; “Genocide,” New York Times; Kaempffert, “Science,” New York Times; 
Waldemar Kaempffert, “Genocide as Practiced by Nazis,” New York Times, November 17, 1946; Lemkin, 
“Genocide,” 228; Lemkin, “Genocide: A New,” 360; United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1948), 197; Jessup, Modern, 183; Kunz, “United Nations Convention,” 738; 
Frank E. Holman, “A Challenge to Individual Liberty under Law,” United Nations World, June 1949, 21; 
Samuels, “U.N.,” New York Times; Fenton, “Approval,” New York Times; “Ratifying United Nations 
Convention on Genocide,” New York Times, December 22, 1949; Kenneth S. Carlston, “Should the United 
States Ratify the Genocide Convention?” in Proceedings of the Section of the International and 
Comparative Law: St. Louis Meeting, September 5-6, 1949 (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1950), 
35; “U.N. Representatives Ratifying Pact Against Genocide,” New York Times, October 17, 1950; “6 U.S. 
Candidates for Nobel Award,” New York Times, March 7, 1952; “U.N. Genocide Ban Said to Be in Peril,” 
New York Times, May 25, 1952; “Lemkin Calls Soviet Guilty of Genocide,” New York Times, January 18, 
1953; “Forum Supports Genocide Accord,” New York Times, January 10, 1954. The adherence to this verb, 
which has lasted to this day, points at there being an orderly and by now almost automatic quality to the 
narration.   
 
67 For example, after the adoption of the Genocide Convention, it was written that “public opinion—and 
Lemkin—had their way.” See: Samuels, “U.N.,” New York Times. In another article by the NYT in 1952 it 
is stated that “For about ten years, Professor Lemkin has been visiting the diplomatic corridors and foreign 
ministries of the world, seeking support for the idea that genocide—a word he coined to cover the 
deliberate extinction of nations, races or religions—should be outlawed internationally.” See: “U.N.,” New 
York Times. This type of Lemkin-centered portrayal is found also in a scholarly article, in which it is 
claimed that “Lemkin had been indefatigable” in the promotion of “his ideas.” See: Kunz, “United Nations 
Convention,” 738. Similarly, the Genocide Convention is described as “Dr. Lemkin’s marvelous 
achievement.” See: James N. Rosenberg, “This is a Matter for Statesmen, Not Lawyers,” United Nations 






the convention,68 or as the founder of “the world movement to outlaw genocide.”69 
Within the narrative, there are repeated references to Cuba, India, and Panama as having 
responded in November, 1946, to Lemkin’s lobbying with the submission of the 
resolution for the outlawing of genocide,70 but these references give no heed to the 
control that the United States and Britain had over the foreign policy, among other 
policies, of these member states, especially at the time of the call for the resolution. 
Similarly, Lemkin’s relationship with the United States government is not denied; it is 
simply not stated in most cases or deemphasized. The reason why the United States 
government has not had to deny that Lemkin or certain member states followed an 
American direction in the making of the Genocide Convention is mainly because the 
                                                          
68 For example, see: “Cuba Honors Pact Father," New York Times, September 22, 1950; “Pact on Genocide 
effected by U.N.,” New York Times, October 15, 1950; “Lemkin,” New York Times. Having been 
popularized by the NYT, this title was also engraved on Lemkin’s tombstone. For an image of it, see: 
Schnur, “Unofficial,” 11. This designation is also found in recent works by genocide scholars, as shown 
here in Chapter 2, note 230. In keeping with the parental title, Lemkin was reported to refer to the Genocide 
Convention as his child. See: “U.N,” New York Times. A similar kind of title referred to him as the author 
of the Genocide Convention. See: “Claims Harriman Pledge,” New York Times, June 23, 1952; “Ad 2,” 
New York Times, January 9, 1954; “Genocide Pact Warning,” New York Times, March 8, 1954.  
 
69 For instance, see: Rosenberg, “This,” 18; “Chinese Will Ask U.N. to Redefine Genocide,” New York 
Times, December 5, 1952; Raphael Lemkin, “Nature of Genocide: Confusion with Discrimination Against 
Individuals Seen,” letter to the editor, New York Times, June 14, 1953; Rafael [sic] Lemkin, “Genocide 
Convention: Projects before the U.N. Opposed as Weakening Enforcement,” letter to the editor, New York 
Times, November 12, 1957. The inspiration for this title is not disclosed in these sources, but it is likely that 
the reference is to an imagined movement rather than an actual one.    
 
70 For instances in which the three member states are mentioned together as the states that acted toward the 
advancement of the convention, see: “Seven Agenda Items Submitted for U.N.,” New York Times, 
November 3, 1946; “Assembly Will Act on Genocide Study,” New York Times, November 6, 1946: 19; 
Raphael Lemkin, “Genocide before the U.N., Importance of Resolution Declaring Crime International Is 
Stressed,” letter to the editor, New York Times, November 8, 1946; Kaempffert, “Genocide,” New York 
Times; Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime” (1947), 149; Lemkin, “Genocide Convention,” New York Times; 
“Law on Genocide Put to Assembly,” New York Times, November 23, 1946; Kunz, “United Nations 
Convention,” 739; Schroeder, International, 27. The repetition of this type of reference points at the 
regularity with which the information on the process that led to the Genocide Convention places member 






matter is not featured in the mainstream information about it.71 
 The placement of Lemkin in the discourse about the question of ratifying the 
Genocide Convention in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s affected both 
the initial debate itself and the memory of it in a manner that helped to depict the 
development of “genocide” as distinguished from American strategy. During the time 
when the American public was absorbing critical information about the possible 
consequences of turning “genocide” into a crime that is recognized by American law, 
Lemkin’s foreignness was accentuated, and thereby the term that was publicly associated 
with him took on a non-American or even an un-American quality. Through the narration 
by mainstream sources of information such as the NYT, Lemkin came to be viewed as 
representing the argument for the ratification.72 At this point, Lemkin’s Jewish identity 
became more pronounced as his activities were publicly connected with the interests of 
Jewish organizations.73 Similarly, the debate in the United States Senate by the 
                                                          
71 The original narration of the NYT has carried over to more recent popular reiterations of it. Power’s book 
provides an instance of this, with the addition of misleading information. In a paragraph that begins with 
the timeframe of May, 1946, it is narrated that “Lemkin had been teaching part time at Yale Law School,” 
and that in order to be present in Nuremberg he “convinced the dean, Wesley Sturges, to grant him leave.” 
See: Power, “Problem”, 49. However, Lemkin’s own list of the offices he had held shows that he only 
became a visiting lecturer with the rank of full professor at Yale University Law School in 1948, and that in 
1946 his main position was being an adviser on foreign affairs to the United States War Department. See: 
Box 2, Folder 1, Raphael Lemkin Papers. It is also of note that the description of Lemkin’s biography in the 
New York Public Library’s accession sheet for the Lemkin papers does not mention his employment by the 
United States government. See: New York Public Library, “Rare Books and Manuscripts Division 
Accession Sheet,” https://www.nypl.org/sites/default/files/archivalcollections/pdf/Lemkin.pdf (accessed, 
1/26/2017).  
 
72 For instance, it is said that Lemkin was “Urging Senate ratification of the United Nations genocide 
convention.” See: Fenton, “Approval,” New York Times. Moreover, Lemkin was mentioned in the reports 
on the ratification of the Genocide Convention by other member states, such as Norway and Ecuador, and 
portrayed in these articles as actively pressing different member states to ratify the convention. For 
example, see: “Norse Sign Genocide Pact,” New York Times, July 6, 1949; “Ratifying,” New York Times. 
 
73 While it may be argued that the cause of ratifying the Genocide Convention or promoting 
humanitarianism in general was typically important for Jewish organizations, it does not mean that there 
was no design behind the public portrayal of these causes as if associated with Jewish interests, with the 





Committee on Foreign Relations combined this notion with the impression that the 
campaign for ratification was generally being run by interest groups of maximized 
political leverage: Republican Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey raised the issue 
of the Jewish people while discussing Lemkin, as if to suggest that Lemkin was 
representative of Jews; this gave an opportunity for Adrian S. Fisher, a legal advisor for 
the Department of State, to argue that Lemkin was “a private citizen” who “does what he 
thinks he should do”; and then Democratic Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut 
enlisted the organizations that support the Genocide Convention to suggest that there is a 
“broad base,” but at the same time show this base as being the concentration of political 
power by interests groups.74 The effect was that the call for ratification would be seen as 
having enough backing to warrant a public debate, but also that the cause of introducing 
“genocide” into American law would be viewed as strange to most Americans and 
                                                          
instances of publications by Jewish leaders of organizations that took part in the public debate, see: Moses 
Moskowitz, “Is the U.N.’s Bill of Human Rights Dangerous? A Reply to President Holman,” American Bar 
Association Journal 35, no. 4 (April 1949): 283-288, 358-359; Rosenberg, “This,” 18-23. In addition, the 
NYT published articles that would strengthen this impression. For example, one article reports that a Jewish 
organization, Brith Sholom, awarded its prize for Humanitarianism to the Australian minister for foreign 
affairs, Herbert V. Evatt, “for leading the fight to outlaw genocide.” See: “Evatt Gets Sholom Prize,” New 
York Times, June 27, 1949. Articles that reported pleas by Jewish leaders to have the Genocide Convention 
ratified had a more direct effect because they gave the impression that these were made on behalf of Jews. 
For example, see: “Plea Made to Pope in Behalf of Jews” New York Times, January 1, 1950; “125 Years 
Marked by B'nai Jeshurun,” New York Times, October 29, 1950; “Berle Chides U.S. on Genocide Issue,” 
New York Times, January 13, 1951; “U.S. Prodded on Genocide,” New York Times, May 24, 1953; George 
Dugan, “Action on Genocide Is Urged by Rabbis,” New York Times, June 26, 1953; “Goldmann Elected 
World Jewish Head,” New York Times, August 12, 1953. Alongside these references to Jewish 
organizations, it was claimed that Christian groups were also calling for ratification. For example, see: 
“Church Groups Appeal to United Nations to Speed Convention Outlawing Genocide,” New York Times, 
February 11, 1948; “Church Unit Appeals to U.N.,” New York Times, September 22, 1948; “Genocide Pact 
Backed,” New York Times, June 18, 1949. It is also noted that support for the Genocide Convention by 
women organizations was also a feature of the narration by the NYT. For instance, see: “Millions of Women 
Urge Genocide Ban,” New York Times, June 25, 1949; “Mrs. Spain Chosen by Jersey Women,” New York 
Times, May 12, 1950; “U.S. Urged to Back Genocide Treaty,” New York Times, June 21, 1950; “Supporter 
Assails Genocide Pact Foes,” New York Times, October 15, 1952. 
 






considered to be an unnatural imposition on them, as expressed by Senator Smith: 
I can’t understand what it all means, and I think others are troubled by it, and it is 
the definition of this new idea, and the biggest propagandist for this that has been 
around seeing me and other people is a man who comes from a foreign country 
who has been the subject of this sort of thing, and why we are putting all the heat 
of propaganda on a foreigner who speaks broken English to try to force this on us 
I cannot understand. I know of many people who have been irritated no end by 
this fellow running around. He is a very nice fellow, and I am sympathetic with 
the Jewish people, but they ought not to be the ones who are propagandizing it, 
and they are.75 
 
For some unspecified reason, Lemkin, who had been sent to faraway Nuremberg by the 
United States government to observe the trial there, did not make the trip from New 
Haven, CT, to appear before the Senate subcommittee in Washington, DC, and instead 
expressed his support for ratification by way of telegram communications.76 Currently, 
the popular retrospective view of the public debate on ratification shows Lemkin as a 
morally driven independent actor, and the portrayal of what was allegedly his cause as 
being dismissed and disrespected by the American political system strengthens the 
display of dissociation between “genocide” and power.77    
                                                          
75 Ibid., 645.  
 
76 Ibid., 369. In Power’s presentation of the matter, she makes an unsourced claim that Lemkin was not 
invited. See: Power, “Problem”, 68. However, it is here considered that Lemkin may have not been able to 
conduct a conversation in English at the level of articulation and pace that is expected at an appearance 
before a subcommittee of the Senate, and the employment of a translator would have called attention to the 
uncredited authorship of his written publications. Thus, it is possible that Lemkin did not defend his 
position about ratification at the Senate because it would have compromised the credibility of his role in the 
discourse. Lemkin’s limited English was not a secret, but having Lemkin attempt to speak at the Senate 
risked displaying before the public an incapacity to communicate in English to the extent of attracting 
disbelief regarding Lemkin’s image as an influential author in English.   
 
77 According to Power’s centralization of Lemkin’s perspective, there was “congressional opposition” to 
what she presents as “his convention.” See: Ibid. Within this framing of the events, it is possible for her to 
claim that “It was hard to see how it was in the U.S. [sic] interest to make a state’s treatment of its own 
citizens the legitimate object of international scrutiny,” and adding that “international law offered few 
rewards to the most powerful nation on earth.” See: Ibid., 69. In this, Power’s role as an agent of 
information is in line with the soft-power instruction that in order for public opinion to favor international 
law it should not appear as a project of American power in service of American interests. Power eliminates 
from consideration the possibility of American authority behind international law by making it seem like 





 By relating “genocide” to Lemkin, the discourse presented the pressure to ratify 
the Genocide Convention in the United States as having a strong sense of international 
invasiveness, and, thereby, domestic political considerations within the United States 
were amplified in contrast to global affairs. Even though the discourse included 
arguments that illustrated how the ratification might improve the state of international 
relations,78 the very presentation of them as lying on the other side of the debate from the 
national spirit in the United States,79 and in disharmony with the workings of Washington 
politics,80 gave the appearance that the promotion of “genocide” as a crime was not 
                                                          
78 For instance, the NYT advertised the Genocide Convention as a treaty or pact for the people. In one 
article, the rationale for the Genocide Convention is expressed by the claim that “individual men as well as 
the state must be held to account for evil acts against society.” See: “A Treaty for the People,” New York 
Times, October 11, 1947. A detailed article following the adoption in the United Nations, not only ascribed 
the Genocide Convention to Lemkin, but described it as “his ‘treaty for the people’” to give it a grass-roots 
appeal. See: Samuels, “U.N.,” New York Times. Similarly, in a later article it was argued that “the average 
person whom the convention is designed to protect” understands that the Genocide Convention “simply 
provides that he and his family, as individuals or as family or national groups, shall not be destroyed 
because of racial, religious or national differences.” See: “Pact for the People,” New York Times, December 
16, 1951. The idea that this treaty is for the people was also conveyed in a text under Lemkin’s name, in 
which it is mentioned that “a leading American newspaper … called the genocide convention ‘a treaty for 
the people.’” See: Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime” (1948), 71. In other words, there was an effort to convey 
the positive elements of the Genocide Convention, but ultimately the discourse was structured to direct 
public sentiment against ratification. 
 
79 It was suggested to the American public that the pressure to ratify the Genocide Convention in the United 
States meant that “Our heritage of individual liberty under law is challenged as never before.” See: 
Holman, “Challenge,” 22.  
 
80 The distance between the Department of State and the Senate was illustrated as part of the narration 
about there being a delay in the ratification. See: “The Genocide Treaty,” New York Times, June 12, 1949. 
While the Department of State is typically associated with representing American interests abroad, the 
Senate is thought to be representative of the American people’s sentiment. Accordingly, the suggestion that 
there might be disagreement between the Department of State and the Senate feeds the notion that public 
opinion in the United States is formed independently of policy interests and protected from it. Whenever 
public opinion is seen as resisting policy—especially foreign policy—interests, it strengthens the 
believability of the democratic process. Hence, this narration is also seen as helpful for governance in the 
United States from this perspective. Moreover, partisanship regarding the Genocide Convention’s 
ratification surfaced as a late rationale for the fading of the debate from the public discourse. It served as a 
natural domestic explanation for nonratification being that the Genocide Convention was adopted by the 
United Nations during the time of a Democratic administration under President Harry Truman, who 
personally recommended it for ratification by the Senate, and it became seen as a partisan agenda by the 
time that Dwight Eisenhower became the president and established a Republican administration. For 
relevant articles in the NYT, see: “Pact Ratification Asked,” New York Times, June 17, 1949; “Text of the 





American, neither as an interest nor as an idea. Consequently, international law in general 
was made to appear less American. Thus, the discourse executed the soft-power tenet that 
for information to be effective, the effort at instilling a certain belief cannot be seen as 
connected to a source of authority that stands to gain from it. The public debate in the 
United States about ratification, and its aftermath of no ratification in the next four 
decades, had the effect of allowing American power to exercise control over how 
“genocide” was to be used, without being perceived as doing so. Even George Finch, the 
director of the division that oversaw CEIP’s publication of Axis Rule and the introduction 
of “genocide” to the public, played a role in presenting the ratification of the Genocide 
Convention in the United States as a matter of debate, as if the incorporation of 
“genocide” into international law was not an American idea in which he was personally 
involved.81 
However, a view of the program for international law as expressed by the same 
Finch just a few years prior to the public debate on the ratification of “genocide” in the 
United States reveals that the Genocide Convention embodied American legal foresight. 
In 1944, the Division of International Law of CEIP released a publication on the future of 
                                                          
York Times, November 5, 1953. The NYT even generated information about Lemkin’s support of Averell 
Harriman as the Democratic candidate for the presidency due to the latter’s expressed view on the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention. See: “Claims,” New York Times. 
 
81 George A. Finch, “Editorial Comment: The Genocide Convention,” American Journal of International 
Law 43, no. 4 (October 1949): 732-738. For instance, Finch was involved in making the approval of the 
Genocide Convention in the United States seem debatable. See: Ibid., 733. In similar writings, legal experts 
called the ratification into question without necessarily opposing it directly. For example, see: Orie L. 
Phillips, “The Genocide Convention: Its Effect on Our Legal System,” American Bar Association Journal 
35, no. 8 (August 1949): 623-625; Carl B. Rix, “Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the 
Covenant on Our Constitution,” American Bar Association Journal 35, no. 7 (July 1949): 551-554, 618-
621; John Foster Dulles, “International Criminal Law and Individuals—A comment on the Principles 
Involved in the Human Rights Covenant and Genocide Convention,” in Proceedings of the Section of the 
International and Comparative Law: St. Louis Meeting, September 5-6, 1949 (Chicago: American Bar 






international law several months before publishing Axis Rule. This publication was the 
product of a shared effort by the leaders of American thought on international law, and 
among the principles that were offered in “a draft of a declaration concerning the 
international law of the future which might be adopted by a competent international 
authority,”82 was the following principle: “Each state has a legal duty to see that 
conditions prevailing within its own territory do not menace international peace and 
order, and to this end it must treat its own population in a way which will not violate the 
dictates of humanity and justice or shock the conscience of mankind.”83 In contrast to the 
information that conceals the American origin of “genocide,” this text points at the 
American discursive fountainhead from which international law flowed toward a level in 
which any member state “may be called upon to place its own house in order.”84  
 In keeping with this destination for international law, the public debate about 
ratification in the United States did not just give a semblance of dissociation between the 
program for “genocide” and an American global vision, it also provided a platform for 
the dissemination of information about the direction of international law toward an 
expansion of involvement in the internal affairs of states without it having a detectable 
                                                          
82 CEIP, International, 3. In the foreword, George A. Finch describes this work as “reflecting a community 
of views.” See: Ibid., v-vi. Among the participants in this project were: Frederic R. Coudert, who at the 
time was the president of ASIL; John Foster Dulles, who would later serve as the secretary of state in the 
Eisenhower administration, and whose sister Eleanor was acknowledged in the preface of Axis Rule for an 
unspecified role; George A. Finch, the director of the international law division of CEIP; Robert H. 
Jackson, Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who represented the United States government as its 
chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials; Philip C. Jessup, who at the time was a professor of international 
law at Columbia University but would later hold different government positions; Arthur K. Kuhn, 
Associate of the Institut de Droit International; Edgar Turlington, who was then the secretary of the section 
of International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association; Robert R. Wilson, who was a 
professor of political science at Duke University and credited in the preface of Axis Rule for an unspecified 
role; and Quincy Wright, a professor of international law at the University of Chicago. See: Ibid., x-xx. 
 
83 Ibid., 7.  
 





measure of forcefulness. The occasion of the ratification presented a public question that 
led to a publicized disagreement through which the process of familiarizing the future of 
international law was carried out. As the information did not appear as coming directly 
from the government to the people but as freely gathered from a debate between pundits, 
public opinion was set to slowly but steadily internalize the direction of international law 
toward greater involvement in domestic matters of member states. The American Bar 
Association (ABA) led the opposition to the ratification from a position of credibility on 
what would be the legally wise opinion for the American public to adopt, and the 
suddenly vocal leadership of Frank E. Holman as the president of the ABA at that point 
in time removed from public memory the previous instrumentality of the ABA leaders in 
the promotion of international law.85 In turn, the credible arguments against the 
                                                          
85 The overall connection between the ABA and the American efforts toward the establishment of 
international law seemed to be negated by Holman’s tenure as president of the ABA. While Holman was 
the president during the publicized debate about the ratification of international treaties in American law, it 
is notable that among the previous presidents of the ABA were David Dudley Field, who may have both 
mothered and fathered modern international law—if one is inclined to assign parental titles—by writing 
and issuing the draft for it in the early 1870s, and Elihu Root, who may have done more than anyone else to 
convert Carnegie’s support and finances into practical use for the advancement of international law in the 
early 1900s. However, in 1948, the public discourse suggested separation between the ABA and 
international law. According to Holman, Judge William L. Ransom had said to him that it was his “duty as 
incoming President of the A.B.A. to alert the American people to the dangers of the U.N. ‘Treaty Law’ 
proposals.” See: Frank E. Holman, The Life and Career of a Western Lawyer, 1886-1961 (Baltimore: The 
Port City Press, 1963), 373. As the following pages of the book suggest, Holman travelled extensively 
across the country to perform this alleged duty. See: Ibid., 374-376. Holman engaged in writings that 
assumed the voice of the public, claiming that it was “confused and bewildered because pressure groups are 
urging their political, social and economic programs under some effective generality or slogan, as, for 
example, there they claim to be acting in the interest of Social Justice, Human Rights, prevention of 
‘Genocide,’ the Common Man or in the interests of World Peace.” See: Holman, “A Challenge,” 22. The 
claim that “The public is anxious for intelligent leadership,” facilitated his argument that “the lawyers of 
today owe a duty of leadership,” and that the supposed protection of the American public from the alleged 
harms of international treaties would be a manifestation of such leadership. See: Ibid. Furthermore, the 
sense of separation between the ABA and the leading promoter of international law, CEIP, was narrated by 
the NYT. See: C. P. Trussell, “Bar Group Accused by Carnegie Fund,” New York Times, October 15, 1950. 
Much like the effect that Holman’s presidency had in leading public perception away from recognizing that 
the ABA had historically been led by active organizers of international law, this article by the NYT 
presented CEIP’s financial grant to the ABA as a source of conflict that lends credibility to the public 
debate. In the article, it was claimed that CEIP “has accused” the ABA “of using funds granted for 
impartial work for peace and law through the United Nations to fight one of the Administration’s principal 





internationalization of American law paved the way for the publicized campaign by 
Republican Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, whose efforts to amend the United States 
Constitution—through what became known as the Bricker Amendment—could then be 
seen as reflective of genuine public concern.86 The Bricker effect was to bundle 
“genocide” together with human rights in a basket of foreign intrusions, thus inspiring 
belief that the facilitation of norms by the United Nations was a threat to the American 
people, even though this legal mechanism had been created and empowered by the legal 
elite of the United States. 
 This display of separation between innovation from within the United States and 
the function of the United Nations conceals the significant direct link between the 
American vision of international law and the constitution of the post-WWII 
intergovernmental organization. The draft of the principles and proposals for the 
development of international law as published under the title The International Law of 
the Future by CEIP in 1944 contains the blueprint for the principles and manner of 
organization as listed in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), which was 
signed on June 26, 1945. For instance, compare Principle 1 of the CEIP text with the UN 
Charter’s Article 2(2):   
Each State has a legal duty to carry out in full good faith its obligations under 
                                                          
the latter had been subservient to the former’s will, and that, therefore, the suggestion of separation 
between them on the ratification of international treaties lacks credibility, the NYT framed the story as an 
act of rebellion by the ABA. The NYT had a leading role in the narration of the ABA’s opposition to the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention. For instance, see: “State Bar Debates U.N. Rights Plans,” New 
York Times, June 25, 1949; William M. Blair, “Bar Group Rejects U.N. Genocide Plan,” New York Times, 
September 9, 1949. 
 
86 For the narration of the Bricker initiatives in connection to the Genocide Convention, see: “D.A.R. 
Intensifies War against U.N.,” New York Times, April 22, 1953; Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: The Present 
Status of the Genocide Treaty,” New York Times, June 11, 1953; Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: A 






international law, and it may not invoke limitations contained in its own 
constitution or law as an excuse for a failure to perform this duty.87 
 
All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting 
from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the present Charter.88 
 
Compare Principle 6 of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 2(3): 
 
Each State has a legal duty to employ pacific means and none but pacific means 
in seeking to settle its disputes with other States, and failing settlement by other 
pacific means to accept the settlement of its disputes by the competent agency of 
the Community of States.89 
 
All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.90 
 
Compare Principle 7 of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 2(4): 
 
Each State has a legal duty to refrain from any use of force and from any threat to 
use force in its relations with another State, except as authorized by the competent 
agency of the Community of States; but subject to immediate reference to an 
approval by the competent agency of the Community of States, a State may 
oppose by force an unauthorized use of force made against it by another State.91 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.92 
 
Compare Principle 8 of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 2(5): 
 
Each State has a legal duty to take, in cooperation with other States, such 
measures as may be prescribed by the competent agency of the Community of 
States for preventing or suppressing a use of force by any State in its relations 
with another state.93 
                                                          
87 CEIP, International, 7.  
 
88 UN Charter, chap. 1, art. 2(2).  
 
89 CEIP, International, 8.  
 
90 UN Charter, chap. 1, art. 2(3) 
 
91 CEIP, International, 8. 
 
92 UN Charter, chap. 1, art. 2(4). 
 





All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes 
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to 
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement 
action.94 
 
Compare Principle 10 of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 2(6): 
 
Each State has a legal duty to refrain from entering into any agreement with 
another State, the performance of which would be inconsistent with the discharge 
of its duties under general international law.95 
 
The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United 
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.96  
 
In addition, there are similarities between the proposals in the CEIP text and other articles 
in the UN Charter. For instance, compare Proposal 2(1) of the CEIP text with the UN 
Charter’s Article 9(1): 
A General Assembly, in which all States should be entitled to representation, 
should be established to serve as the general representative and deliberative organ 
of the Community of States.97  
 
The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.98 
 
Compare Proposal 2(2) of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 10: 
 
The General Assembly, meeting as occasion may require and at least once each 
year, should have general power to deal with any matter of concern to the 
Community of States. Except as may be expressly provided otherwise, its 
decisions should require only a majority vote.99 
 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope 
of the present Charter or relating to the power and function of any organs 
                                                          
94 UN Charter, chap. 1, art. 2(5). 
 
95 CEIP, International, 8. 
 
96 UN Charter, chap. 1, art. 2(6). 
 
97 CEIP, International, 9.  
 
98 UN Charter, chap. 4, art. 9(1). 
 






provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may 
make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security 
Council or to both on any such questions or matters.100 
 
Compare Proposal 9(1) of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 24(1): 
 
The Executive Council should have power, with the concurrence of the General 
Assembly, to adopt general provisions for preventing or suppressing the use of 
force by States in their relations with other States.101 
 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.102 
 
Regarding the advent of a centralized international court, compare Proposal 12 and 
Proposal 17(3) of the CEIP text with the UN Charter’s Article 92 and Article 94(2): 
The Permanent Court of International Justice should be maintained as the chief 
judicial organ of the Community of States, and its Statute should be adapted to the 
organization of the Community of States.103 
 
In the event of a failure by any State to comply with a judgment of the Court, the 
Executive Council should have power to take such action as it may deem to be 
necessary for giving effect to the judgment. If the State which has failed to 
comply with a judgment of the Court is represented in the Executive Council, it 
should not be entitled to vote when the matter is under consideration.104 
 
The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is 
based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms 
an integral part of the present Charter.105 
 
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a 
                                                          
100 UN Charter, chap. 4, art. 10. 
 
101 CEIP, International, 12. 
 
102 UN Charter, chap. 5, art. 24(1). 
 
103 CEIP, International, 13. 
 
104 Ibid., 15. 
 






judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide 
upon measure to be taken to give effect to the judgment.106 
 
Meaning, not only did CEIP instruct the United Nations on the Genocide Convention in 
principle (Principle 2 in The International Law of the Future) and in theory (the 
introduction of “genocide” in Axis Rule), but it actually produced the template for the UN 
Charter itself.  
Moreover, despite the prominence of Holman’s arguments as the president of the 
ABA against the idea of having to ratify a treaty of human rights following the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in the early years of the United Nations,107 the 
promotion of human rights through the charter of an intergovernmental organization was 
nonetheless an American concept. The incorporation of the purpose to encourage “respect 
for human rights” in Article 1 of the UN Charter,108 is a later version of Postulate 2 in the 
CEIP text that encourages “continuous collaboration by States to promote the common 
                                                          
106 Ibid., art. 94(2). 
 
107 For example, the idea of ratifying the UDHR was put in terms of incongruity with American “concepts 
of law and government,” claiming that “it would be a sad day for the people of the United States if they 
were to permit themselves to be led so far astray from their own traditional concepts of government by the 
activities of those who are completely out of sympathy with important and cherished features of our own 
system of government.” See: Frank E. Holman, “President Holman’s Comments on Mr. Moskowitz’s 
Reply,” American Bar Association Journal 35, no. 4 (April 1949): 362. Assuming that Eleanor Roosevelt 
had been instrumental in the drafting of the UDHR and not just its main ambassador, Holman pointed out 
as a matter of concern that “She is not a person in any sense trained in legal draftsmanship.” See: Frank E. 
Holman, “An ‘International Bill of Rights’: Proposals Have Dangerous Implications for U.S.,” American 
Bar Association Journal 34, no. 11 (November 1948): 984. He further claimed that she and the other 
representatives of member states in the effort toward the UDHR were “social and economic reformers” 
who were driven by “a missionary spirit” that risked exposing American law to “United Nations 
intervention” and “many international irritations and provocations.” See: Ibid., 985. In addition, Holman 
appealed to xenophobic sentiment by warning that inevitably “foreign standards of interpretation of these 
rights will be applicable to the American people,” as opposed to the American Bill of Rights that represents 
American “peculiar concepts of justice and propriety.” See: Ibid., 986.  
 






welfare of all peoples.”109 In between the lines, it was possible to read that the discourse 
about the ratification of international treaties in the United States—despite being 
dominated by strong fearmongering tactics that swayed the American public against the 
idea of ratification—directed the existence of the otherwise legal term genocide to being 
constitutive through education rather than adjudication. A hint at this being the favored 
and chosen direction is offered in the statement that “We may well find that the road of 
education and public opinion is a better road in the long run than that of the avenue of the 
criminal law.”110  
This constitutive role of the Genocide Convention points at how the constitutional 
function of the UDHR had been left unresolved at the closing of the public debate on 
ratification in the United States. While the Genocide Convention had been adopted as an 
international treaty by the United Nations on December 11, 1946, the UDHR was 
adopted as a set of “guiding principles” that are not legally binding.111 However, as such, 
the UDHR was considered to be a potential continuation of the UN Charter, which is 
itself an intergovernmental constitution. Within the public debate on the capacity of 
international treaties to become the law of the land in the United States under Article 6 of 
the Constitution,112 the case of Shelley v. Kraemer and its interpretation drew attention to 
                                                          
109 CEIP, International, 5. 
 
110 Carlston, “Should,” 39.  
 
111 Josef L. Kunz, “The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,” American Journal of International 
Law 43, no. 2 (July 1949): 317. This is a reiteration of a statement made by Eleanor Roosevelt who was 
publicly associated with the UDHR. See: Ibid., 321.  
 
112 The relevant text in the Constitution of the United States declares that “This Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 






whether or not provisions of the UN Charter, including the UDHR, are as binding on 
American courts as the American Constitution.113 While the United States Supreme Court 
did not incorporate the UDHR into its decision-making, and the constitutional function of 
the UDHR faded from the public discourse in the United States, the declaration of 
principles inspired the adoption of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms by the Council of Europe in 1950, which called in Section 2 
for the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights that has since executed the 
convention as a matter of law.114  
The genocide discourse has advanced the general concept of justice in 
international law in ways that presented an alternative to the discourse on human rights. 
Even though the Genocide Convention was set as international law to protect members of 
particular groups as such from mistreatment, it is also a protector of human rights in the 
indirect way that an individual’s belonging to any of the listed identity types is generally 
regarded as a human right. In the United Nations, it was the Genocide Convention, rather 
than the UDHR,115 that acted as a stimulus for considerations of an international court.116 
                                                          
113 In one article it was argued that the provisions of the UN Charter, as treaty provisions, “are undoubtedly 
binding on our courts.” See: Paul Sayre, “Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law,” Iowa Law Review 
34, no. 1 (November 1948): 4. This view was not that of the United States Supreme Court in the case, 
leading Sayre to lament that “In the Shelley case we ignored the Charter entirely” and “broke a solemn 
treaty of this Government.” See: Ibid., 11.  
 
114 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, sec. 2, 
arts. 19-51. 
 
115 Holman warned that the UDHR, if “ratified as a treaty and under our Constitution is to become the 
supreme law of the land,” will eventually be “implemented against all of us by the decrees of a new 
International Court of Human Relations.” See: Holman, “‘International’,” 985. However, the UDHR has 
not led to a human-rights treaty that might sanction the establishment of a United Nations court in its spirit.   
 
116 Already in the early work on “genocide,” it was suggested that “Since a country which makes a policy 
of genocide cannot be trusted to try its own offenders, such offenders should be subject to trial by an 
international court.” See: Lemkin, “Genocide: A Modern,” 43. This idea was reiterated on the pages of the 
NYT in the form of a letter that is ascribed to Lemkin, in which it was said, under the section title “Special 





As it turned out, since the UDHR remains a mere declaration and not a treaty in the 
United Nations, the Genocide Convention, as a treaty in the United Nations, has assumed 
a constitutive quality, even though it centers on the prevention and punishment of one 
made-up crime.117 In other words, the Genocide Convention—instead of maintaining its 
status as an astounding agreement among nation-states to oppose a unique crime—was 
forced into becoming the source of a more usable application to make up for the lack of a 
human-rights convention in the United Nations. 
Remarkably, the repurposing of the Genocide Convention for frequent usability of 
the genocide accusation to affect public opinion already started to manifest itself in the 
initial debate about the convention’s ratification in the United States. The notion that the 
legal effect of the Genocide Convention could turn into a Soviet threat was made eminent 
through examples of what may befall Americans upon ratification both outside the 
domain of their country and from within it. It was commonly suggested that Americans 
may be charged with genocide abroad,118 and the public discourse depicted a prospect of 
                                                          
crime of genocide by a special international court is also envisaged.” See: Raphael Lemkin, “For 
Punishment of Genocide: Adoption of Convention Advocated as Step to Safeguard Civilization,” letter to 
the editor, New York Times, June 12, 1947. The NYT raised awareness of this possibility in its own reports. 
For example, see: “The ‘Genocide’ Convention,” New York Times, February 7, 1948; “Court for Genocide 
Opposed by Russian,” New York Times, April 13, 1948. In his article on the Genocide Convention, Finch 
pointed out that “It provides no international court before which governmental transgressions of the 
international law declared in the Convention may be challenged.” See: Finch, “Editorial,” 733. While it is 
accurate that the Genocide Convention does not call for the establishment of an international court, the 
Genocide Convention did, significantly, invite publicized considerations of the need for a fitting 
international court, as illustrated by Finch’s very discussion of the matter.  
 
117 Before it became apparent that the UDHR would not be incorporated as a treaty, it was thought that 
“The Genocide Convention is but the first of several conventions being designed better to secure 
fundamental human rights and security throughout the world community.” See: Myres S. McDougal and 
Richard Arens, “Genocide Convention and the Constitution,” Vanderbilt Law Review 3, no. 4 (June 1950): 
686. Dulles lumped Genocide Convention and the idea of a human-rights convention as similar efforts to 
promote “the compulsion of agreed international standards … which are enforceable by the courts, not by 
armies.” See: Dulles, “International,” 24-25.  
 
118 For instance, see: Rix, “Human,” 552; Phillips, 624. This aspect was raised by Senator Smith in the 





local unrest through charges of genocide for the treatment of African Americans. This 
mainly involved fears that lynching, aggressive responses to race riots, and the general 
segregated experience of African Americans might trigger charges of genocide.119 The 
counterarguments, which sought to allay concerns about such use of genocide charges 
against Americans may have seemed convincing to some,120 but they had the effect of 
only adding to the totality of information in which the ratification of the Genocide 
Convention was thematically associated with alarming claims by African Americans in 
the context of the Soviet Union’s interests. This perception of danger was strengthened 
                                                          
be in a certain country and, whether he has done anything or not, he might be charged with the crime of 
genocide and tried there as poor old Mindszenty was tried, and he would not have a Chinaman’s chance.” 
See: U.S. Congress, Executive, 644.  
 
119 Legal experts raised these as questions. See: A. A. White, “Tomorrow One May Be Guilty of 
Genocide,” Texas Bar Journal 12, no. 5 (May 1949): 227; Kenneth S. Carlston, “The Genocide 
Convention: A Problem for the American Lawyer,” American Bar Association Journal 36, no. 3 (March 
1950): 207; Holman, “Challenge,” 21. According to a report in the NYT, “Opponents of the United Nations 
genocide convention” contended that “Americans involved in race riots or lynchings would be liable under 
the convention to trial by an international tribunal instead of the courts of their own states.” See: “Bar 
Leaders Score Genocide Compact,” New York Times, January 25, 1950. 
 
120 For example, it was suggested by a highly regarded proponent of international law that “the lynching of 
Negroes in the southern states of the United States may arouse a humanitarian revulsion in other countries 
as well as the United States itself, but there are not large, organized, politically active groups of Negroes in 
other states to take up the cudgels on behalf of the fellow members of their race.” See: Jessup, Modern, 
182. Furthermore, it was argued that the Genocide Convention “should not be classified as for the 
protection of human rights, but for the preservations of international peace.” See: Arthur K. Kuhn, “The 
Genocide Convention and State Rights,” American Journal of International Law 43, no. 3 (July 1949): 499. 
In addition, it was claimed that “the concept of genocide does not apply to race riots and other outbreaks of 
mob violence which sometimes occur in the United States.” See: Edgar Turlington, “The Genocide 
Convention Should Be Ratified,” in Proceedings of the Section of the International and Comparative Law: 
St. Louis Meeting, September 5-6, 1949 (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1950), 27. Also, in a letter to 
the NYT that was ascribed to Lemkin it was said that the crime of genocide does not apply “when one 
frightens a Negro,” and that “Very often discrimination against individuals, which is dealt with by U.N. 
Human Rights projects, has been confused with the Genocide Convention, which deals with annihilation.” 
See: Lemkin, “Nature,” New York Times. In the Senate discussion, a telegram from Lemkin stated that “A 
thorough analysis of the Genocide Convention proves conclusively that the Convention does not apply 
either to lynching or to rights.” See: U.S. Congress, Executive, 369. The telegram contained assertions that 
dismissed the association of either lynching or race riots with the crime of genocide. See: Ibid., 370. In the 
conversation that followed, John D. Hickerson, who was then the United States assistant secretary of state 
for United Nations affairs, said that “if there is a lynching case, if this treaty goes through, Russia probably 
will charge that genocide has been committed in the United States,” to which Senator Smith responded: “I 






by the publication of We Charge Genocide in 1951.  
Though the charge of genocide against the United States might seem damaging to 
the American image, the entrance of this genocide accusation into the public discourse 
successfully led the public to understand and mostly agree with the nonratified status of 
the Genocide Convention. Meaning, it served the narration of a nonratification. 
Accordingly, not only did the NYT advertise the book,121 it narrated the escapades of 
William L. Patterson who was recognized as the leader of the charge and editor of the 
book,122 although the book had been written by Americans of European descent.123 The 
story of this genocide charge had affected public opinion without ever becoming a 
concrete legal matter. Correspondingly, the stage was set for many public appearances by 
genocide accusations as part of the discourse that was dominated by the Cold War, and 
through these, international norms would be advocated without the crime of “genocide” 
having to be truly adjudicated.    
                                                          
121 “Books Published Today,” New York Times, November 21, 1951. 
 
122 It presented Patterson as the leading figure in the petition to the United Nations, and also informed the 
public that Lemkin was strongly opposed to it. See: “U.S. Accused in U.N. of Negro Genocide,” New York 
Times, December 18, 1951. For other instances that highlighted Patterson as the leader of the genocide 
accusation, see: “‘Rights’ Agent’s Passport Reported Voided by U.S.,” New York Times, December 25, 
1951; “Patterson Defies U.S.,” New York Times, December 27, 1951; “W. L. Patterson Says U.S. Bars Him 
at U.N.,” New York Times, January 1, 1952; “Negro Issue Pressed on U.N.,” New York Times, January 17, 
1952; “W. L. Patterson on Way Here,” New York Times, January 23, 1952; “U.S. Seizes Passport of W. L. 
Patterson,” New York Times, January 24, 1952; “2,500 Greet Leftist,” New York Times, January 28, 1952.  
 
123 In the book’s opening page, Patterson is described as the editor while the staff consisted of professional 
writers. See: William L. Patterson, ed., We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations 
for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government against the Negro People (New York: Civil 
Rights Congress, 1951). One of the staff writers was the prolific author, Howard Fast, who had been 
employed by the United States Office of War Information during WWII before becoming associated with 
Communism. See: Howard Fast, Being Red (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 1-2, 16. This 
means that while the public discourse showed Patterson, an African American, as leading an African 
American claim, the wording of the genocide charge was the work of European Americans. The 
commissioning of non-African American writers to perform this task may have been related to a greater 
strategy that had been chosen for dissemination by the United States government as part of the public 






Popularity by Vilification of Communism  
Through the Cold War, and throughout it, “genocide” became usable as 
information that may be characterized as soft power. The Genocide Convention did not 
immediately increase the actual legal power of international law, but rather it provided 
moral credibility for the mobilization of groups toward political ends. The more genocide 
claims were made in the press, the more the term genocide became familiar to the public 
and utilizable as rhetoric in international affairs. The publicized charge that genocide was 
committed against African Americans, which was supposedly made on their behalf, was a 
controlled exhibition that allowed for “genocide” to become both familiarized as a 
marker of an international standard and stay nonratified in the United States for the 
period of intense ideological rivalry with the Soviet Union.  
This loose rather than legal use of “genocide” is captured well in the following 
narration of the “Negro Genocide”: “Dr. Lemkin said the accusations were a maneuver to 
divert attention from the crimes of genocide committed against Estonians, Latvians, 
Lithuanians, Poles and other Soviet-subjugated peoples.”124 As an empowered agent of 
information about “genocide,” Lemkin was used to affect public opinion in several ways 
without a single visit to a courthouse: one, the notions of “genocide” in the African 
American context were debunked by the man who was said to have invented the term and 
drafted the convention; two, the crime of genocide was adjudicated on the spot by this 
supposed legal professional who acts as judge and jury as he claimed that genocide is, as 
a matter of fact, being committed by the Soviet Union against several groups of people; 
and three, the accusation against the United States was portrayed as a Soviet tactic, 
                                                          






thereby reducing the credibility of the “African American” genocide charge while 
increasing the credibility of the Soviet threat. While Lemkin was quoted as saying that 
attention was being diverted from what he described as cases of genocide, the effect of 
this publication by the NYT was to amplify the attention to the term genocide.  
Unlike the hollow and detached genocide claim that was made in the name of 
African Americans, the ones that were produced by American information against the 
Soviet Union were politically potent. The groups that were allegedly victims of genocide 
by the Soviet government had the potential of a national organization and a territorial 
claim. By relating genocide accusations to such groups, their identity became inherently 
political because it was built around the defiance of Soviet rule. The agreement on the 
Genocide Convention gave moral weight to the use of “genocide” that, when put into use, 
could popularize notions of victimhood to the attainment of two major effects: one is that 
the “genocide” victimhood can turn a politically nonexistent group into a group that not 
only believes in its right to be sovereign but is also convinced that the sources of such 
political belief are inherent to the group’s identity rather than the work of American soft 
power; and the other major effect is that it equips already existing power considerations 
with a heightened sense of moral duty in the eyes of both the American public and the 
allegedly victimized group. 
A method of a genocide accusation that was typical of the Cold War may be 
identified. First, there had to be an idea that it is beneficial to have the crime of genocide 
be associated with the Soviet government. Second, information, which appears in the 
form of mere reports, is generated to invite interpretation that genocide is being 





experts make the interpretation that genocide is being committed. Fourth, members of the 
victimized group are encouraged and empowered to accuse the Soviet government of 
genocide. Finally, the victimized group itself, under its American-based national 
organization, makes public statements that call upon the United States government and 
the international community to act on behalf of the group toward its political liberation at 
the expense of Soviet sovereignty. This management of information creates a situation in 
which the interests of the American political elite are served by a mobilized identity 
group: the genocide accusation goes full circle by traveling from the interests of the 
American political elite to appearing as being made in the interests of the supposedly 
victim group itself but still in service of the American political elite.  
Seeing that the NYT publicized this information, it provides a source for the 
analysis of this methodical circle of genocide accusation. First, Adolf A. Berle, an 
exemplar of the American political elite,125 is said to have charged that genocide “exists 
today in the Soviet Baltic states and parts of the Ukraine.”126 Second, a report by C. L. 
Sulzberger, an influential foreign correspondent who was a member of the family that 
owns the NYT,127 laid out the framework for multiple genocide accusations by listing that 
hundreds of thousands of non-Slavic peoples, such as the Armenians, Greeks, Iranians, 
                                                          
125 Aside from holding positions such as an assistant secretary of state and the ambassador to Brazil, Berle 
wrote Franklin D. Roosevelt’s lines for public speech and was a member of the “Brain Trust” that 
influenced his presidency. See: Davis W. Houck, “FDR’s Commonwealth Club Address: Redefining 
Individualism, Adjudicating Greatness,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 7, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 259-260.  
 
126 “Berle Says Reds Practice Genocide,” New York Times, March 9, 1949. This charge of genocide was 
made before members of the ABA of the City of New York. Nearly two years later, when Berle was the 
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Republics—Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.” See: “Berle Chides,” New York Times.  
 







Jews, and Turks, were forced out of “the Ukraine, the Crimea, the Baltic states and the 
Black Sea coast of the Caucasus,” and that, “Even before the current drive, seven entire 
nationality groups were uprooted from their homes and shipped eastward,” which the 
report claimed to have included “five Caucasus peoples—the Chechens, Ingush, 
Kalmucks, Karachayevts and Balkans—as well as the Volga Germans and the Crimean 
Tatars.”128 Third, in addition to Lemkin’s opinion,129 a letter, which was signed by 
several church leaders, was published by the NYT in the context of the Genocide 
Convention’s ratification, and in it the article by Sulzberger is interpreted as having 
reported genocide: “In September, 1949, your correspondent Cyrus L. Sulzberger 
reported new waves of genocide perpetrated by the masters of the Kremlin on the 
Armenian, Estonian, Greek, Iranian, Jewish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Turkish, Ukrainian and 
White Ruthenian peoples.”130 Fourth, certain members of these groups were promoted to 
form a leadership that is then afforded means of national organization and platforms, 
mostly in New York, on which the genocide accusation against the Soviet government 
may be issued by them as if an authentic expression of the group’s ethos.131 Finally, the 
                                                          
128 C. L. Sulzberger, “More Non-Slavs Shifted by Soviet,” New York Times, September 12, 1949. 
 
129 For example, in an article that presents Lemkin as an authoritative figure—“the father” of the Genocide 
Convention—he is said to have determined that the “‘Communist persecution of the Jews’… is clearly an 
example of the crime of genocide.” See: “Lemkin,” New York Times. The article’s emphasis that Lemkin is 
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leadership. 
 
130 Michael L. Kruszas et al., “To Outlaw Genocide,” letter to the editor, New York Times, October 24, 
1949. 
 
131 For instances in which the NYT published genocide accusations against the Soviet Union that were made 
by diplomats-in-exile, governments-in-exile, or American-based organizations, see: “Latvians Here Urge 
Freedom for Nation,” New York Times, June 18, 1950; “Genocide in Baltic by Soviet Charged,” New York 





group’s leadership turned its efforts to addressing the United States and the conscience of 
humanity, thereby enlisting the support of public opinion and giving members of their 
own group a motivational boost under the hope that help was to be expected.132  
At this time and in this context began the practice of a detailed suggested 
comparability to Nazi policies as part of an effort to make genocide accusations more 
persuasive. This comparison was seen as being made by representatives of victimized 
nationality groups, but the narration was American. For example, the NYT presented the 
information within a comparative frame, stating that “Witnesses” from “nationality 
groups” appeared on Capitol Hill to retell “the story of the sufferings under dictators and 
conquerors, in Nazi Germany” and “in Soviet Russia.”133 In a separate article, it was 
declared about the Soviet policy to remove “a potentially hostile population from the new 
Soviet military zones” that “This is as clear a case of genocide as any committed by the 
Nazis.”134 Furthermore, the NYT promoted a book that set out to give “An account of the 
occupation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania by German Nazism and Russian 
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Exiles Call on U.N. to Act,” New York Times, December 2, 1951; “Deportation by Reds is Called 
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Times, November 25, 1951: 16; “Hungarian Exiles Call on U.N. to Act,” New York Times, December 2, 
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communism.”135 In this book, the Soviets are compared to the Nazis as invaders,136 
occupiers,137 Russifiers,138 planners of deportations,139 but with one note of exception 
about how “the Reds” who “base their regime and expansion on large-scale annihilation 
of ‘undesirable’ elements” as a rule do not waste “manpower” as the Nazis did in the 
execution of “mass slaughters and cremations.”140 This difference, which was pointed out 
briefly without identifying the group identity of the Nazis’ victims who are described as 
wasted manpower, was presented as a mere note, and not as a reason to discard the 
project of suggesting that the Soviet Union was being genocidal like Nazi Germany.  
The points of comparison did not delve into the realm of finding similarity with 
the degree of Jewish victimization in WWII,141 but focused on the Nazi policies of 
                                                          
135 “Books Published Today,” New York Times, June 15, 1951. This book—and generally the American 
campaign of genocide accusations regarding the Soviet government’s policies in the Baltics—is not 
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Police Department from 1955 to 1965.” See: “Walter Arm, 75, Dies; Ex-Police Press Chief,” New York 
Times, November 11, 1984.  
 
136 Albert Kalme, Total Terror: An Exposé of Genocide in the Baltics, ed. Walter Arm (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), 9. 
 
137 Ibid., 10.  
 
138 Ibid., 122. The idea that the Soviet government was trying to “Russify the Baltics” is the rhetorical 
continuation of the references to the Nazis’ efforts to Germanize occupied Europe in WWII. For instance, 
see: Tolischus, “Twentieth-Century,” 24; Lemkin, “Genocide: A Modern,” 39.  
 
139 Kalme, Total, 140. The text uses the term extermination in the context of the Nazi plans for Poland 




141 When the NYT publicized the voice of “Jews” in 1953 through words uttered by the leader of an 
American organization, it directed specific attention to the Jewish group as victims of the Soviet 
government. The Soviet treatment of its Jews was related to Nazi practices not in terms of evident 
comparability with them but rather as an effort to avoid recurrence of the Nazi practices: “Rabbi Irving 
Miller, president of the Zionist Organization of America, declared Russia should open its doors to a 
‘commission from the small neutral nations’ to investigate whether the Soviet Union was ‘persecuting its 
Jewish population along Nazi lines.’” See: “Jews Here Assail Policy of Soviet,” New York Times, February 





consolidation. While the term genocide was defined in Axis Rule to negate the Nazi 
government’s political successes, the later agreement on the wording of the Genocide 
Convention may have been more directly inspired by the magnitude of the Jewish 
suffering, which is far less comparable than the suffering caused by Nazi efforts in order 
to consolidate control over occupied territories through assimilation.142 The definition of 
genocide was sourced by American power, but the adoption of the Genocide Convention 
was more influenced by the moral reaction, which has suppressed the knowledge of the 
term’s power-based origin as focusing more on obstructing the Nazis than preventing 
Jewish suffering. It is here considered that what is significantly comparable between the 
Nazi and Soviet cases, as accusations of genocide rather than as genocides, is that in both 
an American discourse bolstered the national identity of groups that did not exercise self-
rule at the time of the accusations.   
When the use of genocide accusations against the Communist agenda spread to 
describe situations in East Asia or Central Europe, they further emphasized an ideological 
basis for perpetration rather than practical efforts at establishing federal authority. The 
Korean War, which was also described as fratricide,143 presented a case that led to 
genocide accusations in the United States even though most of the Korean civilian 
                                                          
might become comparable to Nazi practices or are even likely to become so: “We are watching the 
unfolding of another great human tragedy, comparable to nazism [sic] at its worst.” See: “Communist Anti-
Semitism,” New York Times, January 18, 1953.  
 
142 It may be phrased in the following distinctive fashion: Jews under Nazi control were not forced to 
assimilate but were exterminated in a manner that complemented the assimilation of other groups under 
Nazi control.  
 
143 “‘We Must Do Our Part’,” New York Times, July 9, 1950. In this article, it was argued that this 
“fratricide” was “being cruelly fomented by a United Nations member, the Soviet Union,” thus suggesting 






population that suffered from the violence shared the same markers of group identity—as 
the Genocide Convention defines them—with the equally Korean perpetrators. 
Accordingly, the sameness of perpetrator and victim identity in this instance was negated 
by claims that they were of differing and competing ideologies. As such, the genocide 
accusations were not only directed at the Soviet Union, but also against Communist 
China. In other words, the alleged genocide was not perpetrated by the leadership of one 
government, but by “Reds” in general.144 In line with its habit of making genocide 
assertions through Lemkin, the NYT made the following comment: “The Chinese war of 
aggression against the United Nations and South Koreans is a planned totalitarian effort 
to eliminate democratic influence from Asia and is an expression of the genocide 
technique, Dr. Raphael Lemkin of the Yale Law School said yesterday.”145 In addition, it 
was suggested in a separate article that a threat of genocidal quality existed on account of 
religious identity because the lives of “700,000 Christians in the South Korean territory” 
were being controlled “by the North Korean Communist forces,”146 whose Communist 
allegiance was generally portrayed as being godless.147 Still, the main thrust of these 
                                                          
144 For instance, it was reported that the “leaders of the Soviet Union, Communist China and North Korea” 
were all charged by the Republic of Korea “with a criminal conspiracy to commit mass murder and destroy 
the Korean nation.” See: A. M. Rosenthal, “Genocide by Reds in Korea Charged,” New York Times, May 4, 
1951. The text gives no heed to the absence of intent to destroy the Korean nation as such.  
 
145 “Dr. Lemkin Honored for Genocide Fight,” New York Times, January 19, 1951. The greater context of 
this article was the depiction of Lemkin as supported and promoted by a Jewish organization that pressed 
for the ratification of the Genocide Convention.  
 
146 “South Korea Sees Red Genocide Aim,” New York Times, August 22, 1950.  
 
147 This characterization was made in a resolution by B’nai B’rith, a Jewish organization that is based in the 
United States. The resolution was in the context of the “trials of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.” See: “Red 
Anti-Semitism Hit,” New York Times, February 4, 1953. Oddly, the resolution used the phrasing “coldly 
calculated genocide” less than three weeks after it had been used in an editorial in the NYT. For 
comparison, see: “Communist,” New York Times. This suggests that the narrator and actor have a common 






genocide accusations regarding East Asia implied that to the makers of these accusations 
the meaning of “genocide” included government measures against political and economic 
opposition.148 This expansion of the meaning of “genocide” to include as victims group 
identities that inherently challenge a particular form of government was also seen in 
relation to claims of a genocidal purge in Hungary.149  
The use of genocide to engage in a fight against Communism as a different 
civilizational approach to government harked back to the preconvention definition of 
genocide at a postconvention time. In the early days of “genocide” development, it was 
said in an article under Lemkin’s name that genocide was “used by the Nazi regime to 
strengthen the alleged unity and totalitarian control of the German people as a preparation 
for war.”150 Also, by reference to Lemkin’s work in the NYT, the term genocide was 
related to “that modern monstrosity known as totalitarian government.”151 The Genocide 
Convention itself does not mention totalitarianism or any form of government as 
genocidal in spirit, nor does it describe the victim groups of genocide as possibly 
identified for being economic or political in nature. However, as the term genocide 
                                                          
148 One article in the NYT reported that the Republic of Korea accused “the North Koreans of carrying out 
genocide” both “against the professional men of Korea” and “against Christians in Korea.” See: “Korea 
Charges Genocide,” New York Times, October 10, 1950. The major innovation in this accusation was that 
professionals, as a class, were assumed to have an identity as such that makes their victimization qualify as 
a case of genocide. Along these lines, the NYT publicized a statement by the Free Trade Union Committee 
of the American Federation of Labor in which it was claimed that “the Communist regime in China has 
been responsible for the execution or violent death of approximately 14,000,000 persons in the past five 
years” and that “There is no better example” of genocide “than what is happening in Red China.” See: 
“Killing in Red China,” New York Times, October 24, 1952. 
 
149 It was argued that “mass deportations” from Hungarian cities was based on the people’s previous status 
as “middle-class Hungarians,” and that “The ultimate goal of these deportations is, of course, the extinction 
of all those whose past records make them suspect as opponents of the regime.” See: “Purge in Budapest,” 
New York Times, June 20, 1951.  
 
150 Lemkin, “Genocide,” 228.  
 






became usable through American soft power during the Cold War, the departure from the 
legal document that defined genocide also included a return to an association between the 
crime and totalitarianism, and this is reflected in the following statement about 
“genocide,” which was written for publication at least twice by the same member of the 
ABA in 1950: “the crime is one that has characterized the policy of totalitarian states.”152 
Taking the argument a step further, Finch claimed that in its current wording the 
Genocide Convention “is really a cloak for the commission of genocide by totalitarian 
nations.”153  
Nowadays, it has become popular to point out that political and economic groups 
are not among the list of victim groups in the Genocide Convention because of a Soviet 
resistance to it,154 but the so-called exclusion of these groups was not simply a totalitarian 
interest. The workability of the convention would have been jeopardized by committing 
international law to defend political groups whose operation might be directly against the 
sovereignty of the state. Moreover, the basic incentive for governments to sign the 
convention in the first place would have been undermined by the insistence that the 
                                                          
152 Compare: Carlston, “Should,” 37; Carlston, “Genocide,” 208.  
 
153 “Backs Genocide Ban Pact,” New York Times, February 5, 1950. In this article, the text describes Finch 
as being “of the American Bar Association,” without reference to his role as director of the international 
law division of CEIP. Mentioning his involvement in the introductory production of “genocide,” among 
other efforts toward international law, would have possibly confused the newspapers’ readership and 
interfered with the smooth narration of the public debate about the convention’s ratification. Finch’s 
perspective in this article is in keeping with his statement in 1949 that “The Convention is selective among 
the groups it would protect in whole or in part” and that “Political and economic groups were apparently 
not considered as needing or worthy of protection.” See: Finch, “Editorial,” 734. However, like the 
newspaper article, that text does not disclose that Finch—as part of his great role in the advancement of 
international law—oversaw the publication of the book in which genocide was first defined without 
including political and economic groups as victim groups of genocide. The effect of this is to create greater 
separation between international law and its American source of empowerment.  
 






aggressive treatment of such groups, whose very purpose as political might be to defy the 
rule of the government, could be subjected to charges of genocide and held as an 
international crime. This would have given added incentive for a great power such as the 
United States to organize rebellious political groups because international law would 
have then facilitated the destruction of existing governments almost at will. Such a 
convention would have been self-defeating for governments that value their sovereignty. 
The claim that political groups are not mentioned in the Genocide Convention 
calls attention to just how unexamined the General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 
December 11, 1946, is in comparison to the definition of genocide in the convention that 
was adopted two years later. It is misleading to present “The exclusion of political 
groups” in the Genocide Convention as “a deviation from the General Assembly 
Resolution 96 (I).”155 The definition in the United Nations document in 1946 is much 
more generally different from the convention in 1948. It regards genocide as “a denial of 
the right of existence of entire human groups,”156 suggesting that any human group would 
be considered a victim of genocide. Moreover, it claims that “Many instances of such 
crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other groups have 
been destroyed, entirely or in part.”157 Meaning, the inclusion of “political” in the text is 
                                                          
155 Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 
1960), 59. This perspective has been adopted by the genocide scholarship. 
156 United Nations General Assembly, “The Crime of Genocide,” res. 96 (I), December 11, 1946. 
 
157 Ibid. The inclusion of “entirely or in part” is noteworthy in connection to the existence of “in whole or 
in part” in the Genocide Convention and the semblance of distance between the United States government 
and the drafting of the convention. In the Department of State Memorandum on the Genocide Convention 
that was submitted as part of the Senate hearing about ratification in the United States, it is pointed out that 
“the words ‘in whole or in part’ were inserted at the instance of the Norwegian delegate.” See: U.S. 
Congress, Executive, 365. However, the essence of these words had already been captured by “entirely or 
in part” in the resolution that preceded the wording of the convention, and it is unclear what could have 
been the Norwegian innovation. This suggests that there had been an effort to make the process of drafting 






worth noting but is nonetheless eclipsed by the idea that “other” unspecified groups were 
also considered to be victims of genocide according to this definition.  
While the claims for independence and anti-Soviet resistance made it seem 
convincing that the Soviet Union would be motivated to block the inclusion of “political 
groups” in the Genocide Convention, 158 this perception is the product of framing that has 
the effect of turning attention away from other considerations. One such consideration is 
that in the 1946 document “political” seems to be occupying the place of “national.” The 
seeming interchangeability of “political” and “national” points at an emphasis on 
protecting nation-states. With the experience of Nazi Germany’s occupation of Europe in 
mind, the drafters of both the resolution and the convention sought to guarantee that 
existing states would not be swallowed up by imperial policies. However, the soft-power 
use of “genocide” as a marker of the Cold War shifted the discussed meaning of a 
“political group” from its original idea to a focus on the persecution of political groups 
that aspire to establish independent states in defiance of their existing sovereign. Also, as 
more time passed from WWII and the Nazis experience, it is found that even in a text 
under Lemkin’s name in 1947 it was argued that “political groups” do not belong in the 
Genocide Convention: 
Genocide is essentially an ethnic-cultural concept. Racial, national or religious 
groups are better defined in international law than political groups. They are 
predominantly groups of an unchangeable nature whereas a political group is a 
more fluctuating notion. Moreover, in the actual ideological division of the world 
it might be difficult for all nations to agree on the inclusion of political groups. In 
                                                          
158 The claims of genocide were part of direct efforts to “restore independence to the three Baltic countries 
now in the Soviet orbit.” See: “Freedom,” New York Times. A group such as “the Ukrainian National 
Government in exile” is mentioned in the context of “hope of anti-Soviet resistance.” See: “Ukraine,” New 
York Times. The Soviet government’s motivation to stop such a group from being seen as a victim of 
genocide then becomes apparent, but what remains unmentioned is that including such a group within the 
genocide definition would render the Genocide Convention dysfunctional for any government that seeks to 






this case the omission of political groups will not stand in the way of adopting the 
genocide convention.159  
 
The impracticability of political groups counting as victims of genocide was also 
demonstrated by its conflict with the major American project of Germany’s post-WWII 
denazification. Germany’s National Socialist party was a political group, whose physical 
and cultural destruction as such, in a time of peace, by the United States, was both of 
documented intent and sweeping results.   
Even though “political groups” did not become a part of the Genocide 
Convention, “genocide” became a substantial part of the political culture in international 
relations. Through these accusations, the term genocide became known and absorbed. 
Many of the reports about the accusations included explanations of what “genocide” 
means in the form of loose and abbreviated versions of it, such as “the extermination of a 
nation,”160 a “technical name for mass murder,”161 and the “murder of a whole people.”162 
The result was that “genocide” was acquiring the semblance of being a term of the people 
that was used by people. It was soft power that gave the impression that “genocide” was 
available for bottom-up usage rather than being a top-down phenomenon. “Genocide” 
was not shown as a lowered down law but as reflective of a human plea that emerged and 
                                                          
159 Lemkin, “For Punishment,” New York Times. This position, as related to Lemkin, is not commonly 
considered in the genocide scholarship. Despite this text, when the question of ratification in the United 
States gained momentum in the 1980s, Samuel Lemkin, the cousin of Raphael Lemkin, argued in a letter to 
the NYT that “From my discussions with Raphael Lemkin, who originated it, I can say it was within his 
contemplation that the word may be defined as the mass destruction of a group because of whatever 
uniqueness it may possess,” which includes “politics.” See: Samuel Lemkin, “What Lemkin Meant,” letter 
to the editor, New York Times, May 6, 1985. 
 
160 “Korea,” New York Times. 
 
161 Tolischus, “Twentieth-Century,” New York Times. 
 






emerges from the “conscience of mankind.”163 The Cold War even inspired the narration 
of Turks as victims of genocide by the Soviet government,164 but the same Cold War also 
presented advantages for the United States in having the Turkish ally bear the brunt of a 
venomous and voluminous genocide accusation.   
 
The Armenian Issue 
Amidst the many claims of genocide that were facilitated by American 
infrastructure, one group’s relationship with the genocide accusation was being 
developed gradually by American instruction from the Armenian ground up, with more 
time to grow and become integrated into the group’s core identity, before becoming 
advertised prominently and having a lasting effect on the public discourse. The 
worldwide political shakeup of WWII made it advantageous for the American political 
leadership to produce a second act for the Armenian Question. While it is widely known 
as an Armenian issue, it is fundamentally an American project. It was created and raised 
in the United States. There are mainly four American interests that may be considered as 
being served by the construction of what eventually turned into a self-sustaining 
genocide-centered Armenian ethos. 
                                                          
163 The phrase appeared in two important texts in 1946. First, in an article under Lemkin’s name it was 
stated about “genocide” that “The conscience of mankind has been shocked by this type of mass barbarity.” 
See: Lemkin, “Genocide,” 228. Then, it also appeared in a similar wording that claimed genocide “shocks 
the conscience of mankind.” See: https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/47/IMG/NR003347.pdf?OpenElement (accessed, 
11/12/2016). Already prior to these references, the phrase “shock the conscience of mankind” appeared in 
1944 as part of Principle 2 in The International Law of the Future, which articulated the legal duty 
regarding a state’s treatment of its own people. See: CEIP, International, 7.  
 
164 Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism (London: Macmillan, 1953), 171-
172. Also, the book was promoted by an article in the NYT. See: Hasan Ozbekkan, “A People's Tragedy in 






 First, it made Turkey run to American arms. Although Turkey did not participate 
in WWII as an official belligerent, it was the subject of American strategy for the war’s 
aftermath. Turkey was being co-opted into performing an international role. The Turkish 
Institute of International Law was established on May 14, 1943, and to encourage its 
acceptance by Turkey’s leadership the American narration placed the event within a 
placating version of Turkish history.165 In particular, the control over the two straits 
within Turkish territory, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, were critical aspects of 
international law that, from an American perspective, had to be agreeably administered 
by the local sovereign.166 Thus, it was declared that “The American Society of 
International Law cannot but feel gratified and look forward to a profitable collaboration 
in the high task of the development and reinforcement of the science of the law of 
                                                          
165 For instance, in an article that was published in AJIL, it is stated that in the days of the Ottoman 
government, “concession to the Christians … was magnanimously granted by the Turks”; that the 
Capitulations were the “grievous” outcome of “duress by the European Powers”; and that “Turkey” had 
already become a member of “the Family of Nations” in 1856 through the Treaty of Paris but without it 
resulting “in the status of complete independence.” See: Philip Marshall Brown, “The Turkish Institute of 
International Law,” American Journal of International Law 37, no. 4 (October 1943): 640. In addition, the 
text praises the “brilliant leadership” that formed the Republic of Turkey, upon its “amazing 
achievements.” See: Ibid., 641. In a reversal of the manner in which Turks were described by proponents of 
Christian rule over Ottoman land when the Turks appeared as standing in the way of international law, they 
were regarded on this occasion as “a people of sterling character” who greatly strengthen the Family of 
Nations. See: Ibid., 642. Brown was the president of the American Peace Society, which was one of the 
main American organizations that sought to promote international law. Andrew Carnegie contributed 
financially to its operation, and was honored by the title of its vice president between 1908 and 1917. See: 
L. Whitney Edson, The American Peace Society: A Centennial History (Washington: American Peace 
Society, 1928), 259. The book may be seen as a useful road map for further historical research on the 
American efforts toward international organization since long before WWI.  
 
166 The voice of Turkish approval and receptivity was conveyed through two articles by Cemil Bilsel, the 
former rector of the University of Istanbul, which was the site of the new institute of international law. In 
these articles, Bilsel calls attention to the Straits and rationalizes the Turkish agreement with the American 
vision. See: Cemil Bilsel, “International Law in Turkey,” trans. L. Nezih Manyas, American Journal of 
International Law 38, no. 4 (October 1944): 552; Cemil Bilsel, “The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent 
Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence,” trans. by L. Nezih Manyas, American Journal of International 
Law 41, no. 4 (October 1947): 727-747. In the latter, it is stated that “The factor which makes the Straits 







nations.”167 Flattery, though it made the Turkish society more amenable to American 
influence and less attentive to American involvement in anti-Turkish efforts, was not the 
only form of leading Turkey into signing the North Atlantic Treaty and joining NATO as 
a member in 1952. On top of the favorable view of the United States, there was an 
immediate sense of reliance that pressed Turkey to commit itself to this American-led 
alliance, which in turn would allow the United States to have an even greater role in 
shaping Turkey’s identity.168    
 Turkey was driven into attaching itself to NATO and American influence by the 
fear that in the post-WWII international scene, the Soviet Union would develop an 
appetite for Turkish territory. The American influence on Turkey would not have been 
the same without the Soviet Union’s part in striking fear among Turks, first by 
denouncing “the Russo-Turkish treaty of friendship of 1925,”169 and then by demanding 
that in a new bilateral treaty Turkey would cede “areas of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet 
                                                          
167 Brown, “The Turkish,” 642. An example of the efforts to develop Turkey’s willingness to cooperate 
with the precepts of international law, is found in the presence of Robert R. Wilson in Turkey following 
WWII. Wilson, whose career included both United States government employment and university work, 
and whose exact contribution to both Axis Rule and The Future of International Law is unknown, gave a 
series of lectures in Istanbul, in which he sought to promote Turkish awareness of international law. See: 
Robert R. Wilson, International Law in Treaties: Lectures Given at the Faculty of Law of Istanbul 
(Istanbul: Publications of the Turkish Institute of International Law, 1949). For more here on Wilson’s role, 
see: Chapter 4, section titled “‘Genocide.’” 
 
168 The treaty’s Article 2 specifies an institutional commitment, and Article 5 specifies a military 
commitment. See: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” arts. 2, 5. However, 
this document, in which the conditions of NATO membership are detailed, does not have the capacity to 
reflect the tremendous impact that Turkey’s willingness to become a NATO member has had on the 
formation of Turkish identity and the attainment of American interests.   
 






Armenia,”170 as narrated by the NYT.171 This fear was based on a threat whose vividness 
in Turkish eyes was intensified by the narration of an Armenian desire to possess these 
areas, as played out by the Armenian National Council of America (ANCA),172 which, as 
its name suggests, was set up as an American organization.173 In other words, the second 
act of the Armenian Question served an American interest by illustrating the Soviet threat 
and making it seem more real. By superimposing the label “genocide” on this cultivated 
Armenian sentiment, the threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity became more pronounced 
and self-perpetuating, thereby instituting a system of an abusive relationship. In this 
relationship, Turkey had become conditioned to look away from how the main provider 
                                                          
170 C. L. Sulzberger, “Russo-Turkish Straits Talk Halted as Ankara Rejects Three Demands,” New York 
Times, August 4, 1945.  
 
171 The phrasing by Sulzberger also included a double effort to make this Soviet agenda seem more credible 
by using the cliché about Russian naval needs: “Bottled up in the Black Sea, Russia long has wanted a free 
outlet to the Mediterranean”; “the traditional Russian desire to move toward warm water in the 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.” Compare: Sulzberger, “New,” New York Times; Sulzberger, “Russo-
Turkish,” New York Times. His text described the Turks as “nervous about their eastern as well as their 
northern borders.” See: Ibid. This points at a Soviet-American cooperation in which the Soviet government 
created the news and then the NYT appeared more than willing to play a leading role in turning it into 
influential information.   
 
172 Consider the oddity of an American newspaper article narrating the activities of an American-based 
organization that is dedicated to defining Armenian national aspirations, which involved a meeting in 
London as reported by Russian newspapers: “After a considerable period of silence about affairs in Turkey, 
Moscow newspapers published today a petition from the Armenian National Council of America to the 
London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the return of the Kars and Ardahan regions to 
Soviet Armenia.” See: “Armenians in U.S. Appeal,” New York Times, September 22, 1945. 
 
173 The previous time that ANCA had been featured by the NYT was in 1919, to report that the 
organization’s chairman, Miran Sevasly, stated, as if on behalf of all Armenians, that “the people of 
Armenia, as well as Armenians in America and Europe, desired that the United States act as mandatory for 
their country, and that, while they would have to accept the will of the majority nations, they did not wish 
to have a European nation as mentor.” See: “Armenians Desirous of a United Country,” New York Times, 
March 6, 1919. Between then and the publication of the article in September, 1945, there had not been a 
reason for the NYT to make use of this organization’s services in order to voice out Armenian sentiment. At 
the conclusion of WWI, this organization was also used to lead public acceptance toward favoring an 
international court by quoting the chairman of this American organization—again speaking on behalf of all 
Armenians—who expressed an Armenian lack of “trust in justice being meted out by Turkish judges, who 
were themselves either actual participants in the Armenian massacres or were in sympathy with them.” See: 






of its armament and sense of security is the source of its Armenian problem and sense of 
threat. In concealment of this, the public discourse these days—mainly through the 
genocide scholarship—popularizes the argument that the United States government has 
not officially labeled the Armenian victimhood in WWI as “genocide” because of 
political pressure that is applied against it due to Turkey’s NATO membership, but in 
actuality the American propping of the Armenian claim against Turkish territory played a 
role in persuading Turkey to join NATO in the first place and remain a loyal member.   
 Second, the ability to establish through its narration of Armenian identity a 
measure of influence within the Soviet area of control is seen as an American interest. By 
being able to inform Armenians worldwide through content and organization on who they 
are as a collective entity, the United States was shaping the attitude and behavior of a 
group in a strategically potent region. Accordingly, Sulzberger’s report of the Soviet 
intent to renegotiate its relationship with Turkey in March, 1945,174 is seen here as 
sharing the same context as Lemkin’s first reference to the Armenian massacre “by the 
Turks” as an instance of “states expressing their concern about another state’s treatment 
of its own citizens,” which was also published in March, 1945.175 In October, 1946, it 
was the NYT, rather than a Lemkin-ascribed article, in which it was first suggested that 
the Armenian experience was not just one of several instances but one among Lemkin’s 
                                                          
174 Sulzberger, “New,” New York Times.  
 
175 Lemkin, “Legal,” 268. The text also mentions the Greeks as being massacred by Turks. The instances 
that were first mentioned in the passage were “the ghastly pogroms” for which “The United States rebuked 
the governments of czarist Russia and Rumania.” See: Ibid. It is notable that in this initial stage of 
incorporating the Armenian experience into the genocide discourse, it was not presented as a case of 
genocide, and certainly not as a name, which is how “Armenian Genocide” had come to be used. Also 
worthy of note is that the text refers to Jewish pogroms that have not become the subject of a systematic 
campaign to call them cases of genocide. The same set of examples was later offered in a text by the NYT. 






inspirations for coining genocide: 
Attempts at the wholesale extermination of a population had been made before 
and after Rome reduced Carthage to ruins. The wars waged by the Crusaders and 
Mohammedans of old were largely wars of extermination. The Turks in their time 
did their best to destroy the Armenians. It was to identify such crimes that 
Professor Lemkin coined the word genocide.176  
 
This line of historical portrayal was then followed, but without the suggestion that the 
Armenian case was particularly inspiring when the term’s coining occurred.177 In 1948, a 
Lemkin-text in an official United Nations publication referred “to the extermination of 
the Armenians,” as one of several historical events that were “The most widely known 
cases of genocide.”178  
As part of this campaign to incorporate Armenian victimhood into the genocide 
discourse, Lemkin appeared in a CBS interview and attempted to articulate a connection 
between the term genocide and the politically loaded sense of injustice done to the 
Armenians.179 In the television interview Lemkin mentioned the Armenian case in his 
answer to a question about why he became interested in “genocide,” but a portrait item in 
the same year by his friend Gertrude Samuels for the NYT narrated that two cases in 1933 
“shocked” Lemkin “into changing the course of his life”— “the destruction of 600 
                                                          
176 Kaempffert, “Science,” New York Times. This shows the influence of the NYT in signaling the change 
from describing “genocide” as singularly carried out by the German Nazis to making it appear as having 
occurred in other historical cases. This was the seed of what later developed into the fictional dialogue 
between Lemkin and his professor or professors in the two versions that are discussed in this chapter above. 
 
177 “Genocide Before the U.N.,” New York Times, November 5, 1946; Lemkin, “Genocide,” 227; Lemkin, 
“Genocide: A New,” 367; Lemkin, “For Punishment,” New York Times. 
 
178 Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime” (1948), 70. Thus, the United Nations is seen as collaborating with the 
use of the charge of genocide in ways that defy the prescription in Article 6 of the Genocide Convention to 
make such charges through a competent tribunal.  
 
179 “Lemkin Referring to the Armenian Genocide, Full Interview, CBS, 1949,” in Vimeo, 






Christians in Iraq” and “Hitler’s plan to annihilate European Jewry”—without 
mentioning the Armenian experience in this context.180 Samuels’ version was cast aside 
by the effort to genocidize the Ottoman Armenian experience through claims regarding 
this one man’s intellectual arrival at inventing “genocide,” while his function as a cultural 
agent of American power would receive little to no consideration. The attraction of 
attention to Lemkin’s expressed beliefs about Armenian victimhood and genocide has 
had a misguiding effect on the study of how American power at the time endeavored to 
agitate the Armenians. Indeed, once removed from the framing that shows Lemkin’s 
opinion as a genuine reflection of Armenian history, it is seen that his publicized voice 
regarding the Armenian issue was part of a greater American effort to stir up the 
Armenians against Turkey by creating information that lent credibility to Armenian 
feelings of injustice and vengeance.  
This campaign has dominated Armenian political identity to this day, and most 
Armenians who brandish such an identity find the stories about Lemkin readily available 
while the masterful organizational work of Edwin S. Smith toward instituting the political 
identity of Armenians remains outside the popular narrative. Smith was skilled at writing 
and mobilizing people, and was chosen by the White House for government roles.181 
                                                          
180 Samuels, “U.N.,” New York Times. 
 
181 According to an article in the NYT, Smith, who was born in Brookline, Massachusetts, and graduated 
from Harvard University, worked as a reporter for newspapers before becoming “a specialist in labor 
relations.” See: “Roosevelt Sets Up a New Labor Board,” New York Times, July 1, 1934. In a book that 
Smith authored in 1943, the note on the author says that he was the commissioner of labor and industries 
for the state of Massachusetts between 1931 and 1934, before being “sent by President Roosevelt as one of 
our special observers to the International Labor Conference in Geneva, Switzerland,” and then being 
“appointed by President Roosevelt as a member of the first National Labor Relations Board.” See: Edwin 







During WWII, Smith became the executive director of the National Council of 
American-Soviet Friendship, and in relation to his involvement in Soviet affairs he 
formed the American Committee for Justice to the Armenians late in 1945, before 
changing the organization’s name to the American Committee for Armenian Rights 
(ACAR).182 Smith had both the ability and the power to lead in wording an Armenian 
viewpoint and convincing the Armenian people that it is their own.  
As made into public knowledge by the NYT, ACAR under Smith’s control was 
designed to “‘insist that the Armenian provinces in Turkey, which constitute nine-tenths 
of historic Armenia, be incorporated within the Armenian Republic.”183 One form 
through which this message literally echoed in the collective Armenian mind was the 
gathering of a large number of Armenians under one roof, as was done on April 28, 1946, 
in a rally at Carnegie Hall,184 and then have it be reported as news by the NYT.185 The ads 
alone for this event were identity-building, as one of them claimed that the Armenian 
Question “has never been solved.”186 Another ad reveals how the identity-building 
process was still under construction at the time, by being placed on April 24 without any 
                                                          
182 Ibid; “Seeks to Aid Armenians,” New York Times, December 22, 1945; “U.N. Is Urged to Act on 
Armenian Issue,” New York Times, April 29, 1946.  
 
183 “Seeks,” New York Times. 
 
184 It is said that Carnegie Hall was intended to serve mainly as an auditorium for musical performances, 
and thus it is labeled as a music hall. See: Lester, Forty, 87-88. However, it is here emphasized that 
Carnegie Hall had tremendous serviceability in terms of soft power, especially during a time that preceded 
social media and even television. It provided an elegant and specious venue for congregating large samples 
of communities, also known as “groups” in the language of the Genocide Convention, and co-opt the 
representatives of the community through their shared presence into one unified voice.  
 
185 The report by the NYT completes the effect by narrating the call for “Turkey to return the Armenian 
provinces to Armenian jurisdiction,” as if authentically Armenian.   
 






mention of this date having any commemorative significance for the Armenian people.187 
Following the event, the NYT published a letter by Smith, in reiteration of statements that 
were made in one of the ads, which narrated that “Armenian organizations and friends of 
Armenia all over the world have become articulate in their demands for the restoration of 
Armenian territory by Turkey,” under the belief that these are the “demands of humanity 
and justice.”188  
The agitation project also included an American effort in 1949 to organize a 
regular literary source of Armenian information under the title Armenian Affairs. This 
journal, whose first publication was promoted by the NYT,189 concealed the American 
identity of its production by claiming that its purpose was to keep the “English-speaking 
world” informed about Armenians.190 Smith also contributed an article to this short-lived 
journal, and declared that “It will be a happy day for all the Armenian people when they 
become united territorially, economically and culturally under the beneficent and 
progressive way of life which Soviet Armenia has so ably developed during the thirty 
years of its existence.”191 The journal produced only one volume, and neither of its four 
issues contained a title that mentions genocide. Instead, the American development of 
“genocide” through and within Armenian identity was going to be based on deeper 
                                                          
187 “Ad 171,” New York Times, April 24, 1946.  
 
188 Edwin S. Smith, “Armenian Question Discussion: The Return of Lost Territory Held Necessary to 
Exiled People,” letter to the editor, New York Times, May 4, 1946. 
 
189 “Books—Authors,” New York Times, February 16, 1950.  
 
190 “Foreword,” Armenian Affairs: A Journal on Armenian Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1949-1950): 2. 
 
191 Edwin S. Smith, “Re-awakened Armenia as an American Saw It,” Armenian Affairs: A Journal on 






seeding. As the first American effort at an Armenian journal was scratched, the 
groundwork began to be laid for “genocide” to have stronger roots under the cultivation 
of American academia.192 In 1955, following the establishment of “a program of 
Armenian studies” at Clark University,193 the National Association for Armenian Studies 
and Research (NAASR) began its efforts to raise funding, with promotional help by the 
president of Harvard University, Nathan Pusey, and the NYT.194 It was “founded by a 
group of prominent Greater Boston Armenian Americans and Harvard University 
professors in order to foster Armenian studies in America on an active, continuous, and 
scholarly basis,” which led to the advent of several endowed professorships and programs 
in American universities.195 The impetus to this project is said by NAASR to have been 
provided by Richard N. Frye,196 a professor at Harvard University whose past 
                                                          
192 Until then, American academia only offered a minimal contribution to the public discourse on Armenian 
sentiment. In one example of a non-Armenian work of American scholarship, it was stated that “The 
eastern or ‘Armenian’ provinces of Turkey, since 1945 again the object of Russian claims, have long been 
of the sensitive spots occupying the attention of European statesmen.” See: Roderic H. Davison, “The 
Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914,” The American Historical Review 53, no. 3 (April 1948): 481. While having a 
framing effect on the public discourse, such an effort lacks the capacity that an Armenian authorship has in 
terms of being absorbed as an Armenian voice on history.   
 
193 “Education Notes,” New York Times, January 10, 1954. 
 
194 “Armenian Study Aided,” New York Times, October 31, 1955.  
 
195 National Association for Armenian Studies and Research. Recent Studies in Modern Armenian History 
(Cambridge, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 1972), 137.  
 
196 National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, “About Us: History,” 
http://naasr.myshopify.com/pages/history (accessed, 1/26/2017). According to Frye, he and Robert Pierpont 
Blake were the ones who engaged in the early attempt toward establishing “an Armenian Chair either at 
Harvard University or at any other leading American university,” but the idea of “Armenian Studies” at that 
time “had failed to excite and fire the Armenian community in the United States.” See: Richard N. Frye 
“Armenian Studies and NAASR: Reminiscences and the Future,” Journal of Armenian Studies 1, no. 1 
(Autumn 1975): 3. Meaning, not only were the Armenians led into this venture by Blake and Frye, but they 
were found to be initially disinterested. Furthermore, Frye urged Armenians that “Whether you like it or 
not, Armenian Studies are no longer in any ghetto—they have become international and this is the way it 
should be, and this is the way by which progress will be made.” See: Ibid., 2. He encouraged the NAASR 
to work toward greater international influence: “NAASR must show the way to other organizations by 
bringing people together from all over the world, so that it will become the base for international 





employment by the United States government in its “Secret Intelligence branch of the 
Coordinator of Information”197 is not typically considered in connection with his role in 
setting up Armenian information through American academia.  
Third, controlling historiography through the particularized direction of Armenian 
studies and research is also considered as an American interest, and “genocide” 
punctuated the effect of such a control. The sparking of Armenian scholarship and the 
supervision of the initial work of Armenian American scholars meant that American 
historiographical preferences were to be served by information agents that seemed doubly 
credible for being seen as independent experts and as Armenian by descent. Giving an 
account of modern world history through what passes as an Armenian perspective was a 
favored practice even before it became institutionalized, mainly for how it diverts 
attention from American involvement in the national organization of Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire. On the eve of WWII, an American publication by an Armenian covers 
the history of the Armenian Question without considering the political significance of the 
American missionaries there or that the native people did not call themselves Armenian 
until they came under American influence.198  
In 1943, a book was published under the claimed authorship of Simon Vratznian, 
                                                          
See: Ibid, 3. This shows Frye as a driving force in leading the NAASR to have an impact that goes beyond 
study and research. Also, a note on the author in this article states that Frye was “the only non-Armenian” 
who acted as a member of the NAASR’s board of directors. See: Ibid., 1.    
 
197 Beth Giudicessi, “Professor Richard N. Frye Dies at 94,” Harvard Gazette, April 4, 2014. 
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/04/professor-richard-n-frye-dies-at-94/ (accessed, 1/26/2017).  
 
198 A. O. Sarkissian, History of the Armenian Question to 1885 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1938). 
This narration of modern Armenian church history without articulating the extent of American influence is 
also seen in another work that preexisted the organization of Armenian study and research in American 
academia. See: Leon Arpee, A Century of Armenian Protestantism, 1846-1946 (New York: Armenian 






who was the premier of the First Republic of Armenia when it turned Bolshevik in 1920. 
The text maintained the same historiographical omission of American involvement in the 
raising of the Armenian Question in the nineteenth century, and, significantly, added to it 
aspects that would later become regular features in the discourse on Armenian 
victimhood in WWI, such as constructing the narration on sources by interested parties 
without recognizing that they are so,199 and noting April 24, 1915.200 The meaning that 
the text gave to its narration of Armenian victimhood in WWI was also prototypical of 
the political message that would accompany the historical narrative in the years to come, 
namely that the Armenian Question had not been solved; that not only were the 
Armenians wronged at the time of perpetration but they are also victims of an ongoing 
injustice; that their rights and the promises that were made to them have remained 
unfulfilled; and that this is the subject matter of Armenian “hopes and expectations” as 
“Armenia anxiously awaits the justice which is due her.”201 While it is noted in the book 
that the text had been translated, no account is offered to explain how a non-English 
speaker such as Vratzian would be able to read through, and quote passages from, 
untranslated material in English.202 It is therefore considered here that the believability of 
                                                          
199 The readers of the book are directed to James Bryce’s The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire, Johannes Lepsius’ Deutschland und Armenian, and especially Henry Morgenthau’s Ambassador 
Morgenthau’s Story. See: Simon Vratzian, Armenia and the Armenian Question, trans. James G. Mandalian 
(Boston: Hairenik Publishing Company, 1943), 3-4, 30.  
 
200 Ibid., 27. However, this date did not at the time become adopted as a narrative marker, let alone the 
subject of symbolic commemoration.   
 
201 Ibid., viii.  
 
202 The book contains references to sources in English, most notably Morgenthau’s text, without addressing 
how precisely the suggested author of the book managed to locate, read, and understand material in a 
language that was foreign to him. For instance, see: Ibid., 3-4, 28, 84. This also includes the belief that 






Vratzian’s authorship is low. By having a leading political figure appear as the author of 
such a book, the material therein had the high capacity of becoming absorbed as 
representative of Armenian attitude, before being translated into Armenian action. 
Through the work of NAASR since the 1950s, upon its American orientation, the 
historical curiosity regarding how the Haik became Armenian and what the American 
interests were in the Armenian conflict with the Ottoman government had no existence 
within that which was held to be Armenian studies and research in American universities. 
Even before the infrastructure of the genocide scholarship was set, the combination of 
published scholarly material and its favorable acceptance by the scholarly community 
was put into effect. Sarkis Atamian’s historiographical work in 1955, which, among other 
details, introduced the notion that Ziya Göklap was “the intellectual father of the design 
for genocide,”203 was followed up by a review that described the work as a “well-
documented study,”204 and amplified the book’s message about “the present political 
attitudes of a large part of the Armenian community in the United States” being affected 
by the sense of a sacrifice and a failure to fulfill “President Wilson’s territorial arbitration 
in favor of an independent Armenia.”205 Not only does this information create pressure on 
                                                          
203 Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological 
Conflict (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), 181. Aside from this reference to “genocide,” the text 
does not flood the historical narrative with this label, though the label is used in a section title. See: Ibid., 
188.  
 
204 E. Sarkisyanz, review of The Armenian Community, by Sarkis Atamian, The Russian Review 15, no. 2 
(April 1956): 141. 
 
205 Ibid., 142. Wilson’s “arbitration” was also featured in ACAR’s ad for the rally at Carnegie Hall as well 
as in Smith’s letter to the NYT following the event. See: “Ad 539,” New York Times. Smith, “Armenian,” 






Turkey by positing an American obligation to keep a promise to Armenians,206 it also 
presents the American president as an arbitrator, a position which by its essence invites 
the historiographical assumption that the United States government was not an interested 
party in the dispute. Still, the “genocide” narrative was not as systematic as it later 
became.207 
Even before the term genocide turned from being a mere occasional 
accompaniment in the historical narration to a central feature of it, the controlled 
historiographical framework was already leading toward this transition. While it is telling 
that throughout the 1950s and 1960s Armenian-authored works on modern history did not 
mention the term genocide even once,208 these narrations exhibited a controlled direction 
of Armenian modern history toward an effect on how the present political situation of 
Armenians is to be seen.209 The knowledge that a scholar such as Richard G. Hovannisian 
                                                          
206 While this obligation might seem like unwanted pressure from an American perspective, it gives the 
United States government leverage in its relations with Turkey, and a pretext for involvement in a Soviet 
area. 
207 For instance, Atamian did not mention April 24, 1915, but rather focused on the “first shot” that was 
“fired by the Turks on the 20th of April, 1915” in relation to the events in Van. See: Atamian, Armenian, 
189.  
 
208 For examples of such works on the relevant historical period that were authored by scholars of 
Armenian descent without mentioning the term genocide, see: Malachia Ormanian, The Church of 
Armenia: Her History, Doctrine, Rule, Discipline, Liturgy, Literature, and Existing Condition, 2nd ed., ed. 
Terenig Poladian, trans. G. Marcar Gregory (London: A. R. Mowbray, 1955); Louise Nalbandian, The 
Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the 
Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); Leon Surmelian, Daredevils of 
Sassoun: The Armenian National Epic (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1964); Virginia A. Tashjian, Once There 
Was and Was Not: Armenian Tales Retold (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966); Richard G. 
Hovannisian, Armenia: On the Road to Independence, 1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1967). This means that the current Armenian usage of the term genocide—and insistence on that usage—is 
the product of a discursive development and was not reflective of Armenian sentiment during a certain 
period after the term genocide had already become known. 
 
209 These works carried political messages that continued Smith’s agitation about a national awakening. In 
one, it was claimed that “The Turks were rewarded at the expense of a Christian nation.” See: Ormanian, 
The Church, 76. In another, it was argued that “in 1915, the Turks brutally massacred Armenian men, 
women, and children on an unparalleled scale and drove the remaining survivors from Turkish Armenia.” 






wrote an entire book on Armenian modern history in the context of Armenian political 
independence without mentioning genocide at all casts a shadow on his later efforts to 
portray the label of “genocide” as authentically Armenian.210 One of the gaping holes in 
the construction of the Armenian narrative on genocide is that Hovannisian leads the 
charge against alleged genocide denialism when he himself did not use the term in his 
work until after certain conditions for using it ripened.211 However, the absence of 
“genocide” in these historiographical works does not detract from their historiographical 
effect at the time; these works facilitated the later insertion of “genocide” into the 
narrative without it appearing foreign or like a diversion from other aspects of Armenian 
modern history.212 They created a culture of historiography in which American 
involvement in the Armenian fate is systematically omitted.213 In this, even a supposedly 
                                                          
210 For instance, Hovannisian used terms other than “genocide” in a framed historical narrative that would 
later invite the superimposition of the genocide label. He referred to the events of 1915 as “the massacre or 
deportation,” “the cataclysm,” “deportations,” “the deportation and massacres,” “the Armenian tragedy,” 
and “the Armenian deportations.” See: Ibid., 48-49, 53-54, 274 (note 51). In the last reference, Hovannisian 
even declared April 24, 1915, as an “inaugural date” without mentioning “genocide” in his characterization 
of the events that were supposedly inaugurated on that day. These avoidances of “genocide” are odd when 
compared to his later work. For comparison, see: Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., The Armenian Genocide, 
History, Politics, Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s, 1992); Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., Remembrance and 
Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998).  
 
211 For example, in one text Hovannisian mentioned scholars who do not use the term genocide to describe 
the Armenian victimhood in WWI before proceeding to state that “deniers are shameless.” See: Richard G. 
Hovannisian, “Confronting the Armenian Genocide,” in Pioneers of Genocide Studies: Confronting Mass 
Death in the Century of Genocide, ed. Samuel Totten and Steven L. Jacobs (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002), 34. More recently, Hovannisian was credited for an entire article about the 
alleged denialism. See: Hovannisian, “Denial,” 228-247. In his discussion of denialism, Hovannisian does 
not address the absence of “genocide” in his earlier work. The possibility that he might be in denial of this 
aspect of his career has not been examined by the genocide scholarship. 
 
212 Despite the absence of “genocide,” Hovannisian’s text in 1967 did establish the argument of the 
genocide claim by incorporating into his narrative the belief that “the deportations and massacres were 
calculated, irresponsible and brutal crimes.” See: Hovannisian, Armenia, 53.  
 
213 In contradiction to the information in the works of American missionaries who wrote about their 
experiences while the transformation of Armenian identity was still in its formative phase, the works of 
Armenian modern history have diminished or even concealed knowledge of the role that these Americans 
played. For instance, Ormanian explained the new regulations regarding Ottoman Armenians in 1863 not as 





pro-Turkish historiographical response participated.214  
Fourth, it is here suggested that in the interest of power particularization there was 
an American preference to advance international law by education rather than 
adjudication through the Armenian victimhood as the primary subject of “genocide” 
usage. The pleas of the Armenian people as a victimized group presented the potential for 
a more convincing reflection of “the conscience of mankind” than having morality be 
                                                          
offered the following explanation: “These regulations, which may be regarded as the outcome of the 
intellectual progress which the masses had acquired, gave, in their turn, the motive power towards national 
development, thanks to that spontaneous evolution which is ever innate in the intellectual and social sphere, 
whereby action creates action, each in turn being the cause of new results.” See: Ormanian, The Church, 
74. This expresses a way to use vagueness and a general notion of natural progress to divert attention from 
the actual American influence on the Ottoman Armenians. Another manner of diversion involved the 
ascription of influence to non-Americans such as the French. In one work, knowledge of the American 
influence on Armenian identity was concealed by a text that presents the French as the main source of 
Western ideas among Armenians. See: James Etmekjian, The French Influence on the Western Armenian 
Renaissance, 1843-1915 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1964), 115. The very existence of such a book 
strengthens the notion that there was a “Western Armenia” and an “Eastern Armenia” prior to the 
American handling of Armenian identity. See: Ibid., 8. Also, while the works of American missionaries, as 
discussed here in Chapter 4, state that the “Armenians” were largely undeveloped according to the 
standards of the Euro-Christian civilization prior to the arrival of the Americans, this text gives an opposite 
impression, or at least takes an opposite direction, by highlighting that Armenians had been “studying in 
various parts of Europe since at least the sixteenth century.” See: Ibid., 94. Also, in Nalbandian’s text the 
disinterest in the American effect is not only manifested in the absence of research but in the description of 
the “Protestant” organization—when it is briefly mentioned—without relating it to Americans. See: 
Nalbandian, The Armenian, 25-26. In addition, Nalbandian deleted from memory the impact that the 
Americans had on the advent of the modern Armenian use of the Armenian language. See: Ibid., 33-34. 
The discrepancies between these American publications of Armenian modern history and the American 
missionaries’ own description of their work and effect on Armenians while it was still critically taking 
place is material for further historical study. The examples that are here given are sufficient for making the 
point that the framing of this history for a genocide accusation has blocked from view the American 
involvement and the political stakes that would explain the American strategy toward international law.     
 
214 While the text, which set out to criticize the Armenian historiography, directed attention to the 
peculiarity of the Armenian territorial claim when the people themselves did not call themselves Armenian, 
it nonetheless did not connect the appearance of the name to the influence of American culture on the 
identity and political purpose of the people. See: Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of 
Innocent Exposed (London: K. Rustem and Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), 1-2. The text noted the 
“conversion of Armenians to Protestantism by American missionaries,” but did so without consideration of 
the political ramifications of this conversion and without considering that the shift to becoming 
“Armenians” paralleled the “conversion.” See: Ibid., 30. Also, when considering the interests of great 
powers regarding the conflict between the Armenians and the Ottoman government, the text considered 
Austrian, British, French, German, and Russian perspectives without even hinting at there being American 






instructed by the powerful United States government directly and without illustration.215 
By making the popularity of “genocide” become an Armenian cause, the term acquired 
the semblance of a bottom-up usage that could be interpreted more readily as a display of 
genuine moral concern. In this way, “genocide” was set to become known as a crime that 
expresses a people’s sense of injustice rather than be associated with American global 
strategy. Hence, not only the usage of “genocide” was to be removed from its American 
source, but so was the history of “genocide.” The association between Lemkin, the term’s 
perceived coiner, and the Armenian victimhood, the term’s popular carrier, blotted out 
the element of American planning and thereby kept “genocide” from being seen as the 
product of American power. 
A possible addition to this list of effects through the American utilization of the 
Armenian issue as a vessel for popularizing “genocide” involves the fascinating 
relationship between the genocidization of Armenian history and the genocide 
accusations that surfaced during the American war in Vietnam. The Vietnam War 
triggered an instrumental public discussion on the meaning of “genocide” that enhanced 
                                                          
215 For instance, in the Vratzian text it was suggested that the conditions of the Armenians “long disturbed 
the conscience of mankind.” See: Vratzian, Armenia, 7. Similarly, the ad that was posted by ACAR under 
Smith’s leadership to announce its rally at Carnegie Hall highlighted a moral appeal in stating that “The 
systematic massacre of Armenians by the Turks for nearly two generations, resulting in more than a million 
deaths, shocked the conscience of the civilized world.” See: “Ad 539,” New York Times. Smith then 
reiterated the use of “conscience” in a letter to the NYT, in which he claimed that “The conscience of the 
American people cannot permit the Armenians’ cause to be shelved because of political balancing within 
the august frame of the United Nations.” See: Smith, “Armenian,” New York Times. Later, when the 
commemoration of April 24, 1915, became a public event in the United States, an ad made reference to 
“conscience” in the following way: “The outraged conscience of humanity demands justice for the 
Armenian.” See: “Ad 716,” New York Times, April 24, 1966. When the American Senate lent its influence 
on the American public to associate the term genocide with the Armenian claim, Hovannisian was given an 
opportunity to appear before the subcommittee and say in connection to the “ruthless annihilation of the 
Armenian population” that “the ‘conscience of mankind’ did not shudder for long.” See: Investigation into 
Certain Past Instance of Genocide and Exploration of Policy Options for the Future: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, May 11; August 30, 1976 






the gravitas of the term, and the Armenian use of “genocide” became more effective and 
useful as a result of it. While the debate on the Vietnam War empowered the Armenian 
issue by inspiriting the meaning of “genocide” in public discourse, the Armenian issue, in 
turn, dispelled the memory of the discourse on “genocide” regarding the war in Vietnam. 
In other words, the popularity of the genocide accusation in association with the Vietnam 
War damaged American image at the time, but it promoted the awareness of international 
law and lifted up the significance of the genocide label in time for its domination by the 
Armenian issue to the effect of marginalizing other genocide connotations, including the 
attack on Vietnam. Even though the popular use of “genocide” in the context of the 
Armenian issue canceled out the lasting effects of the accusation against the United 
States government over its policies in Vietnam, both of these had a unified and 
cumulative impact on the meaning of “genocide.” The discourse in the United States 
created momentum for the characterization of civil wars as cases of genocide. 
 
Civil Wars 
Vietnam’s status during the American military campaign there can be interpreted 
as a part of the quest to establish international standards of governance, but also as 
imperialism. There is a distinction between the advancement of rules among nations 
according to an American vision and the domination of foreign lands by American force. 
There is a difference between wanting a country such as Vietnam to share the American 
concept of governance and using Vietnam as a buffer zone for the protection of interests 
in other lands as indicated by the following observation in the NYT at a time that 





Indo-China than the country itself. Indo-China is the gateway to the rich and teeming 
lands of Southeast Asia. Communist control of it would pose an immediate threat to 
Burma and Thailand and bring increased pressure on India.”216 The straightforwardness 
of the desire to control such economic resources does not mean that it is a bigger stake 
than the dialectical process of attaining international order.   
 In terms of IR theory, the experience of Vietnam enabled the public discourse to 
emphasize the sense of dichotomy between the justification of the great-power mentality, 
known as realism, and the justification of intervention for social progress, known as 
liberalism. Despite this classification, it is the latter that might be more realistic and 
practical in the management of American foreign policy. The one that is branded as 
realist serves the interest of the world’s strongest military by directly prescribing 
aggressive pursuits in international politics, whereas the other serves the status quo of 
power relations by looking to maintain it indirectly through ideological appeal to the 
public’s controlled set of values. It is the framing of their distinguished and competing 
qualities on a theoretical level, as instructed by the IR discourse, that calls attention away 
from the commonality of their purpose. While one speaks to power, and the other speaks 
to morality, both are utterances of hard power through soft power.  
 Especially during the Vietnam War, political realism and international idealism, 
even by way of criticism against American policy, were two sides of the same coin: the 
power to generate a discourse about the governance of affairs globally. On one side of it, 
                                                          
216 “Attack in Indo-China,” in “The World,” New York Times, April 19, 1953. Any claims that the United 
States lost the war does not follow the suggestion that is made by the passage, according to which the 
American motivation in the campaign was not to control Vietnam as much as it was to incapacitate the 
ability of others to interfere with “the rich and teeming lands,” Burma and Thailand, through Vietnam. A 
broader interest may have been the internationalization of affairs in the region through sparking a local 






Hans Morgenthau argued before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the 
situation in Vietnam was really about “the preservation of the world balance of power,” 
and that, to him, “the United States could not countenance the conquest of Asia by China 
after the model of the conquest of Europe by Hitler.”217 Famously, Morgenthau expressed 
a view of the campaign in Vietnam as being misguided, claiming that “The United States 
can no more contain Chinese influence in Asia by arming South Vietnam and Thailand 
than China could contain American influence in the Western Hemisphere by arming, say, 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica,”218 but less known is the part of the discourse in which he 
promoted a greater American operation in the region. The venture in Vietnam was 
criticized by him for not being effective, but the general goal was justified by the belief 
that it is a ground on which the United States is battling China’s imperial rise.219 Thus, in 
consideration of China’s cultural as well as political influence in the region, Morgenthau 
recommended the following: We have to strike at the power of China itself. We have to 
destroy China. We have to go to war with China. I think this is the inevitable logical 
                                                          
217 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, 
March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 553. 
 
218 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Vietnam Crisis and China,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21, no. 6 (June 
1965): 27. 
 
219 In his major work on international politics, Politics among Nations, Morgenthau adjusted the language 
on imperialism in a manner that mirrored the American power superiority and the Chinese power growth. 
In its early post-WWII mode, the first edition of the book defined the “objective of imperialism” as being 
one of three: “the domination of the whole politically organized globe,” “hegemony of approximately 
continental dimensions,” or “a strictly localized preponderance of power.” See: Morgenthau, Politics, 36. 
However, in a later edition, the text was changed to instruct that only “A nation whose foreign policy aims 
at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations—whose foreign 
policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status—pursues a policy of imperialism.” See: 
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), 39. Meaning, Morgenthau’s definition of imperialism changed to consider only a 
power that is on the rise as conducting imperialist policies, while a power that endeavors to control its 






conclusion to be drawn from the assumption that the paramountcy of the Chinese power 
on the Asian mainland is incompatible with the interests of the United States.”220 On the 
other side of the discourse, the project of international law gained credibility through the 
believability of a public debate in which international law was portrayed as an 
independent entity that is a basis for humanity’s voice even when confronted by 
questionable American conduct in war situations.  
For the American advancement of international law, the Vietnam War presented a 
challenge, but also an opportunity. It challenged the notion that international law may 
ever be applied against the United States, but at the same time it offered a possibility for a 
revamped public discourse about international law that ultimately would prove favorable 
for the enhancement of a global pursuit of an international coded behavior. A major 
advantage for the engagement of the public about international law through soft power 
was found in the persuasiveness with which the critiques about the American policy in 
Vietnam appeared as distinct from the interests of the United States government or even 
as anti-American. This state of affairs meant that the criticism of the American activity in 
Vietnam was based on tenets of international law that were themselves an American 
creation. In the heat of the public debate about Vietnam, it could not be seen that the 
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disapproval of the American destruction of lives and livelihood in Vietnam through 
controlled information actually had the effect of popularizing international law in the 
public sphere. From this perspective, “genocide,” as the catchy criminalizing word that 
denotes the crime of crimes, was a serviceable tool of attraction. As long as the specific 
labeling of the Vietnamese case as genocide could later be removed from the public eye, 
the turning of “genocide” against the United States would not have lasting effects on 
public opinion. Thus, the appeal of “genocide” was able to draw attention to the debate 
about international law while affirming the notion that the term genocide is reflective of 
the defenseless people’s voice rather than being the product of the United States 
government’s will. In turn, “genocide” would be lifted up publicly in time for its entry to 
a phase of greater informational credibility in the form of scholarly literature. 
 In the context of the American military campaign in Vietnam, there was an 
opportunity to stage the first publicized illustration of how a “genocide” verdict in an 
international tribunal might be executed.221 Until that time, “genocide” was purely the 
subject of public accusations—some were highly promoted by the American mainstream 
media while others were not—without any resemblance to a court’s handling of a 
genocide case. The performance of a publicized mock trial that was associated with the 
name of Bertrand Russell, a reputable British scholar, provided a dramatization of an 
international tribunal, and thereby vivified the legal procedure through which 
international courts that are empowered by intergovernmental agreement might dispense 
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justice on matters of international crime. It offered convincing use of language and 
setting without authority and enforceability, and therefore amounted to soft power 
without legal power but toward it. The criticism that it expressed against the United 
States empowered its believability as an inspiration to future legal practice.  
 Accordingly, the information that was produced by the tribunal or about it was 
couched with references to a loaded courtroom term such as “evidence,”222 and filled 
with sharp accusations against the United States. The language attached an imperialist 
meaning to American foreign policy, stressing that its objects were “domination, markets, 
cheap labour, raw materials, conscript of armies and strategic points from which to 
control or threaten.”223 Not only did Russell dismiss the moral argument of “American 
intervention,” he expressed the view that “The racism of the West, especially that of the 
United States” explains the handling of another people’s affairs.224 From its venues in 
Stockholm and Copenhagen, the International War Crimes Tribunal (IWCT), which was 
also known as the Russell Tribunal, issued a judgment that was presented as if uttered by 
moral reason “in the interest of humanity and the preservation of civilization.”225 As in 
the power sourced narratives that previously sought to promote the knowledge of 
                                                          
222 For instance, see: Bertrand Russell, War Crimes in Vietnam (London: George Allen and Unwin; New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), 126; Ralph Schoenman, A Glimpse of American Crimes in Vietnam 
(London: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1967), 1; Bertrand Russell, introduction to Against the Crime 
of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, ed. John Duffett (New York: 
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1968), 3. By using the term evidence, the IWCT acquired the 
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223 Ibid., 4. By describing a “world system of exploitation” that facilitates “the consolidation of the 
American empire,” Russell’s language about the United States is reminiscent of how Nazi Germany’s 
efforts were described in the context of its conquests in Europe. See: Ibid. To Russell, the American 
objective in Vietnam is laced with “financial greed” and is a part of a race to “world hegemony.” See: Ibid. 
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“genocide” as a crime, the narration by the IWCT spoke on behalf of “The conscience of 
mankind.”226 Moreover, Russell called for arousing conscience and challenging mankind, 
and warned that “silence is complicity, a lie, a crime.”227 Among its decisions, the IWCT 
declared that by unanimous vote it was found that the United States government is guilty 
of committing genocide against the Vietnamese people,228 but the streaming together of a 
genocide charge and the voice of humanity in this soft-power production was practically 
being channeled toward human-rights advocacy. In this instance, the charge of 
“genocide” was a form of education on human rights through an image of adjudication. 
The judgment that “the crime of Genocide is daily committed in Vietnam,” was used as 
an affirmation of the principle that “Each people has its own rights and among these is 
the right to choose its own way of life.”229  
 Also for the first time, through the criticism of the American war in Vietnam, 
“genocide” became the subject matter of discussion by renowned philosophers such as 
Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre.230 Following the IWCT, Sartre performed a great service to 
the standing of “genocide” in the public discourse by producing an unprecedented essay 
in which someone of his internationally recognized stature philosophizes about the 
meaning and application of the term genocide. Sartre’s essay starts with what is seen here 
                                                          
226 Claiming that it was “profoundly disturbed by the war waged in Vietnam.” See: Ibid. 
 
227 Bertrand Russell, “Bertrand Russell’s Final Address to the Tribunal, Copenhagen, December 1967,” in 
Crime, Duffett, 653. He added that “The most lasting barrier to genocide is the unity of all peoples to 
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as one of the talking points of the genocide discourse: “The word ‘genocide’ is relatively 
new … But the fact of genocide is as old as humanity.”231 This suggests that Sartre’s 
framing of “genocide” was aligned with that of the powerful American narrator, the NYT: 
after describing “genocide” as a “new word” that “was needed to define the particular 
crimes of which the leading Nazis were found guilty,”232 the newspaper started to narrate 
that the term was “a ‘new legal formulation’ for the ancient crime of annihilation.”233 
While appearing to challenge the American campaign in Vietnam, Sartre echoed the 
American-led popular discourse on “genocide.” Similarly, the rhetorical decision to start 
a sentence with “Every case of genocide is a product of…”234 means that Sartre lent his 
credibility to making “genocide” seem like a concrete phenomenon that has its place in 
popular usage. In other words, Sartre took part in persuading the public that “genocide” is 
an existing matter, rather than showing it as a legal idea that was created in Washington, 
DC, which is the home of the same government that he supposedly sought to criticize.  
This unity of purpose with the American promotion of “genocide” was made less 
perceptible because of the text’s direct criticism of the United States. Sartre’s criticism 
                                                          
231 Jean-Paul Sartre, “On Genocide,” Ramparts, February 1968, 37. It is also notable that with this quote, 
Sartre is seen as adding to the impression that genocides are facts. In between the two components of the 
quote, there was a sentence that provided inaccurate information: “It was coined by the jurist Raphael 
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revisited themes that had been considered by Russell, such as American racism, 
hegemony, and imperialism, while assuming the voice of humanity.235 He pointed at 
American capitalism as an ideological source of what he defined as “imperialist 
genocide.”236 Nonetheless, by implying that this accusation of an American “conditional 
genocide” has no juridical validity,237 and questioning the ability to verify American 
intentions,238 Sartre dulled the edge of a genocide claim that was never going to have 
legal ramifications. In effect, this text promoted awareness of “genocide” as a reflection 
of public sentiment, but also carried a sense of doubt regarding its legal applicability. As 
Carl Oglesby, an American member of the IWCT, wrote in his introduction of Sartre’s 
essay in Ramparts: “In a sense, it does not really matter whether American action in 
Vietnam is fixed with the term ‘genocide.’”239 To put it differently, Sartre’s analysis did 
much more for the prestige of “genocide,” than it did for Vietnamese legal justice.  
 “Genocide” added an air of intensity to the exhibition level of the accusations 
against the United States. The references to extermination,240 and the recollection of 
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Adolf Hitler and Nazism,241 framed the statistical data and images as a matter that has to 
be addressed by humanity. Particularly vivid is the reference to the victimization of the 
Vietnamese by way of poison and experiment, as described by a local named Dr. Nguyen 
in a book that was published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation: 
I must say to you that the policy I have observed is one of extermination of our 
people, of extermination and of experimentation. They have used various kinds of 
poisons which I have analysed. The poisons are chemicals, gases, bombs or 
phosphorus and napalm bombs. I understand that the U.S. authorities state that 
these chemicals are intended to clear trees and grass. The truth is that these 
chemicals combine heavy toxic concentrations, which affect fatally both human 
and animal life.242 
 
Even though such a description provokes condemnation of the United States government, 
it was unrelated to actual legal possibilities regarding the American wartime activities. Its 
function was to invite discussion on how international standards may be better articulated 
and maintained in keeping with a changing world. The shock value of symbols that 
reminded the public of Nazi German perpetration was converted to an enlivened debate 
on the new meeting-place between international law, sovereignty, technology, and 
warfare.  
 While attempting to clear the legal haze by answering numerous quandaries 
regarding American perpetration of war crimes in Vietnam,243 the information that was 
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243 A few years after the dust of the war began to settle, Guenter Lewy produced a set of responses to many 
of the aspects of criticism that had been brought up throughout the American military’s operations in 
Vietnam. For instance, he pointed out that the IWCT “in large measure, relied on evidence supplied by 
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camp.” See: Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 224. Also, Lewy 
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in the matter of the commitment to protect civilians at war, Lewy argued that Vietnamese women and 
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civilians act as support personnel they cease to be noncombatants and are subject to attack.” See: Ibid., 232. 





produced at the time about international law also had to offer up a moral lesson to the 
United States and the rest of humanity. The memory of the Nuremberg trial was evoked 
and reengaged for its ability to mark the legal discussions about the Vietnam War as 
intellectual space for a core reevaluation and reaffirmation of international law.244 The 
critics of the United States government’s war popularized the following quote by the 
chief prosecutor of the United States at the Nuremberg trial, Justice Robert Jackson: “If 
certain acts and violations of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United 
States does them or whether Germany does them. We are not prepared to lay down a rule 
of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against 
us.”245 Meaning, even though it had never become a matter of official acknowledgement 
that the United States government is guilty of war crimes in Vietnam, it was offered 
within the information about the war that the United States is to be reminded of a 
normative commitment that is essential to the credibility of international law. This was 
not contradicted by the American efforts to seize the moment for reform in international 
law. 
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definition of genocide did not quite fit the conduct of American military forces in Vietnam.” See: Ibid., 
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244 In this context, the Nuremberg Trials began to function in collective memory as a critical marker in the 
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 As the renowned philosophers were preparing for the legal spectacle in 
Scandinavia, the leaders of ASIL were making headway in utilizing the public’s 
increased attention to Vietnam in order to develop a discourse on civil war and 
intervention within the confines of international law. Wolfgang Friedmann called upon 
“every student of international law to re-examine … the question of the reality and value 
of international law in the conduct of international affairs,”246 and it was argued that “the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of the new states were weak, poor and in a state of 
social turmoil, accentuated the social and civil war aspects of international conflict.”247 
Since cases of civil war meant a challenged sovereignty, it became pertinent to consider 
the quality of a civil war under the belief that the involvement of a member state in 
another country’s civil war does not qualify as an international war, and therefore the 
United Nations does not have a clearly defined role in such a situation.248 A vacuum was 
identified, and it was maintained that the “decision whether a particular conflict is 
essentially a phase of civil war or of foreign aggression … rests with the Powers directly 
concerned.”249 Filling in the void, the American legal scholar Quincy Wright exemplified 
the power of the pen by determining that “hostilities in Viet-Nam should be regarded as 
civil strife.”250   
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 Commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation’s grant to ASIL, Richard Falk was 
tasked with rounding up relevant information during the Vietnam War in what was 
named the Civil War Project of ASIL.251 As specified by Falk himself, the support by the 
Carnegie Corporation was geared toward “a reinterpretation of the international law of 
civil war adequate to the needs of current international life.”252 In its capacity to allow a 
great power such as the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of another state 
without it being seen as an international crime, civil war became a serviceable term in 
international law. It was thought that if wars such as the one in Vietnam can be identified 
as in-fighting, then the involvement by powers to settle them cannot amount to war 
crimes in international law because the violence in such cases is not seen as being 
between member states of the United Nations.  
 Falk had a leading role in entering the supposed empty space in international law, 
and proposing ways to have it accommodate the experience of Vietnam as a genre. His 
stated aim was not to explain how international law might keep the United States from 
becoming involved in the internal affairs of another country, but to stress how the United 
States might learn from this experience so as to follow a foreign policy that adheres to 
international law.253 Along with the recommendation that “These sorts of conflict should 
be left alone by the United States,”254 Falk described the opportunity that was afforded by 
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the conflict as “a time when it is important to try to restructure expectations about what is 
permissible and impermissible in the context of a category of conflict of which the 
Vietnam war is the most prominent instance to date.”255 Not only did the conflict provide 
a platform for another account of international-law history that omits American 
dominance, but it also presented a case study for a program of civil-war engagement.256   
 Once the concept of civil war was identified as the legal entryway through which 
American military campaigns such as the one in Vietnam may be carried out without 
contradicting international law, the use of “genocide” began to adjust accordingly. This 
was a watershed moment for the term genocide because the focus of its accusations 
spread from targeting leaders of the powerful state, such as Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia, to including leaders from within the collapsing state. This change was given its 
public signal at a roundtable in 1972 that was jointly sponsored by ASIL and the United 
States Institute of Human Rights, in which Louis Henkin of Columbia University directed 
the discussion toward what he described as “manifestations of genocide in civil war.”257 
This statement marked the new phase of “genocide” in American-produced information. 
By presenting civil wars as cases of genocide, great foreign power was to be served in 
two main ways: first, the source of the criminal and punishable violence would be shown 
as internal rather than external; second, the external use of force would not only be seen 
as within the law but actually publicly advocated as part of prevention campaigns. This 
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agenda of genocidizing civil wars also explains the popularity of the claims within the 
genocide scholarship that political groups should be considered as victims of genocide, 
even though the Genocide Convention does not state that they are within the definition of 
genocide.  
 Therefore, the momentary accusations of genocide against the American 
operations in Vietnam are seen as having been advantageous for the soft-power 
promotion of international law in the sense that they gathered momentum for the 
popularity of “genocide” just before its usability would become systematized in a 
controlled scholarly discourse. Accordingly, the Armenian issue became the subject of a 
leading narrative on genocide. The anti-Ottoman narration of history that had been put in 
place to enliven the Armenian feelings of injustice was ready to become inundated with 
the term genocide. There are two main reasons that explain why the context of the 
Vietnam War called for the systematic popularization of the Ottoman Armenian 
victimhood as a case of genocide: first, the Armenian claim’s massive domination of 
“genocide” usage in the discourse allowed for the genocide accusation in the Vietnam 
context to fade away from public memory without it seeming deliberate;258 second, by 
labeling a case of rebellion not only as one of many examples of genocide but as a classic 
case of genocide, the Armenian issue was empowered to become the bulldozer that 
cleared the path for the assignment of “genocide” to civil wars. The information had to 
show the Armenian case not just as claimed genocide but as assumed genocide in order 
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for cases of civil war to be built up as “genocide” on its strength. Thus, it became 
popularly known as assuming “genocide” by its very name. Similarly, it became 
popularly known as the first genocide in the twentieth century. The framing of 
information regarding the Armenian issue, and the attraction to it, also included a denial-
accusation gimmick, which seeks to add to the genocide label’s persuasiveness through 
prejudice. At its core, the systematic popularization of information on the Armenian 
experience as genocide was programmed to be generated successfully through typically 
credible agents of knowledge such as educators and researchers who operate within a 
designed network of scholarship. Only after scholars were positioned to pass this 
information as academic, and even scientific, did the narration of “genocide” in the 
Armenian case also become echoed and bolstered by a plethora of celebrities and 
politicians. 
 
The Scholarly Discourse 
Broad reforms in American education enabled the federal government to control 
the information on the meaning of “genocide.” As the violence in Vietnam escalated, the 
ability to determine what discourse is promoted nationwide as a subject of instruction 
was greatly improved by the Higher Education Act of 1965.259 Its design to “strengthen 
the educational resources” in colleges and universities across the country, meant that the 
control over the information that is taught would tighten. Specifically, Title IV Part C, 
empowered the federal government to promote programs within states.260 Similarly, 
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under Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965,261 the National Diffusion 
Network (NDN) was established in 1974 in order to disseminate information that is 
chosen by a federal panel. NDN was set to function as a “national system for delivering 
information” that allowed for programs that are developed within one state to spread 
more easily among other states.262 Such programs were not only funded toward their 
success, but also required their developers “to train teachers and other staff members in 
the adopting schools.”263 In addition, this federal network was directed to employ “state 
facilitators” who would actively link schools with programs.264 Another legislative effort 
toward achieving a higher level of cohesiveness in the information that is taught across 
the United States was the Department of Education Organization Act of 1979.265 
According to Title I of this legislation, it sought to advance “the management and 
coordination of Federal education programs” and negate the results of dispersed 
education programs.266  
 These infrastructural developments facilitated the consistency with which the 
content on “genocide” would train the public to associate the Armenian victimhood with 
the meaning of “genocide.” Vahakn N. Dadrian was the primary agent through whom this 
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content would be produced to seem authentically Armenian and scholarly. Oddly enough, 
his public foray into the genocidizing of Armenian history was not in an academic 
endeavor, but rather it was facilitated by the NYT on May 30, 1964. In a peculiar 
publication of a letter to the editor,267 the text by Dadrian introduced to the masses some 
of the elements that would become the main features of the Armenian narrative on 
genocide: the forcing of comparison to the Holocaust, the basing of knowledge on biased 
Anglo-American information, and the fomenting of Armenian rage against Turks by the 
accusation of genocide and its denial. Through the publication of this letter, the NYT 
popularized among Armenians and the general public the belief that it is an Armenian 
conviction that they were “victims of the first modern example of genocide.”268 A second 
letter by Dadrian in the NYT repeated the genocide accusation with the generalizing 
wording that “the Turks”—as if to accuse all of them indiscriminately—“committed and 
escaped retribution,” and was more direct in the effort to prepare Armenian minds for the 
first major Armenian event in which the term genocide would be the central theme.269 On 
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April 24, 1965, the NYT publicized information regarding an unprecedented Armenian 
commemorative event through which the genocide label was to be advertised.270 
Moreover, on the same day it reported that “A Soviet newspaper today accused Turkey of 
genocide in western Armenia 50 years ago.”271 Through this narration, Armenian 
consciousness became intensely infused with the idea of genocide victimhood. 
 An American facilitation of Armenian voices popularized the genocide rhetoric, 
and gave it the semblance of a bottom-up expression. This involved a top-down 
imposition on the Jewish voice. The effect of publishing an article in Commentary that 
portrays the Armenians not only as victims of genocide but a forgotten genocide272 co-
                                                          
this paramount issue which touches on crucial national interests.” See: Ibid. As the title suggests, the 
connection to Armenian political claims against Turkey was immediate. 
 
270 “Armenia Remembers,” New York Times, April 24, 1965. It is noticeable that the rhetoric in which 
conviction is related to Armenia or Armenians has the effect of persuading the readers that this knowledge 
reflects Armenian sentiment. In the next two days, the NYT continued its coverage of the event. See: 
“Armenians Mark a Tragic 1915 Day,” New York Times, April 25, 1965; “Concert Honors Armenians 
Massacred by Turks: Church Sponsors Program on 50th Anniversary Descendants of Martyrs Are the 
Major Participants,” New York Times, April 26, 1965. Meaning, the unprecedented coverage of the event 
was spread over three consecutive days. 
 
271 “Soviet Article Accuses Turks,” New York Times, April 24, 1965. The news item added that “Armenian 
students, attempting to show their solidarity with the article, planned a demonstration in front of the 
Turkish Embassy, but were forced by the police to move away.” It was also stated that “The article 
appeared in the newspaper Soviet Armenia.” The information by the NYT did not include an explanation of 
what led the newspaper Soviet Armenia to make the accusation, and specifically, how the accusation might 
have been influenced by American sources. The connection between American influence and the 
information that affects Armenian opinion dates back to the days of the American missionaries in the 
Ottoman Empire during which the Americans introduced, among other literary products, the use of the 
newspaper toward giving the Ottoman Armenian community a group identity that centered on challenging 
the government. At any rate, this incident and the unprecedented coverage of Armenian commemoration to 
highlight the claim of genocide are seen here as related to the agitation of the Armenian public via 
Dadrian’s two letters in 1964.  
 
272 Housepian, “Unremembered,” 55-61. This is recognized as a rhetorical manipulation that has the effect 
of embedding the notion of “genocide” in relation to the Armenians, as if a matter of fact. By inviting 
readers to ask themselves if a genocide is forgotten or not, the author leads them to assume that there was a 
genocide. Again, the account of history is based on biased Anglo-American sources (Lepsius was German, 
but his production of information was subject to Anglo-American support). Even when based on this biased 
information, the labeling of “genocide” is not a natural reading of these sources. The suggestion that it is 
“unremembered” has the effect of sustaining the spark of activism, by giving Armenian readers a notion 






opted the opinion of Jews on a matter of victimhood and made it seem as if it had a 
Jewish seal of approval. Moreover, while the NYT was narrating that Armenians are 
publicly claiming to have been victims of genocide, The New Yorker published three 
extensive installments of a personal account that incorporated the genocide discourse into 
one Armenian’s deliberations about his identity,273 thereby serving as an instructive 
model for Armenian readers. The sentiment about “genocide” that was injected into the 
hearts and minds of Armenians made the genocide claim a part of the public discourse. 
Consequently, academic writings could begin to address the notion of genocide in 
connection to the Armenian victimhood not on any legal ground but simply because 
Armenians were caused to talk about it as such.  
 The infiltration of genocide claims in the form of assumptions into academia 
involved a method of tampering with the meaning of “genocide” that does not meet 
academic standards. A flurry of articles on “genocide” by Dadrian were published in 
academic formats in the 1970s, and in some of them Dadrian declared his own definition 
of genocide, as in the following examples: 
Genocide is the use of deliberate, systematic measures toward the extermination 
of a racial, political, or cultural group.274 
 
Genocide is the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal 
authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to 
reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose 
ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective 
vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision of genocide.275  
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1975; Michael J. Arlen, “Passage to Ararat: II—Voices,” The New Yorker, February 10, 1975; Michael J. 
Arlen, “Passage to Ararat: III—The Fields of Yellow Flowers,” February 17, 1975.  
 
274 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Factors of Anger and Aggression in Genocide,” Journal of Human Relations 19, 
no. 3 (1974), 394.  
 
275 Vahakn N. Dadrian, “Common Features of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A 





These presented detectable differences from the definition of genocide as in the Genocide 
Convention. Dadrian’s assumption of authority as he changed the definition of genocide 
to meet an agenda was supposed to appear scholarly but is profoundly unscholarly. It 
laughs in the face of the idea that social sciences are committed to describing rather than 
inventing a phenomenon. The agenda through Dadrian’s work used the academic 
platform for its inherent credibility as he proceeded to create a new meaning of 
“genocide.” This act was even more extreme than creating something out of nothing 
because Dadrian’s definition of genocide dismissed the existence of “genocide” as it is 
known in international law.  
 Such an aggressive impudence was accommodated by power. While Dadrian is 
recognized as Armenian, his redefinition of genocide was made possible by an ability to 
publish and the will to abuse academic standards when it is convenient. Moreover, the 
reception of Dadrian’s writings as a credible matter of science is as betraying of academic 
integrity as was the very publication of the material. Yet, the genocide scholarship has 
built itself on citing Dadrian as an authority on the meaning of “genocide,” and praising 
him as an eminent scholar. The scholars who were carefully positioned to comment about 
Dadrian’s work had a role in this foul play: the references to his work did not state its 
unscientific quality but rather supported the work,276 and even imitated the practice of 
inventing new meanings of “genocide.”277 From this perspective, it is almost a moot point 
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276 For example, see: Irving Louis Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction, 1976), 45-48. 
 
277 For instance, see: Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization 
during the Holocaust (New York: Free Press, 1979), 8. Fein is another sociologist who was empowered to 





to discuss Dadrian’s use of sources. They are profoundly unreliable for academic use, but 
serve as another indication that his work was backed by power. The contestation of the 
sources on which the Armenian case relies might seem to be redundant because 
Dadrian’s work did not need to prove “genocide” in the standard of legal procedure but 
only to popularize the notion that it is proven.  
 Dadrian’s function in the scholarly discourse even included an odd effort to 
absolve the United States government from responsibility in genocidal terms regarding its 
treatment of the country’s precolonial population, also known as American Indian or 
Native American. Not only did he refer to “the perpetrator group” as “the White settlers” 
rather than as Americans,278 but he concluded that the “victimization involved regionally 
instigated, rather than centrally legitimized and authorized perpetrations; coercive 
methods rather than lethal violence; more dislocation than immediate and direct 
destruction; in terms of a general trend, more assimilative disintegration than 
exclusionary obliteration; and finally, more temporal, segmental and sporadic destruction 
than typical genocide.”279 In other words, the American power to produce information on 
genocide utilized the status that it gave Dadrian as a supposedly credible expert on 
genocide to say that what happened to the precolonial population when confronted by the 
United States government was not genocide. The identification of the agenda of the 
source of his empowerment as a scholar would be one way to explain what could 
possibly have driven him to write such an article. Its awkwardness might be why there is 
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an absence of reference to it in the genocide scholarship. The same scholars of genocide 
who describe Dadrian as a pioneer in their field have acted like the article does not exist.  
 An understanding of soft power can offer an explanation as to how otherwise 
random subjects of comparison and whimsical points of comparison pass as social 
science and become published, as was the case in Dadrian’s treatment of the Holocaust in 
comparison to the Ottoman Armenian experience. Dadrian brandished methodology in 
the title of his work, and yet this comparison is based on pure framing. According to his 
supposedly scientific finding, the “Primary Importance Common Features” of “the 
Armenian and Jewish Cases” are that both were during “global wars” and that in both 
“the conception, design, and execution” was orchestrated by “political parties (Young 
Turks and Nazis) who invested themselves with monolithic power and literally took the 
functions of their respective states over.”280 Neither of these points of comparison 
corresponds directly with the Genocide Convention. This comparison would be the 
equivalent of comparing apples and oranges because both are round and of this world, but 
Dadrian’s points of comparison, while equally random and general, are not as accurate. 
Such sheer framing is the product of power. The quality of the comparison is not in the 
subjects of comparison themselves, but in the ability to promote a discourse that is based 
on their comparison. Instances of what is commonly referred to as self-plagiarism are 
another marker that Dadrian’s articles were productions to propagate information rather 
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Problem,” in Recent Studies in Modern Armenian History (Cambridge, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 
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than an individual’s earnest intellectual endeavor.281 The talking points about comparing 
the Holocaust to the Armenian experience were such urgent components of the genocide 
discourse that they were duplicated.   
 Dadrian’s work was nowhere near being challenged from within academia, 
especially not about the comparison of the Holocaust and the Armenian experience, 
which was part of a greater set of efforts to promote the Armenian case as genocide and 
open up “genocide” for comparative study. In parallel to Dadrian’s efforts, an educational 
program for this comparison was being hatched. The National Curriculum Research 
Institute of the American Association for Jewish Education produced in 1973 a guide for 
the study of genocide and in it the Armenian experience was not only presented as 
genocide, but as the only highlighted example of it.282 The text used the New Catholic 
Encyclopedia rather than the Genocide Convention as its source on the definition of 
genocide,283 and the content through which it elaborated on this instruction that the 
Armenians suffered a genocide was a single article by a rabbi,284 in which Armenians 
were shown as similar to Jews and described as “victims of a genocide.”285 In 1977, 
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282 Albert Post, The Holocaust: A Case Study of Genocide (New York: Commission on Jewish Studies in 
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the title of this organization suggests an association with the Jewish society, its existence enables American 
power to inform the public through a supposedly Jewish voice. For believability, it was by far more 
effective for this information to be produced by an organization that is representative of a group that is 
popularly recognized as having been victimized rather than by the Department of State.  
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Facing History and Ourselves, an organization that was funded by the United States 
government’s Title IV Part C,286 produced a guide for teachers that similarly based its 
definition of genocide in accordance with that of the New Catholic Encyclopedia,287 and 
also cited the same article by the same rabbi as the basis for presenting the Armenian 
experience as not only a case of genocide but as the only one that is discussed as such.288 
This was a top-down comparative narration under construction. Facing History and 
Ourselves would appear as a bottom-up educational organization from Brookline, 
Massachusetts, but due to the combination of funds through Title IV and promotion by 
NDN,289 it reached a level of national and international influence.290 
 After the ground had been prepared for the education of comparability between 
the Armenian and Jewish sufferings, and the public voice of both groups was made to 
appear as if in agreement with the sentiment that both were the two main cases of 
genocide in modern history, the future growth of this American policy as a scholarly 
discourse was made official by the United States President’s Commission in 1979.291 The 
President’s Commission had the effect of concealing the preexisting policy to harness the 
meaning of the Holocaust for a controlled discourse on “genocide,” as well as boosting 
the policy by giving it a formal sanction and making it appear as if a group of highly 
                                                          
286 For more on this here, see: note 50 in this chapter.  
 
287 Strom and Parsons, Facing (1982), 279. 
 
288 Ibid., 280.  
 
289 Ibid., 18. 
 
290 For more on this here, see: note 51 in this chapter.  
 






esteemed academic experts and community leaders were calling for it from the standpoint 
of erudition and morality. It also established Elie Wiesel, who was made the chairman of 
the commission, as the main representative of the voice on how the Holocaust ought to be 
remembered and educated. As part of this empowerment, information was produced to 
lend credibility to his function as the central spokesperson for the Holocaust, such as the 
dubious claim that he “was the first to give the term ‘Holocaust’ a modern usage.”292 
Through the power that was invested in him, Wiesel imparted authority to outlets of 
controlled information on the Holocaust and “genocide” without it being seen as an 
American manipulation. One foundational example of this is Wiesel’s role as the 
president of the organizing committee behind the first international conference that 
promoted the comparability of the Armenian case as genocide with the Holocaust.293  
                                                          
292 See: Elie Wiesel, And the Sea is Never Full: Memoires, 1969-, trans. Marion Wiesel (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1999), 18. Wiesel stated that this was what “Some scholars contend,” as if he did not himself 
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title to describe a work by Wiesel that itself did not mention “Holocaust.” This suggests that when the NYT 
was already mindful of addressing the event as the “Holocaust” the use of the word in this context was still 
absent from Wiesel’s work. Meaning, the later perception of Wiesel’s authoritative status regarding 
Holocaust memory is the function of an empowerment by a popular discourse, which then allowed him to 
make influential statements about Holocaust memory and the comparability of the event in the context of 
“genocide.”   
 
293 See: Charny and Davidson, Book, 7. Charny’s narration of events that surrounded the conference, under 
the title “The Conference Crisis: The Turks, Armenians and the Jews” gives the impression that, aside from 
promoting the comparison of the Holocaust to the Armenian victimhood as a matter of academic practice, 
the conference was used as a publicity stunt to attract attention to the genocide discourse by vilifying the 






 The President’s Commission not only recommended the creation of infrastructure 
toward controlled education on genocide, but its report also engaged in approving content 
that directs the public toward treating the Armenian experience as a case of genocide 
such as the published material in which Hitler is quoted as having commented about the 
Armenians.294 It has become commonly known as Hitler’s Armenian Quote. In the 
following passage, the comparability of the Armenian and Jewish cases is embedded as 
an assumption: 
Although we have no guarantees that those who remember will not repeat history, 
the failure to remember the past makes repetition more likely. Nothing more 
clearly illustrates this claim than Hitler’s alleged response to those in his 
government who feared international oposition [sic] to genocide. “Who 
remembers the Armenians?,” he asked. Indifference to that earlier twentieth-
century attempt at genocide may well have fortified those who later questioned 
the impact of extermination if not its wisdom or necessity.295 
 
While the text recognized that this is an “alleged response,” it nonetheless promoted the 
wording of the comment through rhetorical manipulation to utilize what is claimed to 
have been the Nazi perspective, such as the anachronistic suggestion that Hitler’s 
government members feared an international reaction to “genocide” or the liberty of 
adding “remembers” to the quote. In its backhanded style, the text in the report managed 
to instill the notion of comparability between the Armenian and Jewish contexts without 
having to address the details surrounding this quote.  
There is no available German source for this quote, and, it is therefore regarded as 
an “alleged” comment. The text from which it was taken had not been published by an 
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official German publication but rather saw light as an American publication that was 
created by a professional agent of American information, Louis Lochner. In the first 
publication of the text by Lochner, the saying was “‘Who, after all, speaks today of the 
annihilation of the Armenians?’”296 Later, the NYT published a different version during 
the Nuremberg trial without crediting Lochner, in which the saying was “‘Who still talks 
nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians?’”297 
 Since the authenticity of the source is challengeable,298 the attention of those who 
criticize the usage of this quote has been drawn away from how its popular interpretations 
create a decontextualized discourse even if a version of these quoted words were truly 
uttered by Hitler. The context of the comments by Hitler is Germany’s impending 
conquest of Poland, whose existence as a nation-state had a stifling effect on Germany’s 
ability to spread its governance of affairs in Europe. Poland was established as an 
independent state in the aftermath of WWI, in a territory that otherwise would have been 
likely to come under German influence. The Anglo-American utilization of Poland as a 
political entity that interfered with Germany’s growth in Europe was similar to the 
mobilization of Armenians as a human source of interference with the growth of German 
influence within the realm of the Ottoman Empire. The politicization of the Ottoman 
Armenian existence by Anglo-American power was used to negate the spread of German 
influence there: instead of allowing Germany to build up its use of resources on Ottoman 
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land through the Ottoman government, the Armenians were being organized toward 
claiming sovereignty as an independent state that would align with Anglo-American 
interests.  
According to this view of the power struggle, the insistence on self-rule for the 
Poles on the eve of WWII seemed to parallel the demand for Armenian self-rule on the 
eve of WWI. Both had the effect of negating German expansion. Due to the reeducation 
of Germany after WWII, since Germany’s loss in that war there has been no unaffected 
source of German historiography regarding WWI, but it is likely that Germans at the 
time—not just Hitler—were mindful of how the Armenians were used as pawns by 
Anglo-American power to prevent Germany from developing Ottoman land. By WWII, 
the propaganda about Armenian statehood had long ended. There is an assumption in the 
dominant discourse that Hitler was referring to Armenian victimhood rather than the 
Armenian political claims. In the 1930s, not even the Armenians were speaking publicly 
about severing from the Soviet Union and establishing an independent Armenian state. 
As a contrast to the common belief that Hitler was trying to inspire members of his 
government into action by claiming that they could get away with group murder, there is 
sense in considering that the Armenians were mentioned in the quote as an example of 
the fleeting nature of political claims. The idea of Poland as a nation-state—a political 
idea—was a similar function of power in international politics.  
In asking who speaks about—not who remembers—the Armenians, the allusion 
was to those who generated the verbiage about an Armenian state on Ottoman land to foil 





longer politically relevant.299 In actuality, the lesson of the Ottoman Armenian experience 
was not forgotten by WWII but rather it taught Germany about the politicization of group 
identity according to power considerations. There was reason to believe that through 
military triumph and cultural adjustment the political identity of Poles would fade as 
well.300 There is currently a popular genocide discourse about the Armenians, but not 
about the Poles. Even though the quote calls for a comparison between the Armenians 
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300 The direction of public attention to a discourse on the comparability of the Holocaust and the Armenian 
experience through the supposed Armenian Quote has had the effect of distracting from the similar 
functions that both the Armenians and the Poles had in the attempt to form political barriers that would stop 
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difference between the two cases is that as WWI broke out, Armenians did not have an Armenian state, 
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as the Armenians were used in an effort to establish a political barrier within the Ottoman Empire on the 
eve of WWI, so was Poland seen as a political barrier on the eve of WWII. Their function as such is 
highlighted by the following circumstances: Armenians were promised a state prior to, and throughout, 
WWI, and were the subject of a public debate on their statehood in the aftermath of WWI in consideration 
of that state’s worth as a political barrier; Poland was a post-WWI phenomenon that reflected the Anglo-
American will to prevent Germany from spreading eastward and contesting Anglo-American foreign 
interests. Bryce’s involvement in the Polish national cause during WWI may serve as a marker of the 
commonality between the Armenian and Polish national organizations. A glimpse of Bryce’s role is offered 
in a letter that was sent to him on March 16, 1916, by Israel Zangwill, author of the play The Melting Pot 
(1908), and a political activist for Zionism and Jewish rights. Zangwill was “rather perturbed” to learn that 
Bryce presided over a lecture “given by Roman Dmowski at King’s College.” Zangwill described 
Dmowski as “one of the most dangerous anti-Semites in Europe.” Zangwill further noted that Dmowski “is 
chief of the anti-Semitic party in Poland; it was he and his party who mobilized the cruel boycott which 
nearly ruined the Jews of that country before the war, and it was he also who was chiefly responsible for 
the cruel calumnies of the Jews during the war which resulted in the expulsions, pogroms and massacres 
from which the Jews have lately been suffering.” This was of concern to Zangwill especially because 
Dmowski was leading the effort to persuade “the public men in Western Europe that the Jews shall be 
condemned to perpetual disabilities in the autonomous Poland that is likely to come out of the war.” See: 
MS. Bryce 156, fols. 145-146, Catalogue of the Papers of James Viscount Bryce. While Zangwill 
expressed a sense of surprise in learning about this connection between Bryce and Dmowski’s form of 
Polish nationalism and anti-Semitism, it is here considered that the connection fits within a general view of 
the Anglo-American effort to rally national groups to be in position to foil German plans for expanding its 
territory in Europe and influencing the Ottoman Empire. Despite Zangwill’s reaction, it seems rather 
unsurprising that Bryce, with whom he collaborated to promote Jewish nationalism, was supportive of 






and the Poles, the genocide discourse has used the quote as a launching pad for 
comparing the Armenian suffering to that of the Jews in the Holocaust.301 During WWII, 
“genocide” was devised to protect a nation-state such as Poland from forceful annexation 
by the German government, and Lemkin gave the term genocide a Polish face, but by the 
time that the genocide discourse about the Armenians became systematically featured in 
scholarly works and the popular media in the absence of customary law, the Holocaust 
had become the starting point for a conversation about “genocide.” 
By having an Armenian narrative dominate the scholarly discourse on 
“genocide,”302 soft power shifted the meaning of “genocide” to be mostly defined by 
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Jerusalem. See: SFUCHS, “All in the Family: Dr. Howard Sachar and the Jacob Hiatt Institute,” Brandeis 
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Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 203. Walker’s version of 
history is exemplary of the prevalent historiography that erased from historical accounts the American 
involvement in creating an organized Armenian entity that acted against the Ottoman Empire toward 
establishing a nation-state. Walker did not mention the American influence, but instead that “The situation 
of Armenians was intolerable,” and that they “began to organise themselves politically.” See: Ibid., 125-
126. In contrast to the accounts of American missionaries, Walker did not indicate that the Americans 
breathed life into the Armenian language, but instead pointed out that “Armenian printing had begun as 





association with the policies of a struggling state, thereby increasing the believability that 
civil wars are typical contexts for genocide. This was not a natural interpretation of 
genocide, considering that the Genocide Convention does not mention political groups as 
possible victims of genocide. The discursive emphasis on civil wars in the general 
context of international law helped to bring the Vietnamese experience into view as a 
case of internal chaos rather than a foreign onslaught, but in the case of Cambodia the 
label of “genocide” as a result of civil war was particularly effective in not just 
diminishing American responsibility but laying the responsibility on a local government.  
The transformation in Ben Kiernan’s writing on Cambodia is instructive of how 
the label of “genocide” became usable in the Cambodian case, not simply because of the 
sensationalist value behind knowing that a leading figure in the genocide discourse on 
Cambodia was once sympathetic to the government he now accuses of genocide, but 
mainly because it reveals how the power to frame the scholarly discourse in a certain 
manner goes a long way in dictating what might soon after become widely held, and even 
legally held, as genocide. In his observation of revolutionary Cambodia in 1976, Kiernan 
considered that the governing group is not locally known as Khmer Rouge but as Angkar 
Padevat;303 that Cambodia was “historically a Buddhist society;”304 that because of 
                                                          
Vietnamese context by creating the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal for the Armenian experience, and through 
it promote Hovannisian’s work as “evidence” that the Armenians suffered “a crime of genocide” of which 
“the Young Turk government is guilty.” See: Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, A Crime of Silence: The 
Armenian Genocide (London: Zed Books, 1985), 218, 227.  
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in which it is stated: “Ben Kiernan and others have shown that the Buddhist, Vietnamese, and Muslim 
populations of Cambodia were not simply assimilated; they were massacred and tortured.” See: Travis, 





“heavy casualties” the local government was becoming “increasingly unable to 
administer their expanded zones;”305 that thousands of their troops are being bombarded 
to death;306 that many Cambodian refugees in Thailand were being “trained and financed 
by the CIA”;307 that the government is credited for an effective irrigation program that 
was designed to increase and modernize the living standards; and that the government’s 
“emphasis on hard work, sacrifice and asceticism” had caused some dismay.308 Kiernan’s 
switch from commending the government to condemning them as genocidal does not 
make his original detailed observations disappear, but the genocide discourse carries on 
as if they were never made.  
Thus, while three years later Kiernan explained his change of mind by stating that 
he was “wrong about an important aspect of Kampuchean communism” and that he was 
“late in realizing the extent of the tragedy in Kampuchea after 1975 and Pol Pot’s 
responsibility for it,”309 the details on which his original analysis was based were not 
negated by such a realization. Remarkably, the process through which Kiernan prepared 
public opinion for a genocide discourse regarding the Khmer Rouge government was 
similar to how this was constructed in the Armenian case through the works of 
Nalbandian and Hovannisian: first, the historical framework of genocide was laid out 
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without mention of genocide; then, when the term began to be used as the subject matter 
of sociologists, the combination of the historiographical framing and the sociological 
treatment made the usage of the term seem readily acceptable to the readership. This 
explains why even after his change of perspective Kiernan did not immediately use the 
label genocide, but toiled to construct a narrative that called attention to Pol Pot.310 After 
the work of framing history for a genocide accusation had been completed, the readers 
became mentally prepared for the use of “genocide” when future writers filled in the 
“genocide” blanks that were left by the historians. Following this, the history books 
would simply add the genocide characterization to the discourse that was designed for it. 
In the early days of the American discourse on “genocide” in Cambodia, Pol Pot 
was not the subject of focus that he later became through the work of scholars such as 
Kiernan. In 1977, the title of an American book carried the accusation of genocide 
against the Cambodian government, before it became popularly named Khmer Rouge in 
the West, but in this book Pol Pot was barely mentioned.311 Prior to the genocide 
scholarship’s mention of Pol Pot alongside Hitler’s name,312 the genocide discourse on 
Cambodia focused on the Angka Loeu, which meant “the Organization on High,” to 
                                                          
310 Kiernan, How. The absence of “genocide” in this work is conspicuous when considering the prominence 
of “genocide” in his future works. For instance, see: Ben Kiernan, Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and 
Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996); 
Ben Kiernan, Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, Denial and Justice in Cambodia 
and East Timor (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008). 
 
311 John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in 
Cambodia (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1977), 207-208. One possible explanation to this is that 
when the book was produced Pol Pot’s position as the leader was still precarious, and it would have made 
little sense to load the responsibility of the alleged genocide on him personally while it was possible that he 
would be replaced. When the book was published, Pol Pot had just returned to his leading position from a 
hiatus, and there was no reason to predict that he would lead the Khmer Rouge government until 1979. 
 






epitomize the machinery of a totalitarian state in Cambodia.313 By the 1980s, the 
genocide discourse about Cambodia united the genocide accusation with a systematic 
effort to publicize Pol Pot’s leadership in its perpetration.314 One symbol of how the 
American control of information on genocide had matured into a scholarly discourse was 
in the form of Leo Kuper’s Genocide, which not only supported the Armenian 
narrative,315 but embodied the transition of the genocide discourse from deflecting 
genocide accusations against the American involvement in bringing “destruction on the 
peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,”316 to claiming that genocide was committed by 
the Khmer Rouge government.317 
Simultaneously with the stabilization of the scholarly control on the genocide 
discourse, the public debate in the United States about ratifying the Genocide Convention 
was finally followed up by making the charge of genocide a matter of American law. In 
nearly forty years between one United States president’s request and another United 
States president’s signature, many publicized opinions were expressed and developments 
occurred in the movement toward ratification. In particular, the campaign for ratification 
was narrated as being a Jewish interest. When the Senate finally approved the legislation 
of the Genocide Convention, it was stated that “The treaty was drafted in reaction to the 
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314 For instance, see: William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern 
Conscience (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 33.  
 
315 Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1981), 101-117. Kuper stated that his discussion of the Armenian experience relies “appreciably” on 
the accounts that were produced by Bryce, and also referred to Lepsius and Morgenthau as sources. See: 
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Holocaust,”318 but not that the idea of genocide was created in Washington, DC, to 
criminalize Germany’s governance of Europe regardless of Jewish suffering. In the same 
vein, when United States President Ronald Reagan officially signed the ratification of the 
Genocide Convention on November 4, 1988, the ceremony was organized to show the 
ratification as a gesture to the Jewish people,319 as if to suggest that the signature was 
prompted by the moral plight of Jews rather than being timed according to the ripening of 
the conditions in which American power controlled the information on “genocide.”  
 
Conclusion 
By its essence and the circumstances that surrounded it, “genocide” was not ready 
for legal use upon arrival. It was an invented concept of a crime, and there was no 
international criminal court in which it could be applied. Furthermore, not only did its 
application require the willingness of nation-states to reconsider their sovereign status, 
but also its popularization showed itself as being intertwined with the politicization of 
group identities for the solidification certain claims against existing governments. Its 
mere existence promoted the idea of an international judicial involvement in the internal 
affairs of nation-states, and at the same time boosted the topicality of group identity in the 
context of political independence. Once it was removed from its original American 
design to criminalize Nazi Germany’s newly acquired territorial control in Europe, the 
                                                          
318 Irvin Molotsky, “Senate Votes to Carry Out Treaty Banning Genocide,” New York Times, October 15, 
1988. A similar viewpoint was offered in the report of the President’s Commission, stating that “The 
Genocide Convention itself was the outgrowth of the worldwide moral revulsion upon the revelation of the 
full enormity of the Holocaust.” See: Wiesel, Report, 16.  
 







information about “genocide” as a concept, and then as the subject of an international 
treaty, controlled the knowledge on the source of the term so that it could be effectively 
absorbed by the public as a reflection of humanity’s moral compass rather than 
considered an instrument of power. “Genocide” had to be believed before it could 
become instituted. Thus, it has been stated that the term genocide was created by a Polish 
lawyer whose Jewish identity was later accentuated, as if he—rather than great power—
was the central element in the promotion of the term in the United Nations.  
This chapter’s focus on American activity is not designed to question the 
legitimacy of the post-WWII international order, but rather to point at how the route of 
soft power necessitates a denial of being rooted in a particular source of hard power. 
Attention to how the discourse on “genocide” was carried out without recognition of its 
source of empowerment illustrates that this process is in keeping with the soft-power 
requirement to seek effectiveness through the semblance of no connection to its power 
source. Accordingly, the popularization of “genocide” was made to seem as if coming 
from an African American voice or through descriptions of Communist policies. In 
addition, the narration of the debate about the ratification of the Genocide Convention in 
the United States publicized skepticism regarding the term, which gave the appearance 
that the American political leadership was dissociated from the origination and promotion 
of the term genocide. This created a culture of popularizing “genocide” through bottom-
up imagery for the sake of effective language instillation among the general public. 
References to “genocide” did not meet standards of legal procedure and lacked 
accountability, but they had the effect of increasing the relatability of the term along with 





The overall theme of this chapter is that throughout the Cold War the popular 
discourse on “genocide” treated the term genocide as a tool for education rather 
adjudication, and it became susceptible to being used as an avenue for the advancement 
of narrow interests. Consequently, “genocide” was not only an effective concept for the 
advocacy of human rights but was also used for the instigation of conflict between 
groups. Just as it was originally created to utilize the carefully defined group identities as 
political barriers against any imperial growth in Europe, in the early days of the Cold War 
the genocide accusation was employed in the United States to inspire anti-Communist 
resistance among different identity groups that were politicized. This direction of the 
popular usage placed “genocide” in the common language, but made it seem more 
serviceable as a basis for international polemics rather than international criminal law. 
Without a stated authority or a clear link to legal performance, the popular usages of 
“genocide” made the discourse on international law amount to a collection of clashing 
interests involving the superpowers and newly cultivated national entities.  
Narrow and broad interests met and became interlaced in the discourse on the 
American war in Vietnam. In consideration of that experience, there was incentive to 
construct arguments for forceful interventions in civil wars, and the popular usage of 
“genocide” became associated with cases of civil war as one particularly potent argument 
that would justify hard-power measures by leaders of the international community in 
future situations such as the one in Indochina. Hence, while the United States was 
publicly criticized for aggression in its military offensive in the region, the soft-power 
effect of the genocide discourse following the war in Vietnam was that if the public is 





invite public support for campaigns that are similar to the one in Vietnam that was 
rebuked. This shift in the usage of “genocide” widened the gap between the legal 
definition of “genocide” and its popular usage. By placing the term genocide at the heart 
of political conflicts, the genocide discourse began to make claims that directly defied the 
agreement among nation-states that acts of political contestation, in which a 
government’s sovereignty is challenged, are not within the legal definition of genocide. 
In this context, the Armenian experience during the collapse of the Ottoman state in 
WWI—a case of a professed rebellion against a sovereign—became the main feature of 
scholarly work and popular usages of “genocide.”  
Correspondingly, the meaning of “genocide” became popularly associated with a 
case of civil war, and drifted further away from its legal definition. Although the 
Armenian popularization of the term helped to create a sustained general awareness of it 
in the public discourse, the nature of the information through which the Armenians came 
to treat the label of “genocide” as a core aspect of their identity is in tension with two 
critical elements of international law: international cooperation and legal procedure. 
Despite this, the narration of Armenian victimhood through the term genocide had served 
as the basis for the scholarly discourse on “genocide.” The maturation of this American-
controlled genocide scholarship, along with Germany’s successful graduation from its 
reeducation process and the ending of the Soviet threat, meant that the power of 
“genocide” was ready to aim at a legal capacity. As a result, the gap between soft power 
and legal power in the usages of “genocide” would gradually lessen yet become more 
pronounced. The term genocide began to be addressed in courts, but its meaning by that 





political conflict. A genocidized language of international crime had popularized the 
element of ethnonational identity among groups while the performance of international 
criminal law itself requires that nation-states would adopt a civic identity as a basis for 

























 TOWARD LEGAL POWER, 1989-2010s 
 
As it became apparent that the United States positioned itself as the only 
superpower in world politics, the term genocide was ready for being used by an unrivaled 
American capability to influence what it means. In keeping with this development, 
“genocide” became less about imperial conduct and more commonly used. By the end of 
the Cold War, the popular discourse about “genocide” directed the public discussion on 
the crime to focus on cases of contested sovereignties rather than the abuse of group 
identities by unchallenged state machinery. This shift was carried out even though it 
negates the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, which deliberately 
avoided the insertion of the political group as one of the groups that is protected by the 
international treaty. Seeing that the United States was becoming more dominant in the 
governance of affairs in other regions, the term genocide was adjusted to generate 
analyses that stress innerstate conditions in a simplistic dichotomous language of 
perpetrator and victim. After the experience in Vietnam, and in anticipation of further 
global involvement by the United States, “genocide” was subjected to a transformation 
through which it may be applied in the public discourse to the behavior of local rulers 
rather than be associated with American aggression in relation to that locality. 





and threatened to drag the legal performance of international law toward being subjected 
to influence by information that is itself a source of international conflict. While the term 
genocide acquired legal relevance following the ratification of the Genocide Convention 
in the United States, its usage has maintained informational allegiance to narrow interests 
at the expense of the broader vision of an international law that is informed by unified 
standards of governance. These conditions invite an assessment of how the popular 
usages of the term genocide might be exacting a loss of legal power on the institution of 
international law. The following sections show how the designed usability of “genocide” 
in a post-Cold War period of territorial reconfigurations has popularized the idea of 
criminality in international law but at the same time inspired violence and defied 
jurisprudence.      
 
“Genocide” against the Turkic People 
Without there being a Soviet agenda around the world, the territories that had 
been run under Russian influence were opened up for political reorganization. This 
feature of the international scene after the final chapter of the Cold War had been written 
was not a surprise. In general, the American development of “genocide” was such that the 
term would have a descriptive and prescriptive capacity in the anticipated hostilities 
between groups that came across new opportunities for self-governance. Groups that 
were effectively mobilized into a cohesive unit by information and organization in the 
years that preceded the dismantlement of the Soviet Union had an advantage over other 
people when the moment came for claiming land. Being a crime that is largely based on 





intergroup events that characterized the period. As a legally sanctioned crime, “genocide” 
depends on the assignment of group identity, but as a word that is utilized by controlled 
information, it has the ability to coalesce the identity of a group that is made to believe 
that it was victimized as such. In particular, the case of the Armenian preparedness for 
post-Soviet statehood and post-Cold War conquest is explained by the power of 
“genocide” over Armenian identity. In contrast to the impassioned Armenians, the 
Azerbaijanis were observed to have suffered from “low morale,” “desertion,” and “lack 
of discipline.”1 Since the post-WWII American agitation of its Armenians, and especially 
after “genocide” was placed as the centerpiece in the construction of Armenian identity, 
the deeply embedded belief about Armenian territory and Turkish injustice was a driving 
force when the Azerbaijani-controlled region that is commonly known by its Russo-
Turkic name, Nagorno-Karabakh, lost its Soviet arrangement. 
 The genocide discourse instilled in the Armenians a national fervor that readied 
them for efficient mobilization when the Soviet authority began to wane, but this is not 
revealed in the public narration of the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The events that started in 
February 1988 signaled both an Armenian preparedness to claim Nagorno-Karabakh, and 
a meticulous American use of language about it. Going by the narration in the NYT, “The 
force of nationalism” appears as if its confrontational quality is self-explanatory because 
of the religious difference between these two groups “in an ethnically volatile area.”2 In a 
retrospective work of American narration, it is stated that “the initial phase of the 
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Armenian campaign had been carefully planned well in advance,”3 but the text does not 
explain how the drive to claim Nagorno-Karabakh became a foundational element of 
Armenian identity in the first place. Similarly, during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, the 
Human Rights Watch report, which claimed in this instance to be Helsinki-based but is 
an offshoot of an American organization, suggested that “The genesis of the current war 
in Nagorno-Karabakh dates back to February 1988, when Armenians in Stepanakert, the 
capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, held demonstrations demanding Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
incorporation into Armenia.”4 The information that is readily available about the 
Armenian motivation does not convey knowledge about how power over the popular 
discourse guided Armenian conviction toward an assumption of ownership over 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Moreover, the limited information about this war has kept it from being 
considered publicly as a matter of offense against international law. Even though this act 
of conquest has led to the killing of tens of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands,5 and involved the capture of a territory that had been recognized 
internationally as being under the sovereign control of Azerbaijan since its independence 
of the Soviet Union,6 it has not been subjected to adjudication in an international court for 
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possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. While it was known that “many Azeris 
were killed by indiscriminate fire as they attempted to escape” Armenian forces,7 for 
some reason this information was channeled toward the label of a crisis rather than a 
crime. It might be claimed that international offenses do not apply in a case of civil war 
between Azerbaijan and its Armenians, but there has not been a thorough public debate 
or inquiry into the responsibility of states such as Armenia, or even the United States, for 
coordination or incitement. This serves as an indication that the road to an international 
court is paved by a popular discourse that directs the public toward support for the 
criminalization of international entities. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, such a public 
discourse would not have simply been in disharmony with the image of the Armenian in 
the Western media, but rather it would have contradicted the tremendous project that for 
years has dedicated information toward persuading Armenians that they are victims in a 
manner that emboldened them to perform this act of taking over land in the Caucasus.     
 The Armenians were agitated to claim Turkic land in both what had been 
popularized since WWI as “Eastern Armenia” and “Western Armenia.”8 Primarily, the 
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8 The popular depiction of what was considered Eastern and Western Armenia had changed over the years 
according to American interests and political circumstances in the region. For instance, an editorial in the 
NYT during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 stated that “The fall of Erzeroum gives to Russia the 
whole of Eastern Armenia.” See: “Editorial Article 6—No Title,” New York Times, November 8, 1877. 
What had been described as “Eastern Armenia” later became “Western Armenia.” This points at the 
politicization of the historical claims about the land of “Armenia.” During WWI, the American desire to 
see an Armenian state further East had shifted the concept of greater Armenia eastward. As part of an effort 
to establish an Armenian political barrier between the Russians and the Turks, the NYT described Baku as 
being in “Eastern Armenia.” See: “Importance of British Advent in Baku and Turkestan,” New York Times, 
August 18, 1918. Following WWI, the notion of “Western Armenia” in eastern Anatolia was narrated as 
rivaling “Kurdistan.” See: Arshag Mahdesian, “Armenians Complain of French,” New York Times, 
November 14, 1920. It does not seem plausible that both Erzurum and Baku are of “Eastern Armenia.” This 
indicates that the claims were subject to political conditioning. When the Russians dominated the Ottoman 
northeastern front, Erzurum was considered Eastern Armenia, yet when the political climate had changed 
dramatically in WWI, Erzurum became associated with Western Armenia and the discourse started to 






emphasis was on claiming Turkish land as Armenian. In 1945, Edwin S. Smith’s 
American Committee for Justice to the Armenians announced its insistence “that the 
Armenian provinces in Turkey, which constitute nine-tenths of historic Armenia, be 
incorporated within the Armenian Republic.”9 This focus on Turkey rather than 
Azerbaijan was more prominent as long as the Soviet Union was maintaining its strength. 
When Vahakn N. Dadrian’s two letters of agitation in 1964 were published in the NYT 
ahead of the first publicized commemoration of 1915 on April 24 in 1965, the focus was 
still on Turkey. Through Dadrian, the Armenian voice was narrated as asking “on what 
conceivable grounds can the Armenians be denied the right to reclaim their ancestral 
territories which Turkey absorbed after massacring their inhabitants?”10  
However, on a different platform of information, Richard G. Hovannisian’s work 
prepared minds toward anti-Turkic sentiment while preparing the historiographical 
ground for the genocide discourse in an academic publication. His text carefully placed 
aspects of injustice that were also directed against Azerbaijan. Hovannisian highlighted 
an Armenian sense of lost territory: he presented an Armenian “hope that the great 
Plateau from the Euphrates to Karabagh would once more be Armenian;”11 he argued that 
“the population of Zangezur and Mountainous Karabagh was predominantly Armenian 
and that it was unjust for Azerbaijan to claim the area.” 12 It is seen that before the 
Zoryan Institute was to become associated with vocalizing Armenian sentiment about the 
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past, it was through the power of a highly regarded American university press that the 
notion of “The Moslem masses of Baku … plundering and killing” thousands of 
Armenians13 reverberated among Armenians and became a formative anti-Turkic 
sentiment for a new generation of Armenians.14 Therefore, the power to co-opt the 
national identity of a group through the production of information has to be considered in 
relation to the steering of Armenians toward intense feelings of resentment and 
righteousness decades before the dissolution of the Soviet Union afforded them a chance 
to take combative action against Azerbaijan. This type of information continued to press 
on the Armenian mind during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, as exemplified by Robert 
Melson’s Revolution and Genocide, which engaged in the selective framing of comparing 
the Holocaust and the Armenian experience mainly by presenting both the Nazis and the 
Young Turks as members of revolutionary regimes.15 
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14 Not only was the book published by an American university, but Hovannisian was put in a position to 
function as a tenured professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, in continuation with the 
initiative that was started by Richard N. Frye and Robert Pierpont Blake. For a discussion of this here, see: 
Chapter 5, note 196. Also, Hovannisian’s work was given a favorable scholarly review, to elevate his status 
as a scholar in the public eye. A review of the work in an academic journal did not just praise it as 
“distinguished” for its “scholarly presentation and marshalling of objective data from all sources,” but even 
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loyalty felt by Armenians all over the world to their homeland, now constituted as the Armenian Soviet 
Socialist Republic.” See: David M. Lang, review of Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918, by 
Richard G. Hovannisian, The Russian Review 27, no. 3 (July 1968): 372. A separate work by Hovannisian 
also received favorable review by the same Lang in a German journal—post-Germany’s American 
reeducation—in which it was claimed that “Professor Hovannisian is the soundest of the Western scholars 
working in the field of modern Armenian history today.” See: David M. Lang, review of The Republic of 
Armenia, vol. 1, by Richard G. Hovannisian, Journal of Asian History 6, no. 2 (1972): 142. For another 
such review by this reputable scholar of Caucasian studies, see: David M. Lang, review of The Republic of 
Armenia, vol. 1, by Richard G. Hovannisian, The Middle East Journal 26, no. 2 (1972): 204-205. 
 
15 See: Robert F. Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the 
Holocaust (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 142-143, 172. In this work, Melson popularized 
the notion that the attempt to explain what happened to the Armenians by pointing at the threat that they 
posed to the Ottoman government is a “provocation thesis.” See: Ibid., 10. Melson related this “thesis” to 
Bernard Lewis’ perspective on the suffering of the Armenians in WWI, and in the process Lewis’ work is 
falsely represented. In a rhetorical manipulation, Melson suggested that “Lewis is appalled that once 





 Within the information that is presented before Armenians about their past, the 
decontextualized focus on the term Pan-Turanian is primary in the unification of 
Azerbaijanis and Turks as villainous in the Armenian mind. The term’s first appearance 
in the NYT was in a letter to the editor by “a student of Near Eastern Affairs” who 
remained nameless, in which it was claimed that “The Turks wanted these districts in 
order to obliterate Armenia, which separates Anatolia from the Caucasus, so that, in 
pursuance of their Pan-Turanian policy, they may be able to effect immediate junction 
with the Turks and the Tartars of the Caucasus, who number about 5,000,000 or about 
1,000,000 more than the Turks in Turkey.”16 Strangely, this supposedly random letter by 
a student inspired an influx of articles in the NYT that ascribed to the Ottoman 
government under CUP an adherence to a previously unmentioned Pan-Turanian policy, 
and these articles did not express recognition that the term was first used in that letter.17 
                                                          
This wording is misleading because Lewis did not characterize the event as “genocide.” In addition, 
Melson interpreted Lewis’ reference to a “holocaust” as “a clear allusion to the Final Solution.” See: Ibid. 
Melson wrote this even though Lewis’ text was published before the word Holocaust became popularly 
used to describe the Jewish suffering under Nazi rule in WWII. When Lewis used the term, it was 
commonly used to describe a variety of catastrophes in nongenocidal contexts. For a discussion here of 
when the word Holocaust began to be used in the Jewish context, see: Chapter 5, note 292. Melson 
authored the book as Robert F. Melson, but in his later works the name appears without the middle initial. 
 
16 “Germany in the Caucasus,” New York Times, March 9, 1918. It is here considered that the introduction 
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making the development of the term’s usage appear as a bottom-up process, as if in reflection of public 
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17 For instance, see: “Turks and Crimean Tatars,” New York Times, March 27, 1918; “Kill 1,000 Baku 
Tartars,” New York Times, April 21, 1918; “Japan and China in New Alliance,” New York Times, May 19, 
1918; “New Ideas in Turkey,” New York Times, July 31, 1918; “Old Roads of Empire,” New York Times, 
September 8, 1918. In the last two sources, it was suggested that this Pan-Turanian policy was “fostered by 
the Germans after Pan Islamism failed to unite Mohammedans,” and that it was an “imitation of Pan 
Germanism.” Following Germany’s official defeat and the conclusion of WWI, the association in the 
public discourse of Pan-Turanianism with Germany shifted to an association of Pan-Turanianism with 
Bolshevik ambitions as a challenge to Anglo-American interests. It was claimed that the ability of the “Pan 
Turanian movement” to undermine Britain’s influence on the Muslims within its empire might put the 
Bolshevik government in position to “threaten British control in Mesopotamia and India.” See: “The Open 






The idea that this was a foundational CUP policy later became popularly used by the 
genocide scholarship as part of its commitment to label the Armenian suffering in WWI 
as genocide, again without recognizing the informational source of this discourse.18 The 
genocide scholarship’s many references to a Pan-Turanian program—as if it preexisted 
the wartime decision to exile the Armenians—is in tension with the knowledge that Pan-
Turanianism was only ascribed to CUP since 1918, when considerations of the war’s 
aftermath provided incentive for American information to lead the public into supporting 
an Armenian state out of concern that a Pan-Turkic union with a great power such as 
Germany or Russia might challenge Anglo-American interests in Asia. It follows the 
angle that was pursued by the NYT post-WWI, in which it was suddenly argued that 
“Pan-Turanian propaganda” began in 1908.19 In connection to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
War, the discourse developed a belief that “Pan-Turkism took root among many educated 
Azerbaijanis in the late 1870s.”20 
In 1918, there was a renewed effort in the United States to vilify the Turks, and 
the references to a Pan-Turanian policy were a feature of this new batch of anti-Turkish 
literature. In this context, a former United States ambassador to Germany stressed that the 
Armenian is an “Aryan,” and that the Armenian nation has been serving the American 
faith and civilization.21 This harked back to the pre-WWI idea of a civilizational criterion 
                                                          
18 For example, see: Milivojević, review of Armenian, 306; Bauer, “Essay,” 215; Dadrian, “Secret,” 196; 
Bauer, review of History, 333; Levene, “Creating,” 404, 408; Fein, “Genocide,” 52; Feinstein, review of 
Ambassador, 293; Payaslian, “Destruction,” 155; Melson, “Recent,” 314.  
 
19 W. D. P. Bliss, “Pan-Turanian Movement Menaces Central Asia,” New York Times, March 14, 1920.  
 
20 Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1998), 8.  
 






for the advancement of international law, as it articulated that “Armenians are the only 
people capable of self-government and of representing us in that land.”22 The text 
described a “pan-Turanian peril” in a manner that invited the public to support an 
American-mandated Armenian state, which would have enabled the United States to 
exert greater influence in the region.23 By describing the Pan-Turanian union as a 
menace, the sense of threat was enhanced.24  
It was also in 1918 that the former United States ambassador to the Ottoman 
Empire, Henry Morgenthau, began to contribute to the anti-Turkish literature by 
publishing an article ahead of the publication of his book. Having in mind that 
Morgenthau had left his post as ambassador in 1916, it is peculiar that over a year had 
passed before he began to publish material on what was seemingly an urgent matter of 
moral concern. However, this notion of peculiarity dissipates if his writings are explained 
as having a carefully timed political purpose rather than as an articulation of worry on 
behalf of the Armenian people’s well-being. In similar fashion, the Wilsonian favoring of 
an Armenian state in the Caucasus—with a port in Trabzon—and the fading of it, may be 
better explained by power considerations in international politics rather than by a sense of 
what would be justice to the Armenians.25 As a result, in the information that enthused 





24 For instance, see: “Importance,” New York Times; “Why Armenia Must Be Free,” New York Times, 
December 23, 1919; “Pan-Turanian,” New York Times. 
 
25 In the NYT, “the problem of Bolshevism” in the Caucasus was stressed because “in Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and in Persia, the Russians have been making considerable headway, not only with propaganda but by force 
of arms.” See: Edwin L. James, “President Agrees to Fix Boundaries of New Armenia,” New York Times, 






Armenians about territorial claims in the decades prior to the Nagorno-Karabakh War, 
there was no recognition that the Wilsonian “Greater Armenia” was only advertised as 
workable at the time if it were to be administered under an American mandate for 
American purposes, but not otherwise.26 
The use of “genocide” in the narration of the Armenian past epitomizes how the 
shaping of Armenian memory is defined by political utility rather than historical 
accuracy. In reaction to the framing of the popular discourse on “genocide” in WWI, 
Armenians were directed to build their collective identity on feelings of injustice. 
Armenians were led to believe that the Turkic people have not been adequately punished 
for past events, and that in these events the Armenians lost land without getting it back. 
This sense that matters that lie at the heart of the modern Armenian identity have been 
left politically unresolved was like a call for action. The connection between the genocide 
discourse and Armenian violence against the Turkic people is apparent yet without 
critical development. It has been suggested that Armenians started to engage in terrorism 
                                                          
26 The support for this idea was qualified in the NYT by the recognition that “President Wilson’s arbitration 
of the Armenian frontiers, without the assumption of a mandate for Armenia by America, would probably 
prove a futile undertaking,” and an Armenian autonomy in Turkic territory would only have had a chance 
to work as a solution to what the Americans portrayed as a Bolshevik problem if “it would be America who 
would maintain the boundaries Mr. Wilson would lay out.” See: “Paris Hopes America Will Take 
Mandate,” New York Times, May 27, 1920. Despite being only removed a few years from the losses of 
many Armenian lives, Gerard maintained the same prewar mentality about using Armenians as a political 
barrier and insisted that “We need have no worry about the ability of the Armenians to take care of 
themselves, once they are organized.” See: Gerard, “Why,” New York Times. He then added that “should 
Armenia be attacked from without, it becomes the duty of the League of Nations to take joint defensive 
steps.” See: Ibid. Even though the execution of this idea post-WWI was reliant on the interests and 
capabilities of great powers, there is in existence a narration of a glorious Armenian history that includes 
the belief that great possession of land had been enjoyed by Armenians in the past and bases modern-day 
aspirations on it. For example, it is claimed that “Armenia also was a powerful empire for a brief time in 
the first century B.C.” See: Mark Malkasian, “Gha-ra-bagh!”: The Emergence of the National Democratic 
Movement in Armenia (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996), 7. Armenians had become convinced 
that from their national perspective the conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh meant fulfilment, as in the 
following statement: “The great dream of generations of Armenians came true in 1991.” See: Stephen 






against Turkish officials in the 1970s because they were “Outraged over the alleged 
genocide,”27 and that “the force behind the first wave of Armenian attacks against Turks 
in this century” was “Revenge for the events of 1915.”28 However, even the texts that 
recognize this have the effect of adding more attention to the lore of Armenian 
commitment to retribution, and further tighten the framing of modern Armenian history 
around 1915.29 During the time of Armenian terrorism, the NYT continued to publish 
material in which antagonistic sentiment was rationalized, such as a letter by the 
chairman of the Armenian National Committee, Eastern Region (Boston), in which it was 
said on behalf of “all Armenians” that they were outraged by “the policies of the present 
Turkish Government: its denial of the genocide, its continued occupation of western 
Armenian, its harassment of Armenians in Turkey and abroad and its refusal to even 
discuss any peaceful resolution of the Armenian question.”30 
In the popularization of Armenian victimhood through the genocide label there 
                                                          
27 Michael M. Gunter, “Pursuing the Just Case of Their People”: A Study of Contemporary Armenian 
Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 1. Gunter adds that “In reference to the massacres of 
Armenians by the Turks in 1915, one of the gunmen yelled, as he fired at his victims: ‘More than a million 
of us died! What’s the difference if 25 of you die?’” See: Ibid., 4.  
 
28 Francis P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1991), 21. 
 
29 In the two works listed in the two previous notes, there was a rehashing of Armenian modern history 
through this prism. For instance, in Gunter’s work it is stated that “No matter what the Turkish apologists 
argue, the fact remains that the Turkish Armenians virtually ceased to exist in their ancient homeland after 
World War I.” See: Gunter, “Pursuing,” 21. Similarly, Hyland emphasized that “On key points, however, 
there is little doubt—hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished in 1915,” adding that “Adult men were 
systematically rounded up, marched off, and murdered.” See: Hyland, Armenian, 19. In Hyland’s work, the 
text also adds to the ethos about April 24 being a date of significance, stating that it is “commemorated 
with great sadness each year by Armenians worldwide in memory of the events of 1915,” without noting 
that this ceremonial function was unprecedented until 1965 and was largely affected by American agitation. 
See: Ibid., 15.  
 
30 Aram Kailian, “The Roots of Armenian Violence,” New York Times, August 27, 1983. Such literature 
carries itself as if in representation of Armenian sentiment, but it cannot be assumed that the NYT publishes 






was much to spur Armenian aggression against the Turkic people. However, instead of 
examining how Armenian consciousness is affected by the popular discourse on 
“genocide,” it is argued that “The history of genocide and the failure of larger powers to 
abide by their promises and commitments are part of the consciousness of Armenians in 
Karabagh and elsewhere.”31 Meaning, the effect of the discourse has penetrated the 
language about Armenian identity to the extent that the popular use of “genocide” is 
assumed to be internal to the Armenian consciousness rather than be questioned as a 
subject of foreign influence on the collective consciousness. Both Armenian terrorism 
against Turks and Armenian conquest of Azerbaijan’s land have been described in the 
dominant discourse as “ethnic violence,”32 which falsely suggests that the conflict is 
caused by distinct differences that are inherent to the groups themselves. This depiction 
not only perpetuate the conflict by generating belief that it is natural to the identities of 
the groups, but it also conceals the role of the information that persuades a group such as 
the Armenian people that their collective identity is intertwined with revanchism.33 
Nagorno-Karabakh has been described over a dozen times in the NYT as an “ethnic 
Armenian enclave.”34 Furthermore, in a period of over seventeen years, between May 11, 
                                                          
31 Levon Chorbajian, introduction to The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh: From Secession to Republic, ed. 
Levon Chorbajian (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 25. 
 
32 Compare: Ibid., 1; Felicity Barringer, “28 Reported Killed in 2 Weeks in Strife in Soviet Caucasus 
Region,” New York Times, December 1, 1988. 
 
33 Hovannisian, with his name misspelled in one article, was used by the NYT to voice Armenian sentiment 
that Nagorno-Karabakh “was already a source of dispute when the two republics enjoyed a brief period of 
independence from 1918 to 1920.” See: Felicity Barringer, “A Dispute with Religious Overtones,” New 
York Times, February 24, 1988. This gave an impression that the conflict has a measure of inevitability.    
 
34 The phrase is found in the following articles: Serge Schmemann, “Rival Factions in Georgia Raise Level 
of Clashes,” New York Times, December 24, 1991; Steven Erlanger, “Yeltsin Says U.S. Seeks Arms Pact 
Assuring an Edge,” New York Times, June 11, 1992; “Armenia Captures Strategic Sites in Battle Over 
Caucasus Enclaves,” New York Times, April 12, 1993; “Azerbaijan Holds Plebiscite on Army Ouster of 





1992, and December 22, 2011, there was not a single title of an item in the NYT that 
featured the name “Nagorno-Karabakh.”35 In the same vein, even when the developments 
in Nagorno-Karabakh were fresh, AJIL neglected to address the legal meaning of the 
occupation.36 There was no substantial or lasting public discourse in the West about the 
case of Nagorno-Karabakh as a failure to make international law relevant. The popular 
discourse in the West is not only biased against the Turkic people in their dealings with 
the Armenians, but it has harnessed the soft power of “genocide” to mobilize the 
Armenians against the Turkic people. Without there being an authority behind 
international law, there is no accountability for the information that affects international 
                                                          
December 6, 1994; Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Sending Envoys to Seek Peace in Armenian-Held Region,” 
New York Times, March 14, 1996; “News Summary,” New York Times, April 27, 1998; “Incumbent Is 
Expected to Win Vote in Azerbaijan,” New York Times, October 11, 1998; “Mr. Bush’s Caspian 
Diplomacy,” New York Times, April 16, 2001; Paul Lewis, “H.A. Aliyev, K.G.B. Officer and Azeri Leader, 
80, Dies,” New York Times, December 13, 2003; C. J. Chivers, “Hopeful Signs Appear in Solving a Post-
Soviet Impasse,” New York Times, February 2, 2006; Katrin Bennhold, “Armenia and Azerbaijan Remain 
Stalled in Talks,” New York Times, February 12, 2006; Andrew Kramer, “Armenia to Get a Discount on 
Russian Natural Gas,” New York Times, April 7, 2006; Ellen Barry, “‘Frozen Conflict’ Between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia Begins to Boil,” New York Times, June 1, 2011. A search of the NYT ProQuest archival 
database yielded no results for “ethnic African enclave” in any context. Even though Jackson, Mississippi, 
is a geographical location in which around 80% of the population is of African heritage, a percentage that is 
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NYT has not commonly referred to it as an “ethnic African enclave.” This suggests that the ethnic situation 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is ethnically similar to that in Jackson, Mississippi, is not itself by necessity a 
cause of intergroup strife, and much of the turmoil is affected by the language that is used to describe the 
situation and prescribe the political inclinations of groups, especially by prominent agents of information. 
As late as February, 2016, the Oxford English Dictionary online defined Nagorno-Karabakh as ethnically 
Armenian. This definition was mentioned by me at the 36th Annual Turkish American National Leadership 
Conference on February 26, 2016. My point was that two major institutions of Anglo-American 
information were leading the public to believe that the land is ethnically Armenian. However, going by a 
search on December 6, 2016, the Oxford English Dictionary online no longer defines Nagorno-Karabakh as 
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35 This period is marked by the time between the following two items: “Fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh,” 
New York Times, May 11, 1992; Robert Avetisyan, “Life in Nagorno-Karabakh,” letter to the editor, New 
York Times, December 22, 2011. The publication of the letter was a platform for a representative of the 
Armenian government in Nagorno-Karabakh to further solidify what is widely believed to be the position 
of Armenians regarding the conflict.    
 
36 The sense that there has been a neglect is supported by the knowledge that AJIL did in the past raise 
questions about the legality of occupation. For instance, see: Ernest J. Schuster, “The Question as to the 






law, and there is no rule of law through which the legal procedure may be safeguarded 
from being subjected to the power behind the popular discourse. 
 
The Advent of “Ethnic Cleansing” 
Azerbaijani losses of life and land were not described in the popular discourse as 
violations of international law that require urgent action by the international community, 
but the wording that was used to describe the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh prepared the 
ground for the terminology that served as the bridge between the popular language and 
international law. The insertion of the phrase “ethnic violence” into the popular reports 
had gradually trained the public to develop an uncritical acceptance of the notion that 
civil wars were based on cultural differences despite their political stakes.37 Thus, when 
David J. Scheffer, who had been employed by the United States government in the 1990s 
to work on the design and execution of policies regarding international criminal law,38 
declared in Foreign Policy—a popular magazine on international politics that is 
published by CEIP—that “A dominant feature of the post-Cold War years has been the 
perpetuation of atrocities during times of war, ethnic violence, and social upheaval,”39 his 
framing of the events in ethnic terms had a high degree of believability among readers. 
He then proceeded to connect the phenomenon to an observation that “genocide has 
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“News Summary and Index,” New York Times, July 25, 1967. However, this was the only use of the phrase 
in the 1960s, before being used nine times in the 1970s, climbing to 131 mentions in the 1980s, and 
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become a growth industry.”40 In other words, the prevalence of references to “ethnic 
violence” in the description of wars has given a convincing background for the assertion 
that the crime of genocide had become rampant. Alert readers who were mindful that 
these developments were happening soon after the United States had ratified the 
Genocide Convention may have sensed that Scheffer expected them either to have 
forgotten about the timing of the American ratification or to suppose that the sequencing 
of genocide ratification in the United States and genocide occurrences internationally are 
merely coincidental. Scheffer’s aim was to describe a flooding of “serious violations of 
international humanitarian law” to make the case that “A permanent court with 
jurisdiction over” such offenses “is needed and should be created.”41 A natural argument 
for favoring the establishment of an international criminal court, which was suggested to 
member states of the United Nations shortly after Scheffer’s article, and not without his 
involvement, is that an international crime such as genocide is being committed.  
 Before the term genocide was to be used flexibly in international tribunals, the 
legal definition of “genocide” had already become adjustable by American efforts. Those 
who wanted to make “genocide” usable in trials needed to draw a connection in public 
consciousness between international events and international crime. The efforts to 
effectively change the meaning of “genocide” despite the wording of the Genocide 
Convention had begun during the Cold War,42 but they only reached the capacity of legal 
impact after the United States officially had become a party to the treaty at the Cold 
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War’s end. In a work that immediately followed the American ratification and has been 
thoroughly promoted by the budding genocide scholarship, the practice of altering the 
meaning of an international agreement, and doing so in the guise of social science,43 
received a major boost. In 1990, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn did not just present a 
competing version of the phenomenon that they allegedly sought to study, but they turned 
the practice of doing so into a phenomenon unto itself,44 thereby rationalizing, 
legitimizing, and promoting it. Instead of showing these alternative genocide definitions 
as defiance of a written, signed, and ratified international contract between many state 
parties, a prestigious academic publication—Yale University Press published the book by 
Chalk and Jonassohn—essentially glorified the dismissal of a significant international 
document’s wording.45 
Hence, the applicability of the Genocide Convention from paper to procedure 
became subjected to an extrajudicial influence. In facilitation of bringing “genocide” to 
international trials, Chalk and Jonassohn changed the definition of genocide into “a form 
                                                          
43 In parallel to the project of changing the definition of genocide through academic literature, Ann-Marie 
Slaughter led a campaign to transfer more power to political science in the study of international law. She 
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of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as 
that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.”46 This changed the 
meaning of “genocide” in four main ways: “one-sided” warfare was introduced as an act 
of genocide; “state or other authority” replaced “persons” in the designation of 
perpetrator; “a group” supplanted the particular groups that are listed as protected 
victims; and the group identity—though it does not seem to matter much in this 
definition—became subject to determination by the perpetrator’s definition of the victim 
group. Meaning, through the definition by Chalk and Jonassohn, “genocide” was being 
shaped to fit civil wars in which the groups are divided by cultural traits and one party 
emerges as dominant.47 This definition enhances the ability to convict state actors in 
international law because even if the violence is over political control, any group may be 
considered a victim of genocide as long as it is perceived as a group by the perpetrator. 
 Chalk and Jonassohn added that they had decided against “the utility of coining a 
new term,”48 but the public discourse within which they were operating did proceed to do 
just that. While the work of the genocide scholarship brought public opinion closer to 
accepting a different definition of genocide, the NYT and other American means of 
influencing the discourse popularized a new term that would serve a purpose of 
terminological transition from the language of media reports to the language of 
international crime that is symbolized by “genocide.” For the advancement of 
international law by way of an international criminal court, “genocide” was to be utilized 
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47 For example, the expression “one-sided,” which Chalk and Jonassohn sought to associate with 
“genocide,” was later used in the language that the NYT employed in its description of the war in the former 







for promotional value both because and despite its aura as a rare and ultimate crime. The 
gap between the political nature of civil wars, which by their definition are caused by an 
innerstate conflict over governance, and the legal definition of genocide was narrowed by 
manipulations of the term’s meaning, but was to be filled by the use of a new term: 
“ethnic cleansing.” 
 Bosnian Muslims were the victims whose narration as such would acquaint the 
public with the concept of “ethnic cleansing.” Two editorials in the NYT familiarized the 
term by placing it within the discussion of the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.49 Then, 
on May 30, 1992, the correspondent Chuck Sudetic reported that Serbian forces were 
“expelling thousands of Muslim Slavs,” and he made the claim that this is what “they call 
‘ethnic cleansing’ operations.”50 This was the first suggestion that the term was 
authentically Serbian. Following this, Thomas L. Friedman contributed to the promotion 
of the term by incorporating it into his vocabulary.51 The status of the term was then 
elevated by the claim that the subjection of a community to it is “reminiscent of the 
Nazis.”52 The term was made more graphic by a report that 50,000 people died for 
“‘ethnic cleansing’ operations.”53 When the term made its first appearance in a title of an 
article in the NYT on August 2, it was mentioned more than once in this one item, and 
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described as a policy whose etymological origin comes from “the Serbs of Bosnia.”54 
Finally, on August 23, there was a first attempt by the NYT to treat the term as a 
phenomenon, by including a dash and an explanation of what the term means: “the 
Serbian practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’—driving Muslims and Croats out of communities 
where their people had lived for decades, even centuries.”55 In this fashion, “ethnic 
cleansing” penetrated public consciousness while the narration claimed that the term was 
derived from authentic usage by the local assailants in the scene of the violence.  
 However, it is found that when “ethnic cleansing” first appeared in the NYT the 
term seemed to be used casually in the words of an unnamed “Western diplomat,” who 
was quoted as saying regarding the condition of the “Muslim Slav populations” that 
“There is a lot of ethnic cleansing going on’.”56 This peculiarity of the report is even 
more pronounced because the reporter is Sudetic, the same one who would later claim 
that the term had a local origin and do so without recognizing his previously 
contradictory report. Moreover, it was Sudetic who in another article related the term to 
yet another source. In this version of the term’s usage, it was in the words of the 
“residents” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were said to “talk fearfully of a final attack 
and of campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’.”57 In yet another competing version of who was 
using the term before it became a phenomenon, Barbara Crossette’s report ascribed 
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“ethnic cleansing” to the rhetoric of the Bosnian foreign minister, Haris Silajdzic.58 It is 
strange and significant that the information in the NYT designated the Serbians as the 
source of “ethnic cleansing” after it had already published articles in which it was being 
used by other sources, and it is especially odd that the first source was not even local. It 
could have been claimed that the term was simply translated without making it known at 
first how the “Western diplomat” came to use it, but the suggestion that the term was 
translated so consistently by different reporters of the NYT and adopted by the editors 
without design would have still been hard to believe. Even this incredible claim has not 
been made and the newspaper has not recognized these contradictions about the initial 
introduction of “ethnic cleansing.”  
 The scholarly works that have attempted to put “ethnic cleansing” into analytic 
and historical perspective did not shed much light on the circumstances in which the term 
came into being, and are even found to be misleading. Norman N. Naimark wrote about 
“ethnic cleansing” that “This term exploded into our consciousness in May 1992 during 
the first stage of the war in Bosnia.”59 The reference to an explosion does not reveal the 
source of its origin, and the time reference fails to note that Sudetic’s report introduced 
the term in April. His note directs readers to a work that does not disclose information on 
any decision-making regarding the introduction of the term, but instead uses a passive 
verb to describe the origination: “Then, in May, a new term entered the international 
political vocabulary.”60 This form of grammar and the same verb that does not identify an 
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actor behind an action is adopted in another work in this context: “It soon entered the 
standard vocabulary of the English and other languages.”61 Even though the term came to 
have its influence in English, it is still maintained that “ethnic cleansing” had “its origin 
in the language of the perpetrators.”62 Similarly, in another scholarly work the 
grammatical formation of the sentence suggests that the contribution of the new term was 
done by the war itself.63 Therefore, “ethnic cleansing” became a term that was utilized as 
soft power in the advancement of international law, and the absence of clear reference to 
its origin had the effect of narrating a lack of design behind its usage. This contributed to 
the creation of a perception that in matters of international crime, the language is 
reflective of reaction to events rather than their direction. 
 Nonetheless, it is within the framework of this work to inquire into how the use of 
“ethnic cleansing” has rendered international law exposed to soft power. In consideration 
of the attempts in the genocide discourse to treat the persecution of political groups as 
genocidal—despite the absence of the political group from the list of protected groups in 
the Genocide Convention, and in denial of the blatant tension with the idea of sovereignty 
that such a definition of genocide presents—it is seen that “ethnic cleansing” functions as 
a nonlegal vehicle for effective accusations that genocide is committed against political 
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groups. This effectivity has been demonstrated in the transition of information about 
“ethnic cleansing” to court convictions of genocide. The conflation of “genocide” and 
“ethnic cleansing” is executed in influential academic articles that define a discursive 
reality, which then affects the language that is used by judges in trials. John Webb’s 
article in 1993 is particularly instructive of this phenomenon. The title of his work brings 
“genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” together, and his argument relies on the assumption of 
“ethnic violence,” which is corroborated by the language in the popular media. His 
explanation of “what has become known as ‘ethnic cleansing’”64—again, a passive form 
of grammar is used to describe the origin of the term—relies on the claim that in the case 
of former Yugoslavia “ethnic violence erupted into civil war.”65 Once it is established in 
the information that the groups that are persecuted are identified as ethnic, the political 
context fades from public consciousness, and the argument about “genocide” acquires a 
much more convincing quality. Thus, Webb posited that “The alleged incidents of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in the former Yugoslavia would provide the ideal working model for 
application of article II of the Genocide Convention.”66 It is illuminating to examine how 
he words his coupling of “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide”: 
The following indispensable elements of article II are present in the situation in 
the former Yugoslavia and should be explored in a judicial proceeding: (1) an 
established identifiable national, ethnic, racial or religious group as the victim; (2) 
an intent to destroy the group or groups in whole or in part; and (3) identifiable 
acts in conjunction with the intent to destroy the identified group victim.67 
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Webb left out a critical aspect of article 2 in the Genocide Convention: the destruction of 
the group “as such.” These two words constitute a significant difference, which Webb 
ignored, between “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide.” Their concealment is the basis for 
the consolidation of the two terms. Even if the soft-power measures manage to persuade 
the public that the violence is between distinct ethnic groups, the intent to destroy was on 
account of the political conflict between them and not based on their separate ethnic 
identity. When this difference is heeded, that which is presented as “ethnic cleansing” 
cannot count as “genocide,” but Webb omitted this differentiation.  
 The effect of “ethnic cleansing” in the discourse is to establish a preparedness to 
consider civil war in terms of intergroup strife that is based on group identities that are 
mentioned in the Genocide Convention, and then once there is mental acceptance of the 
events’ narration in genocidal terms, the final argument is that even in the midst of 
politically driven violence against a group, the treatment of noncombative civilians 
within the group is possibly a matter of genocide. This is displayed in the following 
statement by Webb: 
When the acts focus on the identified civilian group, then the charge of genocide 
is appropriate. Thus where the facts are clear, that “ethnic cleansing” is directed at 
a civilian population within one of the described groups, ulterior motives such as 
political or territorial gain should not form an appropriate defense to the charge of 
genocide.68  
 
In other words, the report that “ethnic cleansing” is occurring was a soft-power act of 
bypassing the restrictive language of the Genocide Convention upon which the member 
states of the United Nations had agreed. It was made possible to claim that the 
persecution of civilian members of an ethnic group in a political conflict—which 
                                                          






ordinarily would make the group a political one for all intents and purposes—is genocidal 
and subject to a criminal charge of genocide in an international trial. As a result, cases of 
violence that is instigated by political contestation have been inducted into the scope of 
“genocide.” 
 Webb’s effort is fortified in other works, which articulate ideas to convert the 
popularity of the term into a greater impact in international law. Soon after the advent of 
the “ethnic cleansing,” Drazen Petrovic argued that it “should not be limited to the 
specific case of former Yugoslavia,”69 and that it should find broader usability because it 
“fundamentally represents a violation of human rights and international humanitarian 
law.”70 According to Damir Mirković, the term “overlaps” with “genocide,” and he 
phrased this poignantly in his mention of a “genocidal policy of ethnic cleansing” as a 
phenomenon.71 Over a decade removed from the advent of the term, Michael Mann 
connected it to the main project of the genocide scholarship, the Ottoman government’s 
treatment of its Armenians during WWI. He put forth the argument that the Armenians 
did not constitute the political threat that the Ottomans supposed they did, and through 
this example the desired gray area between ethnic cleansing and genocide is achieved.72 
These uses of “ethnic cleansing” point at a discursive utility that makes the origin of the 
term better explained by informational design than happenstance. 
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 As the Yugoslavian case shows, once “ethnic cleansing” serves the purpose of 
leading public opinion to see the conflict in ethnic, immoral, and systematic terms—even 
if the intent of the perpetrators is markedly over political control of territory rather than 
destruction of an ethnic group in whole or in part—the information can then point at 
“ethnic cleansing” as inadequate to create a sense of a legal void that is to be filled by the 
application of “genocide.” In the scholarly information on ethnic cleansing that offers a 
retrospective view of the Bosnian victimhood, it has been suggested that “ethnic 
cleansing” is “a euphemism for genocide.”73 Thus, “ethnic cleansing” is lifted up for an 
informational purpose, and then lowered down for the criminalization of actions in civil 
war as genocide. Uninhibited by the requirement to prove the “intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,” the term functions as a 
rhetorical carrier of “facts” to the legal destination of a genocide charge.74 It establishes a 
discursive genocidal context in ways that the legal definition of genocide does not permit 
“genocide” itself to do, considering that intent can only be established after facts are 
collected and examined and not before or during the fact-gathering process.  
 The judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in The Prosecutor v. Radislav Kristić amounted to a conviction of genocide in 
consideration of events in Srebrenica, and it illustrates how the popularity of “ethnic 
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cleansing” in the discourse gave the events a genocidal context. In the matter of “the 
attack of the Serbian forces on the town of Srebrenica in July 1995,”75 it was found that 
the Serbian General Radislav Kristić was “guilty of genocide” for his role in “the plan to 
conduct mass executions of all the men of fighting age” in the town.76 Even though in 
this civil-war battle not all the men of fighting age were killed; the attack occurred after 
children, women, and the elderly were transferred away; and negotiations were held in 
the midst of the fighting,77 the judgment was that genocide had been committed. The 
decision disregarded the absence of intent to destroy the group as such, and instead 
constructed a genocide conviction with “ethnic cleansing” at the foundation of its 
narration. It was argued that “a decision was first taken to carry out ‘ethnic cleansing’ of 
the Srebrenica enclave,” and that “what was ethnic cleansing became genocide.”78 The 
idea that ethnic cleansing may transition into genocide is not inspired by the Genocide 
Convention but by the popular information on the events. The judgment’s reasoning is 
foreign to the document upon which member states of the United Nations agreed to 
criminalize genocide. Significantly, it is stated by the judges that they were “unable to 
clarify” the “reasons” for the killing. This is tantamount to saying that they could not 
identify the intent of the attackers. Moreover, the judgment expressed an unevenness by 
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Genocide at the ICTY and Is Sentenced to 46 Years Imprisonment” (Press Release, issued by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, of the United Nations, The Hague, August 2, 
2001), 2, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/tjug/en/010802_Krstic_summary_en.pdf (accessed, 
12/21/2016).  
 
76 Ibid., 10.  
 
77 Ibid., 6-7. 
 






declaring a lack of choice regarding the sparing of lives as falling within the definition of 
genocide rather than considering the lack of choice as an indication that there was no 
intent to destroy the group as such because the killing was conditioned by the fight for 
political control over the territory.79 As a result of the status that information sources such 
as the NYT had given “ethnic cleansing” prior to the establishment of the ICTY, the 
decision in this particular trial was not perceived as being in discord with the Genocide 
Convention.    
In view of this decision, the impression is that the popular description of the 
events, as disseminated through scholarly articles and in the press, has affected the 
judicial execution of international law. The judges who were expected to perform a legal 
interpretation of the Genocide Convention in the context of the events had become 
affected in their capacity to do so by soft power, and interpreted the law according to the 
direction set by this information. The influence of information did not just impact the 
decision, but it was also crucial in controlling public opinion in reaction to it. Hence, the 
genocide scholarship was inclined to keep the consensus view from questioning the 
application of genocide by claiming that the opposite is possibly true and suggesting that 
the ICTY generally exercised leniency in its treatment of Serbian perpetrators.80 The 
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commentary on the performance of the judges is influential as it seeks to narrate the 
progress of international law, and impose a certain perception of it. Not wanting to call 
attention to its own power, the leading information on the progress of international law 
congratulated such a decision for its “soft power,” which is stated to be derived from the 
judges’ “perceived legitimacy as guardians of justice and accountability in much of the 
international community.”81 While the dominant information might create an assumption 
that a tribunal such as the ICTY has soft power, in actuality the utilization of “ethnic 
cleansing” indicates that it was the popular discourse that had directed the jurisprudence. 
The ICTY’s decision has influence, but it is a half-truth to say that it had soft power; it 
was soft power. Going by its performance, it functioned as a seemingly independent 
entity through which soft power rather than legal power determined the judgment. A truly 
independent tribunal cannot be seen as being predisposed to align itself with interested 
information on “genocide.” Put simply, a tribunal that is guided by American soft power 
is not the same as one that has independent legal power.    
Following Kristić’s conviction by the ICTY, the word Srebrenica was made into a 
symbol of genocide in an otherwise nongenocidal civil war, and its quality as a perceived 
genocide within a generally political conflict is itself indicative of a framing that defies 
context. The practice of isolating a particular battle as genocidal within a larger war effort 
may offer a method for international law to criminalize war conduct in civil wars that do 
not count as international wars, but they do not—by the very context of material-based 
war between groups—present situations of an intent to destroy a group as such. It may 
                                                          
81 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State 






happen that genocide occurs during war when members of a group that is not a party to 
the war, as such, are systematically exterminated during the war, but if a group is a party 
to the war, with clear indications of it by the group’s leadership, then the abuse of civilian 
populations is typically reasoned by an intent to win the war rather than an intent to 
destroy a group as such. As the leading interpretation of the Vietnam situation has 
argued, since civil wars are not engaged between member states of the United Nations, 
international law is not readily applicable in such conflicts, even if similar conduct in 
international wars may amount to war crimes.  
By singling out a particular battle zone within a civil war as a case of genocide, 
the ICTY’s decision indirectly calls attention to the massacres in My Lai. If looking at a 
separate incident within a civil war as a unit, then for the consideration of whether or not 
genocide was committed the proportion of the killing in the incident is more significant 
than the mere number of those exterminated. This would serve as an indication to what 
extent the intent was to destroy the group either in whole or in part, but still it does not 
necessarily reveal that the intent was to destroy the group as such. Unlike what was 
reported about Srebrenica, in My Lai there were no negotiations with the villagers; there 
was no evacuation of certain members of the community prior to the attack; and there 
was no warlike focus on the men of fighting age. The destruction of My Lai was so 
severe that even the following sympathetic American account of it does not conceal the 
thoroughness with which the American soldiers assaulted the village: “They demolished 
every house in the hamlet. They polluted every well. When they departed, not an animal 





of all, perhaps as many as 500 Vietnamese civilians lay dead.”82 Unlike the Americans, 
the Serbians did not have the luxury of controlling the information about the attack in 
Srebrenica and exploring the criminality of the perpetration in their own terms. The 
American narration of American acts of perpetration in My Lai was able to claim that the 
soldiers were emotionally distraught;83 that there was confusion;84 that orders were not 
followed;85 that there was a failure to control the soldiers;86 and—a more familiar claim 
after the recent American military campaign in Iraq—that “Part of the problem was bad 
intelligence.”87 In no way has the event been subjected to international adjudication, yet 
Srebrenica became representative of genocide. This serves as another confirmation that 
the information on intergroup violence and the application of genocide is a function of 
power. Public opinion and the performance of international law are determined by the 
dominant characterization of events rather than by the events themselves.     
 Srebrenica mainly reflects how international law is subordinated to American soft 
power, and that its legal language is still under construction. The assignment of 
“genocide” to Srebrenica contributed to the American effort to promote the idea of state 
responsibilities to prevent genocide. Due to the application of “genocide” regarding 
Srebrenica, the ICJ was given an opportunity in 2007 to echo that “acts of ‘ethnic 
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cleansing’ may occur in parallel to acts prohibited by Article II of the Convention, and 
may be significant as indicative of the presence of a specific intent (dollus specialis) 
inspiring those acts.”88 In addition, it sought to establish that “the Yugoslav federal 
authorities should, in the view of the Court, have made the best efforts within their power 
to try and prevent the tragic events then taking shape.”89 Thereby, an attempt was made 
to show Srebrenica as a cautionary tale about genocide prevention.  
Despite this effort, it might be the inadequacy of the “genocide” assignment 
regarding Srebrenica that carries more potential for advancing international law. While 
the legal information on the former Yugoslavia did introduce a precedent for a 
heightened state responsibility in taking action to stop civilian suffering, its employment 
of the term genocide did not elucidate the meaning of “genocide” prevention or persuade 
all governments that the use of “genocide” is independent of a designed discourse. 
Indirectly, though not necessarily inadvertently, the inadequate labeling of genocide to 
describe the events in Srebrenica promoted a discourse on international law by generating 
momentum for the expansion of criminal terminology. The sense that the term genocide 
is inapplicable or ill-applied served as a basis of support for retooling the concept of 
“crimes against humanity” toward its greater role in international criminal law. The 
legacy of the decision about Srebrenica might turn out to be an illustration that 
“genocide” was overstretched. The carnage in Rwanda would receive a similar legal 
treatment, but with an added emphasis on soliciting the international acceptance of 
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“genocide prevention” as a cause for intervention. 
 
Intervention for Genocide Prevention 
To be packaged as a persuasive argument for genocide prevention, the events in 
Rwanda had to be narrated not only as a story of genocide in a civil war, but also as a 
genocide that could have been stopped or at least mitigated. Support for genocide 
prevention means that intervention in the internal affairs of states, especially as they 
struggle against groups that challenge their sovereignty, becomes warranted. If public 
opinion accepts such interventions as reasonable, then the government that possesses the 
strongest military force is invited to plan ahead and clandestinely organize and agitate 
groups against governments that do not yield to its interests. By the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the language of international 
criminal law could thicken.  
 There is a detectable uniformity of message among the popular works of analysis 
on the events in Rwanda, and that is seen as an indicator that there was a concerted effort 
to use the discourse about Rwanda to generate persuasion about genocide prevention. In 
true soft-power form, the information maintained some distance from the United States 
government, and even presented a measure of criticism against its actions so that it would 
not appear as if the government is instructing itself to become a more aggressive 
intervener. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Carnegie 
Commission) was a leading source of such information, and it stated that in Rwanda “a 





position to thwart the plot.”90 The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, asked for “no more Rwandas” in slogan fashion,91 and described a failure by 
“key member states” as well as “the leadership of the UN.”92 Its language was bent on 
showing the events in Rwanda as instructive of the need for greater and faster 
intervention: Rwanda “laid bare the full horror of inaction,”93 and Rwanda confirmed a 
lack “of timely response.”94  
Moreover, it presented the idea of humanitarian intervention as a right.95 Michael 
Barnett’s popular monograph on the events described the conduct of “the international 
community” as inexplicable,96 and issued an accusation that the United Nations suffers 
from an “indifference to genocide.”97 Much like the Carnegie Commission’s argument 
that “even a small trained force … could have largely prevented the Rwandan 
genocide,”98 Barnett’s work calls attention to the “absence of troops” as damaging to “the 
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cause of intervention.”99 In what is probably the most incredible effort among the popular 
information on Rwanda that was produced by the United States, Jared Cohen issued an 
excitable rebuke of the United States government while holding a position in the United 
States Department of State’s Office of Policy Planning.100 His repetitive criticism of the 
United States government in the context of Rwanda reads like the execution of a policy to 
persuade the public that American interventions are desired, while making it seem as if 
the United States government itself is not all that interested in intervention.101 
Conveniently for the United States government, the lesson to be learned from Rwanda, 
according to Cohen, is that it should be better positioned to intervene.102 Alan J. 
Kuperman’s work is seen as skeptical of humanitarian intervention,103 but it too played a 
valuable role in the discourse by popularizing the information via the semblance of a 
polemic, amplifying the focus on civil wars in the context of genocide, and shifting 
attention away from American involvement in creating crises by suggesting that the 
debate ought to be about how to respond to them.  
 Significantly, the dominant information on the events in Rwanda did not just 
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endeavor to justify American intervention to prevent genocide, but sought to persuade the 
public that civil wars are warning signs of genocide. This meant that the information 
would have to overcome the basic knowledge that civil wars are conflicts of a political 
nature. Having in mind the American experience in Vietnam, it would be a coup for the 
United States government to finally systematize an ability to depose regimes while the 
public remains convinced that it is done as a service to humanity. Accordingly, Nicholas 
A. Jones wrote that premeditated and planned extermination lies “Under the cover of civil 
war”;104 Cohen sequenced that “The genocide in Rwanda was preceded by four years of 
civil war”105 and suggested that there was an “inability to distinguish between the civil 
war and the genocide”;106 Scott Straus promoted the notion that without a civil war, 
“genocide would not have happened” in Rwanda.107 Barnett reported that in the view of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) “the civil war was responsible for creating 
the conditions for the genocide”;108 Kuperman stated that “civil war leads to 
genocide”;109 and Mahmood Mamdani declared that in Rwanda “The Genocide was born 
of civil war.”110 If it were to catch on completely, this framing of genocide within civil 
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war would have the effect of giving the United States incentive to construct a narration of 
criminality for governments regularly. In essence, the United States would become 
licensed by international law to employ campaigns of genocide accusation and prevention 
according to its own interests in the protection of political groups. 
 As in the case of Srebrenica, the information about Rwanda as genocide was set 
to overcome the absence of political groups in the Genocide Convention by popularizing 
a language that describes civil war in ethnic terms, knowing that the ethnical designation 
is among the protected groups in the treaty. In the NYT, the civil war in Rwanda was 
explained as ethnic “strife,” “tension,” “warfare,” and “violence.”111 Mamdani 
formulated the concept of “a bifurcated state” to articulate a separation between the 
“civic and ethnic” in the African postcolonial state,112 thereby suggesting that in Rwanda 
the ethnical component presents its own form of governance and cannot be distinguished 
from the political. The colonial angle in the literature on the civil war in Rwanda was 
taken up by references to France’s association with the Hutu elite,113 thus stressing the 
agency of the designated perpetrator while leaving the connection between external 
power and the leadership of the supposed victim group unexplored.114 By dimming the 
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space between political and ethnic causes of violence, the information on Rwanda 
managed to pass an intent to terminate a rebellion as the perpetration of genocide. 
 In the style of the scholarly discourse on the Armenian experience, there was an 
effort to offer the Rwandan case more credibility as a genocide by way of suggested 
comparability to the Holocaust. The call “never again” was invoked to draw a connection 
between the post-Holocaust pledge and the civil war in Rwanda.115 According to Mark 
Levene, “the scale, scope and intensity of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 invites 
comparison with the Holocaust.”116 Barnett pointed out that the massacres in Rwanda had 
“the macabre distinction of exceeding the rate of killing attained during the 
Holocaust.”117 A particularly egregious attempt to compare the events to the Holocaust as 
part of the discourse against nonintervention is found in his quote of the Czech 
Ambassador Karel Kovanda, who is said to have “pointedly observed that ‘it was like 
wanting Hitler to reach a cease-fire with the Jews.’”118  In reality, the Jews of Germany 
were not organized as a political group that challenged the Reich’s sovereignty, and there 
was definitely no civil war in the conditions that existed prior to WWII. The Jewish 
leadership did not issue territorial claims regarding German land, nor were such claims 
made in their name by a great power, and they most certainly did not carry out organized 
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attacks against the Nazi government. The forced juxtaposition between the Holocaust and 
the brutality in Rwanda illustrates the disparity between the original Nazi German context 
of the Genocide Convention and the modern-day application of “genocide” to cases of 
civil war. Unlike the Nazis’ use of government machinery intently to destroy the Jews 
under their control without it being a matter of the government’s survival, the Hutu-led 
government of Rwanda intended to put an end to Tutsi offensives against its existence as 
a sovereign. While the Hutu and Tutsi had been distinguished by nonpolitical traits, the 
ruthless violence was caused by political differences, and was not directed against 
members of a nation-state, ethnicity, race, or religion, for being that. 
 Furthermore, past reports on the relations between the two Rwandan tribes show 
that a sense of racial superiority was a sentiment that existed among members of the Tutsi 
tribe, whom the genocide discourse portrays as the victim group, toward members of the 
Hutu tribe, who are shown by the genocide discourse as the perpetrator group. Decades 
before the genocide label was placed on the Rwandan intergroup conflict, depictions of 
the relations between the tribes, which were then described as Watusi and Bahutu, reveal 
that the long-termed rule of the Tutsi tribe was accompanied by racial disdain toward 
others. In 1938, it was reported in the NYT that the Tutsi are “giants” who rule as 
“autocrats” over millions of people in the land that “they conquered in the course of a 
Hamitic invasion from the north,” and that they consider “the original owners of the soil” 
to be “an object of repulsion and horror.”119 In the 1950s, the descriptions were that the 
“aristocratic Watusi ruled like feudal barons,”120 and that “the peasant population of the 
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Bahutu” had been governed “for centuries” by “the Watusi” who functioned as “the 
country’s overlords.”121 However, in the later public discourse about the conflict in 
Rwanda, the “small, privileged group” suddenly became descriptive of the Hutu elite,122 
whereas the Tutsi came to be known as a “minority.”123 From there, the dominant 
information was able to put the events in genocidal terms by describing them as “the 
systematic annihilation of Rwanda’s Tutsi minority.”124 
 Postcolonialism might suggest the freedom of certain native populations from the 
previous colonial rule, but the political independence of territories such as Rwanda has 
been suffering from a persistent dependency that is perpetuated by foreign creations of 
innerstate intergroup divisions. Violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes had 
already been reported in 1959, and though it involved the burning and sacking of villages 
the popular discourse did not label the events as genocide.125 To the contrary, the point 
was made that the violence was political, as it was stated that “The main reason for the 
flare-up is the fear of the Bahutu tribesmen that when independence is granted to the 
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country the Watusi again will rule them with an iron hand.”126 As the country was being 
relieved from direct subjugation to foreign power, it was burdened by servitude to 
external interests indirectly because of the inner-Rwandan political contestation.  
The imperialist act of manipulating group traits to turn them against one another 
for preferable scenarios is known as the method of “divide and rule.”127 This method 
creates a dependency that is less apparent than the straightforward rule of a colony, and it 
is successfully applied when a great power can persuade leaders of a group that another 
group within the same country is their rival while also convincing the general public that 
the conflict is inherent to the characteristics of the groups themselves rather than 
politically conditioned. Thus, when the group is drawn into epidemical warfare, it 
develops a constant reliance on the great power for the enhancement of its capabilities in 
combat, and becomes inclined to serve the great power’s interests. “Genocide” caters to 
this method because it has the quality of limiting the discourse to a simplistic dichotomy 
of local perpetrator and victim groups while abandoning notions of third-party instigation 
by great power.  
Cases of “divide and rule” do not meet the legal definition of genocide because in 
them the intent of the great power supersedes the intent of the smaller groups it has 
driven into seeing each other as political rivals, but if such cases of “divide and rule” are 
nonetheless labeled as genocide then they benefit the great power by concealing its intent 
and calling attention to the intent of the smaller groups. The genocide discourse is 
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particularly effective in keeping the extent of the great power’s role in a conflict between 
two weaker groups hidden from the public eye due to the assumptions it creates about the 
innocence of perceived victims. Since the genocide discourse emphasizes the victim 
group as a sufferer of violence, the inquiry into the great power’s influence on the victim 
group’s role in the conflict is discouraged. The genocide scholarship is empowered to 
reject and even vilify works that examine the actions of the group that is popularly seen 
as the victim of genocide by claiming that it is insensitive to the emotional toll of those 
who suffered from the event as a group, but the effect of this practice is to deny the 
understanding of how great power, which in the post-WWII international scene has been 
typically or especially American, may exploit the victim group by leading its members to 
a dangerous political conflict in service of interests that are foreign to the group. If a great 
power enjoys a mechanism that allows it to take advantage of conflict and victimization, 
then that not only betrays the mission to improve international standards of governance, it 
even rewards the dominant power for instigating turmoil. Such will be the power of 
“genocide” as a term if the dominant information, be it produced in scholarly writings or 
in the courtroom, falsely carries itself as if the Genocide Convention includes the 
designation “political” in its list of protected groups. 
In the Rwandan case, information has not been produced on the American 
involvement in the fashioning of identities toward political rivalry there, and the genocide 
discourse has negated knowledge regarding the circumstances in which the political 
tension between Hutu and Tutsi members turned into a violent conflict in October 1990. 
The manner in which the genocide label frames the registry of the events in the public 





is now popularly associated with the perpetration of genocide, was forced into warfare by 
a Tutsi attack from Uganda. The invasion into Rwanda was said to be executed by an 
army of 5,000 to 10,000 Tutsi refugees, carrying weapons and wearing uniform, and led 
by General Fred Rwigyema, who was identified as a Tutsi refugee himself, but in practice 
he had been a loyal Ugandan and had recently served as Uganda’s deputy defense 
minister.128 Strangely, at the time of this onslaught on Rwanda by Ugandan troops, both 
Juvenal Habyarimana and Yoweri Museveni, the presidents of Rwanda and Uganda 
respectively, were in New York. Another oddity is that in its report on the next day, the 
NYT claimed that the “refugee army” numbered “more than 1,000 fighters,” without 
recognizing that this is a substantially different estimation from what was reported in the 
newspaper on the previous day. At any rate, this was a significant offensive by Ugandan-
trained soldiers, who were immediately narrated in the popular discourse as being Tutsi 
refugees.  
The planning behind this massive operation has been kept out of focus by the 
genocide discourse, earning only minimal and decontextualized references in the 
genocide-centered literature: the description of the event is characterized by brevity in the 
references to the Ugandan affair and the labeling of the invading troops as members of 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).129 This remarkable turning point in the intergroup 
relations is treated as almost inconsequential because a recognition of its importance 
would have presented the events in Rwanda as nongenocidal. Despite the gravity of this 
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military attack in October 1990, the literature has marked the reaction to the killing of 
Habyarimana in a plane crash as the constitutive event of the violence, with emphasis on 
April 1994 as the beginning of the civil war.130 The controlled narration of the events 
assumes that the RPF was an independent organization, and even the rare reference to 
Ugandan responsibility maintains a vagueness of meaning that does not engage in a study 
of how great-power leverage in Uganda at the time is connected to the planned invasion 
of Ugandan troops into Rwanda in 1990. There are indications that the United States had 
an increasing amount of influence on the Ugandan government in the time that led up to 
the mobilization of Ugandan soldiers as Tutsi members and the staging of their attack on 
Rwanda. In the summer of 1989, the United States Agency for International Development 
“almost quadrupled its aid” to Uganda by raising it from $8 million to $30 million in two 
years,131 “plans to open a stock exchange” in Uganda were initiated,132 and even the 
concept of creating “national parks” was being introduced.133 These markers of American 
power in Uganda have been ignored and washed away by a genocide discourse that 
inspired and supported the criminalization of the Hutu-led government, and narrated it as 
a cautionary tale against nonintervention. 
   Instead of defending the Genocide Convention, the ICTR proved to be 
unfaithful to the prevention of subversive groups from receiving genocide-victim status, 
and, as a result, showed itself as subservient to soft power. The implications were that a 
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legal body of customary law in matters of international criminality was being built up in 
accordance with a popular framing of what “genocide” means and how it is to be applied. 
The qualities of internationality and legality were combined to give the ICTR an air of 
authority and legitimacy, but the content that was produced on “genocide” through the 
tribunal was aligned with the promotion of international law itself. Its treatment of 
“genocide” demonstrated an approach that is fundamentally similar to that of the 
American-based genocide scholarship, with the major difference being that an 
international tribunal is expected to be a more effective production of soft power than the 
genocide scholarship for its higher degree of perceived independence, and for its 
immediate appearance as the language of international law itself.  
The ICTR’s alignment with the popular treatment of “genocide” was apparent in 
the decision by the tribunal chamber in 1998 that it was “satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that” a Rwandan mayor by the name of Jean-Paul Akayesu “had the intent to 
directly create a particular state of mind in his audience necessary to lead to the 
destruction of the Tutsi group, as such.”134 By ignoring the significance of General 
Rwigyema’s mobilization of soldiers to attack Rwanda, and the question of who it was 
that directed the collective state of mind that possessed thousands among the Tutsi tribe 
to challenge the Rwandan government, the tribunal displayed strong bias against the local 
government of a weak state. It overlooked greater strategies and overriding intents that 
use existing group differences to disguise the political nature of challenges against 
existing governments. The nongenocidal became incorporated into international law as 
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genocidal just as the adjudication of international crime was about to acquire a sense of 
permanence through a central international criminal court.  
 
The House that “Genocide” Built 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR, in their capacity as ad hoc organs for the 
adjudication of crime in international law, have illustrated the homelessness of 
“genocide,” as a crime whose legal procedure was without a permanent address. The 
contract that would call for the establishment of an international criminal court would not 
only centralize the execution of international criminal law, but also provide an 
opportunity to strengthen the authority of its administration, reintroduce an international 
criminal code, and regulate the proceedings. The contingent and loosely woven process 
that empowered the two international tribunals both reflected the void of a legal 
mechanism and acted as a necessary initial maneuver toward it. The ICTY was 
established by way of a UNSC resolution that relied on previous resolutions,135 and did 
not even mention Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which was then stated as the 
basis for the resolution to establish the ICTR.136 Having this tentativeness in mind, the 
advent of the Rome Statute is seen as having a measure of inevitability if the American 
conception of international law was going to be solidified.  
 As indicated by the literature that was produced around the time of the Rome 
Statute, the desire to nurture the controlled growth of “genocide” as a legal term was 
                                                          
135 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 808 (1993), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/808(1993) (accessed, 12/21/2016).  
 
136 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 955 (1994), 






complemented by housing its adjudicative development. In their analysis of the state of 
international law’s treatment of atrocities, Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams 
expressed a commitment to expand the legal definition of “genocide” through “judicial 
interpretation” and despite “the political hurdles.”137 They argued that “the most 
promising route for the future evolution of international law on genocide would be 
through clearer expansion of customary international law.”138 As the wording of the 
Rome Statute suggests, this expansive function of “genocide” was going to be facilitated 
indirectly by offering space for the legal information on genocide to be produced rather 
than attempting to directly change the legal definition of the term. Instead of presenting 
the plans to expand the use of “genocide” before the member states for the renegotiation 
and reconsideration of the Genocide Convention itself, the Rome Statute’s impact on the 
term is transformative in its direction of the environment in which “genocide” can 
gradually and less noticeably be molded through popular information. Hence, the 
increasing applicability of “genocide” may be navigated by soft power without risking 
the loss of the term’s unique legal status as the subject matter of a rarely attained 
universal agreement on an international crime and as a catchy word of a highly attractive 
quality. The sense that the power of “genocide” cannot be restructured or replaced 
explains why the detectable changes in its applicability have been reserved by the Rome 
Statute for customary law under the guidance of the ICC. 
 Domestic procedure is another manner through which the Rome Statute enabled 
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the legal applicability of the term genocide according to external sources of soft power. 
The Rome Statute’s Article 1 declares that the ICC “shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction.”139 Moreover, a scholarly work has claimed that “the International 
Criminal Court empowers state sovereignty more than ever before by giving states that 
have ratified the Court’s statute the first right to try their own nationals for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”140 The emphasis on customary international 
law that is achieved by the ICC lends credibility to the applicability of “genocide” by 
individual states in local trials. Complexly, Article 6 of the Genocide Convention, which 
empowers the adjudication of genocide charges by “a competent tribunal of the State in 
the territory of which the act was committed,”141 leaves Article 2 exposed to piecemeal 
abuses by popular information if an organ such as the ICC cooperates with the alteration 
of Article 2, and thereby inspires and supports the state tribunals that follow the same line 
of interpretation. A recent example of an exposure to such abuse is seen in Guatemala. 
There, the Genocide Convention’s Article 2, which had already been abused by a local 
penal code that omitted the words “as such” from the legal definition,142 was interpreted 
to fortify the ICTR’s work toward presenting civil war as genocide.143 In promotion of 
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this decision’s effect on the worldwide meaning and application of genocide, the 
genocide scholarship declared the Guatemalan trial’s genocide verdict in 2013, which had 
to be retried, as “a vindication for victims” and a “milestone for showing that the judicial 
system could prosecute cases at the highest level.”144 The idea of more domestic 
applications of “genocide” received scholarly support in the argument that “domestic 
prosecutions of international crimes provide some comparative advantages over 
international prosecutions.”145 
 Therefore, it is becoming apparent that the Rome Statute has enhanced the 
American ability to alter the legal purpose of the term genocide through soft power, and 
without having to change a single word of Article 2 in the Genocide Convention. In other 
words, the governments, whose agreement to ratify the Genocide Convention had given 
“genocide” its legal status, are powerless as the applicability of the term is being shaped 
indirectly yet steadily to have a different meaning. The flagrance of shifting the definition 
to protect political groups that actively engage in violent defiance of governments is 
imposed without the agreement of member states that agreed to become parties to the 
treaty as it had been worded. This is the direction to which the genocide scholarship has 
pushed the legal development of genocide: the description of civilians who are associated 
with a political group as victims of genocide. The outlook appears to be that this would 
be the function of “genocide” unless or until international criminal law is further 
developed. When William A. Schabas noted that the Rome Statute’s definition of 
                                                          
144 Ibid., 138.  
 
145 Nancy Amoury Combs, Fact-finding without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of 






genocide “is essentially a copy of Article II of the Genocide Convention,”146 he phrased 
himself accurately but failed to disclose the omission of Article 1’s clarification that 
“genocide” is applicable as a crime “whether committed in time of peace or in time of 
war.”147 Even though Schabas does consider elsewhere that genocide was originally 
distinctive from “crimes against humanity” for not being confined to “international armed 
conflict,”148 his work has called attention away from how the omission by the Rome 
Statute’s definition affects the ability of the public to detect the connection between the 
original context of the Genocide Convention and the new international criminal code. 
According to Schabas, the public is to consider that “The distinction between genocide 
and crimes against humanity is less significant today, because the recognised definition 
of crimes against humanity has evolved and now unquestionably refers to atrocities 
committed in peacetime as well as in wartime,”149 as if this has happened without design. 
He focused on the current status of the terms without informing his readers about how or 
why “genocide” has served as a fertile ground for the codification of “crimes against 
humanity.”  
 Until the Rome Statute came into force, the definition of “crimes against 
humanity” had not been documented in a contract through the United Nations, and had 
been limited to times of war. The emphasis on this limitation at the time of the 
Nuremberg trial served as one of the main arguments for the need to draft a convention—
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the Genocide Convention—that would be relevant to times of peace in addition to times 
of war.150 By using “genocide” in its indictment but not in its judgment, the Nuremberg 
trial primed the term for elevation in the public discourse yet reserved its use for the 
convention. The success of the campaign to draft, adopt, and ratify the Genocide 
Convention would have been put in doubt had “genocide” not been seen as distinct from 
“crimes against humanity.” Now that “genocide” has become a prominent term, the 
distinction is mainly helpful for the ability to trace the development of international 
criminal law accurately.  
The argument that the definition of “crimes against humanity” has simply evolved 
into its current meaning ignores the element of design in the use of genocide’s popularity 
to introduce an extended criminal code that is the equivalent of the Genocide 
Convention’s Article 2 but without the restrictive insistence on special intent and group 
identity. Slyly, the discourse that was generated by the events in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, through their dramatization to show genocide as a scourge, has been 
converted to a narration of a public demand for better handling of genocide-related crises. 
As a result, there was wide support for a statute to establish the ICC, but this statute also 
included the codification of new crimes. The Rome Statute, which was the fruit of the 
“genocide” campaigns in the 1990s, did not just establish the ICC, but provided an 
opportunity to define the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction and thereby give legal 
sanction to crimes that were previously undocumented in this manner.151 
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 According to the framework of analysis that is offered here, it is found that the 
soft-power capacity of “genocide” has made it possible for “crimes against humanity” to 
be incorporated into a binding document of international law, and allowed for definitions 
of crimes upon which there was no agreement in a convention to have legal effect. While 
it might be claimed by the genocide scholarship that “crimes against humanity” simply 
turned applicable outside the realm of international wars, the definition of “crimes against 
humanity” in the Rome Statute is tantamount to a much more applicable definition of 
genocide. Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” as a set of 
acts that are “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,” and it further states that these acts 
include persecutions against any group on political grounds. The effect of the Rome 
Statute could be felt while it was still in the process of coming into force. In 2000, the 
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, by way of an agreement between the United 
Nations and the government of Sierra Leone, empowered the special court to try persons 
for committing “crimes against humanity” while engaged in a civil war.152 Hence, it is 
considered that while the ICC was constructed by the attractive power of “genocide,” the 
capacity of the Rome Statute to drastically extend the scope of criminal prosecution in 
international law lies in its placement of an applicable set of “crimes against humanity” at 
the core of the new international criminal code. An indication of this being the trend is 
found in the Rome Statute’s accompaniment by the release of books whose title is Crimes 
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against Humanity.153    
 From this perspective, it might be appropriate to say that the ICC is a house that 
was built through the popularity of “genocide” in a controlled discourse. It would be 
misleading to claim, as the dominant narration of events seems to do, that occurrences of 
genocide have themselves generated agreement about the need for a permanent court as 
the ICC. “Genocide” has functioned as the vessel that carried momentum to the Rome 
Statute, and metaphorically built the house from which “crimes against humanity” can 
have its quieter yet more spreadable effect on criminal convictions in international law. 
Much like “genocide,” the ICC is an attractive feature on the surface of international law. 
The power of “genocide” to inspire legal procedure is reflective of the indispensability of 
a codified crime for the creation of a court, and is not accidental, but rather a precondition 
that is vital for customary law and the life of any law, be it domestic or international.   
Even before “genocide” was introduced to the public in 1944, and long before the 
Rome Statute called in 1998 for the establishment of the ICC, an attempt had been made 
to combine a criminal code and a criminal court for the advancement of international law. 
To this effect, two international conventions were issued on the same day—November 
16, 1937—by the League of Nations for signature by member states: one was the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism uerrorism Convention); the 
other was the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC 
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Convention).154 While the references to the protection of minorities in a number of new 
nation-states post-WWI is a significant precedent to the Genocide Convention,155 so is 
the Terrorism Convention. Even less imagination is required to consider that the ICC 
Convention was a prototype for the statute that established the ICC more than sixty years 
later.156 The two pre-WWII conventions were offered in tandem, and are instructive of 
how the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute are tied at the hip.  
 Though of a particular criminal focus that is different from that of the Genocide 
Convention, the Terrorism Convention was a significant trailblazer in the development of 
international criminal law. It introduced a state duty “to refrain from any act designed to 
encourage terrorist activities directed against another State and to prevent and punish 
activities of this nature and to collaborate for this purpose.”157 The acts of terror were 
seen as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state 
of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.”158 
Noticeably, the advent of the Terrorism Convention sought to create international 
standards of civilian protection while at the same time protecting the state from a terrorist 
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attack by a nonstate entity. While the Genocide Convention does not itself negate such a 
protection of the state, the manner in which the convention was applied through the ICTR 
markedly criminalized a government for its reaction to an attack by a nonstate entity. 
Akayesu was convicted of public incitement to create a genocidal state of mind, but the 
Terrorism Convention would have sought to protect him and his government from the 
conspiracy and incitement that created “a state of terror” in Rwanda. An American-
sponsored Uganda had its soldiers—under the claim of being a nonstate entity—invade 
Rwanda, yet, despite these markings of conspiracy and incitement toward terrorism 
against a state, popular information in the form of the genocide discourse has covered up 
the significance of this event with the cooperation of a United Nations sanctioned organ 
of adjudication. In this, the United Nations has completely negated the work of the 
League of Nations. It could be that the Terrorism Convention had not been designed to 
last, for it was abolished soon after its ratification with the termination of the League of 
Nations, and was not reintroduced by the United Nations in the aftermath of WWII. 
Furthermore, by not being a member of the League of Nations, the United States was able 
to remain unaffected by the Terrorism Convention without having to deny the convention 
by withholding its signature. 
 In view of the long-running American commitment to advance international law 
through soft power, the Terrorism Convention is seen as having provided an invaluable 
service because it functioned as launching pad for the ICC Convention without appearing 
as an American agenda. In other words, even though it was cancelled by the war and the 
replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations, the Terrorism Convention 





later. The great amount of time that had passed before the Rome Statute picked up where 
the ICC Convention left off reflects how necessary it was to take a gigantic step—in a 
rehearsal—prior to WWII. The preparatory value of the ICC Convention did not simply 
lie in making the idea of an international criminal court more realistic, but also in the 
immediate connection that it drew between crime and court. Through its very first article, 
the ICC Convention made it known that its international criminal court would be set up 
for trying “persons accused of an offence dealt with in the Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism.”159 Similarly, the text of the ICC Convention stipulated 
that the accession of member states to the convention was “conditional on the deposit by 
the same High Contracting Party of an instrument of ratification of, or accession to, the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.” Meaning, the ICC 
Convention did not even have to come into force in order for it to establish a blueprint for 
the Rome Statute that similarly intertwined the establishment of the permanent and 
central court with the acceptance of a new criminal code.160 
 However, the full extent of American planning and directing that went into the 
development of “crime” as a concept in international law has been kept from clear sight. 
This hiddenness is in keeping with the style of soft power, which generates desired 
effects by employing persuasive and indirect means. Accordingly, in the volume that was 
published by CEIP to record such conventions, the editor Manley O. Hudson added in an 
editorial note of context regarding the Terrorism Convention and the ICC Convention 
that both conventions were inspired by the French government’s reaction to “the 
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assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia at Marseilles on October 9, 1934.”161 
This style of narration is now practiced by the genocide scholarship, which in the cases of 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has sought to convince the public that a necessary 
development for the advancement of international law, such as the production of 
customary international law on “genocide,” was the direct result of this or that crisis 
rather than the result of indirect influence. 
In addition, the meaning of these two conventions is not considered in the public 
discourse because of the decontextualized framing by the dominant literature on the 
history of genocide and international criminal law. The genocide scholarship has 
distorted history by employing extreme exaggeration to present Lemkin’s proposal to the 
international conference in Madrid in 1933 as outstanding, instead of recognizing that his 
rejected proposal was a minute contribution within a vastly greater project to arrive at the 
predetermined destination of a convention on terrorism.162 The genocide scholarship does 
not consider the power relations that enabled the execution of a strategy to promote 
international law, but unfolds a misleading narrative because of its moral appeal. 
Likewise, scholars, who molded the historiography of international law in an effort to put 
the inauguration of the ICC in perspective, have framed their timeline to show the 
Nuremberg Trials as the symbolic beginning of international criminal law, and do so 
while showing the Nuremberg procedure as if a direct reaction to what happened in 
WWII rather than as a manifestation of a strategy to construct international law.163 In a 
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162 For a discussion of this here, see: Chapter 5, section titled “Lemkin’s Intellectual Property,” and 
especially note 39.  
 
163 For instance, Ratner and Abrams premised their book on the idea of a Nuremberg legacy, as indicated 





phrasing that shows how the reference to Nuremberg and Lemkin leads the public away 
from considering that power motioned the progress of international law, it is stated that 
“In the wake of the Nuremberg trials, Rafael [sic] Lemkin’s effort to outlaw the crime of 
genocide finally succeeded.”164 
The attachment of the ICC Convention to the Terrorism Convention as its sole 
criminal code shows that “crimes against humanity” had not been conceived as a subject 
of international criminal law before WWII. However, there have been efforts in the 
scholarly works on international law to criminalize the Ottoman Empire by ascribing the 
origin of “crimes against humanity” to the suffering of the Armenians in WWI. It has 
been suggested that “the first” use of the term in some way was in relation to the wartime 
massacres of Armenians on Ottoman land.165 The source to which reference is made in 
                                                          
States President starts its narration of the background to the establishment of the ICC with reference to how 
“After World War II, the international community, outraged at the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, 
took action at Nuremberg against many of the leaders responsible.” See: Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
“Memorandum to the President,” in Toward an International Criminal Court? Three Options Presented as 
Presidential Speeches, ed. Alton Frye (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 5. For another 
work that shares the same framing effect, see: Antonio Cassese, “From Nuremberg to Rome, International 
Military Tribunal to the International Criminal Court,” in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, ed. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 1:3-19.  
 
164 Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 25. Not only did Schiff produce a phrasing that makes Lemkin appear as the main actor in the 
progression of “genocide” within international law, but his description presented a reality that is devoid of a 
grand strategy.  
 
165 For example, much of the attention to “crimes against humanity” in this context is due to references in 
two influential publications. See: William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of 
Crimes (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000), 16-17; Antonio Cassese, “Armenians 
(Massacres of),” in The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, ed. Antonio Cassese 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 249. Both texts present the accusation as “the first” in some way: 
“It has been suggested that this constitutes the first use, at least within an international context, of the term 
‘crimes against humanity’”; “Thus, for the first time, the notion of crimes against humanity was 
propounded and it was also asserted that those involved in such crimes would be held criminally 
responsible.” Compare: Schabas, Genocide, 16-17; Cassese, “Armenians,” 249. Schabas misleadingly 
presents this dug-up wartime document as “a joint declaration” in the context of his legal discussion even 
though it was a nonlegal warning against a belligerent, and he incorrectly claims that the term crimes 
against humanity was used as such in the communication. In addition to making the wartime 





this regard was not a legal document, but a relayed diplomatic message, in which 
hyperbolic language is used in a communication that was meant for the Ottoman 
government in the context of the Allied Powers’ desire to affect the Ottoman 
participation in the war.166 Furthermore, the now famous quote does not even use “crimes 
against humanity” as a term: “In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity 
and civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they 
will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman 
Government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.”167 It reveals 
a language that looked to create a discourse on international law through the suffering of 
the Ottoman Armenians. 
Within the modern-day wave of scholarly efforts to build a case against the 
Ottoman government in the reconstruction of a genocidal context, focus has been kept 
away from another statement in the communication, according to which there is no 
knowledge that the Ottoman government itself organized the massacres: “For about a 
month the Kurd and Turkish population of Armenia has been massacring Armenians with 
                                                          
crimes” and “against humanity” for effect on readers, and he does not explain that by saying “propounded” 
he refers to a communication that is far removed from having legal relevance. This is not a reliable 
narration of international law’s history. Interestingly, Schabas’ work of reimagining the significance of 
“crimes against humanity” in relation to WWI and the Armenian experience is found in a book that came 
out soon after “crimes against humanity” received a repurposing treatment in the wording of Article 7 in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in July, 1998. See: United Nations, “Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court,” http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (last accessed, 
1/24/2017). Dadrian’s treatment of this document is even more misleading because his false suggestion that 
“crimes against humanity” as a term  “has its origin in the public recognition of the Armenian genocide by 
the three principal Allies in World War I,” was accompanied by the false presentation of the term as the 
“equivalent” to “genocide.” See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian 
Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1999), 34. 
 
166 It does not appear unusual for belligerents to use threatening words as part of an effort to discourage a 
wartime enemy. 
 
167 U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 
Supplement: The World War (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1928), 981. 
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the connivance and often assistance of Ottoman authorities.”168 The text points at the 
existence of what in the current criminal code fits the description of a crime against 
humanity, but the casual claims by scholars that this was the first legal expression of the 
term crimes against humanity is misleading. In actuality, there was not nearly enough 
contextualization for an evaluation that meets legal standards; the reference was to the 
concept of crimes against humanity, and it was not stated as the legal term that it is today 
nor was it a legal term at the time; the concept of crimes against humanity or civilization 
had already been used on the pages of the NYT in other instances prior to this depiction 
of the Armenian victimhood.     
This last point is significant because it brings into view how the concept of these 
crimes had been developed through popular usage in the United States, and how the 
claim that the Ottoman government’s conduct warranted a “first” instance of “crimes 
against humanity,” internationally or in general, amounts to misinformation, and might 
indicate bias in the presentation of Ottoman history in influential scholarly works. The 
term crime against humanity was popularly used in condemnation of the slave trade in 
1854.169 In the context of the Dallas Treaty in 1857, it was argued that a war between 
Britain and the United States would be “a crime against civilization, which the Christian 
nations ought never to forgive.”170 In 1860, references to “crimes against humanity” were 
168 Ibid. Neither Schabas nor Cassese mentions that the communication does not issue a direct accusation 
against the Ottoman government regarding the massacres. It is also notable that this part of the 
communication blatantly ignores Ottoman sovereignty by referring to the land as “Armenia.”  
169 “The Slavery Question—The Issue and the Arguments,” New York Daily Times, July 7, 1854. In a later 
article, still in the 1850s, it was reiterated that the slave trade was “a crime against humanity” and “a sin 
against God.” See: “The African Slave-Trade,” New York Times, June 2, 1858. 





made in relation to the actions of “the Miramon faction” in Mexico.171  
During the American Civil War, the NYT published an article from the Memphis 
Avalanche that carried an accusation of “crimes against humanity” by the North, whose 
war tactics were described as paralleling those of “the Sepoys of India and the Druses of 
Syria.”172 As expressed in an article titled “Crimes against Civilization,” the United 
States government was engaged in converting the events of the Civil War into a language 
of war crimes.173 In reaction to the “burning and shelling of an unprepared Japanese city 
[Kagosima], containing 180,000 inhabitants, against whom there was no war, by the 
British Admiral” in 1863, the British parliament was accused of a “barbarous crime 
against humanity.”174 Similarly, by the close of the nineteenth century, the popular usage 
of “crimes against humanity” was also made regarding the acts of guards in “the 
penitentiary system of the Southern States”;175 Irish Americans who were suspected of 
setting “explosions in London”;176 the Russian government in the treatment of Jews 
within its territory;177 Americans in an insurrection against Hawaiian officials;178 and the 
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Cuban Conservative Party “during the war of 1868-78.”179   
Even in the context of international law or WWI in particular, the Ottoman 
Armenian case did not present the first reference to crimes against humanity or 
civilization. The concept of “laws of humanity” was put into language in the conferences 
at The Hague before WWI.180 In the beginning of WWI, before Ottoman Armenians were 
driven from their homes and exposed to the harshness of an unruly wartime environment, 
“A Crime against Humanity” was the title of an article by the NYT in which it was stated 
that “The dropping of bombs into the City of Antwerp from a German Zeppelin airship is 
a crime against humanity of which civilized nations should take notice by earnest protests 
to the German Government.”181 Meaning, the popular discourse about international war 
was directing public opinion toward adopting a language of international law through the 
notion of a crime or crimes against humanity or civilization ahead of the Armenian 
suffering. 
It was in correspondence with the priming of “crimes against humanity” for 
greater use through the Rome Statute that the literary works began to circulate the 
misleading suggestion that the term originated in the Entente’s reaction to the Ottoman 
treatment of its Armenians. This has become a part of the standard narration of the 
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180 The Hague convention of 1907 reiterated the statement made in 1899, with minor adjustments, stating 
that: “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting Parties deem it 
expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscience.” See: James Brown Scott, ed., The Hague: Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 
1907, Accompanied by Tables of Signatures, Ratifications and Adhesions of the Various Powers, and Texts 
of Reservations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), 101-102. It is notable that despite the 
prominence of the word forbidden regarding certain actions by states, the word crimes was not featured in 
the language that was used in the two conventions at The Hague before WWI.  
 





history behind the establishment of the ICC,182 aside from having a place in the general 
narration of international law’s history. Before the Rome Statute created an incentive to 
reimagine the history of “crimes against humanity,” Georg Schwarzenberger commented 
in reference to “crimes against humanity” and “crimes against peace,” that “Prior to the 
Charters of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg (1945) and Tokyo (1946), 
these forms of extraordinary jurisdiction were unknown to international law.”183 The false 
belief that “crimes against humanity” originated in the Ottoman Armenian experience is a 
foundational element in how the structure of international law is commonly understood.  
Through the recent reimagining of the term’s history, the information about the 
progression of international law maintains the semblance of distance between the 
penetration of “crimes against humanity” to an international criminal code and soft 
power. The grammar that is used to communicate this narration persuasively is itself 
revealing of this purpose as it relates verbs to events rather than to powerful actors. For 
example, in a discussion about WWI, it is stated that “The war provoked criticism by 
many of both the outrageous behavior by a government towards its own citizens (Turkey) 
and aggression against other nations (Germany).”184 This is representative of how the 
style of the language itself is structured to lead the public into believing that the 
codification of crimes, as in the case of “crimes against humanity,” is a reaction to events 
rather than a strategy to institute power effectively. As long as “crimes against humanity” 
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183 Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 248. 
 
184 Jackson Maogoto, “Early Efforts to Establish an International Criminal Court,” in The Legal Regime of 
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is presented as an old term that originated in reaction to events, then it is less likely to be 
considered as a newly documented set of crimes that makes the construction of 
international criminal law appear as a function of power.  
There are parallels between the public discourse about the nonratification of the 
Genocide Convention in the United States,185 and the one about the nonratification of the 
Rome Statute. In both cases, the debate comprised of liberal voices that pointed at 
international interests and moral appeal on one side, and conservatives in the House of 
Representatives, the Senate, and the Pentagon who expressed concern for the safety of 
Americans abroad and the United States constitutional soundness on the other. In the 
cycle regarding the Rome Statute, the NYT’s narration made the following key references 
to create a sense of a debate: 
“Delegations are twisting themselves into pretzels to bring the Americans in,” 
said Richard Dicker, a lawyer at Human Rights Watch and an expert on the court. 
The Pentagon has demanded guarantees that no American soldier or official on 
duty abroad could ever be tried by the court, a stipulation that President Clinton, 
while professing to support the court, has shrunk from overruling. 
In Congress, opposition among Republican leaders has been extremely strong.186 
 
Within this debate, the NYT, in its capacity as an opinion-giver, expressed its support 
when the United States added its signature to the adoption of the statute, stating that “In 
signing the treaty establishing an international criminal court, President Clinton served 
American interests and the cause of justice worldwide.”187 Then, just as the narration 
made it seem as if the switch to the Eisenhower administration was part of the 
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explanation why the United States drifted toward nonratification of the Genocide 
Convention, so did the narration regarding the nonratification of the Rome Statute claim 
that “Washington’s cooperation is under attack from conservatives in Congress and 
members of the incoming Bush administration.”188 A scholarly instrument of narration 
was provided in the form of a book that was published by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, in which Ann-Marie Slaughter led the public away from considering that the 
Rome Statute is an American project of soft power. She did this by marking the delay of 
the ratification as the middle ground between ratification and rejection of the ICC.189 The 
effect of this public debate is that it strengthens the ability of the Rome Statute and the 
ICC to function as soft power that is not considered to be associated with American 
interests or an imposition of authority. By this depiction of the United States as a hesitant 
party, the public is invited to believe that this major development in international law is 
not a matter of American design, but an echoing testament of humanity’s consciousness.  
 Once the public debate on the nonratification of the Rome Statute effectively 
created an impression that the United States government is not sufficiently active and 
involved in the fight against international crime and in the prevention of humanitarian 
disasters such as genocides, public opinion was opened up for literary products that 
would reignite a passion for intervention, and in the process promote even further the 
view of the United States as a responder rather than a designer. Accordingly, it was 
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claimed that “many Americans, as a matter of conscience, principle, and national interest, 
believe it is time to end America’s policy of formal hostility to the Court and replace it 
with a clear and unequivocal policy to support the Court in its important mission of 
bringing perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice.”190 This belief “that the United States 
should support the Court”191 not only disseminated the assumption that the ICC is not an 
American project, but created the sense that the United States has not been doing enough 
to support the ICC. Consequently, the public is impassioned to develop an inclination to 
participate in human-rights activism and “call a savage a savage.”192 Through literature 
that appeals to the public’s perception that “tyrants” are perpetrating crimes against 
innocent victims,193 a government that possesses a globally dominant military is able to 
have its public hold the opinion that it should intervene militarily in civil wars as part of 
the commitment to prevent and punish genocide and a growing list of other crimes. 
 
Misleading the Masses 
American soft power continues to dominate the meaning of “genocide” and its 
application despite the introduction of unprecedented international organs of law to 
interpret the Genocide Convention and the establishment of the ICC. Moreover, it may 
even be formulated that American soft power has become better equipped to dominate 
how the term genocide is defined and used through these new means of producing 
                                                          
190 Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: U.S. Interest in the International Criminal Court 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 3. 
 
191 Ibid., 9.  
 








information about “genocide.” Independent scholars whose expertise is genocide studies, 
together with the American influence on the most popular avenues of information, have 
functioned as agents of American soft power and created a popular genocide discourse. 
These days, the ongoing status of this genocide discourse functions as a source of 
analytical inspiration for legal information that is conveyed by judges in tribunals that are 
recognized as competent has taken the level of persuasiveness to a higher level.  
If soft power is strengthened by the degree of separation between its manifestation 
and its origin, then the creation of customary international law on genocide has allowed 
the popular discourse to grow much more effective. The semblance of distance between 
the genocide scholarship and its source of power had already been widely believed by the 
public, and the distance between international judges and the influence of American soft 
power appears as even greater. These judges are informed by the work of the genocide 
scholarship, and the information that they produce is influenced by the popular discourse 
in a way that is not directly linked to a source of power and is likely to be more 
persuasive. If the judges in cases that consider indictments of genocide, be it in ad hoc 
international tribunals, domestic trials, or the ICC, digest and process information that is 
largely affected by American perspectives as they interpret the international treaty that 
gave the term its legal definition, then their impact on international law is even more 
damaging than that of the genocide scholarship itself. Legal power is not to be found in a 
system that enables an interested party194 to influence the quality of customary law to 
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undermine the wording of international treaties. Instead of witnessing an arrival at legal 
power, soft power has become more sophisticated, and more pervasive, in its ability to 
influence attitude and behavior with an indirectness that negates the accountability of 
law.  
 Rather than reserve the information on genocide to thoroughly independent 
judges, the introduction of legal procedures in international criminal law has had the 
effect of opening up the meaning of “genocide” to even greater influence by the popular 
discourse. While the genocide scholarship has been directly affecting the judges’ 
opinions on genocide on a case by case basis, the place of “genocide” in popular 
information has added a dimension of influence that affects judgments more indirectly, 
through public opinion. Since much of the international information is affected by the 
United States, and since judges are committed to considering major trends in public 
sentiment, it becomes possible for the judges’ performance to be subjected to soft power 
both by way of the genocide scholarship that produces the research that is then used as 
evidence, and the popular discourse on “genocide” that sways public opinion about cases 
before investigations or trials are held. Much like the international judges, the popular 
discourse is informed by the genocide scholarship, and has the effect of elevating the 
scholarly works and predetermining the voice of the judges. As a result of this 
multiplicity of voices on “genocide”—scholars, judges, and pundits—the element of a 
singular biased source of soft power over these affairs remains out of clear sight.  
 Samantha Power’s main argument in “A Problem for Hell” is that over the course 





describes as genocides,195 but the main effects of her book—it is claimed here—have 
been to establish an association between the United States and responses to crises rather 
than responsibilities for their creation, and to further popularize the genocide 
scholarship’s determination of what counts as genocide. As Power claims to survey “the 
major genocides of the twentieth century,” her evaluation of the American performance 
in reaction to humanitarian crises invited the public to think of the United States as a 
responder.196 The emphasis on the United States as a responder means that she 
propagated an assumption that the question of American involvement in these crises only 
pertains to the catastrophic violence without offering detailed accounts about what 
preceded it. Thereby, Power created a proclivity to rule out that American involvement is 
an antecedent that affected the event. She used language to frame the public’s perception 
of the American role within notions of an initial American neutrality. Power struck a 
moralistic tone as she called attention to the United States as a bystander to genocide and 
called attention away from considerations of how American power might instigate violent 
conflicts and then label them as a genocide that is perpetrated by officials of the local 
government. 
 The structure of Power’s book reflects how the popular discourse on the 
Armenian experience as genocide was foundational to the genocide discourse in general, 
and, as such, it is also at the heart of that which is misleading about it.197 Power’s project 
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of exploration starts with her version of the genocide scholarship’s narrative about the 
Armenian victimhood. The title of her book’s first chapter exclaims “Race Murder,”198 
and it opens with a second-hand delivery of an unsourced fable.199 The use of “race 
murder” is sensationalist, and it is a reference to Henry Morgenthau’s hyperbole,200 but 
Power invites her readers to believe that this is a fair description of what happened.201 
Much like the genocide scholarship, Power quoted Morgenthau’s narration about the 
uprooting of “peaceful Armenian populations,”202 as if free from power considerations. In 
line with the genocide scholarship’s disinterest in the American strategy behind 
“genocide” and international criminal law, Power’s delivery of Morgenthau’s words was 
unaccompanied by the consideration that the text was deliberately constructed in this 
manner to cater to an American design to thicken the body of international law in the 
war’s aftermath by issuing information on war crimes.  
As a study of the post-WWI American efforts does show, this is precisely what 
ended up happening in the form of CEIP’s report under the title Violation of the Laws and 
Customs of War in 1919, which shows a design to use the war as a launching pad for a 
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criminal code. In consideration of the American work toward international law that 
preceded WWI, it would be in agreement with such endeavors to create a documentation 
of the war in a language that makes the wartime events fit into brackets of war crimes 
such as “murders and massacres,”203 “deportation of civilians,”204 and “attempts to 
denationalise the inhabitants of occupied territory,”205 all of which were listed in the 
report by CEIP, and included references to particulars involving cases other than the case 
of the Ottoman Armenians. In order to overcome the mental barrier that is presented by 
the genocide scholarship, and was bolstered by Power, one has to consider that American 
strategy preceded these events whose narration has served to promote the progress of 
international law, especially as it pertains to crimes. Events need to transpire and be 
narrated as crimes before they can be convincingly codified as crimes. Since the 
American plan to codify such laws preceded their occurrences, it is considered that there 
was a strategy to narrate them in preparation for their presentation as crimes. The most 
likely power-based explanation—that Morgenthau’s narration was designed to 
criminalize Germany through the Ottoman government and generate information that 
could be later used to develop international law—is one that Power eliminated from 
consideration.  
Since the existence of international criminal law has been explained indirectly, as 
if the reaction by the conscience of humanity—rather than as an American strategy for 
instituting its power—is the main cause for it, the genocidization of the Armenian 
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experience has come to function as the frontline of power concealment. As long as the 
treatment of the Armenians by the Ottoman government is widely considered to have 
been a genocide, the details regarding the American strategy to codify international war 
crimes remain unexplored and largely unknown. This explains why the genocide 
scholarship has propagated the notion that the Armenian experience is the first genocide 
of the twentieth century as part of a greater effort to instill as knowledge that genocide 
happened in history. The effect of this literature, which was further popularized by 
Power’s thoroughly promoted book,206 has been to lead the public into believing that 
genocides existed as a phenomenon long before the term genocide was invented in 
Washington, DC, and separately from American power considerations. 
In addition to the prominent placement of the Armenian experience within this 
history of “genocide” in works of the genocide scholarship itself,207 the genocidizing of 
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the Armenian experience is further cemented by general works of WWI history. These 
works mostly offer a cursory presentation of the events, yet the brevity of their analysis 
within the context of the war has the capacity to offer a different kind of persuasiveness 
that complements the efforts of the niche works by the genocide scholars. Books on the 
topic of WWI are commonly believed to be reflective of the mainstream historiography 
when they are offered on the shelves that are designated for information on WWI by a 
dominant bookseller such as Barnes & Noble. In their supportive role of the discourse by 
the genocide scholarship, they function as confirmation of knowledge, and instill in the 
readers an unexamined conviction that the use of genocide regarding the Armenian 
experience is a matter of course. In such promoted and readily available books about 
WWI, the following references are made to the Armenian experience as genocide: 
…the most obvious example being the Turkish genocide of the Armenians.208 
 
…except in Turkish Armenia, no population was subjected to genocide…209 
 
...Turkey’s unparalleled genocide against the Armenian people—the first 
holocaust of the twentieth century…210 
 
Successive Turkish governments continued into the twenty-first century not only 
to deny that an Armenian genocide ever occurred but to prosecute any Turk who 
dared to write of it.211 
 
To take one example which has been much in the news lately: Armenian groups 
around the world argue that Turkey should not be allowed into the Europe Union 
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until it has admitted that it conducted genocide more than ninety years ago.212 
 
Jay Winter’s reference to “the Armenian genocide” as part of his general narration of 
WWI presents yet another example of how the popular texts that offer a broad view of 
history have adopted and fortified the genocide discourse,213 but his voice on the 
Armenian experience invites a closer inspection. He has been a promoter of the notion 
that WWI was “a European civil war,”214 which is a phrase that shares the use of the 
phrase “Armenian genocide” in the effect of leading the public away from considering 
aspects of American strategy regarding WWI. At least in one instance, the United States 
government funded the dissemination of Winter’s presentation of the Armenian 
experience as genocide.  
 In a film that was released on November 10, 1996, by the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, KCET of Los Angeles, and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), under 
the title 1914-1918: The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century, Winter said the 
following about WWI and WWII, in reference to the Armenian experience and the 
Holocaust: “It is no accident in my mind that both of them were marked by genocide.”215 
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At the time of the film’s production, PBS was funded by the United States government 
via the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the National Endowment for the 
Humanities.216 In addition, the film’s coproducer, KCET, has also produced the annual 
“Armenia Fund Telethon,”217 in which it collected “over $120 million of infrastructure 
development assistance and humanitarian aid for Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh.”218 It 
is said that the money raised in KCET’s Telethon in 2013 was specifically for “the 
construction of the Vartenis to Martakert Highway” so that it may function as a link 
between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.219 Ties exist between the United States 
government’s funding, the work of a leading American historian, and the fortification of 
land that was taken by force from Azerbaijan. 
 Works by scholars of Armenian heritage, especially when seen as published or 
promoted by an Armenian-themed organization such as the Zoryan Institute, enjoy even 
greater credibility as they omit significant details about the American role in the creation 
of the modern Armenian identity. Scholars of Armenian descent were first empowered by 
American institutions and organizations to frame the modern history of their ancestors, 
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and have kept out of this frame an examination of how Americans had transformed 
members of the Haik ethnoreligious community in the Ottoman Empire into an Armenian 
nation that was organized toward self-rule and whose leadership pressed for the political 
replacement of Ottoman sovereignty. Built on this framing, the genocidization of this part 
of the Ottoman past has directed the public discourse away from considerations of 
relevant offenses against the Ottoman government during a time of peace. Ronald Suny’s 
commitment to “understand the causes” of the events in the 1890s and in 1915 invokes 
the memory of “the war of 1877-1878,”220 which leads to a focus on Russian rather than 
American interests as a generative force for the events that followed. This was echoed in 
Raymond Kévorkian’s work.221 Aside from the misleading nature of Dadrian’s general 
approach to the events of 1915 through the simplistic and narrow prism of “a conflict 
between perpetrator and victim-group,”222 he also shifted attention away from powers 
that destroyed the Ottoman government to Germany, which was in the process of 
practically modernizing governance in the region on the eve of WWI: to him, “the 
distribution of power relations in national and international arenas” explains why German 
responsibility for the Armenian suffering “remained obscure and vague.”223  
 The effort to conceal knowledge of foreign influence on Armenian identity 
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toward challenging Ottoman sovereignty is also sustained by a branch of 
autobiographical writings that has the effect of presenting the genocide discourse as a 
core element in the Armenian existence. The style of prose by Michael J. Arlen, whose 
language of intimate Armenian sentiments about WWI was popularized on the pages of 
The New Yorker,224 was picked up by Peter Balakian in the 1990s. In his first of such 
works, Balakian called attention to the Armenian household as the narrative’s main 
setting.225 In the form of first-person narration, he repeatedly described his experience of 
reading “Morgenthau’s memoir,” thus presenting this carefully crafted work of American 
strategy as a personal account of history.226 Through Balakian’s narrative, readers of an 
Armenian heritage, and the general public, are led to believe that the reading of 
Morgenthau’s text is a ritual of sorts for Armenian American young adults. This has a 
self-perpetuating quality to it, which has the power to influence many Armenian 
Americans to adopt the custom of basing their knowledge of the past through 
Morgenthau’s decontextualized work. The narration that Balakian produced was designed 
to speak on behalf of Armenians through the unassuming voice of one who speaks about 
personal feelings and experiences, with a high level of credibility. The softness of the 
approach has the potential of a deep penetration into the collective psyche. The 
combative direction of such material can be sensed in his remark at the sight of Turkish 
Americans who showed up to protest the use of “genocide” against Turkish ancestors in 
an event that was organized to take place in the prominent venue of New York’s Times 
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Square. He wrote the following words to describe his emotions at the time: 
My ancestors had been driven off the earth they had lived on for twenty-five 
hundred years, had been killed one by one, and the things they had built with care 
over centuries of tradition had been confiscated or destroyed, and now the 
grandchildren of those Turkish people were stalking the United States in order to 
prevent Armenians from telling their story. The perpetrators trying to silence the 
victims and their descendants.227   
 
This emotional framing has the power to inspire a heated intergroup rivalry for years to 
come. The readers of this text, be they Armenians or Turks, are expected to feel 
resentment toward the other group upon reading such a description, and become all the 
more distracted from the power behind this narration. As long as Armenians and Turks 
argue about the agency of their own ancestors, a unique entryway for knowledge about 
American agency in the strategy to stifle Germany and establish international law 
remains shut. It is seen here as primarily an American-produced text that vilifies Turks 
while looking away from what effect Americans had on the Ottoman Armenian situation. 
Not only are Armenians presented as victims who are prevented from doing something, 
and not only are Turks presented as perpetrators and stalkers; also, the United States is 
described as a passive and exploited space, and that leads attention away from 
considering the American activity regarding this conflict.  
 Even works by scholars of Armenian descent that engage in the cultural 
transformation of the Ottoman Armenians in the decades that preceded their conflict with 
the Ottoman government have not engaged in a detailed study of what precisely the 
Americans had accomplished among the Armenians politically. Gerard Libaridian 
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discussed the developments within the “Armenian communities” in the 1840s and 1850s, 
but in utter contradiction to the reports by American missionaries at that time, he chose to 
relate the introduction of “Textbooks and poetry” without regard to the Americans but 
instead stating that they were “published in Constantinople and Moscow.”228 Simon 
Payaslian’s circumspection of the foreign influence on Armenian national identity is 
more complex because his work directly focuses on American policy regarding the 
Armenians. While he did convey to his readers that at the time of initial contact between 
the American missionaries and the Ottoman Armenians the Armenian version of 
Christianity was different from the American version of it,229 he did not delve into the 
effect that the newly Americanized religious organization of Ottoman Armenians had on  
Armenian political identity. Moreover, he drove a wedge between the critical years of 
American influence in the midnineteenth century and the development of Armenian 
political aspirations against the Ottoman government. According to Payaslian, the 
political rift is to be explained by developments “After the Crimean (1854-56) and the 
Russo-Turkish (1877-78) wars,”230 but by then the American reconfiguration of the Haik 
identity had already been set in motion.  
When Payaslian presented an analysis about the American perspective during the 
actual warring between the Armenians and the Ottoman government, especially during 
WWI, he backed the common information that shows the American stance as neutral.231 
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It is here considered that the official position of governments, or how that position is 
commonly presented in the prevalent historiography, does not preclude the possibility of 
soft-power influence. As exemplified by Payaslian’s work, the discourse does not show 
an exploration of the influence on the Ottoman Armenians from within the Ottoman 
territory by foreign cultural agents such as the American missionaries. The stated 
neutrality of the United States government until April 1917 does not mean that 
Americans did not interfere during a time of peace between the American and Ottoman 
governments with the Ottoman ability to govern its own people. Ottoman Armenians 
were affected in apparent ways by the wartime efforts of the Russian government in 
1877-78 and of the Entente in WWI, but there has been a disinterest in studying the less 
visible exertion of influence on the Ottoman Armenian identity as an indirect form of 
offense against the Ottoman government. 
 The avoidance of heed to the offenses against the Ottoman government during a 
time of peace that preceded the much discussed violence is also supported by the works 
of scholars whom the genocide scholarship portrays as representative of pro-Turkish 
leanings and genocide denial. Without having to employ or support the label of 
“genocide,” these works are nonetheless instrumental in keeping a discursive focus on 
1915. The rebuttal itself of the genocide characterization has a part in the popularization 
of the discourse on the Armenian suffering in 1915 by lending itself to a publicized 
debate. The research directions of these so-called denialist texts avoid the consideration 
of offenses against the Ottoman government during a time of peace just as the genocide-
centered works do, and no substantial alternative to “genocide” is offered in the realm of 





focus on the Russian agency that is associated with ambitions of conquest, and just as the 
Armenian American narration is noticeably disinterested in unearthing knowledge about 
soft-power impact on Armenian identity, it is also found that those who are said to be 
apologists for the Turkish government have handicapped the defense of Ottoman history 
by looking away from the indirect interferences with the Ottoman ability to govern its 
population.  
Some of the better known studies that stress the existence of political conflict 
between the Armenians and the Ottoman government have done so while leading the 
public away from considering how foreign power on Ottoman land had directed the 
Armenians toward becoming organized politically against Ottoman sovereignty. Bernard 
Lewis described the events of 1915 in nongenocidal terms as “a struggle between two 
nations for the possession of a single homeland,”232 but he did so without explaining how 
or why the ethnoreligious Haik people of the Ottoman Empire turned into an Armenian 
national unit. Instead of addressing the work of the missionaries, he called attention to 
“the Russian conquest of the Caucasus” and “The political and cultural impact of Russian 
Armenia.”233 His reference to the religious reorganization of the Armenians did not fully 
convey the enormity of the transformation. Bloxham, of the genocide discourse, criticized 
the scholarly efforts by Stanford Shaw and Ezel Shaw, and Justin McCarthy,234 but they 
had produced narratives that ignore soft-power offenses against the Ottoman government 
by a foreign presence during a time of peace just as he does. The work by Shaw and 
                                                          











Shaw firmly defended the Ottoman government by arguing that their wartime policy 
regarding the Armenians was preceded by the revolt in Van,235 but at the same time they 
weakened the persuasiveness of such a defense by limiting its argument to the Russian 
influence on the Armenians,236 and giving no account for the foreign influence on the 
Armenian collective organization from within the Ottoman territory. As suggested by the 
subtitle of McCarthy’s work on Muslim victimization,237 it joined the endeavor to 
introduce the term ethnic cleansing into academic discourse following the events in the 
former Yugoslavia. McCarthy’s construction of events shows “Russian imperial 
expansion” as the only major external cause of change for the intergroup hostilities 
during the last century of the Ottoman Empire.238  
Along such lines, Erik Zürcher did not use the term genocide in his depiction of 
Turkey’s modern history, but he also stayed clear from articulating the process in which 
the Armenian group identity became nationalized through foreign instruction from within 
the Ottoman Empire; instead, he posited that the Armenians “Saw in a Russian victory 
their chance to achieve the establishment of an Armenian state in eastern Russia,”239 as if 
to suggest that there was a preexisting Armenian national identity that was triggered by 
the external influence of the Russian government. In continuation of the Russian theme, 
Michael Reynolds offered a framing of the events within the context of a “twilight 
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struggle that the Ottoman and Russian empires waged for the borderlands of the 
Caucasus and Anatolia.”240 In another display of a focus on Russian influence, Michael 
M. Gunter related Armenian nationalism to Russia’s wars of conquest in the nineteenth 
century and the Marxist spirit of the Armenian revolutionary parties that became active 
later in that century.241 The nature of Edward Erickson’s focus on the events of 1915 as a 
case of counterinsurgency created a framework within which Ottoman wartime policies 
may be rationalized without having to delve deeply into the foreign-sponsored cultural 
project that shaped the Armenian group identity from within the Ottoman territory during 
a time of peace. As Gunter, he mentioned 1887 and the Armenian revolutionary 
formation by briefly noting the Russian influence of Marxist ideology.242  
Guenter Lewy’s The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey, which has received 
strong attention and criticism by the genocide scholarship,243 questioned the popular 
usage of the genocide label regarding the Ottoman Armenian experience, but he did not 
engage in a close examination of the relationship between foreign power and the 
politicization of the Armenian group identity, and he did not consider the cultural 
influence on the Armenians during a time of peace as an interference with the Ottoman 
government’s ability to govern them. Lewy barely mentioned the American missionaries 
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in this book, and in his short reference to them he coupled them together with German 
missionaries, and regarded them as witnesses rather than as active influencers from 
decades before the violence.244 Like Gunter and Erickson, Lewy claimed that the 
Armenian revolutionaries “were influenced by Russian Marxist revolutionary thought” in 
1887 without much detail and without giving much heed to the impact of the American 
missionaries.245      
Remarkably, these three scholars, Lewy, Gunter, and Erickson, explain in their 
texts that hunchak, which carried the name of the revolutionary party that led the 
Armenian challenge against the Ottoman government, means “bell” in Armenian, but 
they do so without exploring the link between the Armenian choice of symbol to the 
Liberty Bell, which is a symbol of revolution in the American cultural tradition.246 In 
other words, the narrations that respond to the genocide claims, much like the narrations 
of the genocide claims themselves, do not offer a detailed account about the impact of the 
meeting between American missionaries and the Haik inside the Ottoman Empire. Both 
the genocidization of this past and the attempt to counter the genocidized discourse leave 
out a focus on how external cultural influence inside the territory of a sovereign may lead 
to political conflict between that sovereign and members of its population. The 
dominance of “genocide” in the narrative on matters that pertain to international law 
blocks away knowledge regarding how a state’s involvement in the development of a 
group identity within another state for political purposes is itself a matter that could be 
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subject to investigation as a matter of crime in international law.  
Since becoming of greater legal relevance, the genocide discourse has produced 
literature that is designed to target different markets around the world,247 and within its 
ability to do so, there has also been an attempt to influence the voice of the Turkish 
people on the Armenian issue. Taner Akçam’s work is representative of this trend. His 
Turkish origination is regularly advertised alongside his criticism of Turkey, and, thus, 
his appeal has the capacity to generate a following from within Turkey. His call for 
Turkish introspection is tantamount to couching the origination of the modern Turkish 
state in criminalization. In his translated book, the text offered the following 
grammatically awkward sentence that does not seem to have an equivalent in the Turkish 
language: “What is crucial is that this ethnic cleansing and homogenization paves the 
way for today’s Republic of Turkey.”248 Favorable reviews of the book in the popular 
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media provided space for known scholars to show their approval of the narrative.249 The 
promotion of Akçam’s voice in the popular discourse has allowed for scholars, such as 
Thomas de Waal, to build a narrative that seeks to co-opt Turkish trends and placate 
Turkish intellectuals. In de Waal’s words, for Turks to become accepting of the genocide 
label is a sign of “growing openness” to be considered as “good news.”250 Turkish 
scholars who welcome a discourse on “genocide” were commended by de Waal, who 
erroneously described Akçam as the first of such Turkish historians even though he was 
not trained as such.251 This trend marks a soft-power endeavor to convince the Turkish 
people that they should accept culpability rather than examine their history for the 
directions it might give toward locating the place of the Ottoman collapse in the past and 
future of international law. In other words, the genocide discourse has been attempting to 
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persuade Turks of their own denialism in order to prevent a situation in which Turks 
become increasingly capable of pointing at denialism about American agency in the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
American Soft Power as International Criminal Law 
In the twenty-first century, the treatment of developments in Sudan presented the 
first major case in which the newly formed relationship between the popular discourse 
and the ICC was showcased. It showed how in the era of the Rome Statute soft power 
presses legal performance and overshadows legal power in international law. Sudan’s 
decades-long civil war became the testing ground for both the newly established ICC and 
the freshly acquired image of the United States as a hesitant actor in international crises. 
These two added features in the handling of “genocide” complement each other. The ICC 
may have been the product of American planning and execution but the discourse about 
the nonratification of the Rome Statute in the United States has given the ICC the 
semblance of independence from American interests. The ICC’s design to follow the 
guidelines that were set by the Rome Statute would give its function an appearance of an 
international self-mechanism and allow the United States to employ its soft power as it 
examines how its influence through reports may lead toward desired results either by 
influencing the legal process or by subordinating it to public opinion. The Sudanese 
political turmoil presented yet another case that could be manipulated into a discourse 
about genocide because it mainly consisted of two rival groups that are distinguishable 
ethnically and religiously. However, there was much more to this conflict than what the 





 Sudan has been politically challenged from the start of its independence and even 
by the very nature of its statehood. In the post-WWII postcolonial days, an Arab 
government offered an opportunity for the American-led civilizing mission. In 
comparison to Sudan’s “African pagan south,”252 the Arabs of Sudan who had just freed 
themselves from being governed by traditional colonialism appeared to be more 
culturally equipped to govern the land in keeping with the standards of membership in the 
United Nations. Even prior to Sudan’s independence in 1956, and amidst descriptions of 
tension with the British colonial authority, the NYT began to show the Arabs of the 
territory under a favorable light. Not only did the Arabs have much more experience of 
interaction with the West than did the African pagan tribes, but they also presented a 
greater potential for a centralized government because the Muslim faith and the Arabic 
language united the culture of the “northern two-thirds of the country,” whereas the other 
third was divided by roughly “twenty-six languages, not counting dialects,” and practiced 
“Witchcraft and magic” in an “innumerable” variety of “cults.”253 The British rule gave 
the Arabs of Sudan their training in political organization, and the rejection of the British 
provided a vital cause around which the Arabs of the land could unite into a nation. The 
ability of the Arabs there to function as a nation-state was foundational to the African 
tribes’ civilizing project, and as the Americans knew well from their experience with the 
precolonial tribes in America, the introduction of a new governance into their lives might 
lead to violence. 
 However, the cultural gap was such that resentment and rebellion against the Arab 
                                                          








rulers turned out to be the major stimulant toward civilizing the pagan tribes. The 
repulsion by what was perceived as foreign rule once again provided a social glue, and 
the need to be armed to achieve secession created a dependency on the civilized powers. 
Thus, a relationship between the pagan tribes and the West was accomplished, and for its 
maintenance, civil war was perpetuated and became a regular feature of the Sudanese 
existence. Put differently, as long as the pagan tribes were fighting against their Arab 
government, they were being engaged in a civilizing process without having to recognize 
it. Correspondingly, until the pagan tribes proved to have reached a certain level of group 
organization in the style of the Euro-Christian civilization, they were depicted as 
terrorists or rebels rather than victims. Ironically, or rather premeditatedly, the sign that in 
Sudan a bridge had been formed between the Euro-Christian civilization and the pagan 
tribes was to be the destruction of the bridge that the Sudanese state was offering its 
southern residents.   
 As the Sudanese experience shows, terror organization is a step toward 
civilization as it advances political organization among people who were not previously 
inclined to do so. According to the American narration of the events in the 1960s, the 
“terrorists” were “organized under the name Anya-nya, which means ‘poisonous insect’,” 
and were led “by a ‘field marshal,’ Lutada Hiller.”254 In other words, the fight against the 
government had given the public narration an unprecedented occasion to give the many 
separate tribes a single unified name—though an ominous one—and a ranked leader 
whose title is taken from the military terminology of the Euro-Christian civilization. The 
political nature of the violence was stated plainly: “Their goals are secession from the 
                                                          






Sudan and territorial independence for the three southern provinces, Equatoria, Upper 
Nile and Bahr-al-Gazal.” During this time, it was already understood that in the fight 
against “a spreading rebellion” the Sudanese government had engaged in “ruthless efforts 
to stamp it out.”255 However, this was not accompanied by claims of genocide. Instead, 
the NYT likened the “insurrection” by the Anya-nya to other efforts by entities that were 
perceived as unsympathetic in the West, suggesting that the rebels were fighting “with 
much the same hit-and-run guerrilla tactics as those in Vietnam and the Congo, and with 
a bitterness and brutality reminiscent of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya.”256  
 Several years later, the civilizational progress of these tribes—now united for 
some time under a common political cause—was given an ideological impetus: 
Communism. In the early years of Sudan’s rule under Major General Jaafar Muhammed 
al-Nimeiry, Communists were first accused of involvement in the political life of the 
country.257 Then in the 1980s, it was claimed that “the outlawed Communist Party in the 
north was coordinating with the southern rebels.”258 By this time, the main revolutionary 
activity was no longer known as the foreign-sounding Anya-nya, but as the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army, which is an English name, and led by Colonel John Garang,259 
who was American-educated.260 The identification of this group in English reflects an 
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attempt to make the organization seem more relatable to the English-speaking public, and 
the leadership by a graduate of an American university is symbolic of the tremendous 
cultural distance from the tribes’ past beliefs in supernatural powers. As the southern 
population of Sudan was becoming increasingly civilized, its representative organization 
was no longer named after a harmful scaly reptile but the new name reflected the purpose 
of seeking freedom. In a role that parallels Uganda’s role in the Rwandan civil war, 
Ethiopia functioned as the neighboring state sponsor of the nonstate entity that was 
leading the rebellion in Sudan. Garang’s leadership was described in the NYT as “a ‘tool’ 
of Soviet-backed Ethiopia.”261 The association of Garang’s organization with the United 
States’ rival of the Cold War did not hinder the civilizational progress of the southern 
Sudanese, but rather accelerated it. Picking a side during the Cold War was a rite of 
passage into the civilizational world, and in this context of proxy war the arming of the 
two sides by the superpowers could become more openly narrated.262 It was made public 
knowledge that “Washington had a high profile in the Sudan,” and that the United States 
provided the Sudanese government with “the biggest aid package in Africa apart from its 
support for Egypt.”263 
 As the Cold War was drawing to a close, the reports’ description of group identity 
shifted to a focus on religious differences, and the new emphasis began to define the 
division between the rulers and the rebels as that between the Muslim government and 
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the population in the south that is mostly “Christian or animist.”264 The conflict was still 
shown as political, and it was recalled that the rebels “have long sought autonomy from 
the north,”265 but an added feature to the narrative was that they “want an end to Islamic 
law,” because they represent a region “where most people are Christians or animists.”266 
Until that time, some reports actually showed the Sudanese government as being in 
tension with Islam, rather than with Christianity or animism, as there was disagreement 
between President Nimeiry and “the Islamic priests of Omdurman” over “prohibition on 
alcohol in the city,” and it was added that among those who challenged Nimeiry was “Dr. 
Hassan al-Turabi, the Sudan’s Attorney General and leader of the Moslem Brotherhood, a 
powerful urban Islamic group.”267 Previously, it was even reported that the “right-wing 
Moslem zealots” formed “something approaching national unity” with the “black 
Christians in the south” and the “die-hard Communists” in their common cause against 
Nimeiry.268 Moreover, the narration of an ethnoreligious divide was also manifested by 
changing the religious designation of the southern rebels. From being described as 
multiple disconnected and cultish tribes, the rebels were suddenly presented repeatedly as 
animists, which is a unifying term that has the effect of highlighting a sense of a religious 
divide with the Muslims. No longer was it seen as a case of one organized Muslim 
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community and tribal practices that lack commonality between them. The Christian label 
was also used to suggest an easily perceived impression of a religious division, and 
increased the likelihood of directing public opinion in the West toward support for the 
rebels’ cause. 
 Under American influence over Sudan, the National Islamic Front acted out the 
new narrative’s design. It was described as a “well-financed, fundamentalist party that 
has been the most hawkish in pursuit of the war against the mostly Christian and animist 
southerners.”269 Through this Islamic party’s role in the narrative, the popular discourse 
could place an emphasis on the ideological agency of the ruling people rather than that of 
the rebels. Soon thereafter, Brigadier Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was introduced as 
“the country’s new military ruler.”270 While there was still mention that the rebels held 
“offices in Ethiopia,”271 there were no longer claims that there was a Communist aspect 
to the rebellion. At this point of the narrative, the demands by Garang and his 
organization were specifically related to bringing “an end to Islamic law.”272 Therefore, it 
is here considered that the change in the information’s focus on group identities in Sudan 
corresponded with a design for the narration of what remained at its core a civilizing 
political contestation throughout the years of Sudan’s independence. The violence was 
not based on the groups’ ethnoreligious identities, but on the interests of those who 
wanted the intergroup warfare that created and maintained a dependency by the natives 
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on the Euro-Christian civilization.   
 As a result of the added emphasis on the Christianity of the rebels, the view of the 
violence in Sudan as the manifestation of a political conflict gave way to the rise of moral 
sentiment as the main formulator of public opinion about it. The fighting that had been 
described as “one of Africa’s most debilitating civil wars,”273 and “a chronic civil 
war,”274 became a story of a one-sided aggression. While the narration of the war as a 
chronic feature of Sudanese politics concealed the foreign interests that shaped the 
situation, it was nonetheless recognized as political violence. Then, from a language that 
used to ascribe the suffering to the civil war itself by relating verbs to it,275 the tone 
changed to blaming the Sudanese government for “bombing civilian targets in the 
south.”276 This change was also marked by adding the numbers of the dead and the 
displaced to the information about the war, and the effect was to frame the events within 
the context of a humanitarian crisis.277 It was then possible for the narration to be 
advanced by the agency of interest groups, which as groups that are characterized by the 
Christian faith or concern for human rights were seen as credibly seeking to press the 
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United States government into action.278 Thus, the information that the public received 
about the violence in Sudan created a perception that if the United States were to 
intervene it would be in reaction to a moral outcry rather than in accordance with its 
power considerations or plans for the progression of international law.  
 In a critical juncture for the popular discourse on Sudan, a direct effort was made 
in the start of 2004 to disconnect between the collective memory of a long civil war and 
the new narrative of genocidal massacres. Since the war between the government and the 
rebels had been engaged for decades without any reference to genocide, the 
persuasiveness of the reports toward a genocide discourse relied on severing from the 
conflict of the past. Hence, the popular discourse on the events in Sudan presented a 
direct separation between the previous information about the inevitability of the political 
clashes in Sudan and new information that would show the government as cruel to its 
civilians. This was achieved by the following narration: “As Africa’s longest-running 
civil war comes to a close in one corner of this vast country, a terrifying new theater, 
fueled by old ethnic divides and old-fashioned greed, opens here in another.”279 Such a 
text created a new context in which the political premise is associated with the civil war 
that supposedly ended, whereas the ethnic identity of the groups and the tyrannical 
character of the regime are stressed toward the making of a genocide discourse. 
Accordingly, the violence in Darfur was presented as “Sudan’s other war,” but this 
attempt to drive a wedge between the civil war that has defined Sudan’s existence for 
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years and the fighting in Darfur is largely unconvincing if one takes into account that 
Darfur had already been mentioned as a battling ground within the country’s perennial 
civil war. For instance, in 1992 it was reported that the Garang-led “guerrilla force of 
some 40,000 fighters” was “battling government troops as far north as Renk and 
Darfur.”280 Even though the civil war was stopped for a time, and Garang briefly 
functioned as vice president of Sudan before his death in a helicopter crash, there was 
nevertheless still a general unrest in the country.281 Meaning, to genocidize the events in 
Darfur since 2004, the popular narration of Sudan’s civil war engaged in a method that 
amounts to context cleansing.  
 Following the discourse on the events in the former Yugoslavia, the public ear 
had been trained to perk at the uttering of “ethnic cleansing,” and the events in Sudan 
were described by Nicholas Kristof as “The most vicious ethnic cleansing you’ve never 
heard of.”282 As in the case of Srebrenica, the term ethnic cleansing was used as a 
gateway to a genocide discourse. Kristof made the point that “In the 21st century, no 
government should be allowed to carry out ethnic cleansing, driving 700,000 people from 
their homes,” and at the same time he promoted the notion of comparability “to the 
Rwanda genocide of 1994.”283 It was Kristof who introduced the name “Janjaweed” to 
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the readers of the NYT, and referred to them as “lighter-skinned Arab raiders” who at the 
bidding of the Sudanese government “are killing or driving out blacks in the Darfur 
region near Chad.”284 Thus, in one writing effort, Kristoff wrote off the political nature of 
the decades-long conflict and imposed a racial reasoning to explain the conflict. In his 
next essay in the NYT, he made the direct claim that “the government of Sudan is 
engaging in genocide against three large African tribes in its Darfur region here.”285 
Showing that the genocide scholarship is in harmony with the NYT, scholarly literature 
was then produced to define the case as “a form of ethnic cleansing verging on the 
genocidal,”286 and the claim that there was “evidence of ethnic cleansing” was converted 
to a claim of genocide.287 Along the lines of such collaboration between the newspaper 
and academic writing, Human Rights Watch also followed Kristof’s narration, claiming 
that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed “are implementing a strategy of ethnic-
based murder.”288 As in the 1990s, the reference to “ethnic cleansing” cleansed the 
information about the conflict of its political terms, and replaced them with terms that are 
borrowed from the Genocide Convention.  
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 Unlike the circumstances of the ICTY and the ICTR, the post-Rome Statute era of 
international criminal law presents the legal option of convictions under the term crimes 
against humanity, and this affected the direction of information toward legal procedure. It 
created a new equation of terms, in which “ethnic cleansing” is used to build “evidence” 
of criminality, and “crimes against humanity” is used for indictments that are more 
applicable. In this formation, usage of “ethnic cleansing” may lead to genocide claims of 
a certain credibility, and the genocide claims may lead to indictments of crimes against 
humanity. Since the term crimes against humanity contains definitions of crime that are 
not as dependent on more than one level of intention at the time of perpetration, the aura 
of the genocide accusation is utilized by the popular discourse. 
 As the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United 
Nations Secretary-General of 2005 shows, the conclusion “that the Government of the 
Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide” was qualified by the statement that 
“International offences such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have 
been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.”289 Despite 
this view that no genocide had been committed, in 2009 the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the 
ICC decided to include “crimes of genocide” along with crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in its list of the alleged crimes for which there is a warrant for al-Bashir’s 
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arrest.290 This document is reflective of the soft-power utility of “genocide” as it 
accompanies the more applicable “crimes against humanity.” It also sheds light on the 
function of the Genocide Convention in relation to Georg Schwarzenberger’s observation 
that it “is unnecessary when applicable and inapplicable when necessary.”291 The utility 
of “genocide” seems to challenge Schwarzenberger’s assumption of what is “necessary.” 
While the new status of “crimes against humanity” marks the legal superfluity of the term 
genocide, its function as an attractable device at the hands of those who seek to advance 
international criminal law makes it a necessary commodity of soft power. 
   In the case of Darfur, the United States began to employ “genocide” as a form of 
soft power that increases the likelihood of legal procedure even if the conviction might 
not include the perpetration of genocide. A close cooperation between the genocide 
scholarship and the United States government produced information that associated the 
events in Darfur with “genocide” prior to legal proceedings, and created conditions in 
which public opinion around the world had created expectations of criminalization before 
information could be produced by way of administered law. As two genocide scholars 
have relayed, their work as members of the United States State Department’s Atrocities 
Documentation Team (ADT) provided the “foundation that led then US Secretary of 
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State Colin Powell to accuse the government of Sudan of genocide (September 9, 
2004).”292 They recognized that “never before had one nation officially accused another 
of genocide as the events unfolded,”293 but did not suggest that this process is legally 
unsound. The questions in the Questionnaire that was used to glean information from 
locals leave out the political context of the civil war and do not have the potential to 
establish an intent to destroy any of the groups that are protected by the Genocide 
Convention as such.294 Nonetheless, the information that had been collected was 
described by these scholars as “Evidence.”295 Regardless of whether or not the public is 
initially convinced that the material collected by ADT does prove genocide or whether or 
not it is reasonable for American research to determine what counts as evidence, the 
language in the dominant information determined that it was a case of genocide.  
 The context of the Summer Olympics that were to be hosted by Beijing in 2008 
served as a setting for an extravaganza that co-opted public opinion into relating genocide 
to Darfur, not because of a close analysis of the events in Sudan themselves but rather 
because China was popularly accused of enabling genocide. The dominant discourse did 
not ask whether or not genocide was being committed, but rather assumed genocide by 
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asking whether or not China will stop facilitating it. Chinese influence in Sudan was not a 
recent feature of Chinese power, but rather it dates back to the 1960s.296 Just as the 
United States was involved in arming the Sudanese government, so was China.297 Much 
like the United States, China had become invested in the production of oil on Sudanese 
land.298 However, when the narration began to emphasize harsh treatment of civilians by 
the Sudanese government, China was singled out as the main sponsor of the Sudanese 
government among the great powers. The occasion of hosting the Summer Olympics—a 
celebration of China’s place among the nations—had become a launching pad for 
accusations of genocide and human-rights violations. In the NYT, Kristof promoted a 
campaign to “shame Beijing into better behavior.”299 As narrated by the NYT, American 
agents of soft power such as Hollywood actors and nongovernmental organizations 
popularized the name “Genocide Olympics” to embarrass China,300 and the discourse in 
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the NYT was expanded to include references to a cultural genocide by China against 
Tibetans.301 Without a day in court, the genocide accusation regarding Darfur had 
managed to turn a case of civil war, which had been instrumental for the American-led 
civilizing process, into the subject of an informational campaign that swayed public 
opinion against China while setting up international criminal law for continued 
susceptibility to American soft power. With such control of the information on 
“genocide” by American soft power, judgments in courts of law are susceptible to being 
scripted according to how decisions in the court of public opinion are narrated.       
 
The Abuse of International Law 
No high-profile case of alleged genocide has presented such an inappropriate use 
of international law as the one that regards the governance of Cambodia between 1975 
and 1979. In neither of the other contexts is the connection between American soft power 
and the popular usage of “genocide” so blatantly imprinted on a court ruling. The 
campaign regarding Darfur has shown how the combined efforts of the United States 
government, the genocide scholarship, and the mainstream media can lead to a legal 
procedure by the ICC in the form of a warrant for the arrest of a state leader. However, 
the Darfur example does not involve a massive academic effort to reframe history, and it 
still has not reached the level of court procedure. In both cases of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, the navigation of information was more indirect as the genocide accusation 
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progressed from news reports and academic processing to international criminal 
tribunals. Although these cases received a significant legal treatment and produced what 
is seen as customary law, the influence that American soft power had on the judgments 
focused on the general matter of how the Genocide Convention is to be interpreted but 
did not require the acceptance of a contested historiography.  
While the popular usage of “genocide” in reference to the Armenian experience is 
grounded on a biased rendering of historical events according to political preferences, it 
has not been the subject matter of a judicial decision in a competent tribunal. If an organ 
that is officially recognized by the United Nations ever executes a conviction of genocide 
that gives a legal sanction to the popular narration of the Armenian victimhood, then that 
might result in an impasse for international criminal law. Such a judgment might yet 
happen without an uproar if political conditions enable the genocide scholarship to exert 
sufficient influence on Turkey’s governance, and thereby create infrastructure within 
Turkey for information that would lead the Turkish public not only to accept the 
genocidized version of the history regarding the Ottoman Empire’s collapse but to absorb 
it as their own. This scenario has been unfolding in Cambodia. No tumult is noted 
because the matter has the approval of the current Cambodian government, but it is 
nonetheless an alarming manifestation of how American soft power can lead to the co-
option of international law. The problematic nature of the Cambodian case illustrates the 
state of American control over international criminal law, and highlights an abuse of 
international law that might become the norm if allowed to generate a thick body of 
customary law.    





that which he held in 1979 on the government of Cambodia at the time,302 the information 
about the conditions in Cambodia following the American bombardment was not yet 
controlled in the systematic manner that eventually led to the forming of the ECCC. 
Before completely changing his view of Cambodia in 1979 and eventually becoming the 
founding director of Yale University’s Genocide Studies Program, Kiernan’s work 
actually reflected an effort to sympathize with the revolutionary organization that 
governed Cambodia. It is not ruled out that the greater context behind Kiernan’s dramatic 
change of tone is that initially there may have been incentive for emerging scholars to 
participate in a discourse that offers a favorable narration of Cambodian resilience, and 
thereby diminish the impact of the American bombardment on the country.   
 The distance between narrating a hope for a Cambodian rebound and an 
accusation of genocide could not have been covered immediately, but there is an 
indication of an early attempt to do so hurriedly. When there was still a scarcity of 
material that would depict the revolution in Cambodia negatively, American information 
resorted in 1978 to translating and publishing a book that had been released in French the 
year before, and superimpose the genocide label on the work. The report of the 
missionary François Ponchaud, who witnessed the revolution and remained in the country 
until May, 1975, reveals a different approach from that of Kiernan’s original work in 
1976, but unlike the literature that followed, it does not have the marking of information 
that was designed toward a genocide accusation. Ponchaud’s account did express that 
there was a measure of harshness and suspicion in the revolutionary governance of 
                                                          







Cambodia, but he also described an intent to improve the conditions of the country and 
the people. Ponchaud recalled that the “deportees were classified” and asked “to state 
their identity,” but also that “Those who told the truth would not be punished.”303 While 
Ponchaud’s depiction of the revolutionary organization showed an animosity toward 
“American imperialism,”304 and a heightened suspicion of “enemies within,”305 he 
nonetheless stated that “The preamble to the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea” 
called for  
an independent, unified, peaceful, neutral, nonaligned, sovereign and democratic 
state enjoying territorial integrity, a national society informed by genuine 
happiness, equality, justice, and democracy, without rich or poor and without 
exploiters or exploited, a society in which all live harmoniously in great national 
solidarity and join forces to do manual work together and increase production for 
the construction and defense of the country.306  
 
This text, which nowadays does not receive much attention from the genocide 
scholarship, is more akin to Imagine by John Lennon than Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler. 
The conditions in bombarded Cambodia were not conducive to the successful 
reconstruction of a healthy society, and Ponchaud’s narration showed Pol Pot as focused 
on “repair work and restoration,”307 and concerned by the knowledge that malaria had 
infected the vast majority of the working force.”308 
 Despite the substance of Ponchaud’s actual account, the packaging by the 
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American publisher, Holt, Rinehart and Winston—the same publisher whose division, 
Metropolitan Books, published the translation of Akçam’s A Shameful Act—sought to 
genocidize the narrative. It is seen that the publisher added to the product material that 
was not Ponchaud’s own contribution, and this addition is foreign to Ponchaud’s account. 
The front flap of the book described the Cambodian revolution of 1975 as “one of the 
most brutal” ever, even though Ponchaud’s report itself did not suggest that he considered 
the revolution to be one of the harshest in history.309 The back flap of the book presented 
information that is even more removed from Ponchaud’s view by exclaiming that the 
Cambodian government “has systematically destroyed its own people and their past.”310 
Moreover, the back quotes Jean Lacouture’s review of Ponchaud’s work in The New York 
Review of Books, in which it is stated that “The new masters of Phnom Penh have 
invented something original, autogenocide.”311  
In this manner, the American production of this book, in cooperation with the 
publication of an influential review that genocidized Ponchaud’s information in a popular 
magazine, co-opted Ponchaud’s voice on the events by propagating a genocide accusation 
through his work. In the author’s note for the English translation, Ponchaud shared with 
his readers that “[Noam] Chomsky was of the opinion that Jean Lacouture had 
substantially distorted the evidence I had offered,”312 but considering that this comment 
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was written within the American publication of his monograph, it was not to be expected 
that Ponchaud himself would reject the co-option of his work. Ponchaud had given his 
consent to the American packaging of his book, and even added in the author’s note an 
expression of a sentiment that was not expressed in his original text by claiming that “the 
self-slaughter of the Khmer people” is to be “denounced.”313 Much literary material has 
been generated since the dramatic change of tone by Ponchaud, and the distortion has 
become the dominant information. 
Within the process that genocidized the Cambodian experience of 1975-1979, 
Gregory Stanton functioned as a liaison between the United States government and the 
scholarly production of material. In 1980, Stanton was the field director for the Church 
World Service in Cambodia, and from 1992 to 1999 he was officially employed by the 
United States government as a foreign-service officer in the Department of State.314 After 
a few years in which he established himself as a scholar, Stanton had a leading position in 
IAGS, as vice president from 2005 to 2007, and president from 2007 to 2009.315 His 
career embodies the thin line between American interests and scholarly information, as 
well as their effect on international law. Hence, Stanton’s narration is considered here as 
most reflective of the commitment to rewrite Cambodia’s history according to an 
American agenda to compare the leadership of the revolutionary government in 
Cambodia to Hitler’s leadership of Nazi Germany. 
When Stanton and Kiernan were conducting interviews in December 1986 to 
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create a body of information that would eventually be used to criminalize Cambodian 
action of genocide, they produced the following account from an eyewitness by the name 
of Huy Rady: “People from the Eastern zone would be known by their scarf. If you were 
wearing a blue scarf they would kill you. There was a plan to kill all the Eastern zone 
people. They were not going to spare any of them.”316 Based on this claim, which 
contradicts Ponchaud’s observation that evacuees who cooperated were unharmed, 
Stanton made the following point of comparison to the Holocaust: “The blue scarf was 
the yellow star.”317 Stanton aimed to establish the Cambodian experience as “one of the 
worst genocides in human history,”318 and in an attempt to genocidize the events there, he 
incorporated into his language references to intent and the types of groups that are 
protected by the Genocide Convention in the following way: “Premeditated murder. 
Genocide as state policy. Intentional killing of all ‘class enemies,’ elimination of cities 
and city dwellers, destruction of every ethnic and religious minority, mass murder of the 
Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea, execution of all teachers, doctors, lawyers, 
soldiers and government officials.”319 To complete the framing of information within a 
comparison with the Holocaust, Stanton offered the following vilifying statement about 
the Cambodian leader whose work proved to be influential in the revolutionary effort: 
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“The blue-print for the Khmer Rouge revolution, the Mein Kampf of Kampuchea, was 
written by Khieu Samphan, in his Ph.D. dissertation in economics at a French 
university.”320  
 A study of Samphan’s work reveals that Stanton’s comparison of it to Hitler’s 
manifesto is a resounding example of flawed information. Samphan obtained his doctoral 
degree in 1959 at the University of Paris,321 and Stanton’s reference to the Sorbonne—as 
it is commonly known—as “a French university” is such a tremendous understatement 
about France’s leading institution of higher education and research that it calls immediate 
attention to Stanton’s style of information control. Stanton may have considered it 
unbecoming to suggest that the famous university approved a work that he described as 
similar to Mein Kampf, or he may have concluded that the public would find his claim to 
be unbelievable because of it. The identity of the university in which Samphan obtained 
his Ph.D. lends credibility to Samphan’s work, and might suggest that his academic 
endeavor even had the support of a powerful source.    
 Contrary to Stanton’s assertion that Samphan’s work was Hitleresque, the 
translated version of Samphan’s dissertation actually reveals a sober analysis of why the 
Cambodian economy was not prepared for an American imposition of free trade because 
it reinforces a “recapitalist structure,”322 whereas Cambodia’s economic structure still 
resembled a “precapitalist agricultural economy.”323 In Samphan’s assessment, the 
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American aid to Cambodia in the 1950s was not conducive to developing Cambodia’s 
economy because it tended “to emphasize integration into the world market dominated by 
the United States of America, integration which underlies current underdevelopment.”324 
In stark opposition to Stanton’s claim that the Khmer government intentionally sought to 
kill “all” class enemies,325 Samphan stated in his dissertation that “We are not proposing 
to eliminate the classes having the highest incomes,” and professed that, instead, “we 
believe ways can and must be found to bring out their contributive potential by 
attempting to transform these landlords, retailers, and usurers into a class of industrial or 
agrarian capitalist entrepreneurs.”326 Samphan recognized that “Cambodia must and can 
industrialize,” but he thought that the success of this process depended on a “structural 
reform” by the state itself.327 When his vision was put into practice by the revolutionary 
government, it was done in the catastrophic conditions that followed the American 
bombardment. It is unlikely that while writing his dissertation Samphan could foresee the 
destruction of the Cambodian environment by the American campaign in Indochina, yet 
Stanton’s misleading presentation of Samphan’s intentions took advantage of the 
mayhem to criminalize him and erect a narrative that meets American historiographical 
preferences. 
 In consideration of Stanton’s history of service to the United States government 
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and the detectable bias in his narration of the revolutionary experience in Cambodia, 
knowledge of his role within the United Nations in the establishment of legal procedures 
to adjudicate genocide casts a shadow of doubt on the separation between American 
policy and international law. As revealed by Stanton’s online biography at George Mason 
University, while Stanton was an official of the United States government, “he drafted 
the UN Security Council Resolutions (955 and 978) that created the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” and he also “wrote the Options Paper on how to bring 
the Khmer Rouge leaders to justice for their crimes in Cambodia.”328 Moreover, while 
not officially employed by the United States, but as the founder of Genocide Watch, 
Stanton was “deeply involved in the U.N.-Cambodian government negotiations that have 
brought about [sic] creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, for which he has drafted 
internal rules of procedure and evidence.”329 This significant disclosure is amplified by 
the knowledge that Stanton had at one time been employed by both the United States and 
the United Nations. While assigned by the United States government “to work on the 
steering committee of the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations” with a budget 
of $800,000 for an “investigation” of the events,330 he was also hired by the United 
Nations “to direct the human rights education and training programs in Phnom Penh.”331  
 The creation of political conditions that were conducive to the establishment of 
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the ECCC are indicated by the production of documents toward it through the United 
Nations. In 1992, a resolution by the UNSC declared the decision that “the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia shall be established under its authority.”332 
In 1997, a commission that was sanctioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, announced the desire “to assist efforts to investigate Cambodia’s tragic 
recent history, including responsibility for past international crimes, such as acts of 
genocide and crimes against humanity.”333 Meaning, just a few years after the assumption 
of authority in Cambodia by the United Nations, the governance of that country was 
directed toward incriminating its past leaders and genocidizing its own history. This 
maneuver was carried out under the claim of being guided by “the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on 
Human Rights.”334 Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi A. 
Annan reported the reception of a letter from Prince Nordom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, the 
two prime ministers of Cambodia in which the new leadership of Cambodia essentially 
reiterated the recommendation by the Commission on Human Rights, and thereby 
occasioned the written recommendation by Secretary-General Annan that “the assistance 
of the United Nations” regarding this matter “is necessary.”335 Thus, it was made to seem 
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as if the wish to indict the former officials of the Cambodian revolutionary government 
was local, and that the United Nations was merely responding positively to a request by 
those who represented the Cambodian people.   
 Then, when a Group of Experts was empowered by the United Nations to produce 
a recommendation to “establish an ad hoc international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge 
officials for crimes against humanity and genocide committed from 17 April 1975 to 7 
January 1979,” it could claim to do so “in response to the request of the Government of 
Cambodia.”336 This narration of the Group of Experts’ purpose—suggesting that it was 
produced on behalf of Cambodia—had the effect of negating a recognition that through 
this report the credibility of the United Nations was used to convert American-controlled 
information into “evidence.” Nevertheless, the bias in the following consequential 
statement is observable: 
In the view of the Group of Experts, the existing historical research justified 
genocide within the jurisdiction of a tribunal to prosecute Khmer Rouge leaders. 
In particular, evidence suggests the need for prosecutors to investigate the 
commission of genocide against the Cham, Vietnamese and other minority 
groups, and the Buddhist monkhood.337 
 
By claiming that there is “evidence” to suggest that the leaders of the Khmer government 
committed genocide, a procedure of the United Nations facilitated the acceptance of 
flawed information. This information had been commissioned by the United States 
government toward controlling the historiography of the people whose country it had 
bombed. In this, Stanton had a leading role both in the process of constructing a narrative 
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that criminalized the leaders of the Khmer government, and in the process of sanctioning 
this collection of biased information as legal evidence. 
 As noted in the United Nations document that worded the validation of American-
controlled information as legal evidence, the genocidization of Khmer history was based 
on the “scholarly works” by Elizabeth Becker, Nayan Chanda, David P. Chandler, Karl 
D. Jackson, and Ben Kiernan. The use of their works in this context strengthens the 
suspicion that the American control over academic depictions of history may guide the 
framing of events toward fitting specific crimes in international law. In the case of 
accusing the revolutionary leaders in Cambodia of genocide, the scholars who are listed 
above were empowered to generate a narrative that describes the events in proximity to 
the spirit of the Genocide Convention. Despite the efforts to frame the rule between 1975 
and 1979 as genocidal, the events themselves did not correspond with the legal definition 
of genocide, and, as a result, these historiographical endeavors, especially the suggestions 
that there was an intent to destroy any of the type of groups that are protected by the 
Genocide Convention, as such, appear to be forced. 
 Conspicuously, the Group of Experts relied on the American-controlled 
information without regard to what the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea might 
indicate about the intent of the revolutionary government in its general treatment of 
diversity. The constitution of 1976 states in Article 12 of Chapter 9: “Every citizen of 
Kampuchea is fully entitled to a constantly improving material, spiritual, and cultural 
life.”338 Article 13 of that chapter declares: “Men and women are equal in every 
                                                          






respect.”339 More specifically relevant to the context of how ethnoreligious groups are to 
be treated, Article 20 of Chapter 15 clarifies that “Every citizen of Kampuchea has the 
right to worship according to any religion and the right not to worship according to any 
religion,” and added that “All reactionary religions that are detrimental to Democratic 
Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people are strictly forbidden.”340 This is in line with the 
government’s foreign policy, which, according to Article 21 of Chapter 16, “refuses all 
intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries,” and is set “to contribute actively 
to mutual aid and support in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, and in favor of independence, peace, friendship, democracy, justice, and 
progress throughout the world.”341 A fair interpretation of the government’s actions in 
consideration of its own constitution would recognize that the intent of its officials was 
not to destroy groups of the kind that are protected by the Genocide Convention but to 
defend the political existence of the state in the context of civil war and an American 
aerial assault on the country. 
 Instead, the decision to establish the ECCC was determined by texts of seemingly 
independent scholarly works that in actuality presented an American-controlled wording 
of what happened to match the Genocide Convention. This is particularly visible in the 
references to the Cham community in the literature that was cited by the Group of 
Experts as the basis for the genocide accusation. In one effort to give the impression that 
the revolutionary government in Cambodia had the intent to destroy a religious group as 
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such, the scholar Nayan Chanda insisted that “Over sixty thousand Cham minority 
people—mostly in the Kompong Chan area—were massacred for their Islamic faith.”342 
This was also the view that Stanton—whose name was not mentioned by the Group of 
Experts among those of the authoritative scholars on the Cambodian experience—
presented as fact by stating that “The Cham Muslims were especially singled out for 
murder.”343 Along these lines, David Hawk, who wrote in Karl D. Jackson’s edited 
volume, claimed that “The Cham, an Islamic group of Malayo-Polynesian racial stock, 
were singled out for especially harsh treatment.”344 Similarly, Elizabeth Becker attempted 
to relate the events to the language of the Genocide Convention by suggesting that the 
Chams were “doomed” as a matter of government policy “for their ‘foreign race’ and 
their ‘reactionary’ faith,”345 and that the revolutionary organization attacked them openly 
and systematically.346 The unevenness in the body of material about this is found in the 
absence of such emphasis in David P. Chandler’s work even though it is also listed 
among the main influences on the Group of Expert’s report.347 Furthermore, while 
Kiernan’s work played a central role in preparing the historiography for the insertion of 
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the genocide label by associating the Khmer government with a policy of ethnic 
cleansing and by stressing that the Chams were classified “for racial reasons,”348 it is here 
considered that in an earlier work he had made references to attacks against the Chams in 
1952,349 and in 1973,350 prior to the establishment of the revolutionary government. The 
stress in these texts on the persecution of minorities was abandoned in the years that 
followed the report by the Group of Experts, and the developed state of the genocide 
scholarship has defied the Genocide Convention more directly by claiming that the 
characterization of genocide is accurate even though the massacres had a political 
context.351 Overall, these scholarly texts that have served as the historiographical basis 
for genocidizing the Cambodian experience during the rule of the revolutionary 
organization between 1975 and 1979 are seen as information that was guided to have this 
effect.  
 This historiography was ready for use by the time that the political conditions for 
the establishment of the ECCC in Cambodia were directed by American power through 
the United Nations. The Group of Experts’ reference to the “1993 Constitution” of 
Cambodia shows the significance of the political process that was executed by the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The year after the UNSC resolution that 
empowered this control over the domestic affairs in Cambodia, the new constitution 
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provided “for an independent judiciary through a Supreme Court and lower courts.”352 
Once it was possible to establish a special—or, extraordinary—court in Cambodia in the 
likeness of the one that had been tested in Sierra Leone, the United Nations General 
Assembly requested,353 and then decided,354 that the legal determination over the 
narration of a significant period in history would be opened up for “voluntary 
contributions.” This means that the United Nations invited interested parties to essentially 
buy a court that would administer the legal sanctioning of a biased historiography. 
Entities were enabled to fund the ECCC, and especially those under American influence 
were obliged to do so. According to the report of the ECCC’s finances in 2013, the total 
contribution for that year by Japan—a state whose foreign policy has been dominated by 
American power since the end of WWII—was by a substantial margin the highest single 
donation, and amounted to 42% of the total contributions.355 Such a management of 
international law goes beyond auctioning legal procedure for it hands genocide 
convictions not to the highest bidder but to any bidder. In this fashion, the United Nations 
encouraged possessors of global and regional interests to purchase world history, and was 
an active participant in the abuse of international law.  
 Going by the genocide scholarship that accompanied the advent of the ECCC, to 
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genocide scholars this abuse of international law is a source of further empowerment. The 
decisions of the ECCC have not only confirmed the work of the genocide scholarship, but 
have enabled it to expand the meaning of “genocide” in greater defiance of the Genocide 
Convention. In relation to the Cambodian context, Alexander Laban Hinton could 
advance the claim that genocides arise in situations of “political strife.”356 It also allowed 
for the discursive separation between the immediate deaths that were caused by the 
American bombing, which are numbered to be “perhaps as many as 150,000 deaths,”357 
and the great suffering that continued to haunt the Cambodian people in its aftermath. 
Hence, Hinton can mention that the United States hit Cambodia with over half a million 
tons of bombs,358 yet place the blame for the prolonged suffering that happened following 
the bombardment as unrelated to American responsibility by way of stressing the agency 
of “a genocidal regime.”359 In 2008, Kiernan completed a full circle of controlled 
information by inserting the report by the Groups of Experts into the genocide 
scholarship’s discourse about the Cambodian experience. After the Groups of Experts 
lent credibility to Kiernan’s scholarly status by suggesting that according to his work 
there is cause for the charge of genocide, he lent credibility to the Groups of Experts by 
highlighting their determination that “The events of 1975-1979 … fit the definition of the 
crime outlawed by the UN Genocide Convention.”360 In this manner, one extension of 
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soft power complements another, and the public discourse is carried out in a manner that 
predetermines the quality of the legal procedure.  
 In the NYT, the abuse of international law was celebrated rather than criticized. 
The newspaper urged that the trials of Samphan and other “senior Khmer Rouge leaders” 
must be “pursued expeditiously” so that “true justice” may be served.361 The genocide 
label has managed to attract a discourse that distracts the public from the responsibility 
that the American intervention had on the governance of Cambodia. In 2011, the NYT 
quoted Samphan, then at the age of 80, asking “‘Can you imagine what the situation was 
like for the Cambodian people and the country as a whole during such carpet 
bombings?’”362 However, within the dominant information about the events, his plea is 
made to seem like a denial of his own responsibility. 
 Through the ECCC, a great amount of data manipulation and dissemination under 
American control has been put into use. Elderly Cambodians are being subjected to a 
publicized ordeal because of an American interest in marginalizing the impact of the 
United States decision to bomb Cambodia as heavily as it did during its military 
campaign in Indochina. This project also involves a soft-power ambition to affect the 
collective memory of the Cambodian people.363 If Cambodians become convinced that 
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the suffering in the 1970s was mostly the result of a Chinese-inspired Communist 
party,364 then the genocide discourse would not only register a successful concealment of 
American responsibility, but also turn local minds against the influence of China in its 
own region. Therefore, the genocidized state of the Cambodian experience is seen as a 
particularly accentuated abuse of international law. It presents a case in which the 
government that bombed a people is the one that writes the history of that people 
according to its own agenda.    
 
Genocide Labels vs. Human Rights 
At the core of the effort to treat “genocide” as a crime lies a belief about unified 
international standards of governance. The Genocide Convention presents an agreement 
between states that their power to govern comes with a duty to protect their own civilians 
in the form of an undertaking to prevent violence that might be defined as “genocide” and 
to punish those who commit it. The crime of genocide is the outcome of particular 
circumstances in the relationship between governments, between governments and their 
own citizens, and between governments and other governments’ citizens. The Genocide 
Convention focuses on the legal labeling of a certain kind of perpetration, but is not 
worded in a manner that articulates what would prevent the conditions that may lead to 
genocide or—more likely—to nongenocidal mass suffering. This wording is partly 
performed by the UDHR. The promotion of the rights of people before states is located 
on the other side of the same coin that promotes the duty of states toward people. From 
this perspective, the advancement of human rights in international law is expected to have 
                                                          






a preventative effect on conditions of persecution and even the extreme crime that is 
defined as genocide. However, a critical prerequisite for the development of universal 
human rights appears to be trust between governments that a powerful state would not 
use the existence of human rights to influence the affairs of another state from within and 
thereby seek to replace the acting government of the state with one that would better 
serve the powerful state’s narrow interests. Thus, while both the Genocide Convention 
and the UDHR are on the same branch of international law that seeks to establish 
international standards of governance in the relationship between states and citizens, 
states have only agreed to proceed toward this goal through the criminalization of a 
drastic and rare state behavior in a treaty, but have not converted the UDHR into such a 
document.  
 The “faith in fundamental human rights” is declared as a pillar of the preamble in 
the Charter of the United Nations,365 yet the UDHR has not been codified for legal 
procedure within the organization of the United Nations. In 1947, the idea to “write an 
international bill of rights” was proposed by the United States government before the 
Human Rights Commission, and the campaign for it was publicly associated with the 
leadership of “Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt.”366 The UDHR has not amounted to an 
international covenant but to two separate ones. Both were adopted on December 16, 
1966, but their coming into legal force has not matched the eventual near universal 
acceptance of the Genocide Convention. One of these, the International Covenant on 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,367 which entered force on January 3, 1976, has not 
been ratified by the United States.368 The other, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights declares “freedom of thoughts, conscience and religion,”369 the holding 
of “opinions without interference,”370 and “freedom of expression,”371 to be rights, but 
the covenant, which was brought into force on March 23, 1976, has not been ratified by 
China. It is the latter covenant that carries a greater potential of handicapping states in 
cases of challenges against the government. China’s nonratification of this covenant has 
been counteracted by criticism in the American-controlled information.372 The lack of 
agreement, especially between the United States and China, on how to legally define 
human rights in international law so that their protection may be applied universally 
reflects a void in the language of international law. As a result, “genocide” has been used 
in ways that exceed the scope of its legal definition to make up for the vacuum that has 
been maintained by the absence of a similar convention on human rights. The 
popularization of the genocide label has enabled American-inspired information to 
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renegotiate the demarcation between the specific crime of genocide and the general 
failure of states to remain faithful to the concept of human rights when they are 
confronted by challenges to their sovereignty.  
However, in the recent case of Perinçek v. Switzerland, this overuse of 
“genocide” for the progression of the American-envisioned international law around the 
world has reached the point of collision with the international adherence to human rights. 
Doğu Perinçek, a Turkish national, claimed before the European Court of Human Rights 
(European Court) that Switzerland had violated Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (European Convention), which states the freedom of expression, when 
Switzerland’s legal system convicted him of a crime for stating in public his opposition to 
the use of the genocide label in the characterization of the Armenian experience during 
WWI. The European Court decided in Perinçek’s favor in December 2013373 and this 
decision was later confirmed by the European Court’s Grand Chamber in October 
2015.374 In other words, the popularization of a genocide label outside the framework of 
the Genocide Convention has led to an international environment in which one of the 
basic human rights of an individual was violated. Hence, the tension between the 
American-led misuse of “genocide” and the promotion of human rights was manifested in 
a prestigious European court.  
 The opposition of these elements in Europe, under the influence of American-
controlled information, is embedded in the conflict between the substance of the 
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European Convention and the direction taken by parliaments in Europe. While the 
UDHR, which was adopted on December 10, 1948, has not reached the status of a 
convention among member states of the United Nations, its instruction on the “freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion,”375 the “freedom of opinion and expression,”376 and 
the protection from attacks against one’s “honour and reputation”377 carried over to the 
European Convention, which was drafted in 1950, and brought into law on September 3, 
1953.378 In this document, the “freedom of thought, conscience and religion” is protected 
by Article 9(1); the “freedom of expression” and “to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers” is protected by Article 10(1), and the “protection of the reputation or rights of 
others” is stated in Article 10(2).379 Such human rights of Turkish nationals in Europe 
have been jeopardized by the trend of European parliaments to follow the lead of the 
genocide discourse and turn into a matter of legislation the popular usage of the genocide 
label to describe the Armenian experience in WWI. This is an instance in which soft 
power impacts domestic legislations and threatens to affect international law in a manner 
that undermines human rights and legal standards.  
This practice has reached a moment of emphasis when the Council of Europe 
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claimed that “The Fact of the Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman Empire” had been 
“recognised” in the parliaments of “Sweden, Lithuania, Germany, Poland, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Switzerland, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Cyprus, the Russian 
Federation, as well as the US House of Representatives and 43 US States, Chile, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Canada, Uruguay and Lebanon,” to justify its own “call upon all 
members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to take the necessary 
steps for the recognition of the genocide perpetrated against Armenians and other 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century.”380 It was argued 
in the document that this step was seen as necessary in leading Turkey toward 
“recognition … of this odious crime against humanity” and the normalization of its 
relations with Armenia.381 This conflation of “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” 
is conspicuously in line with the discourse on international criminal law post-Rome 
Statute. Furthermore, the effect of imposing further official use of this legally 
unsubstantiated genocide label is that the freedoms of thought and conscience, and 
opinion and expression, along with the protection of reputation, would be exposed for 
violations against Turks like Perinçek in countries where the rejection of this label is 
against the law. This would become a contentious legal issue even though no competent 
tribunal of the kind that is listed in Article 6 of the Genocide Convention has ever held 
that genocide had been committed against the Armenians in WWI, nor would this matter 
have this kind of public discussion if not for the popular information about it.  
                                                          










 Despite the legal decision to side with Perinçek’s right to freedom of expression, 
the judgment by the European Court used a language that sustains the soft-power status 
of the genocide label regarding the Armenian experience, and, thereby, perpetuated the 
clash between popularized genocide labels and the human rights of those who are 
affected by such popularization. For instance, in a press release by the registrar of the 
European Court it was stated that Perinçek was convicted in Switzerland for having 
publicly challenged “the existence of the Armenian genocide.”382 This wording creates an 
assumption that Perinçek was in denial of the existence of some matter, and it takes the 
opportunity to promote “the Armenian genocide” as a phrase. Instead of this choice, it 
could have offered a careful articulation to explain that he was rebutting the 
characterization of an event, and not an event itself. The court proceedings provided a 
platform for highlighting that Perinçek “had described the Armenian genocide as an 
‘international lie’,”383 which, again, was another opportunity to promote the usage of “the 
Armenian genocide” as a phrase, and decontextualize Perinçek’s historiographical 
perspective. While the European Court pointed out—in defense of individuals who 
challenge common labels of historical events—that “historical research was by definition 
open discussion and a matter of debate,”384 it did not recognize the soft-power element in 
the domination of historical data, the creation of a general consensus among leading 
historians, and the conversion of the popular discourse to legal sanctioning in courts that 
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were recognized as competent by the United Nations. Therefore, the publicized language 
of the European Court’s judgment supported the historiographical framing that the 
genocide scholarship has established.  
 Significantly, the European Court squandered an opportunity to express its 
general concern for the abuse of history at the expense of human rights in Europe. In its 
evaluation of Article 10(2) of the European Convention, which considers the conditions 
for the restriction of the freedom of expression in keeping with the needs of democratic 
governance, the European Court determined that Switzerland did not show that there was 
a “pressing social need” to administer the punishment of “an individual for racial 
discrimination on the basis of statements merely challenging the legal characterisation as 
‘genocide’ of events that took place within the territory of the former Ottoman Empire in 
1915 and subsequent years.”385 Yet, the European Court did not consider that the case 
before it reflected a pressing social need to protect individuals whose group identity puts 
them in a relationship of historiographical contestation with the dominant narration of 
history. The Armenians of Europe are not under any threat by the general society because 
of the common discourse, whereas the Turks in Europe and around the world are. The 
European Court did not express an interest in protecting the reputation of Turks from 
accusations of genocide by association and genocide denial in countries where the 
American-led genocide discourse has dominated the collective beliefs about the history 
of the Ottoman Armenians.386 The dissenting view of the European Court’s Grand 
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Chamber reserved for itself the ability to make a statement about history in support of the 
genocide discourse, and even protect this historiography from the decision, by registering 
the following opinion: “That the massacres and deportations suffered by the Armenian 
people constituted genocide is self-evident. The Armenian genocide is a clearly 
established historical fact. To deny it is to deny the obvious. But that is not the question 
here.”387 This mentality reveals a great distance from recognizing that the mere focus on 
this aspect of Armenian modern history is an act of historiographical framing.388 
 On the face of it, the genocide label that has been used against the leaders of the 
Ottoman Empire might seem like a strictly Turkish problem, but it pertains to the 
memory of a government that was perceived by the Euro-Christian civilization as 
representative of Islamic governance. The historiographical characterization of the 
Ottoman conduct is reflective of the dominant historical narrative that surrounds Muslims 
and people of Islamic heritage who might not even be active followers of Islam as a 
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religion. This historical narration is intertwined with the national narrative of Euro-
Christian states, in which questions are raised regarding the ability of Muslims to 
assimilate and function as patriotic citizens. Perinçek’s experience in Switzerland, which 
is a country that has been particularly influenced by American education on the 
Armenian experience,389 shows that in countries of the Euro-Christian civilization there is 
a severe insensitivity to the offensive parts of historiography that still maintain a 
vilification of non-Christians as the “other,” even though they have become increasingly 
present among the general society.  
 The underestimation of the impact that exclusionary narration has on the sense of 
national belonging among Muslims in countries of the Euro-Christian civilization is 
noticeable in the academic debate over multiculturalism. As defined by Will Kymlicka, 
the term denotes a design by state policy “to provide some level of public recognition, 
support or accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups.”390 In the aftermath of 
the events on September 11, 2001, multiculturalism has come under criticism for 
facilitating the existence of Muslim communities as independent entities within states 
that are predominantly representative of the Euro-Christian civilization. As Kymlicka 
puts it, “multiculturalism has declined as Muslims have come to be seen as the main 
proponents or beneficiaries of the policy.”391 In a work that describes “a retreat from 
multiculturalism wherever Muslims and Islam have come to dominate a country’s 
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integration debate,”392 Christian Joppke and John Torpey suggest that the Muslim 
presence “is destructive of the liberalism that enables it.”393 According to them, “the crux 
of the matter is Islam’s penchant for demanding that its adherents remain entirely and 
always within its religious framework and to accept secular law only if this is first 
commanded by religious law itself.”394 They do not consider how the general discourse 
might exclude Muslims, but prefer the explanation that Muslims are inherently out of 
place in liberal societies because of Islam’s “orthopraxy.”395 The emphasis on the cultural 
gap between Muslims and the general society in countries of the Euro-Christian 
civilization might be misleading because the perceived disinclination of Muslims to adopt 
the national identity of such countries could be caused by differences in how intergroup 
relations are remembered and narrated rather than by differences in beliefs and practices. 
In his defense of multiculturalism in spite of the dominant post-9/11 discourse, Kymlicka 
not only considers cultural barriers but also historiographical ones. However, even 
though he recognizes that “perceptions of historic injustice” present an “important 
obstacle to the adoption of Western models,”396 his examples do not include cases of 
systematic American-led historiographical discrimination against Muslims, nor is it 
expected that in the current environment scholars of the Euro-Christian civilization would 
consider the Turks to have been victims of historiographical abuse. 
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 In view of Perinçek v. Switzerland, it is seen that the historiographical project of 
the American-led genocide discourse was strengthened by the legal procedure of the 
European Court regardless of the decision to defend the freedom of expression. The 
information that was generated by the proceedings amplified the discourse about the 
Armenian experience as genocide, and offered little consideration of how the dominance 
of the popular discourse challenged Perinçek’s freedom of expression in the first place. 
While the decision was seemingly for the protection of human rights, the popular 
information about it created even more damage for the reputation of Turkish individuals. 
In an exemplary news item about the case, the British tabloid, the Daily Mail, drew on 
the celebrity power of Amal Clooney, who represented the Armenian government before 
the European Court’s Grand Chamber, to attract its readers to information about the case, 
in an article titled: “It’s Amal Versus the Genocide-Deniers: Mrs. Clooney Leads Euro-
Court Fight for Turkish MP to be Prosecuted for Calling Death of 1.5 Million Armenians 
‘a Lie’.”397 The decontextualized presentation of the information is occasioned by the 
legal case, and it appeared before a wide readership. In it, the claim is made that “The 
killings in 1915 are regarded by many historians as the first genocide of the 20th century, 
and are said to have inspired Nazi leader Adolf Hitler.”398 Alongside images of Amal 
Clooney in court, the online article features a picture of Perinçek and a picture of a pile of 
skeletons, under which the caption says the following: “Never forget: An undated 
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photograph showing men standing behind a mass grave containing the remains of 
Armenian victims slaughtered by the Ottoman Turks during the 1915 genocide.”399 For 
the members of the public who first became acquainted with Amal Clooney in connection 
with the famous actor, George Clooney, the perceived image of this court case is that of a 
familiar human-rights lawyer who is leading an argument against a Turkish genocide 
denier.  
Consequently, the public might be convinced that Amal Clooney was protecting 
human rights in this litigation, but the very dominance of the discourse against Turks 
shows how concrete is the threat of genocide misuse against human rights: not only the 
freedom of expression, but the protection of reputation from the damage that is done by 
soft power. In this environment, the use of “genocide” becomes a discouraging element 
in the quest for universal agreement on human rights for it shows that both may be 
manipulated by soft power. When it comes to the commitment to establish international 
standards in the relationship between governments and their citizens, the opposing 
directions between genocide labeling and that of human rights may lead to a loss of way. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the ratification of the Genocide Convention in the United States, the term 
genocide has started to have legal effects on international politics. This effort has mainly 
included a reliance on the credibility that has been lent to the genocide scholarship, the 
dissemination of guided information on specific events in the popular media, and the 
establishment of organizational infrastructure for adjudication. In general, the discourse 






developed and promoted the notion that civil wars provide a common habitat for the 
perpetration of genocide. This has been carried out in the dominant literature on 
“genocide,” even though the Genocide Convention does not set out to protect political 
groups, and civil wars are inherently situations in which the intent is not to destroy 
groups that do not challenge the sovereignty of the state but to attain or maintain political 
control within a state.  
 Despite the designed proclivity to view civil wars as genocide, in the Nagorno-
Karabakh War, the Armenians of the region inside the recognized territory of Azerbaijan 
attacked its civilians with the support of Armenia, but the event did not generate 
information that would lead the public to expect prosecution within the legal procedures 
of international law, and it is considered that the American-led discourse on Armenian 
victimization had emboldened Armenians to pursue an aggressive campaign against the 
Turkic people and believe that their territorial claims against them are justified. 
Nevertheless, the warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh did produce information in which 
language could be used to prepare the ground for genocidizing civil wars by describing 
political contestation as ethnic violence. The reports on the war in the former Yugoslavia 
introduced the term ethnic cleansing, which would then be used to transition information 
toward a genocide claim, as seen in the ICTY’s decision that Serbs had committed 
genocide against Bosnians in Srebrenica. Regarding the mass killings in Rwanda, the 
ICTR registered convictions of genocide that criminalized a government that had been 
drawn into a civil war by a massive act of terrorism when Ugandan soldiers of Tutsi 
heritage were mobilized as a nonstate entity to invade Rwandan territory. Both of these 





and created conditions for an agreement among states on the establishment of the ICC, 
which had already been desired prior to WWII by those who have been orchestrating the 
progression of international law.  
The Rome Statute not only facilitated this centralized court for international 
crime, but also reconfigured the criminal code, and presented a new meaning and 
function for “crimes against humanity.” This significant change was not highlighted in 
the public discourse, which focused on showing the United States government as hesitant 
about ratifying the document. Around this time, literary material showed the United 
States as a reluctant intervener, thereby persuading the public to consider American 
policy in terms of reactions and responses rather than initiatives and instigations. These 
works of genocide narration, which were produced following the events of the 1990s, had 
the effect of leading public opinion to support the idea of American intervention for 
genocide prevention. The suddenly genocidized quality that was added to the popular 
depictions of the protracted civil war in Sudan gave the United States the opportunity to 
test the new tools of international criminal procedure while adhering to a strictly 
informational capacity in the campaign to label the brutal fighting in Darfur as genocide 
and use the believability of the label to apply pressure on China. Simultaneously, through 
the United Nations, the United States was able to create adequate conditions for the 
establishment of the ECCC in Cambodia as a medium that would give a legal sanction to 
the project of controlling the historiography of the country that it had bombed by 
accusing the local leadership of genocide.  
Such an abuse of international law was further manifested in the case of Perinçek 





international legal affairs has reached the point where the misuse of the term genocide 
clashes with the protection of human rights. The existence of this conflict defeats the 
common purpose—or at least potential—of both the Genocide Convention and the 
concept of human rights in international law, which is to arrive at unified international 
standards of governance. Therefore, while American soft power has over the course of 
many years gradually, patiently, and, to a great extent successfully, been used to prepare 
minds and facilities for the advancement of international law, the temptation of using its 
ability to popularize the information on “genocide” in a legal context for the sake of 
serving narrow interests indicates that the American political leadership may have 
neglected the broad vision of reaching unified international standards of governance. The 
abuse of international law by American soft power stifles the flow of free judicial 




















This dissertation shows how the term genocide has functioned as an element of 
soft power within the vision of international law that was developed during the hard-
power contest between the American and German ways of power from the 1870s to the 
1940s. Since the genocide scholarship has not expressed recognition that its existence as 
a source of information on “genocide” is an extension of power, the study of the term 
genocide as a phenomenon has thus far been limited to biased scholarly works that 
through a popular discourse affect legal affairs without being legally sanctioned. By 
adhering to a power-based approach to the study of the term genocide as an informational 
tool, this dissertation provides an analysis of the term’s origination and development 
within the context of the power considerations that inspired the modern quest for the 
establishment of international law and continue to navigate the progression of 
international law. Unlike the works of genocide scholarship that present the advent and 
usage of the term genocide as a moral response to violent events, this work offers a view 
of “genocide” as representing a critical stage in the particularization of power toward the 
governance of global affairs. The following sections consider the meaning of the findings 
about the history of “genocide” in a manner that points at the potential of a dialectical 





power, might eventually turn into international legal power.    
 
The “Genocide” Story 
 The story of “genocide” within the history of international law is about how 
power utilizes group identity for governance worldwide. As soft power, the term 
genocide has played a role in the project to negate hard-power contestation by organizing, 
politicizing, and sustaining identity groups. For legal power in international law, the 
language of identity politics through the popular usage of “genocide” cannot continue to 
dominate the criminal code. In the dialectical progression in which great power is 
particularized toward international law, group identity was a foundational component of 
nation-states: the functionality of such states depended on the strength of their national 
identity. From the perspective of those who seek to establish a global law, nation-
building and nation-preserving processes are necessary for internationalism even though 
they constrain the effort to reach an international legal system that asks of nation-states 
not only to surpass the conflicting interests between them but to choose unified standards 
of law over law that is defined by group identity. For international law to work, nation-
states are asked to make a difficult choice: international unity over the national unit. The 
choice of international unity might weaken the national unit, but the national unit might 
owe its existence to international unity as a destination.   
 Governance has a utility-based relationship with group identity. Without a 
common identity among people there is no collective and there is no mobilization. People 
accept law when it is relatable to their existence as a society. Political leadership is a 





 However, the intricacy of the relationship between governance and group identity 
reveals itself when governance evolves toward exercising power over a larger group that 
includes people who are not of the same ethnic background. This is when governance 
negotiates with the ethnic group identity in the interest of transitioning toward the more 
inclusive civic identity without losing the core of the social glue that keeps people 
responsive as a governable unit. In other words, the goal of a governance that seeks to 
successfully introduce law over a variety of different identity groups is to promote the 
element of social activation that is inherent to the group identity but also to limit the 
sense of exclusivity that might disrupt the interaction with nongroup members within the 
same evolving larger society. Inclusive governance is effective governance when it 
maintains intergroup exchanges within a general attitude of a united society.  
 This negotiation process is complex, and the information through which it finds 
expression is itself a form of governance that is mindful of group identity. Thus, it is 
considered that the new electoral trends that have been narrated as a resurgence of 
ethnonationalism are also a platform for a reminder that civic nationalism has virtue as 
the preferred political culture. Similarly, on campuses of leading American universities, 
student organizations are encouraged to maintain group identity as the source of social 
activism but are discouraged from excluding individuals who do not seem to possess the 
group members’ identity features. These two discourses—one popularizes a populist 
phenomenon and the other popularizes a progressive phenomenon—actually complement 
each other. They both advance a notion of passion that is related to group identity as well 
as an awareness of the dangers that exclusivity presents to a pluralistic society.  





power. It inspires social engagement in issues of governance without it seeming like a 
top-down project. The fluctuations of group identity have to seem authentic rather than 
controlled in order for changes in governance to appear as if they are made by the people. 
Significantly, when these changes are reflective of the particularization of power toward 
governance they enable the civic element to keep in check the strong emotions of group 
identity. In one recent example that presented a compelling argument for group identity 
on the one hand and general inclusivity on the other hand, it was publicized by outlets of 
the mainstream media in the United States—including the main avenues of social 
media—that a woman of no known genealogical African heritage considers herself to 
have an African identity, and has based much of her social behavior on this belief. While 
her case might reflect the sentiment of others in American society and her influence on 
society is largely perceived as a snapshot of a bottom-up social change, it is also 
considered here that the informational focus on her case is a top-down act. This is the 
subtle art of the conversation between governance and group identity, and the 
dissemination of knowledge about this case served governance by highlighting the 
importance of group identity to people while also emphasizing that the general society’s 
civic identity provides its members with a freedom that overpowers social limitations that 
are associated with group identity perceptions in a multigroup society. Knowledge of this 
case both popularized group identity and placed group identity in the context of a society 
in which group identity is subordinate to the encompassing civic identity.  
 Governance successfully utilizes group identity when it directs the intense 
feelings that are inspired by group identity toward the long-term advancement of 





group identity related protest in the United States during the 1960s became popularly 
known as a civil-rights movement; it was not named after one particular identity group 
nor was it named the “ethnic-rights” movement. While the mobilization in this case was 
ethnic-based, the language that was used to describe the movement channeled its 
meaning toward civil evolution. This is how soft power operates when it leads to legal 
power.  
 What is the function of “genocide” within the striving for a delicate balance 
between governance and group identity? In the international realm, the term genocide has 
been used to popularize international criminal law through the production of exciting 
information about conflict between identity groups that appeals to groups’ political sense 
of self. The popular discourse on “genocide” is information toward an increase in the 
scope and quality of governance, but it is also a term that inculcates a language that 
marks separation between groups. “Genocide” promotes a language of claims that does 
not convert into calm. It stresses the selfhood of identity groups as political creatures by 
offering a link to the popular international discourse, but this very utility popularizes the 
group identity as a unit. Since the term genocide is identity laden, its popular usage has 
the power to mobilize the national unit, and keep it mobilized. It is likely that most 
genocide accusations will be argumentative and open-ended without being conducive to 
adjudication or reconciliation. This means that despite having contributed to the 
American-led civilizing process through solidifying national identity and advertising 
international criminal law, the common usage of “genocide” is a challenge to, rather than 
a mirror of, a civic mentality among nation-states.  





confuses—against the spirit of the Genocide Convention—protected groups with 
rebellious groups, it pushes forward narrow interests of national sentiment through self-
assured claims of injustice. In the case of “genocide,” the popular usage of the term does 
not simply protect the existence of identity groups, it offers a language of exclusivity 
between the groups about justice. This creates a conflictual and dysfunctional 
environment between groups that have been politically empowered to be members of the 
international society. The language of conflicting group claims for justice begs for order, 
and, hence, promotes the sense of a need for international law, but it has been doing so 
regardless of legal procedure and without accountable information that would allow for 
order. 
 The fervor of group identity is significant for governance locally and globally, but 
it is harnessed toward effective governance only once it is placed under a civic arch. 
While in American society the language of group identity is subservient to civic identity, 
in the international society the popular usage of “genocide” is not restrained by a 
universal civic identity. As in the United States, the unsettled nature of the relationship 
between governance and group identity might be an inevitable part of governance 
internationally, but the lack of structural civic identity for international governance 
indicates that there is a gap between international law and the accomplishments of 
interstate law in the American legal system. Once a shared law is wanted among the 
nations, as it was among the American states, then the information that intensifies 
national identity may be superseded by information that secures the rule of law 
internationally. In the United States, elected political leaders profess their allegiance to 





particular group identity within the American society. In the international setting, group 
identity, as embodied in the term genocide and its popular usage, is currently hovering 
above the law.  
 By paying attention to what the story of “genocide” tells about power, it becomes 
observable that international law is still at a developmental stage in its dialectical 
progression. Governance speaks to group identity, but soft power in international affairs 
has not transitioned from using a language that strengthens the national unit to offering an 
expression of international unity under a fair and trusted legal system. Nevertheless, the 
process toward legal power does not have to match the promise of legal power. As this 
dissertation suggests, evidently power is being invested in creating information that 
fortifies the national unit, which is essential to, but not the quality of, international law. 
Nation-states might find a clearer path to an international civic identity if they develop 
such an identity within their own borders. Civically insecure nation-states are conditioned 
to rely on the ability to nourish a dominant group identity. Insecurity is exasperated by 
the dread of unrest and rebellion that may receive external support in the form of a 
genocide accusation against members of the government. As this stage of international 
politics shows, the passion for the national unit is a prerequisite for the peace of 
international unity; participation within the nation-state is a prerequisite for regulation 
among nation-states; and the popular calls for justice are a prerequisite for legal 
performance toward international order.   
 It could be that the foundations of national identities around the world are not 
nearly sturdy enough for the popular information to systematically construct knowledge 





operation—with the legitimate authority that is legal power—might require it. Even 
though nation-states have not secured their governance in a way that would afford them 
distance from identity politics, it is here considered that a shift toward a language that 
values civic identity on top of national identity can commence without delay. By pointing 
at the work of soft power in the employment of “genocide” to popularize international 
law, this dissertation might have the effect of helping the genocide discourse give way to 
a discourse that is more direct about its power source and process of power 
particularization. The culture of accountability in international law can start its spurt of 
growth now alongside a realization of the following analysis: the term genocide has value 
in popularizing group identity as political capital and international criminal law as a 
concept but suffers from incapacitating legal deficiencies that prevent it from directly 
offering much for the sake of international order.  
 
Hard Power at the Core of International Order 
International law would not have gotten its start with the American effort for 
international arbitration in the late nineteenth century if not for power considerations on a 
global level, and, correspondingly, international law cannot be explained without 
recognizing first and foremost that hard power provided the basis for its promotion. As it 
became possible and desirable to turn the world into a global community, the idea of 
communalizing the governance of the world’s territories came in tow. Much like the 
formation of a legal system on a local level, the creation of an international legal system 
was undertaken by the existence of a network that possessed the ability and commitment 





maintenance of a status quo in relation to the distribution of material. A prerequisite for 
its enactment is the capacity to establish authority over those whose affairs the law sets 
out to govern. 
 While the idea of law requires an imaginative working of the mind, it is tied to a 
calculation that starts with material advantage. Competition over necessities for survival 
between unequally positioned individuals leads to an imbalance in the possession of these 
life necessities. The possessor of an accumulated amount of such material has more than 
enough, and begins to consider how to convert material superfluity to material advantage. 
It is when this material advantage is attained that the establishment of law—the usage of 
material advantage to crystallize the material advantage—becomes advantageous and a 
matter of interest. In the quest for law, the core of both means and end is material. In its 
most elementary manifestation, law begins as an effort to preserve hard power by the 
conversion of hard power into institutions and information that would govern behavior in 
agreement with the existing distribution of material. Once the law is established 
successfully, the conformity to its rules means that an order has been formed through a 
process of legitimization, and, thus, the law acquires a quality of governance that exceeds 
the original consideration of hard power that led to its design. The law then enables a 
greater number of people to become one society that abides by the power’s idea of order.   
 However, for law to receive the response of conformity and, thereby, turn into 
order, it must be traced to a clearly communicated authority. Without a displayed 
connection between the hard power that led to the creation of the law and the system that 
administers it, there would be no sense among those who are expected to abide by the law 





state law, the enforcement of the law by the police serves as an immediate 
communication about the authority of the government, but for international law, there is 
no world government, and wars have been required to communicate authority. It is 
unusual for people to ask why the local police station is open daily, but it is common to 
question why the United States military has been actively engaged in wars around the 
globe. A certain showing of hard power is required for an authority to be seen as a source 
of law, and it is apparent that the United States has not presented itself as being at the 
level of authority on a global level that matches the authority of a government on a 
domestic level.   
 In the case of international law, there has not been a direct assumption of 
authority by the United States, even though American considerations of hard power have 
led it into being. Not only that, but the scholarly discourse has concealed the degree to 
which international law is a matter of American planning. This concealment has been 
attempted through predominant theory, historiography, and news reports on current 
affairs. The theoretical framework of the American-led study of IR insists on teaching 
that realism and internationalism are dichotomous approaches, but in actually 
internationalism originated as an indirect form of maintaining a balance of power in 
Europe, which was a major Anglo-American interest during the rise of Germany in the 
years that led to WWI. The basis of internationalism as a project was to erect national 
entities that would be motivated to surround Germany as political barriers and thus 
impose a balance of power in Europe. In this, international law was designed to be a 
system that would stimulate the multilateral interaction between these nation-states in 





 By claiming that the United States followed a doctrine of nonintervention in 
European affairs and remained neutral until joining WWI in April of 1917, the dominant 
historiography has kept hidden the significant work of Americans through soft power, 
with the cooperation of allies among the great powers, toward giving previously 
nonpolitical groups a national identity and organizational guidance. Robert College, 
whose effect on the cultivation of the Armenian and Bulgarian nationalities within the 
Ottoman Empire was particularly far-reaching, provides a primary example of an 
American institution that actively educated and trained its students to become national 
leaders of different groups who would then execute the administration of their group as 
politically independent entities. While no European power interfered with the completion 
of the railway that laced together the United States of America from the coast of the 
Atlantic Ocean to the coast of the Pacific Ocean, American power established national 
organizations to the east of Germany that created disturbances in Germany’s ability to 
use its influence over the Ottoman government toward the completion of a railway from 
Berlin to Bagdad, which could have connected the Reich to the Persian Gulf and possibly 
later to India. Nonetheless, the historiographical language that shapes the popular view on 
the wording of the criminal code in international law does not include the recognition that 
before many Armenians were made to suffer from the political conflict between the 
leaders of the Armenian revolutionary effort and the Ottoman government there had been 
foreign influences on the Armenian collective identity that amounted to interferences 
with the Ottoman ability to govern its population.   
 Following WWI and the establishment of the League of Nations, the nation-states 





were the newly constructed states of Eastern Europe. Their destruction, as such, was the 
main political project of Nazi Germany in WWII. In this context of hard-power 
considerations, the term genocide was invented in Washington, DC, during the war to 
introduce the protection of the national group so that at war’s end the United States and 
its allies could criminalize the Nazi German actions against internationally recognized 
nation-states and prevent such acts of expansion from recurring. The credibility of the 
term genocide in public opinion was bolstered by the term’s association with a Polish 
lawyer, whose voice as a person from Poland was taken to represent the sentiment of 
victimhood, and highlight that the conquered territories were occupied nation-states. This 
was part of an effort to generate information that in the war’s aftermath would give 
impetus to Germany’s reeducation and support the quick reestablishment of the nation-
states in Eastern Europe as such. Hence, “genocide” came to life as a creature of soft 
power that had been begotten by hard power.  
 Despite its origins in American considerations of hard power, the term 
genocide—along with the general project of post-WWII international law via the United 
Nations—was made to seem non-American through mainstream depictions of news 
regarding “genocide” and the development of international criminal law over the years. 
The United States was described as hesitant about the ratification of the Genocide 
Convention, and then withheld its legal use of “genocide” for decades. In addition, the 
United States was accused of genocide in publicized campaigns regarding the conditions 
of African Americans in the 1950s, and following the escalation of the military assault on 
Vietnamese villages in the 1960s, though these accusations vanished from the popular 





ratify the Rome Statute that established the ICC and revamped the codification of crimes 
in international law. These instances give a superficial impression that the direction of 
“genocide” in particular, and international law in general, is independent of American 
considerations, but a power-based analysis of the history of "genocide" instructs a 
different interpretation. Accordingly, it is considered that for the American political 
leadership hard-power interests were held to be better served by a soft-power strategy 
that would portray the term genocide as non-American, and maintain the semblance of 
distance between one powerful government and the direction of international law. In 
actuality, the vision of international law illustrates an American way of power, and the 
United States did not simply stumble across an opportunity to promote international order 
following the two world wars but rather it fought for this opportunity.  
 
“Genocide” as Soft Power 
Since the day of its inception, the information about “genocide” has called 
attention away from a detailed recognition of the power that designed the term. This 
means that right from the start there was no clearly stated authoritative source for 
“genocide” as law. The very first explanation of “genocide,” in Axis Rule, did not 
elaborate on why it had been determined by the American political leadership to promote 
the criminal code of international law through Raphael Lemkin or what was the ultimate 
goal of the term genocide in the long run following WWII; rather, it applied the term to 
the actions of the Nazi German government, as if to suggest that the actions themselves 
necessitated the naming of them as “genocide.” Thus, the moralistic tone with which the 





perceived as an utterance that expresses the conscience of humanity, and not as part of a 
power-based design for the advancement of international criminal law. 
 The insistence on maintaining a distance between “genocide” and its source of 
authority opened up the way for a discourse on “genocide” that is removed from the 
term’s original context, and dictated by the potential to inspire unity of mind about 
“genocide” as a crime. Since the narration of the history of “genocide” has diminished 
the sense of its power-based purposing, and heightened its value as the designation for a 
shocking crime, it is not common to consider the American-led desire to maintain Poland 
as a political barrier against German expansion to be one of the leading reasons behind 
the advent of the term genocide; instead, the Holocaust is considered in this context. 
Originally, the systematic execution of Jews under Nazi German control in Europe was 
not the main feature of the term genocide as articulated in Axis Rule, but the Holocaust 
later came to represent the inspiration for the Genocide Convention because it presented a 
case in which Jews were exterminated, as such, without being members of a politically 
purposed group that challenged Germany's sovereignty. Even though by WWII Zionism 
had functioned as an active Jewish national organization that was influenced by the 
interests of great powers and a factor in international politics, it did not contest 
Germany’s control of its homeland. Meaning, the Holocaust told the story of a 
persecution that was not conditioned by a group’s rejection of its state’s sovereignty. In 
addition, the Nazi German method of mass execution indicated an exceptional intent to 
destroy the group. At some point, the discourse on “genocide” began to show the Jewish 
suffering as the prototypical case of genocide, while ignoring the clearly stated objective 





previously functioned as lands of nation-states such as Poland. The political element that 
was central to the original usage of “genocide” during WWII was replaced by usage that 
linked the term to a universally condemned offense.   
 Therefore, it may be observed that the lack of transparency in the introduction of 
this legally purposed term allowed for a culture of beguilement to dominate the process 
through which “genocide” became known to the public. The dissemination of information 
about “genocide” followed the method of what is now known as soft power. It was 
advanced through agents of information that were perceived as separated from American 
considerations of hard power, and was given qualities to frame the discourse, attract 
attention, and persuade minds. In accordance with its purpose to be an effective promoter 
of the idea that international law concerns itself with the internal affairs of sovereign 
states, “genocide” was made amenable to the indirect use of power. As a moment in the 
progression of international law, it was used to elevate the awareness of the need for legal 
procedure that would criminalize persons of a member state through the United Nations, 
but at the expense of being a bona fide article of international law itself. It was utilized to 
bring public opinion closer to international law, but its existence as a term that has been 
molded through soft power to construct international criminal law has included usages 
that do not befit a legal term.          
 There was a great deal of manipulation involved in how the term genocide was 
first made legal in the Genocide Convention, then kept from legal relevance until the 
American ratification of the convention at the end of the Cold War, while gradually being 
shaped into legal use through the popular discourse. The member states of the United 





interpreted according to its definition in the Genocide Convention. As long as “genocide” 
remained strictly associated with the Nazi German perpetration of the Holocaust, the bar 
for proving the intent to destroy was held so high that the term genocide was kept far 
from legal use. “Genocide” remained popular in the public discourse through constant but 
erratic references to it. Only when the American-based narration of modern Armenian 
history began to systematically feature the term genocide, did the language on genocide 
become dedicated to treating civil wars as hotbeds of genocide. This new literary 
direction was made public just as the genocide accusations against the American 
campaign in Vietnam reached a high level of popularity, and “genocide” had penetrated 
deeper into public consciousness.  
 The momentum of genocide consciousness reignited the interest in “genocide” 
and prepared the ground for a controlled reshaping of the term’s meaning by the 
production of scholarly works and popular literature that compared the Armenian 
experience to the Holocaust. This comparison suppressed even further the original 
context of “genocide” in reaction to the German Nazi aggression against existing nation-
states. Even though both the Poles and the Armenians functioned as barriers to prevent 
German expansion, the Polish case inspired the new emphasis on protecting national 
groups because Poland had been a nation-state before WWII began with the Nazi German 
invasion, whereas in the Armenian case there had been no Armenian nation-state at the 
start of WWI, and the Armenian political existence was carried out by way of an openly 
stated rebellion against its Ottoman government. According to the first text on 
“genocide” in Axis Rule, the Polish type of victimhood exemplified it, since the Poles 





keeping with the later agenda to bring “genocide” into applicability in cases of civil war 
through popular usages of the term, the genocide discourse became inundated with 
references to the Armenian case as a primary example of genocide.       
 Knowledge of what “genocide” means—how the Genocide Convention is to be 
interpreted—was not initially determined by international judges, but by an empowered 
academic network of scholars. While appearing as independent experts, certain promoted 
works of sociologists suddenly began to generate information that changed the legal 
definition of genocide, and began to treat the Armenian suffering during WWI as 
genocide. In preparation for the advent of genocide scholarship as a field of study, 
sociological meaning-making functioned in tandem with works of historiography that had 
structured the narration of events to match a genocidized history. Since these works of 
history did not use the genocide label themselves, they were not immediately seen as 
biased, but they provided the sociological works with the necessary material to make a 
determination about “genocide” while seemingly basing it on dependable historical data. 
In other words, the historical framing was followed by sociological labeling. In the 
Armenian case, the use of the term genocide under the pretext of sociological study was 
preceded by works of history that carefully depicted the events through allusions to 
“genocide” but without using the term genocide. This template of historical framing 
before the sociological labeling was followed in the Cambodian case. Such works were 
then lent credibility by the production of popular commentary on them, before reaching 
the level of common usage.  
When history is genocidized through a discourse, it means that the language that 





from a great power to a local actor, and to intensify intergroup conflict about the past. 
This utilization of an academic discourse is seen as soft power because it has shaped the 
meaning of “genocide” in public opinion while ignoring the connection between the 
political power behind it and the information that it has produced. Hence, it is observed 
that the information that determined how “genocide” is to be used and perceived lacks 
legal power because the international adjudication on matters of “genocide,” which has 
followed the establishment of a structured popular discourse on “genocide,” was never 
shown as protected from the influence of this information and its potential politically 
driven sources.  
 Consequently, the application of “genocide” as the subject of adjudication in 
cases of civil war was achieved, and the worldwide awareness of international criminal 
law has grown, but the law is so thoroughly affected by soft power that it has no legal 
power. The judgments on “genocide” in international tribunals during the 1990s, and the 
introduction of domestic trials on “genocide” following the Rome Statute, have generated 
courtroom information about international crime, but the dominance with which popular 
information has determined the conditions for the interpretation of “genocide” has made 
the role of the courts a mere formality. Sheer power over legal information might cause 
public opinion to give “genocide” a meaning that agrees with American foreign policy 
and historiographical preferences, but it fails to function as law among governments that 
are deprived of equal participation in legal interpretation. The tremendous influence that 
one government might have on international organizations and court systems in other 
nation-states has the capacity to yield legal results that shape the customary use of 





In other words, soft power may have garnered legitimacy for “genocide” in public 
opinion, but at the cost of raising the suspicion of other governments. If the rule of law is 
maneuvered by a disequilibrium in soft power, then international criminal law might be 
misused as a weapon for moralistic attacks on other governments by those who have a 
soft-power advantage, without the legitimacy of law and without the possibility of a 
universal intergovernmental conformity. 
 
The Legal Power of International Law 
For international law to have legal power, the law must have a clear source of 
authority while at the same time that source of authority must respect the independence of 
the law after it had been given. The ongoing subjection of the term genocide and the 
development of international criminal law to soft power means that both of these 
conditions are not met. Through its ability to persuade indirectly, the American political 
leadership has not had to be straightforward about its leading role in the construction of 
international law, and it enjoys an advantage from the creation of sophisticated ways to 
affect legal interpretation instead of supporting a legitimately international mechanism to 
do that under protection from the dominance of any one government. The American 
ability to dominate the interpretation of international law, as shown in its treatment of the 
Genocide Convention, is disruptive of the legal procedure. It means that there is a 
gigantic loophole through which the United States may systematically use its power to 
shape customary law that would redefine the treaty law. A study of the history of 
“genocide” suggests that not only is the American political leadership in denial that it 





is detrimental to the ability of international law to project both authority and legitimacy.  
 Legal power is an indication of the separation of powers. In the United States, the 
successful governance of affairs depends on the believable existence of separation 
between the executive, legislature, and the judiciary. Conversely, in the administration of 
global affairs, through the United Nations, murkiness surrounds the separation of powers 
because the United States government does not show itself as the face of international 
order, yet its hand reaches all three branches of international governance. In this sense, 
the United States betrays its own brand of governance. Although it might not be 
advantageous for the United States to declare itself the executive of international order 
because that could be interpreted as a direct challenge to the sovereignty of other 
governments, the source of international law has to be known if international law is to 
have authority. International law is an American vision, for which the United States 
fought and won two world wars. It is based on proven American hard-power superiority, 
and it was designed to create an international order that both promotes American 
standards of governance and maintains the status quo of power relations between 
governments that is favored by the United States. Since it would have been difficult to 
inspire international cooperation through direct communication about such an agenda, the 
quest for international criminal law was conducted indirectly through moralistic 
narratives on “genocide” and by supposedly independent narrators. As a result, the 
United States abandoned the position of authority over international law so that the 
rationale for it, and the application of it, may be more readily persuasive. 
 This soft-power approach is seen here as antithetical to the apparentness of hard 





international law. Hard power is the basis for the American yearning for international 
law, but it had to be negated if the international community was to be persuaded about 
the concept of international law, and especially international criminal law. Thus, the 
voice of humanity has been invoked through soft power, and, over the course of decades, 
minds have been brought closer to the concept of international law. However, for 
international law to have the authority and legitimacy of a law, the authority over it has to 
be acknowledged, and, as part of this acknowledgement, accountability has to emerge so 
that biased information may no longer dominate the international judicial information. 
This too is a transitional phase. For international law to be thoroughly international as a 
system of legal power, the authority and accountability behind the execution of it is to be 
shared by all who govern through the law.  
In the dialectical progression of international law, the destination of international 
law was set by hard power, but the motion to it is driven by soft power, and once there, 
legal power requires that the authority would be directly known as a guarantee that the 
indirect method of influence does not dominate the legal procedure. For those who have 
been persuaded about international law as a concept to become participants in 
international law in practice, the previously serviceable indirectness of information 
control must give way to the directness that would nourish the transparency and 
comprehensiveness of legal power. Transparency would be attained when the United 
States government is found willing to consider the extent to which the American political 
leadership has been the power source behind the vision of international law, and actively 
seeks to fully realize this vision by taking measures to assure member states of the United 





indirect means. Comprehensiveness would earn legitimacy once it becomes observable 
that the adjudication in international law produces information that is not scripted by a 
preexisting discourse but reflects a well-roundedness. 
As the connection between American hard power and international law becomes 
known, it then becomes possible to engage in an open dialogue with the source of 
international law about the significance of protecting law interpretation from the 
debilitating abuse by the power that envisioned the law and might believe it has 
ownership over the law’s interpretation. This protection of the judiciary from being 
controlled by the power that made the law is the essence of the rule of law and a pillar of 
the American-led civilization's political system of choice. Not only is it a tenet of Greek 
democracy, but it is reflective of Jewish jurisprudence as well. The separation between 
law interpretation and lawgiver is advocated in the ancient Talmudic story about the oven 
of Akhnai. In the Babylonian Talmud, tractate Bava Metzia, page 59b, it is written that 
when the rabbis of old debated over the cleanness of an oven in legal Halakhic terms 
there was an attempt by the Divine to intervene in their process of interpreting the law 
that is known as the Torah, which they considered to have come from the Divine. One 
side of the argument was led by Rabbi Eliezer, who resorted to the performance of signs 
and omens as a method of proving his rightness. The other side of the argument was led 
by Rabbi Yehoshua, who insisted that matters of legal interpretation such as this are to be 
determined according to a majority opinion that is informed by the merits of the 
reasoning, and not by the display of power that suggests a godly backing. Rabbi Eliezer 
then proceeded to appeal to the law’s source of origination for proof that his 





was heard siding with Rabbi Eliezer. This divine intervention was rejected by Rabbi 
Yehoshua who recalled Moses’ phrase in Deuteronomy 30:12, “it is not in heaven” (lo 
ba'shamayim hee), to mean that the law had already been lowered from above and given 
to the people, and, as such, is not the sole possession of its giver. What was the divine 
response to this? Rabbi Natan relayed that according to the prophet Elijah, God joyfully 
replied “My sons have bested me” (nitskhuni banay).  
 Meaning, even the source from which the law originated cannot—in the name of 
the law—use its power to dominate the law’s interpretation. While the rabbis’ defense of 
their control over oral law is intertwined with their own quest for organizational power, it 
nonetheless speaks volumes about the need to defend customary law in international law 
from abuse of power by the entity that originated the law. It would be a triumphant 
moment for international law when it is recognized by the United States government, 
from a position of confidence, that criticism against its interference with the 
interpretation of law is rightful. Such criticism, and its acceptance, would be an 
encouraging sign for the viability and sustainability of international law. If the originator 
of the law is admittedly corrected by those to whom the law had been given, then there is 
an indication that the law is absorbed.  
 The circumstances of international law’s American origination are different from 
a story in which a divine entity introduces a law to a people, but by addressing the 
profound differences a strong light may be shed on the difficulties that have hindered the 
progression of international law. One such difference is that the United States is not 
transcendent in relation to the other nation-states. Even if American exceptionalism was 





removed from the law, and must itself abide by it. This means that unlike a source of law 
that is unbound by its creation, the United States is subjected to the law and is therefore 
motivated to affect the law in its favor after it had been put in writing. Another difference 
of major importance is that, as opposed to divinely revealed law, international law, as 
domestic law, is not a given law but rather is a law that is still in the making. As seen in 
the Rome Statute, international criminal law was rewritten and reworked long after the 
Genocide Convention was brought into force. In international law there is still an influx 
of information in the writing of the law and not just in its interpretation, and that may 
continue to tempt the United States to control treaty law through customary law. Thus, 
two main questions are raised: How does the American political leadership separate 
between the broad vision for the advancement of international law and the narrow 
interests that it is looking to serve through dominating the popular discourse? How is the 
information of law interpretation to be kept separate from the process of lawmaking in 
international law? 
 Before its expansion into matters within states through the Genocide Convention, 
international law was mainly concerned with matters between states. International 
arbitration was the major innovation that the Americans introduced and tried to promote 
in the late nineteenth century as a concept that was to be incorporated into a system of 
law, and the Americans who worked on the design of international law fancied the United 
States as the world’s most adequate arbitrator. The American image as a non-European 
entity did not translate into a universal acceptance that the United States is a trusted 
mediator in disputes between European powers, and international law became highly 





between nation-states. Even with such a court in full operation, the United States 
remained caught in a delicate position as the chief constructor of the means for 
international arbitration while being itself an interested party in a wide range of 
international disputes. The lack of a mechanism to enforce the compliance of 
governments with international court decisions over contentious issues between nation-
states emphasizes the measure of tension and unpredictability because the level of 
enforcement largely depends on American interests as a variable. Accordingly, 
international law has mostly been inter-national law, involving conflicts of interests 
between the nation-states, among which is the United States.  
 However, international criminal law carries a potential for international law to 
focus on the advancement of unified international standards of governance. If agreement 
can be reached on the information that is produced about commitments that all member 
states of the United Nations have toward their civilians, then international criminal law 
can inspire greater cooperation among governments and have a positive effect on 
international law in general. The authority of law that is lacking between nation-states 
would appear to exist between the governments of nation-states and their civilians if 
agreement can be reached on exceedingly unified standards of governance. To arrive at 
this level of agreement, the criminal code in international law has to be satisfactory for 
both governments and their peoples. It might be a standard of governance in itself to 
assure civilians that there is a universal understanding that they are not to be abused by 
government power, but there is also a need for the codification to assure governments 
that international law protects them from other governments that have greater power.  





between governments and the public, rather than a document that is used for mobilization 
according to one government's interests against another's interests. The effort to improve 
governmental treatment of civilians is tantamount to improving and strengthening 
governance in general, and can be seen as a uniting task that is common to all 
governments, and refreshingly different from the confrontational nature of using law to 
decide between governments. Unlike matters of arbitration between states the law 
regarding the quality of relationships between governments and people worldwide does 
not have to be dominated by self-interested manipulations. The dark side of the Genocide 
Convention has been the unpronounced concern among governments that the United 
States government has used the convention to interfere with the internal affairs of foreign 
states not only with impunity but with the support of public opinion.  
Thus far, the United States government has withheld a clear acknowledgement 
that it is the authority behind “genocide” and that the Genocide Convention is a product 
of its vision, and it has been tempted to divert from the way of a responsible lawgiver 
while considering itself free to manipulate the interpretation of the law. Soft power has 
been used to direct information regarding “genocide,” thereby affecting the majority 
opinion in the public before cases of “genocide” enter a courtroom or receive 
consideration by an organ of the United Nations. This American ability to co-opt the 
identity of groups and narrate violent events between groups in association with the term 
genocide blights international criminal law, but, significantly, it is not a necessary feature 
of international criminal law. If the United States recognizes that its hard power sparked 
the drive for international law, and the information of international law becomes less 





Crimes against Humanity and Crimes against Government 
To have a sustainable system of interpretation in international criminal law that 
would have legal power, the codification of crimes in international law must be operable. 
Both the substance of the Rome Statute and its limited reception among member states of 
the United Nations indicate that the written law of international crime has not reached a 
level of operational stability. The treaty made international criminal law more applicable 
by sanctioning the creation of the ICC and articulating the crimes within its jurisdiction, 
but its inability to draw universal support is a token of its incompleteness. Since the 
United States, whose soft power directed the production of the Rome Statute, is not itself 
a party to the treaty suggests that it has an experimental quality. In addition, the total 
number of governments that are not parties to the treaty amounts to over a third of the 
member states in the United Nations, and among these there are several regionally 
powerful governments. The recent withdrawal from the treaty by three African states 
marks a trend to reject the codification. Governments cannot be expected to trust the legal 
procedure of international criminal law if they cannot be brought to agree on the very 
structure of this legal procedure. In other words, before legal power is achieved, the work 
of soft power has to reach a certain point of success. A significant segment of the 
international community has not been persuaded by the Rome Statute. It is here 
considered that this hesitation regards the codification of crimes rather than the 
establishment of a permanent and central criminal court. 
 In contrast to the legal definition of “genocide” in the Genocide Convention, a 
“crime against humanity” was defined in the Rome Statute as an offense against a civilian 





type as such. Moreover, in the Rome Statute the persecution of groups on political 
grounds is included as a crime against humanity, while the Genocide Convention does 
not recognize members of a political group as possible victims of genocide. Another 
major point of distinction is that the perpetration does not refer to “persons” exclusively 
as in the Genocide Convention, and the charge of such crimes via the Rome Statute may 
be directed against governments. This means that according to the criminal codification 
of international law in the Rome Statute, a government may be held guilty of committing 
a crime against humanity if it can be shown that the government had mere knowledge of 
a widespread attack against people who are associated with a rebellious group.  
 When the nation-states agreed on the legal definition of “genocide,” they did not 
give their consent to have the accusation of genocide become a source of harassment 
against governments. While the Genocide Convention is concerned with the protection of 
civilians from persecution, it does not expressively expose government officials to undue 
prosecution. The term genocide may have been simplistically advertised as the group 
version of homicide, but “genocide” was markedly different from homicide in the 
requirement of intent. Article 2 of the Genocide Convention carefully stipulated the 
existence of the crime by mentioning three levels of intent for the establishment of a legal 
charge. The murder of an individual may be established with proof of intent to kill, but to 
prove the crime of genocide it is required to establish a triple intent: an intent to harm 
members of a group that is based on a common ethnicity, nationality, race or religion; an 
intent to harm the members of the group as such; and an intent to harm the group as such 
in whole or in part.  





requires proof that the assailant did not act in self-defense or caused harm by accident. 
The second intent is particularly difficult to prove because it involves the subjective 
assignment of identity by the assailant. It requires proof that goes beyond the victims’ 
own collective identification as members of a group, for it seeks to ascertain that the 
assailant was cognizant of the victims’ assigned group membership while intending to 
harm them, and harmed them because of their assigned group membership. Within this 
requirement of intent, it has to be shown that in case the victims were members of both an 
ethnoreligious group and a rebellious group at the same time, that the assailant harmed 
them as members of a protected group rather than a political group. The third intent is 
crucial for giving “genocide” its qualities of systematic execution and massive 
victimization. It requires proof that the assailant harmed members of a protected group 
type as such while maximizing the ability to do so. This intent may only be proven by 
showing that there was a plan to harm the group in general according to the capacity of 
the assailant to reach members of the group. The requirement of “in part” alongside “in 
whole” means that this intent does not have to be translated into a complete elimination 
of the group, but that it has to be demonstrated that virtually all members of the group 
who could potentially be subjected to harm were intended to be harmed. By articulating 
this requirement to prove a triple intent, the Genocide Convention protected persons, who 
were expected to be in position of governmental power, from abusive charges of 
genocide.     
 Through the work of soft power, the popular interpretation of the Genocide 
Convention—and then judicial interpretations of it—dismissed the requirement to prove a 





Statute, which openly weakens the position of a state government against political 
challenges from within the state. The incorporation of “crimes against humanity” into the 
treaty law of the United Nations by way of the Rome Statute means that the ICC is 
empowered to support groups that are organized to rebel against governments, and that 
domestic judicial systems are equipped with criminal terminology to convict government 
officials of crimes following the conclusion of civil wars in which the rebels are 
triumphant. Without clear defense of governments, this is a prescription for more soft 
power and intergroup violence rather than international legal power and unified standards 
of governance. It shows international criminal law as a tool of self-interested external 
power over governments rather than as a structure for the advancement of the relations 
between existing governments and civilians. 
 Third-party instigation of innerstate conflict is the blind spot of international 
criminal law. The Genocide Convention concerns itself with third parties that are 
suspected of being complicit to the act of genocide, but it does not concern itself with 
third parties that create an environment of conflict in which violence and the suffering of 
civilians is imminent. In other words, the Genocide Convention only regards the 
relationship between a third party and the perpetrators of genocide in acts of aggression, 
but expresses no focus on the possibly criminal nature of the relationship between a third 
party and the eventual victims of intergroup violence. On the one hand, this means that 
the existence of third-party instigations should rule out the legal applicability of 
“genocide” regarding the resulting intergroup violence, but on the other hand, it has 
meant that third-party instigators have not been the subject of scrutiny for possible 





 Correspondingly, involvement in the instigation of intergroup conflict has been 
concealed by genocidizing the information about the circumstances, which means that the 
violence has been presented in terms of a simple perpetrator-victim dichotomy. The 
framing of events through the label of “genocide” has served the art of great-power 
interference in another state’s affairs because it directs attention to the two domestic 
groups as the two main actors, and distracts from the third-party instigation that led to the 
political conflict. This is especially effective when the labeling of genocide highlights the 
view of one group as victim and leads public opinion to consider it immoral to examine 
the conduct of the victim group under the sponsorship of a great power. As the 
genocidizing of the Ottoman Armenian experience reveals, soft power has made it 
possible to spread the popularity of the genocide label even in reference to a case in 
which the ultimate intent—to destroy a government—belonged to the powerful third 
party that erected an Armenian political challenge, while the intent of the local Ottoman 
government was to resolve a political conflict that it had not started and could not control. 
This is an instance in which the persecution of a political group by a government was 
preceded by the intent of a third party to destroy the government.  
 Since the criminalization of a government for the persecution of a political group 
has received legal pronunciation in the Rome Statute’s codification of “crimes against 
humanity,” a powerful third party such as the United States may instigate innerstate 
conflict and lead the blame against the state’s government with even greater persuasion. 
In previous decades, the United States employed soft power to impose its interpretation 
of the Genocide Convention for the criminalization of governments that are caught up in 





binding document of international law in which it is written that the persecution of groups 
on political grounds is a crime against humanity. As the codification of “crimes against 
humanity” increases the applicability of international criminal law, it also has the 
potential of keeping international law from actual legal power. If the codification of 
“crimes against humanity” is seen as an American mechanism to interfere with the 
internal affairs of governments, then the procedure that adjudicates these crimes will be 
considered an American instrument rather than an international law. There is a stark 
difference between the use of soft power to bring nation-states to accept international 
criminal law and the use of international criminal law as accepted by nation-states to 
enhance one party’s self-interested soft power.     
 Therefore, it is here considered that in order to rescue the international legal 
system from being an extension of soft power, and defend governments from the 
existence of legally protected—and publicly supported—rebels, the incorporation of 
“crimes against humanity” into international law has to be counterbalanced by coupling it 
with the protection of governments. The introduction of such protection into the criminal 
code of international law would not simply set out to protect governments from rebelling 
citizens, but to protect governments from powerful governments that use another state’s 
citizens against it. These instances would typically be related to an act against a 
government during a time of peace, being that interferences of a soft-power nature are 
most effective when there is no direct hostility between governments. For example, when 
Ottoman Christians began to receive an American education toward their political 
organization as self-ruling entities on Ottoman land, the Ottoman Empire and the United 





received expression in the League of Nation's Terrorism Convention, which was used as 
the criminal code for the original ICC Convention of the same day, but the Terrorism 
Convention lost its legal standing with the dismantling of the intergovernmental 
organization that had processed it. Article 1.1 of the Terrorism Convention called upon 
states not to encourage terrorism against other states, but there has not been a convention 
within the operation of the United Nations that makes the involvement of one state in 
terror activities against another state a crime in international law.  
 The term crimes against government is offered here as a name for the set of 
crimes whose codification would counterbalance “crimes against humanity.” Unlike the 
design of the Terrorism Convention, the meaning of “crimes against government” is not 
limited to protection from state sponsorship of violent acts against another state and its 
people but includes protection from activities that can be measured as amounting to the 
establishment of an organized political challenger to the government. Even if such 
involvement by a foreign government would be hard to prove, the mere processing of 
legal information about it would nevertheless have a positive effect on the relations 
between governments and civilians by calling attention to the possibility of a crime 
against the government before “crimes against humanity” might be committed. In this 
manner, the legal function of “crimes against government” would both offset and 
complement “crimes against humanity.” It would offset “crimes against humanity” 
because it would condition the criminalization of governments for persecution on 
political grounds on the question of preexisting involvement in the state’s internal affairs 
by a powerful foreign government. Hence, states would be relieved from their concern 





suspicious of international criminal law. The codification of “crimes against government” 
would complement “crimes against humanity” because it would greatly amplify the 
ability of international law to prevent the amount of violence between governments and 
citizens by addressing an earlier stage of innerstate political conflict, and be a major 
contribution toward unified international standards of governance. It places trust in 
governments and motivates them to cooperate with international law under the belief that 
innerstate violence is to be effectively prevented at the sight of foreign intervention 
during domestic peace rather than by foreign intervention during a civil war. In short, a 
legally recognized list of “crimes against government” would not impede the protection 
of civilians, but rather allow for international law to do so universally through legal 
power with a reduced threat of self-interested soft power.    
 
The Ottoman Key 
It is shown in this work that the genocidization of the Ottoman Armenian 
suffering during WWI is a primary example of how the term genocide functions as soft 
power. Through sources of information that present themselves as independent of 
political power, the genocidizing of Armenian history has had an effect on memory and 
its political meaning. A foundational element in the chain of events is that soft power was 
involved from the beginning of this process. The Armenian political conflict with the 
Turkic people was shaped by the soft-power influence on the Armenian identity in the 
nineteenth century and by the soft-power influence on the Armenian insistence that the 
suffering of their ancestors in WWI has to be characterized as genocide. American 





genocide discourse portrays the United States as a bystander in relation to the Armenian 
experience during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it is considered here that 
knowledge of the American activities in Ottoman territory during the nineteenth century 
is vital to understanding what happened there in WWI and how it has been narrated. 
 Under the influence of American missionaries, the peaceful ethnoreligious group 
that had been known by its members as Haik began to assume a new political identity. 
The Anglo-American circles that built the Armenian image in Western public opinion 
through soft power preferred to use the name that links the people to the Bible and 
ancient sovereignty. Persuaded of their right to rule, and organized toward political 
independence, the Armenian revolutionary leadership aggressively sought to rule over a 
large portion of Ottoman land and name the country Armenia. In other words, an 
Ottoman minority was injected with the foreign belief that it is a nation and was provided 
with an institutional framework that prepared it to challenge its own government for the 
creation of an Armenian state. The American role in this transformation is related to the 
ongoing genocide discourse on the Armenian experience: the popularity of the latter has 
overshadowed knowledge of the former; knowledge of the former has the capacity to 
inspire a reexamination of the latter. By understanding how foreign influence on group 
identity is related to a catastrophic political conflict in this instance, one becomes better 
equipped to evaluate the popular usage of “genocide.”   
 Both the nationalization of Armenians and the genocidization of the Armenian 
past are significant reflections of the American effort to establish an international order 
through international law. The creation of an Armenian nation disrupted German plans to 





Armenians during the Cold War and in its aftermath, but the question of how to define 
the Ottoman treatment of its Armenian population during WWI in terms of international 
law has a broader meaning. In the late nineteenth century, the idea of Armenian 
governance over Ottoman land presented the potential of establishing in the region a 
government that would meet the civilizational criterion of international law. By the close 
of the twentieth century, the genocidized Armenian history presented a discourse that 
shaped international criminal law. But, in the early twenty-first century, after many years 
of using “genocide” to frame the information on WWI, attracting public attention to it, 
and persuading the public to believe it, the continued popularization of a genocide label 
that is purely based on soft power presents an impasse for international criminal law. The 
international criminal code might never be steadied without first arriving at a 
terminological resolution of this highly publicized historical issue. Legal power might 
never be attained if soft power continues the contentious practice of genocidizing this 
history.  
 Since the advent of the Rome Statute, the new definition and status of “crimes 
against humanity” in the criminal code of international law has opened the possibility of a 
different approach to describing the Armenian experience during WWI in legal terms. 
Through the genocide scholarship, the Ottoman government’s treatment of its Armenians 
has been misleadingly presented as the first case of “crimes against humanity.” This trend 
in the literature seems to have started in parallel to the beginning of efforts to promote the 
legal relevance of the reformed term in the late 1990s. Be that as it may, in consideration 
of the current wording of what the term means, it is undeniable that what happened to the 





but further terminological discernment might be necessary.  
There are differences between committing genocide, committing a “crime against 
humanity” in the context of political competitors who respect the sovereignty of their 
state, and committing a “crime against humanity” in the context of political rebellion. 
Moreover, there is a difference among situations of “crimes against humanity” between 
the aggressive treatment of the member of an organization of political rebellion and the 
aggressive treatment of civilians who are not rebels but are suspected of being associated 
with the rebellion in some way. Yet another difference among cases of “crimes against 
humanity” regards the question of whether or not foreign power was involved in the 
existence of the group that engaged in political rebellion. In short, there is reason to 
consider the inclusion of a distinction in the criminal code of international law between 
genocide, egregious “crimes against humanity,” circumstantial “crimes against 
humanity,” and “crimes against humanity” that are inseparable from “crimes against 
government.”  
 As currently codified in the Rome Statute, the meaning of “crimes against 
humanity” includes cases in which the government knows of a widespread attack against 
a group on political grounds. Being that the Ottoman government’s persecution of its 
Armenian population on political grounds during WWI followed foreign acts that were 
committed against the Ottoman government’s ability to govern its Armenian population 
peacefully, the case presents a critical example of how committing a “crime against 
humanity” is conditioned by what may be termed as a “crime against government.” In a 
manner, the victimhood of the Ottoman Armenian people in WWI would remain without 





suffering an international offense against a government preceded and begot a “crime 
against humanity.” International law would be greatly advanced if the genocide label 
were removed from the discourse on the Ottoman treatment of its Armenians, and, 
instead, the case is recognized as illustrative of how great-power offenses against a 
government beget a government’s offense against civilians in its own territory. 
Accordingly, a shared characterization of the events may be reached through a three-way 
agreement by official representatives of Armenia, Turkey, and the United States.  
 Therefore, it is here envisioned that the three governments may consider 
favorably the establishment of a carefully constructed international committee of scholars 
that would closely examine the historical connection between the interferences with the 
Ottoman government’s ability to govern the Ottoman Armenians and the eventual 
persecution of the Ottoman Armenians by the Ottoman government on political grounds. 
This thorough examination would provide material for the articulation of the relationship 
between offenses against a government by a great power and offenses by that government 
against a civilian group. Its conclusions would offer an evaluation “crimes against 
government” as a potentially usable term in international law alongside “crimes against 
humanity.” Such information would draw the three governments closer to finding an 
agreement on how the Ottoman government’s treatment of Armenians within its territory 
is to be characterized in relation to an expanded legal terminology in international law. 
Then, subject to the findings of the international committee of scholars, the following set 
of statements may be proposed:      
The United States government recognizes that in the nineteenth century foreign 
cultural power, which was principally American, actively organized Ottoman 
Armenians in a manner that is inseparable from the eventual Ottoman Armenian 





United States government recognizes the American influence in the construction 
of a genocide discourse that promoted the belief that the Ottoman government had 
committed genocide against the Ottoman Armenians. Seeing that during WWI the 
Ottoman government’s persecution of Armenians was on political grounds in 
relation to preexisting foreign interferences with the Ottoman ability to govern its 
affairs, and considering that a competent tribunal had never convicted persons of 
the Ottoman government under the charge of genocide in accordance with the 
Genocide Convention, the United States government emphasizes that in its view 
the Ottoman government’s treatment of the Ottoman Armenian population during 
WWI does not amount to genocide as legally defined in the Genocide 
Convention.        
 
Based on the American statement, the Turkish government recognizes that during 
WWI the Ottoman government persecuted Ottoman Armenian civilians on 
political grounds at a time of war as the Armenian political challenge against the 
Ottoman government was greatly amplified by the credible threat that the powers 
of the Entente presented against the continued existence of the government. 
Moreover, for the advancement of international law and the betterment of the 
international community, the Turkish government recognizes that nowadays such 
a persecution by a government against an identifiable group of civilians within its 
territory on political grounds amounts to “crimes against humanity” according to 
the Rome Statute, but the Turkish government clarifies that this recognition has 
no legal validity and that the events in question had transpired long before the 
Rome Statute entered into force. Seeing that the persecution of Ottoman 
Armenians on political grounds by the Ottoman government was preceded by 
foreign activities on Ottoman territory that led to the organization of Ottoman 
Armenians in a manner that is inseparable from their eventual challenge to the 
sovereignty of the Ottoman government, the Turkish government emphasizes that 
“crimes against humanity” ought to be considered in connection with what 
amounts to “crimes against government.” In addition, the Turkish government 
clarifies that an agreement with the Armenian government regarding the 
characterization of the Ottoman Armenian experience during WWI does not 
imply a desire on its part to normalize relations with the Armenian government, 
but such an agreement does lend itself to an expression of hope by the Turkish 
government that the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan may find new 
momentum for resolving the dispute over the occupied region of Nagorno-
Karabakh because of the interconnectedness between the genocide discourse and 
the mobilization of Armenians toward territorial claims. 
 
Correspondingly, the Armenian government appreciates the Turkish 
government’s recognition that in WWI the Ottoman government persecuted 
Ottoman Armenians as members of an identifiable group on political grounds in 
what would amount to “crimes against humanity” according to the Rome Statute. 
Also, the Armenian government recognizes that prior to this persecution, foreign 
cultural power led to the organization of Ottoman Armenians in a manner that is 





government, and thereby created a political conflict between the Ottoman 
Armenians and their government. Hence, the Armenian government ceases to 
promote the claim that genocide was committed by the Ottoman government 
against the Ottoman Armenians, and dismisses the territorial and compensatory 
claims against the Turkish government that were associated with the genocide 
discourse. Considering that the collective memory of the suffering by the Ottoman 
Armenians during WWI is a matter of tremendous sentimental importance to the 
Armenian people, the Armenian government encourages the advent of symbolic 
and substantive gestures by the Turkish government toward a communication of 
commiseration. 
 
In this manner, a breakthrough may be reached regarding the controversial topic that has 
promoted international law through soft power yet prevents it from progressing toward 
legal power.  
 A resolution of the controversy over the legal characterization of the Ottoman 
government’s treatment of the Ottoman Armenians during WWI is the key to turning 
around the approach to international criminal law. By recognizing the American 
involvement in this political conflict and its narration, the United States government 
would lend an unprecedented amount of promise to the future of international criminal 
law. If seen as decisively moving away from the soft power campaign to popularize the 
genocide accusation against the Ottoman government and the accusation of genocide 
denial against the Turkish government, the United States would give international 
criminal law a chance to formulate its legal power. The general meaning of this would be 
that there is an American commitment to addressing how its advantages over other 
member states in soft power affect international law.  
Furthermore, the study of what American power has done for the sake of 
international law is beneficial for the growth of international law. It would lead to a 
recognition that international law was the vision of the American political leadership. 





be an inclination to change the culture of its influence. Being on the cusp of legal power, 
the progress of international law requires a direct and limited approach rather than an 
indirect and pervasive one. Following decades of genocide labeling, the legacy of the 
Ottoman Armenian case could be an American recognition that international law has 




Like Turkey, China is a principal inheritor of a great non-Christian empire whose 
size and style of governance had presented a major obstacle to the advancement of 
international law in the nineteenth century. Both the Ottoman and Qing governments 
were treated by the architects of international law as culturally resistant elements that had 
to be broken down in order to build up new governance over their vast territories. These 
governments were faced by a much more powerful movement to modernize governance 
around the world according to a Euro-Christian civilizational criterion. Neither the 
Ottoman government nor the Qing government was organized toward nationalism and 
were thus found to be incapable of readily contributing to internationalism.   
 The nationalization of the two empires was a prerequisite for the world’s 
internationalization, which was the new inventive method for securing that there is a 
balance of power in every region to prevent the growth of a dominant power that could 
rival the Anglo-American union. In the Ottoman case, the Christian peoples were taught 
by American educators to think of themselves as members of national entities. This 





Ottoman government, and the Ottoman leadership itself finally became driven by the idea 
of a Turkish nationalism. The Qing experience of forced nationalization also involved a 
great many fatalities, but the violence there erupted mainly in the natives’ rejection of the 
missionaries as agents of education. Following the Boxer Rebellion, the subdued 
government was made more amenable to the foreign instruction on governance. As the 
Euro-Asian empire collapsed in WWI, the East Asian empire was allowed to maintain a 
centralized control over its territory but became subjected to foundational cultural and 
legal reforms toward becoming a national participant in the Euro-Christian international 
society. Therefore, the relationship that the governments of Turkey and China have with 
international law is marked by the history of what had been done to the two former 
empires in the aim of arriving at international order.   
 China’s position in relation to international law is similar to Turkey’s because of 
their uniquely shared vantage point on the history of internationalism toward unified 
standards of governance. Even though Japan presents another example of a non-Christian 
empire during the formative years of international law, the Japanese willingly embraced 
the Euro-Christian civilization's brand of governance by the late nineteenth century, as 
indicated by the entry into force of the Meiji Constitution in 1890. While Russia has been 
for decades a headliner as the main rival of the United States in the international scene, 
there is no civilizational gap between the two leaderships, and their cooperation dates 
back to the treaty over Alaska in 1867. Also, Iran is commonly portrayed as an 
independent regional power that is a reluctant participant in the American-led 
international community, but there was no Persian empire when conditions were created 





Turkey and China stand apart from other nation-states for having the experience of 
violent confrontations with the Euro-Christian culture of governance be a critical part of 
their history as nations. Their perspectives on the history of this violence is denied by the 
Western historiography because—unlike the increased openness and criticism about 
imperialist colonization—there is an obstruction of the information that would reveal 
what had been done in the name of international law.  
 If modern-day Turkey and China are seen as products of acculturation toward 
national governance, then the remaining great political divide between the American-led 
international law and these two powerful nations is not civilizational but 
historiographical. Similarly, the general reason for Turkish and Chinese hesitations about 
human rights is here seen as based on history rather than culture. The source of the 
tension is not over cultural differences about governance but rather the incongruous 
narratives on what occurred—and is occurring—in the process of arriving at a unified 
international standard of governance. As embodied by the work of the genocide 
scholarship, the dominant historiography has relentlessly concealed knowledge of the 
American interferences with the ability of the Ottoman state to govern its affairs. The 
genocide discourse has been so protective of this concealment that it has actively sought 
to layer it with distractions such as the discourse on Turkish denial of genocide 
recognition.  
In actuality, the accusation of denial against the Turkish government is a 
preemptive act that has allowed the United States government to avoid having to deny 
that American soft power had been invested in replacing the Ottoman government with 





criterion of international law. Similarly, the popular information about China depicts the 
Chinese government as defiant of international law. This is done without considering the 
extent to which China's suspicion of international law is not caused by a conceptual 
opposition to a unified quality of governance but is rooted in the road to it. China’s own 
historical experience of the path to international law instructs that the project is more 
American than is advertised, and this discrepancy can explain the Chinese skepticism. In 
other words, it is here considered that for Turkey and China the main point of contention 
with international law is not inherent to the form or quality of governance, but regards the 
unrecognized past of interferences with their governance and the lack of assurances 
regarding the way forward. Foreign interferences with the internal affairs of existing 
governments have played a role in the history of unifying the culture of governance, and 
the recognition of it might promote a more effective dialogue about the future of 
international law. Unless it is believed that the arrival at a unified culture of governance 
requires more interferences during a time of peace with the internal affairs of certain 
governments, it would be sensible for the information of international criminal law to 
include language against the continuation of this practice.               
 Turkey’s voice has been heard regarding its resentment of the genocide label that 
has been placed by soft power on the Ottoman government’s treatment of Armenians in 
WWI, but China’s voice on the direction of international law has been withdrawn, 
without there being a single historiographical issue to activate it toward a leading role. In 
Turkey’s case, the genocide accusation has been issued against the Turks’ own national 
history, reputation, and territorial integrity, and has expanded to offensive assertions 





relation to human rights in general. However, in China’s case, popular genocide 
accusations have mainly vilified China by way of association for its influence on other 
governments, as in the genocide accusations regarding Cambodia and Sudan. The 
genocide discourse does not aim at China’s Qing history, but still focuses on attempts to 
draw a connection between China’s current form of government and the lack of 
accountability for human rights. Even the popularization of the Dalai Lama’s claim that 
China committed cultural genocide against its Tibetans was mainly an assault against 
China’s human-rights record.  
 Instead of remaining silently opposed to American-led efforts to promote human 
rights in international law, China can establish its voice as an active supporter of 
international treaty-making that would more effectively lead to unified standards of 
human-rights protection by first protecting governments from the abuse of “human 
rights” as a tool of soft power. Meaning, in order for human rights to be honored, “human 
rights” must not be used as a weapon against governments. There is a strong Chinese 
argument to be made about how human rights might be truly advanced internationally if 
international law can protect governments from foreign-inspired political challenges. 
Currently, the combination of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Rome Statute facilitates foreign cultural influence and handicaps the state in its 
dealings with rebellious groups. Considering this state of affairs, it should come as no 
surprise that China has not ratified these treaties. While China maintains a distance from 
the American promotion of human rights, it has not clarified how its support of human 
rights may be attained through the greater security of governments in international law.    





renegotiation of the status quo in the international scene, and, as a result, it has 
experienced international law as inter-national law. In relation to China, international law 
has had the quality of international disputation alongside the aspects of international 
cooperation. It surfaces as an American mechanism for maintaining an advantage over 
other nations rather than a formula for the universal improvement of governance. 
Recently, the Chinese perspective of international law as confinement rather than 
opportunity was illustrated in China’s refusal to partake in the legal procedure of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration that was sanctioned by the United Nations Convention on 
the Laws of the Sea to arbitrate in the matter of the Philippines’ claim of a dispute with 
China over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This communicated a distrust in 
international law. As long as China continues to challenge the status quo that is favored 
by the United States, it is fated to face the side of international law that by its essence 
preserves the American advantage in power relations.  
In reaction, China might drift away from international law as Germany did on the 
eve of WWII, or it might seek to preserve the power that it already has by investing in the 
development of international criminal law. By supporting the transition of international 
criminal law from being a domain of soft power to becoming a system of legal power, 
China might find that international law can be free of American dominance. Once the 
information of international criminal law is thoroughly international, it could pull the 
entire project of international law toward the broader aim of achieving a unified quality 
of governance rather than be defined by clashing narrow interests between nation-states. 
To find common language with the United States on international standards of 





international criminal law, which is not as immediately and directly confrontational as 
matters of arbitration.   
 
An International Discourse of Law 
As a tool of soft power, “genocide” has been used to guide the member states of 
the United Nations toward international criminal law, but it is not suitable for effective 
legal use. Not unlike the role of the iconic biblical leader who guided a people through a 
desert to their promised land but without entering it himself, “genocide” has led to 
international criminal law but is not a living presence in its legal power. Just as leading 
people toward the administration of law is different from administering it, the power to 
do the latter is different from the power to do the former. The function of “genocide” has 
been to lead the member states of the United Nations to absorb international criminal law 
as an agreeable concept but this function is in disharmony with the legitimate 
administration of international law. “Genocide” has been popularly used to frame 
information, attract to it, and persuade of it, but the function of promoting international 
criminal law is not the same as applying it. International law may have been fashioned in 
the image of American governance, but its existence cannot be controlled by American 
information that masquerades as international information. The finding that “genocide” 
has been used as a tool of soft power toward the advancement of international law raises 
the question of whether or not self-interested soft power can be separated from the legal 
procedure that makes international law. 
 This question is difficult to answer, but its critical consideration is of significance. 





quality. Nonetheless, if international law is to be carried out with legal power, then there 
would have to be a discussion about self-interested intentions and the control of 
information. Firstly, regarding American intentions, this study of “genocide” suggests 
that the term genocide may have been used to advance both narrow and broad American 
interests. On the one hand, American soft power has applied the label of “genocide” with 
the effect of diminishing the memory of American aggression in Cambodia or limiting 
Chinese influence in Sudan, but on the other hand, the general promotion of the Genocide 
Convention through American soft power has had the effect of leading governments to 
accept an American brand of governance. If the United States government intends to 
direct international law so that it serves narrow American interests by being used as an 
arena for battles over public opinion, then international law will not have legal power 
among nation-states and it may lead a government to block its public from accessing 
world public opinion. However, if the United States intends to support international law 
so that it inspires other nation-states to adopt the American quality of governance as their 
own, then international law may have legal power. An international unity in the form of 
governance is out of reach as long as there is no unified quality of governance. The 
existence of nondemocratic governments is related to the inability of governments to trust 
that international law will protect them from unwarranted interferences with their internal 
affairs. Therefore, by putting an end to the soft-power abuse of the Genocide Convention 
and supporting the protection of member states from “crimes against government,” the 
United States government would communicate its intentions to affect governance while 
respecting governments, and allow international law to attain legal power.      





reason to consider the dominance of American soft power in the formation of opinion 
worldwide. It has to be considered that the United States may have a tremendous 
advantage on other nation-states by the ability to affect international decision-making 
even without the intention to do so on specific matters of international law. The amount 
of American influence on global information presents a challenge to the soundness of 
international law. This would be tantamount to a situation in which a party to a case in a 
domestic court regularly controls the information that affects the judge’s opinion on a 
wide range of matters. Even if the information does not involve the matter of the case 
directly, the party benefits from the ability to affect the judge’s general knowledge and 
beliefs because it creates a general proximity of mind between the party and the judge. 
From this perspective, international law does not equate with the legal power of domestic 
law because the American dominance of information in the world has no equivalent in 
domestic law wherever the separation of powers is exercised. Law is a source of 
authoritative information, but as a process it depends on preexisting information as its 
source for assessing the consensus opinion on morality, and if the United States is able to 
control most of that preexisting information in what is internationally considered to be 
common knowledge, then it also indirectly affects the information that is created by 
international judges at The Hague.           
 In order for international law to become less dependent on American intentions 
and more immune to American information, there must be greater emphasis on the 
conditions of international judges as both consumers and disseminators of internationally 
available information. For the purpose of advancing the internationalization of 





wide array of nation-states. Especially with regard to international judges whose 
decisions have influence over how a state governs its own affairs, it might be necessary to 
consider reforms in the professionalization of their position; in the focus of their 
information; and in the forum for their information. These three points of reform might 
enhance the ability of international judgments to distinguish themselves from the effects 
of soft power, and allow for international law to develop its legal power.  
 According to this vision of reform, the work of international judges would be 
subjected to more scrutiny but also invested with more power. At this time there is no 
system in place to account for the influence that preexisting information has on the 
performance of international judges. More specifically, international judges are not 
trained to exercise source criticism with attention to the power origination of a given 
information. As judgments in relation to the genocide discourse have demonstrated, 
international judges have been unduly influenced by this American-based source of 
information. Considering the extreme imbalance between member states of the United 
Nations in the influence over general opinion, it is vital to establish a method through 
which it may be ascertained that international judges exercise awareness of the indirect 
influence that the United States has on what might be seen at first glance as common 
knowledge. A certified scholar is not necessarily an independent expert; a social 
movement might be a top-down co-option of grass roots; and international organizations 
could be practically American-run. For international law to have the legitimacy of legal 
power, its judges cannot be suspected of providing agency for American soft power. The 
job requirement of an international judge might then require greater isolation and 





sense of prestige. Currently, “international judge” might be a position that is occupied by 
a legal practitioner who is a representative of a nation-state within the United Nations, 
but for the attainment of legal power in international law the position must become a 
skilled profession unto itself. In this profession, discernment regarding information 
sources would be a primary skill.              
 Additionally, the focus of international law could shift from deciding on matters 
of dispute between governments to articulating unified standards of governance among 
governments. In this way, instead of assuming the existence of legal power, international 
law would earn legal power. Conflict resolution through arbitration requires a level of 
authority and legitimacy that international law does not have, but the repurposing of 
international law toward an arrival at effective relations between governments and their 
civilians everywhere would present a process of legitimization for international law. 
Accordingly, the language of international law should be less restrictive or prohibitive. 
Instead, it can facilitate dialogue about governing solutions. If the authority behind the 
construction of international law becomes more openly considered, then it would mean 
that legitimacy would greatly depend on the ability to show that international law is 
inspired by an American-developed system of order but is not under American control.  
 Having in mind that international law is not enforced by a policing system of the 
type that complements domestic law, the role of international law might be accurately 
described as largely informational and still in development. For the information of 
international law to be effective, it not only has to be removed from any national bias, but 
it also has to concentrate on establishing standards rather than imposing them. The 





international treaty on human rights there has been an attempt to influence the internal 
affairs of nation-states through popular claims of genocide prevention. Such an attempt is 
a misuse of the Genocide Convention. The popular discourse changed “genocide” from a 
rare crime to a tool for the criminalization of governments that are embroiled in civil war. 
As an alternative to the continued overextension of “genocide,” it is worth considering 
the merit of addressing human rights more directly but with a more tentative approach 
that befits international law’s stage of development. The arrival at an internationally 
shared legal language about the treatment of civilians by governments is hindered by the 
presumptive reference to “rights” and might be better served by terminology that does not 
make premature assumptions about the universal acceptance of these principles as 
matters of justice. If international law is in a process of becoming a unified language 
toward international standards of governance, then international judgments should have a 
formative rather than a punitive capacity. In a formative environment, “human rights” is 
still a working title in the legal sense. 
 In order for international law to maximize its ability to process and produce 
information, it might be advantageous to introduce new forums for international 
judgments. The establishment of an international court in every member state would 
enhance the dialogue between international law and governments. Based on the UDHR as 
a starting point for evaluation, the international courts could be set up for the review of 
human-rights related grievances. These courts would operate without jurisdiction over 
governments, and would not rule for or against the host government. The judgments 
would not be in the form of decisions on what is just, but assessments that would 





courts under the sponsorship of the United Nations would be to analyze the workability 
of human rights through a detailed approach to the relationship between a government 
and its citizens.  
 Through these cases, international law would be able to become better informed 
about the readiness and hesitation of states to apply different aspects of human rights, 
while at the same time international law would have the ability to inform governments 
through particularized judgments that would amount to legal opinion without 
condemnation of the government. The authority of the courts would be strictly 
informational, and allow for a language on human rights to be developed under the 
control of the United Nations, without legal power but certainly toward it. Instead of 
leaving the information on human rights in the hands of seemingly international 
organizations that are creatures of American soft power, the international courts would 
enable governments to have more control on the conversation regarding human rights. 
The accusations of human-rights violations against governments would thus be replaced 
by trusted avenues of communication about the viability of human rights under each 
government.  
 Even though the judgments would not add to international customary law, they 
would provide sanctioned and esteemed data that amount to an international conversation 
of a legal nature on standards of governance within each member state. Put differently, 
the judgments would develop a databank of information that is similar to customary law 
but strictly used for the purposes of developing and maintaining a body of knowledge on 
the position of a particular government regarding a wide range of human-rights 





discourse on human rights within each member state in keeping with the particulars of 
each government’s conditions. It would not be international law, but an engagement with 
international standards toward international law. Rather than generate customary law that 
is based on the interpretation of treaty law, these courts would produce material whose 
analysis could lead to effective treaty law. 
 By creating a system that is based on trust in the internationality of the 
information, the ability to generate a common language on human rights in an 
environment of development would supplant the American way of calling attention to 
human rights indirectly through the divisive language of criminalization in contexts of 
destruction. The use of “genocide” as soft power has promoted human rights by seeking 
to turn public opinion against governments in intense circumstances of conflict. The 
banner cause of the genocide discourse has been the prevention of genocide, but the 
waving of this banner has aggravated intergroup relations. Furthermore, “genocide 
prevention” is a misnomer. It is a banner phrase that enables direct foreign intervention at 
the first sign of one-sided violence between a state and any identifiable group among its 
citizenry, without proving the existence of genocide and without preventing the causes of 
the violence. In cases of publicized calls for “genocide prevention,” soft power is able to 
misuse the term genocide for a desired political outcome in the disruption of a state’s 
ability to govern. The call for “genocide prevention” may even increase the occurrence of 
intergroup violence in the future if the outcome of it allows a strong military to directly 
intervene in the governance of states and becomes a proven strategy of foreign policy. If 
the combination of intergroup violence and calls for “genocide prevention” is seen as 





then there will be motivation for American power to support more rebellious activity in 
different states.  
 The prevention of intergroup violence would be the outcome of a focus on 
eliminating conditions of discord between governments and civilians. This could be 
advanced by the work of international courts that would articulate what might be 
preventing a member state from meeting the principles of the UDHR in its treatment of 
citizens. In other words, the focus would be on what typically prevents a government 
from administering order in harmony with human rights rather than on promoting the 
general awareness of human rights by way of criminalizing a government through crisis. 
If these international courts encounter a case that indicates a state-committed atrocity, 
then they would be expected to issue a referral to the ICC, but their designed purpose 
would be to negate the conditions of state-committed atrocities in the first place.    
 Moreover, such a system of courts would invite change in the scholarship on the 
relations between governments and civilians. The genocide scholarship in its current 
format would become outdated. The genocide discourse has popularized the use of 
“genocide” through academic scholarship so that it would have an effect on public 
opinion and the behavior of governments. If international courts of the kind that are 
proposed here became operative, then the project of the genocide scholarship would 
likely become obsolete. The shift to a focus on human rights would mean a shift away 
from the genocide scholarship. There would be a focus on different data. No longer 
would there be need for a scholarly production of material that perpetuates the role of 
identity politics in the relationship between governments and civilians. The Genocide 





such, but the term genocide has been used to intensify political conflict by labeling the 
violence as anti-ethnicity, antinationality, antirace, or antireligion. Through the genocide 
discourse there has been an indirect insistence on portraying the struggles of governance 
around the world in relation to group identity. This infrastructure popularized 
international law through “genocide,” but at the same time generated material that is 
steeped in partiality and void of legal viability.   
 Following a new direction, the work of relevant scholarship would be of two main 
emphases: one is research for the international courts in each member state; the other is 
the analysis of decisions by the international courts to advance the knowledge of the 
interaction between the courts and the member states. As a field of study, it would earn a 
vote of confidence by a commitment to jurisprudence that would replace its current 
pretense of having an apolitical social-scientific design. This would not mean an undue 
entanglement with legal jargon or a heavy reliance on the legal profession, but an 
embrace of a research culture that has a legal orientation. In keeping with the work of the 
courts, the relevant scholarship would be put in proximity with court procedure and kept 
at a distance from the current role of genocide scholars as discourse makers and framers 
of politicized history. The production of literature that criminalizes governments, past or 
present, by way of comparisons that are presented as scientific works while infested with 
bias, is an abuse of the academic profession in general and social science in particular. 
Scholarly activity on international law would be based on legal procedure rather than 







The Power of “Genocide” 
What is the power of “genocide”? The very question is based on a ground 
assumption that the designed function of “genocide” precedes the language about it. As a 
phenomenon that is the subject of study in a dissertation of political science, the term 
genocide is seen as—first and foremost—a tool of international governance. The 
moralistic discourse that “genocide” has generated regarding the characterization of 
events is its fruit, and not its seed. It reflects how “genocide” is used, but does not reveal 
for what “genocide” was devised. The genocide scholarship is a field of study in 
academia that has not articulated “genocide” as a phenomenon in this manner because the 
genocide scholarship itself is a part of the phenomenon. Its part has been to lend scholarly 
credibility to designations of “genocide” in accordance with the interests of the power 
that has given it life. By its nature, the genocide scholarship cannot recognize its role as 
such. To be effective as an indirect form of information control, the genocide scholarship 
cannot reveal that it is an instrument of soft power. Thus, the genocide scholarship has 
been narrating events as “genocide” without examining why it does so from a power-
based approach. Concomitantly, the information that popularizes the use of “genocide” as 
a label is plentiful, but the influence that the term genocide has had on international law 
by design has been overlooked.   
 The problem with the power of “genocide” is not simply that it is used to affect 
legal procedure through popular discourse. On a deep level, the function of the term 
genocide is problematic because its legal meaning perpetuates the politicization of 
identity-based divisions within a system that supposedly seeks to arrive at a unified legal 





sustain them in public consciousness, and its effects repel the laying of bridges that 
eliminate identity-based notions of political separation. Instead of encouraging people to 
connect through nurturing their mutual expectation of governing standards, it has been 
used to facilitate connections between group identity and political conflict. In this sense, 
“genocide” functions as an affirmation of inter-national division rather than international 
law.  
 By understanding the history of “genocide” within the context of international law 
from a power-based perspective, it becomes possible to start a process of separating 
between what international law requires and what “genocide” is able to give. The advent 
of the term genocide was an expression of international law being confronted by the Nazi 
German attempt to unify Europe under one government. In other words, “genocide” was 
designed to disrupt unification of governance, and now it is in tension with the ability to 
turn international law into a system of unified standards of governance. There is an 
inherent quality to the divisive function of “genocide” usage in the popular discourse 
because it was originally constructed to solidify mental boundaries of group identity 
through political claims. Thus, its popular usage has had the effect of producing a 
language of conflict that makes state governance vulnerable to the direction of group 
identities. 
 By seeing the power behind “genocide” throughout its history, it is possible to 
point at the narrow interests that might be served through it at the expense of an arrival at 
international law’s broader aims. The power to define “genocide” in the popular 
discourse is related to the power to persuade people that they have a national group 





feeding on the moral consensus over the Holocaust. The legal definition of “genocide” 
bunches together two completely different situations of group identity such as race and 
religion: it confuses cases in which X persecutes Y because of what X believes about Y’s 
biological essence with cases in which X persecutes Y because of what both X and Y 
believe about Y’s cultural choice. It draws moral strength from the former, which is 
associated with the memory of the Holocaust, and converts it into the politicization of 
culture through cases of the latter.     
 This view of history shows that the genocide discourse has used the moral 
momentum of Holocaust memory to lend credibility to a language that translates cases of 
political conflict into cases of identity-based persecution. On the eve of the Holocaust, 
German Jews were not organized toward overthrowing the German government, whereas 
in other cases that have been labeled as “genocide,” first a group under a sovereign 
starts—possibly due to foreign influence—to give its collective identity a political 
meaning, then it acts against the sovereign toward a political goal, and finally, the 
discourse depicts the sovereign’s reactions in genocidal terms by emphasizing the 
identity aspect and deemphasizing the political purpose. This treatment of crime in 
international law enables one government that has soft-power advantages over others to 
support the creation of a politicized group identity within an existing nation-state and 
then also popularize the belief that the group was a victim of genocide in the aftermath of 
a rebellion.  
 Instead of protecting nation-states and their civilians, “genocide” presents a 
potential threat against the existence of nation-states and the well-being of their civilians 





foreign cultural influence to create tension between a government and its civilians by 
turning the focus of the criminal code in international law away from the prevention of 
interferences with the internal affairs of nation-states. In order for the international 
community to become a society of free cultural exchange—including the sharing of 
norms toward unified standards of governance—the threat of politicizing group identities 
within nation-states has to be addressed. For instance, an overlooked distinction exists 
between a rebel group that mobilizes through group identity and a victim group that is 
persecuted because of its group identity. 
 Through its ability to establish believable assumptions about group identity, 
“genocide” usage popularizes the failure to recognize how influence on the culture of a 
group—its spirit—is intertwined with the introduction of a social organization that is a 
preparation route for running the government of a separate nation-state. If a foreign 
power is able to convert civilians of a particular government into becoming members of a 
new religious organization, then that religion could provide the basis for stronger cultural 
ties between that group of civilians and the foreign power than those between the group 
and its sovereign. It invites the group to prefer the norms of the foreign power over those 
that are favored by the group’s sovereign; it creates infrastructure for what may be seen 
as an alternative government within a nation-state. The group’s organization as such can 
inspire a quest for political independence that is based on a cultural choice, and lead to 
mass violence. In such a case, popular claims of genocide-related injustice highlight the 
cultural divide as the cause of violence, center the accusations on the domestic 
government, and divert attention from a discourse about how international law may 






 In matters of law, there cannot be justice without order. In international law the 
idea of worldwide justice had to be constructed for the promotion of worldwide order, 
and “genocide” has been used to illustrate the meaning of justice in this context. It has 
been utilized for the solidification of two concepts that were vital for one stage of 
developing international law: national identity and justice between nations. However, for 
worldwide justice to transform from an idea to a matter of practice, the legal terminology 
has to allow for order in the administration of law. As a term whose legal definition is 
based on the requirement of a multilayered intent that is almost always going to be 
unprovable, “genocide” has inspired and facilitated popular usage that advertised notions 
of justice by narrating events divisively. Its effectiveness in the creation of lingering 
public debates about competing characterizations of history is intertwined with its 
inability to offer clear legal resolution. Calls of “genocide” vocalize a yearning for 
justice, but, unlike calls of “murder,” they are issued loosely and echo because the crime 
has a debatable nature. While labeling someone “murderer” is typically subject to legal 
scrutiny, the popular genocide claims on opinion pages of newspapers indicate that 
“genocide” is a crime that mostly appears in public as a matter of opinion. The common 
usage of the term genocide is a formula for popularizing demands for justice that is not 
directly conducive to order.  
 Therefore, “genocide” is limited as an instrument of legal power in international 
law. The term genocide is defined in a legal document and has been used to affect the 
legal discourse of international law, but, in the progression of international law toward 





unexpected case the triple intent of “genocide”—as stipulated in the Genocide 
Convention—is met, then “genocide” would be a manifestation of international law’s 
legal power, but unless or until that happens the term genocide will mainly be a popular 
representation of the idea that crimes are to be addressed by international law. The soft 
power of “genocide” cannot be denied, but its incapacity to generate sustainable legal 
power in international law has to be met by more applicable terminology. “Genocide” 
will remain a powerful reminder that in the aftermath of WWII member states of the 
United Nations agreed that international law relies on a shared expectation of governing 
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